



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 92 AND 67 TO FACILITY OPERATING

LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 27, 1985, Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed amendments would amend Technical Specification 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, for Salem Units 1 and 2. The proposed amendment sought a modification of the wording in the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) as well as changes in the containment isolation valve table (Tech. Spec. Table 3.6-1).

After an initial staff review, the staff concluded that the LCO wording change was unacceptable and that the containment isolation valve table modification was acceptable with one exception. PSE&G had included two containment outboard series isolation valves in the table (CC117 and CC118, Component Cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps) with the intention of using either one or the other of these outboard valves as the isolation valve for a particular containment penetration. The staff stated that only the valve which is closest to the containment (CC118) should be included in Tech. Spec. Table 3.6-1.

In order to gain approval of this license change request, PSE&G on February 15, 1989 resubmitted the requested change removing valve CC117 from Tech Spec Table 3.6-1 for both Salem Units 1 and 2, and withdrawing their proposed change of the wording in the LCO.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

The original November 27, 1985 request contained the following proposed changes to TS 3.6.3 and associated ACTION statements.

- (a) Description of change: The change would allow an inoperable isolation valve to satisfy its OPERABILITY requirements if the valve is maintained closed to isolate the affected penetration.

Staff evaluation: The proposed TS change would consider an inoperable containment isolation valve to be OPERABLE, i.e., the limiting condition for operation to be satisfied, if the valve is administratively maintained closed. Consequently, fluid lines could be isolated, and administratively maintained closed, without ever having to declare that a limiting condition for operation was not being met or that an ACTION statement has to be entered. Although, isolating a fluid line and administratively maintaining that condition is an acceptable approach for meeting the current LCO, having to enter an ACTION statement is preferable from an operational safety standpoint. Operations personnel would be more aware of potential safety concerns by having to take remedial action, and documenting it, to reestablish compliance with a LCO. Consequently, the staff found the proposed changes to TS 3.6.3 unacceptable. PSE&C, in their February 15, 1989 resubmittal, withdrew this proposed change.

The original November 27, 1985 request contained the following proposed changes to Technical Specifications (TS) Table 3.6-1, containment Isolation Valves.

- (a) Description of change: Adding valves (as listed in the submittal) to TS Table 3.6-1 because they are considered to be containment isolation valves and subject to Type C (local leakage rate) testing.

Staff evaluation: These valves were inadvertently omitted from Table 3.6-1 and the Type C testing program. Adding these valves to the Type C testing program is acceptable.

- (b) Description of change: Changing the classification of certain valves (as listed in the submittal) such that they are required to be Type C tested, rather than being excepted from Type C testing.

Staff evaluation: Adding valves to the Type C testing program is acceptable.

- (c) Description of change: Designating certain valves (as listed in the submittal) in the steam generator blowdown and steam generator blowdown sampling lines as not being subject to Type C testing.



Staff evaluation: These valves are connected to the secondary side of the steam generator, which constitutes a closed system inside containment which is not postulated to rupture during a LOCA. Thus, the subject valves will not be exposed to containment atmosphere during a LOCA and do not constitute potential containment atmosphere leak paths. Although Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 requires main steam system (e.g., main steam and feedwater) isolation valves in boiling water reactors to be Type C tested (Section II.H.4 of Appendix J), it does not require such valves in pressurized water reactors, as the Salem facility, to be Type C tested. Therefore, it is acceptable to delete the subject valves from the Type C testing program.

- (d) Description of change: Deleting valves 11(21) SS93, 12(22) SS93, 13(23) SS93, and 14(24) SS93 from TS Table 3.6-1.

Staff evaluation: The staff determined that these valves are not required to be containment isolation valves and may be deleted from the table. Since they are not containment isolation valves, they are not subject to Type C testing.

Further, the staff found that valve CC117 is not a containment isolation valve. As a further clarification to that SER, the staff finds that the valve CC117 may be deleted from TS Table 3.6-1 and removed from the Type C testing program. The valve was deleted from table in the February 15, 1989, resubmittal. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes as described above to be acceptable.

In addition, administrative clarifications and typographical corrections were made to the licensee's incoming technical specifications pages and bars were added to those pages to show the changes.

### 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

#### 4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 24261) on July 2, 1986 and consulted with the State of New Jersey. No public comments were received and the State of New Jersey did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

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Dated: April 24, 1989