

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-III-89-50A Date August 2, 1989

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.

Facility: Commonwealth Edison Co. Licensee Emergency
LaSalle Unit 2 Classification:
Marseilles, IL 61341 Unusual Event
Alert
Docket No. 50-374 Site Area Emergency
General Emergency
X Not Applicable

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Subject: OPERATION OF REACTOR IN THE STABILITY MONITORING ALLOWABLE REGION

At 1:52 p.m. (CDT), August 1, 1989, while the reactor was operating at 98 percent power, the licensee noted that the B Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump was acting erratically.

The operator had just changed level control and had just placed the A feedwater pump into automatic (the B pump was still in manual). About 30 seconds later, the flow from the B pump increased and did not consistently respond to operator actions. The operator returned the A pump to manual and tripped the B pump. A motor-driven feed pump was then started to assist in providing feedwater to the reactor. Reactor power was manually reduced to about 56 percent when the reactor entered the stability monitoring allowable region. The reactor operator then inserted a pre-determined array of control rods in order to exit this region. The reactor was not operated in the restricted region. The reactor was in this region of operation for approximately 15 minutes, and exited the region with reactor power at 43 percent.

During this event, the reactor water level varied between 18 inches below normal and 15 inches above normal (the reactor would have automatically scrammed if the water level had dropped to 23½ inches below normal). A runback (partial closure) of the A reactor recirculation flow control valve also occurred causing a mismatch in flows between the two recirculation loops of greater than 10 percent flow.

At 2:10 p.m., the licensee entered the two-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) to correct the mismatch or declare the A recirculation loop inoperable. At 4 p.m., the licensee tripped the A reactor recirculation pump so that the flow control valve could be opened. This terminated the two-hour clock but started the four-hour LCO for being in a single loop operation.

At 4:05 p.m., the flow control valve was opened, the A recirculation pump restarted, and the four-hour LCO terminated.

The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the B feedwater pump problem. The runback of the A recirculation flow control valve may have been caused by a higher than normal level reset point in the runback logic.

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
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
The Senior Resident Inspector was in the control room during this event. A Region III inspector has been sent to the site to monitor the licensee's investigation of this incident. A representative from NRR also is on site.

The State of Illinois will be notified.

Region III first learned of this event at 2:30 p.m. (CDT), August 1, 1989. This information is current as of 12:15 p.m. (CDT), August 2, 1989.

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