

**NORTHEAST UTILITIES**

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY  
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY  
HOLYDOKE WATER POWER COMPANY  
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

General Offices • Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270  
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270  
(203) 665-5000

April 25, 1989

Docket No. 50-245  
A07899  
Re: 10CFR50.90

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1  
Response to Request for Additional Information  
Undervoltage and LNP Protection Modification

Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) requested an amendment to Millstone Unit No. 1's Operating License, via letter dated December 2, 1988.<sup>(1)</sup> The proposed changes will reflect the implementation of the modifications related to degraded grid protection for Class 1E power systems at Millstone Unit No. 1, which are scheduled to be completed during the 1989 refueling outage. A summary of the planned modifications was provided to the NRC Staff via letter dated August 15, 1988.<sup>(2)</sup>

An NRC letter dated March 20, 1989<sup>(3)</sup> requested additional information concerning the undervoltage detection modifications and related license amendment request. Provided herein are responses to the NRC Staff's requests. In addition to the specific responses, a discussion of the design philosophy is also provided. These responses may be used as a basis for a future meeting to discuss the design change and license amendment request in detail.

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- (1) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Undervoltage and LNP Protection Modifications," dated December 2, 1988.
- (2) E. J. Mroczka letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Degraded Grid Protection for Class 1E Power Systems," dated August 15, 1988.
- (3) M. L. Boyle letter to E. J. Mroczka, dated March 20, 1989.

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Design Philosophy

The existing LNP design consists of two identical and redundant sets of relaying that sense an LNP condition and then load shed buses, start the diesel and gas turbine generators, and automatically align the generators to the buses. The circuits are not unique, i.e., the relay logic actuates all the same devices in parallel or series circuits such that a single failure of one circuit is compensated for by its redundant counterpart. The voltage sensing is presently taken on the high side of the RSST, not the 4160 volt buses. Also, an LNP condition is defined as a loss of normal (NSST) or reserve (RSST) offsite power to both trains of emergency equipment; not just one bus or the other.

The design that was proposed prior to May 1987 would have altered the existing design as follows:

- o relocate the undervoltage sensing to the Class 1E 4160 volt buses,
- o provide for the automatic reinstatement of the load shed feature, and
- o split the existing load shed and LNP logic into separate divisions.

However, the splitting of the load shed and LNP logic into separate divisions raised concerns with respect to the plant's response to partial LNPs due to the unit's asymmetrical bus arrangement (Refer to Reference 2 for details).

Subsequently, a new design was to be developed that could safely relocate the undervoltage sensing to the Class 1E 4160 volt buses without requiring the LNP logic to be split. The design transmitted by Reference 2 accomplishes this goal. The requirements used in developing the design are as follows:

- o relocate the sensing to the Class 1E 4160 volt buses,
- o do not split the load shed/LNP logic,
- o meet the single failure criterion,
- o use the existing definition that an LNP condition exists only if both safety buses lose off-site power, and
- o assume conditions that could cause a loss of voltage or degraded voltage on one bus and not the other would be caused by the single failure.

In light of the above, the following responses to the NRC questions are provided.

Request No. 1:

The load shed and LNP logic diagram provided in your August 15, 1988 letter shows multiple points where signals from redundant divisions are brought together into common logic gates. Identify the isolation and separation you have provided between redundant circuits. Provide the actual schematic diagram of the undervoltage detection logic.

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Response:

Attachment 1 provides the actual schematic (wiring) drawings for your review. Refer to CWDs 279, 279A, 279B, 282, 282A, and 282B for the redundant undervoltage sensing on Class 1E buses 14E and 14F. The redundant S1 and S2 relays are located in the same enclosures, but are physically separated by a barrier. Electrically the relays are sensing off the same potential transformers but are separated by fuses. The DC power supplies are from separate supplies.

Request No. 2:

The load shed and LNP logic diagram shows multiple points where a single failure of a logic gate can cause load shedding of both redundant divisions and starting and loading of the emergency generators even though off-site power is still available. Please justify.

Response:

The diagram showing the AND and OR logic gates is only a diagram to describe the logic. The actual wiring drawings represent a true indication of separation and redundancy. The design is single failure proof.

Request No. 3:

There is no signal identified in the load shed and LNP logic that separates the onsite buses from the normal station service transformer and the reserve station service transformer (trips NSST and RSST breakers on buses 14A, 14B, 14C, and 14D) on a loss of voltage or degraded voltage signal. Please explain how this is accomplished.

Response:

To allow a fast transfer of the station buses after a generator lockout occurs, a .3 second time delay is used to allow for the momentary condition when both the NSST and RSST breakers are open. The fast transfer occurs within 6 cycles.

Request No. 4:

It appears from the load shed and LNP logic diagram that a loss of power (<70% voltage) can exist on a single division (14E or 14F) with no automatic action taken to correct it other than load shedding of the respective buses and a degraded voltage annunciation. Does the load shedding also start the automatic connection of the emergency power sources to the buses? If not, how does the plant respond to a LOCA with simultaneous loss of off-site power to one division and a single failure of the redundant division?

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Request No. 5:

With respect to question 4 above, the same situation applies to a degraded voltage condition (<90% but >70% voltage) except the buses are not load shed. How then does the plant respond to a LOCA with simultaneous degraded voltage on one division and a single failure of the redundant division?

Request No. 6:

From the load shed and LNP logic diagram provided, it appears that a single failure in 14E or 14F switchgear such as a switchgear fire that disables the switchgear undervoltage relays will also disable the undervoltage detection logic for the redundant division. The remaining division will then not be able to respond to a loss of voltage condition. Please justify this violation of the single failure criteria.

Response to Questions 4, 5, & 6:

These three questions pertain to the fact that a loss-of-normal power condition is assumed to exist if less than 70% voltage or less than 90% voltage (with an accident signal generated) is present on both buses 14E and 14F. This is consistent with the existing plant design. The design is such that if one bus has a degraded voltage or loss-of-voltage condition, its cause would have to have been the single failure and thus the other bus would remain with adequate voltage.

Request No. 7:

Identify the source of power to the redundant S1 and S2 logic channels shown in the load shed and LNP logic diagram. If the source of power is from the Class 1E power system, justify the connection of the Class 1E power between redundant divisions. Describe the separation and isolation provided between redundant systems.

Response:

The source of power for the main load shed and LNP circuits (CWDs 288, 288A & 289) are as follow:

S1 Circuit (SH-288) - DC-11A-1  
S2 Circuit (SH-289) - DC-11A-2

The circuits identified above are from redundant Class 1E DC sources. The existing method of isolation between trains at Millstone Unit No. 1 is to utilize coil-to-contact as well as contact-to-contact isolation. The new design utilizes the same methodology. Cable separation is accomplished by running S1 and S2 cables in separate trays and conduits.

The new voltage sensing relays and timers which provide sensing for 14E and 14F (CWD's 279A&B, 282A&B) provide a redundant method for sensing loss of voltage to buses 14E and 14F. The new relays and timers are also powered by separate Class 1E DC circuits. Both trains of voltage relays and timers for bus 14E are located within panel 2421B but in separate sections of the panel. Also, both trains of voltage relays and timers for bus 14F are located within panel 2422, where the divisions of equipment are located within separate sections of the panel. The voltage relays for both divisions sense off the same set of PTs.

Request No. 8:

It is not clear from the logic diagrams you provided in your August 15, 1988 letter how the load shedding of the emergency buses will be bypassed during load sequencing and subsequently reinstated following load sequencing. Please provide an explanation of how this is accomplished.

Response:

Once a load shed/LNP signal is received, the NSST and RSST breakers to buses 14C and 14D are tripped open on load shed.

When both NSST and RSST breakers to buses 14C and 14D have opened, a signal sensing breaker position will provide a seal-in for the LNP circuitry such that once on-site power is established on buses 14E and 14F, the LNP initiation signal will not clear thus blocking any further total bus load shed signals.

Reinstatement of the load shed feature following an LNP is accomplished in the new design by treating each bus as an island. If a bus loses power, its voltage sensing relays will sense the condition and initiate a load shed for only that bus. The buses which incorporate this design are as follows:

<u>Bus</u>	<u>Voltage Setpoint</u>	<u>Logic</u>
14A	40%	2 of 2
14B	40%	2 of 2
14C	40%	2 of 2
14D	40%	2 of 2
14E	70%	3 of 3
14F	70%	3 of 3
12C	40%	2 of 2
12D	40%	2 of 2
12E	40%	2 of 2
12F	40%	2 of 2

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Request No. 9:

The load shed and LNP logic diagram indicates that a signal with no time delay will be sent to the load shed and LNP actuation circuits whenever the NSST and RSST breakers to buses 14C and 14D are all simultaneously open. One of the actions this accomplishes is blocking of the fast transfer circuits. Will the logic interfere with a legitimate fast transfer when all the breakers to buses 14C and 14D are simultaneously open as part of the fast transfer sequence?

Response:

When both the NSST and RSST breakers to buses 14C and 14D are simultaneously open, a signal will be sent directly to the load shed and LNP actuation circuits. Within the load shed and LNP actuation circuits, a 0.3 second timer delays the initiation of the load shed and LNP actuation.

On a successful fast transfer from the NSST to the RSST, the 0.3 second timer will prevent the load shed and LNP circuits from actuating. The new design is no different from the existing design with respect to this. The existing design looks at the breaker position as well and provides a 0.3 second time delay to allow fast transfer prior to declaring a load shed/LNP condition.

Request No. 10:

The load shed and LNP logic diagram shows 3-out-of-3 logic for the loss of voltage relaying and 2-out-of-3 logic for the degraded voltage relaying. Why isn't 2-out-of-3 logic used for both?

Response:

The loss-of-voltage logic requires a 3-out-of-3 condition so as to preclude a blown PT fuse causing a bus to be load shed inadvertently. Since the 2-out-of-3 degraded voltage logic is interlocked with the accident signal and the same condition on the other bus, a blown PT fuse does not negatively impact the 2-out-of-3 logic.

Request No. 11:

With regard to Table 3.9.1 in the revised Technical Specifications you submitted in your December 2, 1988 letter, the first part of that table identifies power available relaying on the emergency buses. This apparently replaces the power available relaying previously identified in Tables 3.2.2 and 4.2.1, however, the relays identified in Table 3.9.1 do not appear to be the same as those relays identified in Tables 3.2.2 and 4.2.1 since more buses and more relays are involved. No description however is provided for the new configuration. Please clarify whether this is a new configuration and, in either case, describe the actuation logic and function of these relays.

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Response:

The power available relays for buses 14E and 14F that were previously specified on Table 3.2.2 are covered by Table 3.9.1. In addition to these relays, power available relays for buses 14G, 14A & 14C are also included since these relays provide permissive for the FWCI start circuits.

Request No. 12:

Identify the function of the Train A and Train B load shed and LNP circuit relays shown at the bottom of page 3/4 9-2a in Table 3.9.1 of the revised Technical Specification. Are these the relays that provide the functional logic shown in the load shed and LNP logic diagram?

Response:

The train A and B relays shown on the bottom of page 3/4 9-2a are the LNP actuation circuits that send signals to load shed the buses, disconnect the off-site supply and start the gas turbine and diesel generators.

Request No. 13:

Regarding the load shedding function identified on the logic diagrams provided in your August 15, 1988 letter, clarify whether the phrase "Load Shed Bus" and "Load Sheds Buses" means separation of the loads from the buses or separation of the buses from their power source. If it means separation of the loads from the buses, then why is load shedding provided for the loads of buses 14B and 14D if these buses are not loaded to the emergency diesel or gas turbine generators, and why aren't the bus 14B load shed relays identified in Technical Specification Table 3.9.1? If it means separation of the loads from the buses from their power sources then how is separation of the loads from the buses accomplished prior to load sequencing?

Response:

The difference between load sheds bus and load sheds buses is simply a load shed bus occurs if only one bus loses voltage. Load sheds buses implies a complete loss-of-voltage to the station and all buses are load shed simultaneously. It also means the off-site supply breakers are tripped. Bus 14B is not included in the technical specifications since it is not a safety bus and is in no way aligned to the gas turbine generator or diesel generator buses.

Request No. 14:

- a. No instrument functional test, calibration, or instrument check frequencies are identified for the "Undervoltage/Time Relaying" in Table 3.9.1 of the revised Technical Specifications. The surveillance frequencies for these items should be once per shift, one per month, and once every refueling outage respectively. Please add

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these surveillance requirements to the revised technical specification.

- b. Also, the trip setpoints with minimum and maximum limits for the "Undervoltage/Timer Relaying" are not specified in Table 3.9.1. This information should be provided in the revised Technical Specifications, and the basis for the setpoint values should be provided to us for our review.
- c. In addition, there is no operability requirement identified for the "Undervoltage/Timer Relaying" in Table 3.9.1 when in the "Refuel/Shutdown" mode. This relaying should be operable in these modes whenever the safety-related equipment in the division it monitors is required to be operable. Please revise the technical specifications accordingly.

Response:

- a. It was intended to functionally test and calibrate the undervoltage/timing relaying once per refueling outage. This is consistent with what is done with the power available relaying. Also, all the relaying is continuously monitored to annunciate any single relay that may fail with the plant on-line.
- b. It is not intended to include relay tolerances within the technical specifications. Allowable setpoint ranges are covered by plant setpoint control procedures. The 90% and 70% voltage setpoint values correspond to 4160 volt bus voltages. The 8-second 90% time delay is long enough to allow motor starts but less than the 10 second DG FSAR start time. The 2-second 70% time delay is long enough to allow coordination with main bus overcurrent devices to allow for bus fault design by the individual circuit breaker.
- c. With the plant in the Refuel/Shutdown mode, "automatic" emergency AC power is not required since plenty of time is available to align power to the emergency buses through manual actions. The ECCS motor breakers are racked out to prevent inadvertent operation. Also, voltage studies indicate that with the transformers lightly loaded an overvoltage condition is much more likely than an undervoltage condition.

Request No. 15:

The undervoltage relaying that initiates transfer of the safety buses to the gas turbine generator are all connected to bus 14E which is not connected to the same winding of the NSST that feeds bus 14A. How then can you assure that a degraded condition on bus 14A will be detected by the relaying on bus 14E in order to automatically transfer bus 14A to the gas turbine?

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
Response:

This failure mode has been addressed by the attached GE analysis (Attachment 2).

If you have any questions on the above information, please feel free to contact my staff.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY



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E. J. Mroczka  
Senior Vice President

cc: W. T. Russell, Region I Administrator  
M. L. Boyle, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1  
W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3

Docket No. 50-245  
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Attachment 1  
Millstone Unit No. 1  
Undervoltage and LNP Protection Modification

April 1989


Docket No. 50-245  
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
Attachment 2  
Millstone Unit No. 1  
Undervoltage and LNP Protection Modification

April 1989



UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION  
POOR 1-126-33





**GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION**  
**CONTROL WIRING DIAGRAM**  
**START-UP TRANSF. #1 MFTED POT.**  
**EXISTING IN LOCATION**

**B-187613**


**SHFT 222**

C.R.P. # 922A(29065 SH 30, 31)

5020.SH.4)

AFTER CHANGES  
LNP & UV MOD

NON  
Q.A.



C1222A

AFTER CHANGES  
UV'S LNP MODS  
DETAIL "C"

80-135

REDRAWN FROM (-31001, SH 222A)

REV. 3

START-UP TRANSFER #1

TRANSFORMER #1

TRANSF. (SPARE)

(25.502-31033, SH. 5)

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REVISIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION P.A.#  
X 1/27/77 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION 31033 SH 222A  
— (REMOVAL ONLY)

TITLE START-UP TRANSFER #1 METER POT

WATERFORD, CONNECTICUT

FOR NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.

MILLSTONE UNIT 1

80-135

BY MAT

BY PED

DATE 12-5-83

TIME 9-2-84

FILE NO. 25-202-31000, 222A

P.A.# 80-135

NOTES:

1. DETAIL "C" REFLECTS WIRING OF WESTINGHOUSE XFMR ONLY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE G.E. RSSI XFMR.

2.  BUILT PER DCR-MI-S-284 80

3. RE-DRAWN FRECA DCR-MI-S-1307-83

4. SCALE CB-2


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
6. BY CHM APP

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
8. BY CHM APP

9. BY CHM APP






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SH. 264. REV. 2


C.A.D.

AFTER CHANGES (SEE SH. 264 BEFORE)  
LINEARVOLTAGE LNP & MDP

P.A. # NO. DATE RE VISIONS BY CHINAPPAPPA P.A. # 80-135 SCALE N/A Dwg. No. 25202-31001 SH 264 A

NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATIONS


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MS. MZ. A




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


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SH. 268, REV. 14

		<b>NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO.</b> <b>FOR NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.</b>			
		<b>MILLSTONE UNIT NO. 1</b> <b>CMD 4160V SWIR BUS 14C</b> <b>UNDERVOLTAGE SENSING</b> <b>WATERFORD, CT.</b>			
TITLE:		APP.			
		BY	WBZ	C-H-D.	APP.
		DATE	5/23/88	DATE	DATE
		SCALE	N/A	W/C. NO.	SH-268A
		P.A.#	80-135		
REVISIONS		BY CWH APP APP			
P.A.# NO. DATE					
MF					

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## NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED

**Q.A.****B-187613**

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
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
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
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4160V SWGR 14D CUBICLE 7



















REVIVATIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION

CH# 922B (-29065, SH 28 & 29) CH# 922A (-29065, SH 30 & 31)



CRP 908  
-29065 SH 23



- Dwg # 3905

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
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
25202-31001

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY  
HILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
CONTROL WIRING DIAGRAM  
B-187613  
DRAFT NO. 1  
DATE OF DRAWING: 10/10/68  
DRAWN BY: D. C. GUNN  
CHECKED BY: J. R. HARRIS  
APPROVED BY: J. R. HARRIS  
SH 288

REVISIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION		P.A. NO.	80-135	AS BUILT PER DCR-MI-5 932 83
X	USED FOR CONSTRUCTION	80-135	AS BUILT PER DCR-MI-5 932 83	AS BUILT PER DCR-MI-5 932 83
		80-150	AS BUILT PER DCR-MI-3 920 82	AS BUILT PER DCR-MI-3 920 82
		80-150	NO	NO
			REVISION	BY CHA 80-135




C.R. 2-2-C (1-29127) SH. 3070)					
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO.					
FOR NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.					
TITLE MILLSTONE UNIT NO.1 CONTROL WIRING DIAGRAM LNP INITIATION					
WATERFORD, CT.					
BY	DALE	CHKD.	APP.	DATE	APPL.
		<i>APP.</i>	<i>1A</i>	<i>6/29/85</i>	<i>6/29/85</i>
SCALE	NONE	DRAWN BY			
REF. NO.	<i>CRAH APP/P</i>				<i>P.A. # 80-135</i>
REV. NO.					DATE
MAN. P.A. #					25/02/ - 31/001
NOTE: MANUAL REVISIONS TO THIS DOCUMENT ARE PROHIBITED. ALL REVISIONS MUST BE PERFORMED BY THE GED CAD UNIT.					
C.A.D.					




RELEASER CONTROL

**REVISIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION** PA NO \_\_\_\_\_

NO FEAR SAFETY RELATED





NON  
G.A.


AFTER CHANGES (SEE BEFORE OF SH. 290)

C.A.D.

**C.A.D.**



NOTE:  
MANUAL REVISIONS TO THIS DOCUMENT  
ARE PROHIBITED. ALL REVISIONS MUST  
BE PERTINENT BY THE NEED CAD UNIT.

AFTER CHANGES (SEE BEFORE OF SH. 290) U.A.  
 REVISIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION P.A.# 80-135  
 X 1/27/87 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION DJH



AFTER CHANNELS UNDERVOLTAGE & UPS MODES

480V AUXILIARY  
POWER TRANSFORMER 14D/12D  
25202-391B2, SH.3



NON  
QA


AFTER CHANGES  
UNDEEFFECTIVE IN P.MAPS  
REVISIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION P.A.B  
X//✓ P.D. ISSUED FOR CONST. DLM  
DATE 10-13-75

NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO.  
FOR NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO


TITLE NO. LSTONE UNIT NO. 1		C.W.D.
480V SWGR. #12D(1A)		COMPT. #12B
WATERFORD	JOHN,	
DATE 10-13-75	DATE 10-13-75	
SCALE	SCALE	
BY CWD	BY CWD	
REVISIONS	REVISIONS	
NO. P.A.B	NO. P.A.B	

25202 31001 SH295A

NOTE:  
1. TO TB908-54A-133 ON CWD 290.  
2. (FC) INDICATES FIELD COMMON TERM.  
JUMPERED TO OTHER POINTS OR SAME  
TERMINAL BLOCK SEE DWG. -31028 SH.7



480V SWGR BUS 12D COMP T.11 (-39007, SH. 57)



THIS DING WAS RETAINED IN PART  
FROM MUSCO DWI, 2401-10001,  
295B, REV 13

AFTER CHANGES (SEE BEFORE OF SH. 2951)  
UNDER VOLTAGE & LINE & MODS.

C.A.D.

NOTE:  
MANUAL REVISIONS TO THIS DOCUMENT  
ARE PROHIBITED. ALL REVISIONS MUST  
BE PERFORMED BY THE GEN CO UNIT.

NON  
Q.A.

PLANS DURING CONSTRUCTION P.A.# 80-135  
ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION D.J.H. 10-24-74

NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO.  
FOR MILLSTONE NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.

TITLE 480V BUS 12D UNDERVOLTAGE SENSING  
CWD WATERFORD, CT.

BY DLM CHD. APP. DATE  
DATE 31-65 DATE

SCALE NONE DWG. NO. 25202-3100 SH.2958  
P.A.# 80-135


REVISIONS BY THE APP. DATE


NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED


1. (FC) INDICATES FIELD COMMON TERM.  
JUMPED TO OTHER POINTS ON SAME  
TERMINAL BLOCK SEE DWG-31028, SH 7


2 TO "B" WIRE IN CABLE C1324D  
ON CWD 324A.

3 TO "B" WIRE IN CABLE C1311A  
ON CWD 311.










REVISIIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION	P.A NO 80-125.	X 11/29/88 ISSUED BY C.R.C.	8 LNP MDS
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CHANGES (NO BEFORE)  
PLACE,



## MILLSTONE UNIT 1 RELAY SETTINGS

## 480V BUS 12C

## PT RATIO 480/120

QTY	DEVICE NO.	TYPE	CAT. NO.	RANGE	FUNCTION	SETTINGS	PRIMARY	NOTES
2	27LG/12C	BBC ITE-27H	211R0275	30-55V LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LOAD SHED	D.O. @ 45.7V P.U. <= 47.1V	183V	AUX. PNL.
1	2LS/12C	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	TD BUS LOAD SHED	2.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.
1	2-1/12C	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LS PULSE	0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.
1	2-2/12C	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LS PULSE	0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.

## 480V BUS 12D

## PT RATIO 480/120

QTY	DEVICE NO.	TYPE	CAT. NO.	RANGE	FUNCTION	SETTINGS	PRIMARY	NOTES
2	27LG/12D	BBC ITE-27H	211R0275	30-55V LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LOAD SHED	D.O. @ 45.7V P.U. <= 47.1V	183V	AUX. PNL.
1	2LS/12D	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	TD BUS LOAD SHED	2.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.
1	2-1/12D	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LS PULSE	0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.
1	2-2/12D	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LS PULSE	0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.

## 4.16KV BUS 12E

## PT RATIO 480/120

QTY	DEVICE NO.	TYPE	CAT. NO.	RANGE	FUNCTION	SETTINGS	PRIMARY	NOTES
1	27D/12E	BBC ITE-27H	211T0175	60-110V DEGRADED VOLTAGE ALARM	D.O. @ 109.3V P.U. <= 110.0V	418V		L2421A
1	74DA/12E	BBC ITE-62K	217K0575D	0-100SEC DEG. VOLT. ALM. TIME DELAY	60.0 SEC. TDOD	N/A		L2421A
2	27LG/12E	BBC ITE-27H	211R0275	30-55V LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LOAD SHED	D.O. @ 45.7V P.U. <= 47.1V	183V	AUX. PNL.
1	2LS/12E	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	TD BUS LOAD SHED	2.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.
1	2-1/12E	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LS PULSE	0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.
1	2-2/12E	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LS PULSE	0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.

## 4.16KV BUS 12F

## PT RATIO 480/120

QTY	DEVICE NO.	TYPE	CAT. NO.	RANGE	FUNCTION	SETTINGS	PRIMARY	NOTES
1	27D/12F	BBC ITE-27H	211T0175	60-110V DEGRADED VOLTAGE ALARM	D.O. @ 109.3V P.U. <= 110.0V	418V		L2422
1	74DA/12F	BBC ITE-62K	217K0575D	0-100SEC DEG. VOLT. ALM. TIME DELAY	60.0 SEC. TDOD	N/A		L2422
2	27LG/12F	BBC ITE-27H	211R0275	30-55V LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LOAD SHED	D.O. @ 45.7V P.U. <= 47.1V	183V	AUX. PNL.
1	2LS/12F	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	TD BUS LOAD SHED	2.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.
1	2-1/12F	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LS PULSE	0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.
1	2-2/12F	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LOSS-OF-VOLTS	BUS LS PULSE	0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	AUX. PNL.

## LNP CIRCUITS 61 &amp; 62

QTY	DEVICE NO.	TYPE	CAT. NO.	RANGE	FUNCTION	SETTINGS	PRIMARY	NOTES
1	2-1	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LNP AND BUS LOAD SHED PULSE		0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	TechSpec CRP 926
1	2-2	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LNP AND BUS LOAD SHED PULSE		0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	TechSpec CRP 926
1	2-3	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LNP AND BUS LOAD SHED PULSE		0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	TechSpec CRP 926
1	2-4	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC RSST FAST TRANSFER BLOCK		1.0 SEC. TDPU	N/A	CRP 926
1	2-1A	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LNP AND BUS LOAD SHED PULSE		0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	TechSpec CRP 926
1	2-2A	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LNP AND BUS LOAD SHED PULSE		0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	TechSpec CRP 926
1	2-3A	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC LNP AND BUS LOAD SHED PULSE		0.3 SEC. TDPU	N/A	TechSpec CRP 926
1	2-4A	AGASTAT	ETR14D3AN	.15-3SEC RSST FAST TRANSFER BLOCK		1.0 SEC. TDPU	N/A	CRP 926

Note - 2-1 thru 2-3 and 2-1A thru 2-3A relays are in tech specs; however, settings are not

## RELAY TOLERANCES

TYPE	TECH-SPEC*	AS-FOUND	AS-LEFT PICK-UP OR RESET
BBC ITE-27N	3.0%	2.7%	0.6% NTX 0.7 V of Drop-Out
BBC ITE-27H	5.0%	3.0%	0.8% NTX 1.03 times Drop-Out
BBC ITE-62K	10.0%	8.0%	4.0% Instantaneous
BBC ITE-62T	10.0%	4.0%	2.0% Instantaneous
AGASTAT ETR	10.0%	5.0%	2.5% Instantaneous

\*If Applicable

Docket No. 50-245  
A07899

Attachment 2  
Millstone Unit No. 1  
Undervoltage and LNP Protection Modification

April 1989