GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775

AREA CODE 504 635-6094 346-8651

June 23, 1989
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File No. G9.5, G9.42

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Gulf States Utilities (GSU) Company hereby files an application to amend the River Bend Station - Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-47, pursuant to 10CFR50.90. This application is filed to add two additional circuit breakers to Technical Specification Table 3.8.4.1-1, "Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices," which were installed during the second refueling outage at River Bend Station. The Attachment to this letter and Enclosure provide the justifications and proposed revisions to the Technical Specifications.

Your prompt attention to this application is appreciated.

Sincerely,

J. C. Deddens
Senior Vice President
River Bend Nuclear Group

JCD/LAE/RJK/DAS/ch

Attachment

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

STATE OF LOUISIANA)
PARISH OF WEST FELICIANA)
In the Matter of) Docket No. 50-458
GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY)
(River Bend Station - Unit 1)

AFFIDAVIT

J. C. Deddens, being duly sworn, states that he is a Senior Vice President of Gulf States Utilities Company; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

J. C. Deddens

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and Parish above named, this 23rd day of June, 1989. My Commission expires with Life.

Claudia F. Hurst
Claudia F. Hurst
Notary Public in and for
West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

Mr. Walt Paulson, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Post Office Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

Mr. William H. Spell, Administrator
Nuclear Energy Division
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
Post Office Box 14690
Baton Rouge, LA 70898

ATTACHMENT

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY
RIVER BEND STATION
DOCKET 50-458/LICENSE NO. NPF-47

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES
(88-013)

LICENSING DOCUMENT INVOLVED: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

ITEM: Table 3.8.4.1-1 PAGE: 3/4 8-31

REASON FOR REQUEST:

During the first refueling outage and previous outages, maintenance and construction work required that temporary power cables be run into the drywell. For convenience and ALARA considerations, it is desirable to provide 480 volt receptacles in the drywell to power tools and other temporary equipment during future outages. A modification request (MR) has been implemented to add two receptacles in accordance with all applicable technical specification bases and design criteria. This design requires the use of a containment electrical penetration. Therefore, these circuits must be added to Technical Specification Table 3.8.4.1-1 for primary containment conductor overcurrent protection devices utilizing Gould Type HE43 circuit breakers.

DESCRIPTION:

Containment electrical penetrations are part of the primary containment pressure boundary. As such, the short circuit current available to the feed through conductors must be limited to prevent penetration seal degradation. The Technical Specifications require that circuits which run through these penetrations have protective devices installed to prevent overcurrent conditions.

As described in the River Bend Station (RBS) Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 8.3.1.1.4.3, containment electrical penetration assemblies are designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum fault current versus time condition which could occur because of single random failure of circuit overload protective devices. No single failure causes excessive current in penetration conductors which degrade penetration seals. All protective devices automatically disconnect power to the penetration conductors when currents through the conductors exceed the established protection limits. Electrical penetrations containing 480V power circuits are nominally rated to carry 180 percent of full load current continuously with all other circuits in the same penetration operating at full load.

Overload protection of electrical penetration 480-V motor control center power circuits is provided by a series-connected molded case circuit breaker and fuse, each rated to open the circuit during overload conditions, thus providing redundant protection. The circuit protection design provided for the two receptacles in this proposed change conforms to these requirements. Additionally, the design is identical to the as-built configuration for receptacle 1POP-WR2A01 already listed on Technical Specification Table 3.8.4.1-1. The new receptacles perform no safety related function and no safety related systems, other than the containment penetrations, are affected by this modification.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

In accordance with requirements of 10CFR50.92, the following discussion is provided in support of the determination that no significant hazards are created or increased by the changes proposed in this amendment request.

1. No significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated results from the proposed change because:

   The conduit, cable and equipment associated with this modification are being installed in accordance with all applicable seismic and electrical separation criteria. As such, adequate electrical protection in conformance with the Technical Specification Bases and USAR Section 8.3.1.1.4.3 is provided for all containment penetrations used. Operation or failure of the equipment installed by this modification has no impact on any safety related system. Because this proposed change does not result in any new plant operating modes and electrical penetration overcurrent protection is provided as described in the USAR, this proposed change cannot increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than any previously evaluated because:

   A single failure of the equipment installed by this modification would at worst cause a loss of power to motor control center (MCC) 1NHS-MCC2A. Loss of this non-safety related MCC is assumed by the USAR during design basis accident conditions and is therefore, as previously analyzed. No other new, credible failure modes can be identified. The circuit protection design is identical to the as-built configuration for receptacle 1POP-WR2A01 already listed on Technical Specification Table 3.8.4.1-1. Additionally, this proposed change does not introduce any new plant operating modes. Therefore, this proposed change can not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

   Overcurrent protection is provided such that no single failure will cause excessive current in the penetration conductors. This ensures that the

overcurrent protection is in accordance with the RBS USAR. Additionally, the circuit protection design is identical to the as-built configuration for receptacle 1POP-WR2A01 already listed on Technical Specification Table 3.8.4.1-1. The new receptacles perform no safety related function and no safety related systems, other than the containment penetrations, are affected by this modification. Further, the proposed change does not result in any new plant operating modes. Therefore, the proposed change does not result in any reduction in the margin of safety.

Based on the above considerations, the proposed change does not increase the probability or the consequences of a previously evaluated accident, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, and does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety. Therefore, Gulf States Utilities Company proposes that no significant hazards are involved.

REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

The requested revisions are provided in the Enclosure.

SCHEDULE FOR ATTAINING COMPLIANCE:

These two 480-V receptacles were installed during the second refueling outage. Technical Specification 3.8.4.1 provides surveillances for properly designed circuits to ensure operability. With this assurance of operability, the Technical Specifications allow the circuits to be energized in Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3. Since these circuits have not yet been added to the list of qualified overcurrent protective devices, GSU will ensure that the circuits are de-energized prior to starting up from the refueling outage. These circuits will continue to be verified as de-energized in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.4.4 for unqualified A.C. circuits inside containment while in Operational Conditions 1, 2, or 3 until this proposed change is approved.

NOTIFICATION OF STATE PERSONNEL:

A copy of this amendment application has been provided to the State of Louisiana, Department of Environmental Quality-Nuclear Energy Division.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL:

Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) has reviewed the proposed license amendment against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environmental considerations. As shown above, the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration, nor increase the types and amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. Based on the foregoing, GSU concludes that the proposed changes meet the criteria given in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for a categorical exclusion from the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement.