

JUN 20 1989

In Reply Refer To:
Docket: STN 50-482/89-07

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
ATTN: Bart D. Withers
President and Chief Executive Officer
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letters of April 13, 1989, and June 7, 1989, in response to our letters and Notice of Violation dated March 15 and May 10, 1989. We have reviewed your replies and find them responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By
J. L. Milhoan

James L. Milhoan, Director
Division of Reactor Projects

cc:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
ATTN: Otto Maynard, Manager
of Licensing
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
ATTN: Gary Boyer, Plant Manager
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839

*RIV:C:OPS *D:DRS
JEGagliardo/lb *LJCallan
/ /89 / /89
*previously concurred

D:DRP 6/19/89
JLMilhoan
1/9/89

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Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating
Corporation

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Kansas Corporation Commission
ATTN: Robert D. Elliott, Chief Engineer
Fourth Floor, Docking State Office Building
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1571

Kansas Radiation Control Program Director

bcc w/enclosure:

bcc to DMB (IE01)

bcc distrib. by RIV:

RRI
Section Chief (DRP/D)
RPB-DRSS
RIV File
MIS System
Project Engineer (DRP/D)
DRS

R. D. Martin, RA
DRP
R. DeFayette, RIII
SRI, Callaway, RIII
RSTS Operator
Lisa Shea, RM/ALF
D. R. Hunter

J. E. Gagliardo

D. V. Pickett, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-D-18)


WOLF CREEK

NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

Bart D. Withers
President and
Chief Executive Officer

June 7, 1989

WM 89-0167



U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Letter dated May 10, 1989 from L. J. Callan, NRC to
B. D. Withers, WCNOG
Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Response to Request for Additional
Information on Violation 482/8907-01

Gentlemen:

This letter provides Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCNOG) response to the request for additional information documented in the Reference. The request for additional information was in conjunction with Violation 482/8907-01 involving the failure to provide a written safety evaluation for a temporary modification.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. O. L. Maynard of my staff.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "B. Withers".

Bart D. Withers
President and
Chief Executive Officer

~~8906150036~~

BDW/aem

3pp.

Attachment

cc: B. L. Bartlett (NRC), w/a
E. J. Holler (NRC), w/a
R. D. Martin (NRC), w/a
D. V. Pickett (NRC), w/a

IC-89-227

**Response to Request for Additional Information
on Violation 482/8907-01**

Request:

Provide additional information concerning instructions, guidance, and/or training that will be provided to individuals that prepare and review safety evaluations and report responses to assure that they understand the revised procedure (ADM 01-022) and other measures you have taken to prevent recurrence of this type of issue.

Response:

As identified in letter dated April 13, 1989 from B. D. Withers, WCNOG, to the NRC, procedure ADM 01-022, "Authorization of Changes, Tests and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59)" was revised to provide additional guidance on when a written safety evaluation should be initiated. Specifically, the revision provides the guidance that when the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) description is general in nature and the change cannot be easily determined to affect the 10 CFR 50.59 Section (a)(i) criteria, then a written safety evaluation should be initiated. A letter has been sent to other WCNOG organizations identifying the need to review and revise, as appropriate, their procedures governing the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation process to incorporate this guidance. Additionally, Violation 482/8907-01 and the revised procedure ADM 01-022 have been explained in detail to those individuals who assist in the review and preparation of safety evaluations associated with temporary modifications.

Request:

Provide additional information concerning the results of the reevaluation of the Nuclear Safety Evaluation (S. E. No. 89-SE-021) considering the effects of the decreased voltage of the battery bank with a cell jumpered as it is being discharged under design accident conditions.

Response:

Nuclear Safety Evaluation, S. E. No. 89-SE-021, was revised and reviewed by the Plant Safety Review Committee on May 30, 1989. This revision to the Nuclear Safety Evaluation provides additional supporting information to the original evaluation, and was determined to not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The following provides the results of the re-evaluation:

The removal (electrically) of a cell from the subject bank has been calculated to remove 2.7% of the rated capacity of the bank (reference EER 89-NK-02). Therefore, the loss of a cell, which represents a 2.7% capacity loss, is insignificant to the system's function because the system's function only requires 37% of 100% total system capacity.

Response (cont.):

The calculation has also shown that it would require the removal of at least five cells before voltage would drop below 105 volts (minimum required) during the worst case load, i.e., station blackout. During a station blackout, AC and charger power are lost; thus, the fully charged battery terminal voltage with one jumpered out cell would be expected to drop to an initial nominal terminal voltage on the order of 120.95 volts verses 123 volts for 60 cells. This lower voltage will not affect the functional requirements of the battery bank. At no time during the station blackout will battery terminal voltage drop below the overall minimum battery voltage of 105 volts. In addition, the removal of one cell or 2.25 volts (if it were a good cell) from the bank which floats between 132-135 volts will not have any noticeable effect upon the system since this loss is within the described float voltage range. To provide the same minimum battery voltage of 105 volts with one cell jumpered out, it should be noted that the individual cell voltage has changed from 1.75 to 1.78 volts.