



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 113
License No. DPR-28


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) dated January 12, 1987 and clarified on January 29, 1988 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(b) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. III, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective immediately.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard H. Wessman, Director
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 22, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 113

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

DOCKET NO. 50-271

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove

49
49b
60
66

Insert

49
49b
60
66

TABLE 3.2.6

POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels	Parameter	Type of Indication	Instrument Range
2	Drywell Atmospheric Temperature (Note 1)	Recorder #TR-16-19-45 (TE-16-19-30A) Meter #TI-16-19-30B	0-350°F 0-350°F
2	Containment Pressure (Note 1)	Meter #PI-16-19-12A Meter #PI-16-19-12B	0-275 psia 0-275 psia
2	Torus Pressure (Note 1)	Meter #PI-16-19-36A Meter #PI-16-19-36B	0-80 psia 0-80 psia
2	Torus Water Level (Note 3)	Meter #LI-16-19-12A Meter #LI-16-19-12B	0-25 ft. 0-25 ft.
2	Torus Water Temperature (Note 1)	Meter #16-19-33A Meter #16-19-33C	0-250°F 0-250°F
2	Reactor Pressure (Note 1)	Meter #PI-2-3-56A Meter #PI-2-3-56B	0-1500 psig 0-1500 psig
2	Reactor Vessel Water Level (Note 1)	Meter #2-3-91A Meter #2-3-91B	(-200)-0-(+200)"H ₂ O (-200)-0-(+200)"H ₂ O
1	Control Rod Position (Notes 1,2)	Meter	0-48" RPIS
1	Neutron Monitor (Notes 1,2)	Meter	0-125% Rated Flux
2	Torus Air Temperature (Note 1)	Recorder #TR-16-19-45 (TE-16-19-34) Meter #TI-16-19-41	0-350°F 50-300°F
2/valve	Safety/Relief Valve Position From Pressure Switches (Note 4)	Lights (SRV 2-71-A thru D) Closed - Open	

TABLE 3.2.6

POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION
(continued)

TABLE 3.2.6 NOTES

Note 1 - From and after the date that a parameter is reduced to one indication, operation is permissible for 30 days. If a parameter is not indicated in the Control Room, continued operation is permissible during the next seven days. If indication cannot be restored within the next six hours, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours.

Note 2 - Control rod position and neutron monitor instruments are considered to be redundant to each other.

Note 3 - From and after the date that this parameter is reduced to one indication in the Control Room, continued reactor operation is permissible during the next 30 days. If both channels are inoperable and indication cannot be restored in six hours, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours.

Note 4 - From and after the date that safety/relief valve position from pressure switches is unavailable, reactor operation may continue provided safety/relief valve position can be determined from recorder #2-166 (steam temp in SRV's, 0-600°F) and Meter #16-19-33A or C (torus water temperature, 0-250°F). If both parameters are not available, the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours.

Note 5 - From and after the date that safety valve position from the acoustic monitor is unavailable, reactor operation may continue provided safety valve position can be determined from recorder #2-166 (thermocouple, 0-600°F and Meters #16-19-29A or B (containment pressure 0-275 psia). If both indications are not available, the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and in a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours.

Note 6 - Within 30 days following the loss of one indication, or seven days following the loss of both indications, restore the inoperable channel(s) to an operable status or a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.7 must be prepared and submitted within the subsequent 14 days, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

Note 7 - From and after the date that this parameter is unavailable by Control Room indication, and cannot be restored within 24 hours, continued reactor operation is permissible for the next 30 days provided that local sampling capacity is available. If the Control Room indication cannot be restored within 30 days, the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within six hours and in cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours.

TABLE 4.2.6

CALIBRATION REQUIREMENTS
POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION

Parameter	Calibration	Instrument Check
Drywell Atmosphere Temperature	Every 6 Months	Once Each Day
Containment Pressure	Once/Operating Cycle	Once Each Day
Torus Pressure	Once/Operating Cycle	Once Each Day
Torus Water Level	Once/Operating Cycle	Once Each Day
Torus Water Temperature	Every 6 Months	Once Each Day
Reactor Pressure	Once/Operating Cycle	Once Each Day
Reactor Vessel Water Level	Once/Operating Cycle	Once Each Day
Control Rod Position	(Note 5)	Once Each Day
Neutron Monitor	Same as Reactor Protection Systems	Once Each Day
Torus Air Temperature	Every 6 Months	Once Each Day
Safety/Relief Valve Position	Every Refueling Outage (Note 9) (a Functional Test to be performed quarterly)	Once Each Day
Safety Valve Position	Every Refueling Outage (Note 9) (a Functional Test to be performed quarterly)	Once Each Day

3.2 (Continued)

standby gas treatment system operation so that none of the activity released during the refueling accident leave the Reactor Building via the normal ventilation stack but that all activity is processed by the standby gas treatment system. Trip settings for the monitors in the ventilation duct are based upon initiation of the normal ventilation isolation and standby gas treatment system operation at a radiation level equivalent to the maximum site boundary dose rate of 500 mrem/year as given in Specification 3.8.E.1.a. The monitoring system in the plant stack represents a backup to this system to limit gross radioactivity releases to the environs.

The purpose of isolating the mechanical vacuum pump line is to limit release of radioactivity from the main condenser. During an accident, fission products would be transported from the reactor through the main steam line to the main condenser. The fission product radioactivity would be sensed by the main steam line radiation monitors which initiate isolation.

Post-accident instrumentation parameters for Containment Pressure, Torus Water Level, Containment Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitor, and Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor, are redundant, environmentally and seismically qualified instruments provided to enhance the operators' ability to follow the course of an event. The purpose of each of these instruments is to provide detection and measurement capability during and following an accident as required by NUREG-0737 by ensuring continuous on-scale indication of the following: containment pressure in the 0 to 275 psia range; torus water level in the 0 to 25 foot range (i.e., the bottom to 5 feet above the normal water level of the torus pool); containment hydrogen/oxygen concentrations (0 to 30% hydrogen and 0 to 25% oxygen); and containment radiation in the 1 R/hr to 10^7 R/hr gamma. The Control Room Toxic Gas Monitor assures that the Control Room operators, wherever required to be in the Control Room, will be adequately protected against the effects of an accidental release of toxic gases and that the plant can be safely operated or shut down under design basis accident conditions.

The Degraded Grid Protective System has been installed to assure that safety-related electrical equipment will not be subjected to sustained degraded voltage. This system incorporates voltage relays on 4160 Volt Emergency Buses 3 and 4 which are set to actuate at the minimum voltage required to prevent damage of safety-related equipment.

If Degraded Grid conditions exist for 10 seconds, either relay will actuate an alarm to alert operators of this condition. Based upon an assessment of these conditions the operator may choose to manually disconnect the off-site power. In addition, if an ESF signal is initiated in conjunction with low voltage below the relay setpoint for 10 seconds, the off-site power will be automatically disconnected.