

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-286/89-03

Docket No. 50-286

License No. DPR-64

Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York
P. O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511

Facility Name: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant

Type of Meeting: Enforcement Conference

Enforcement Action No: 89-25

Meeting Date: April 28, 1989

Prepared by: Ernest D. Sylvestre, Jr. 6-13-89
W. T. Olsen, Reactor Engineer/Physical Security date

Approved by: Ernest D. Sylvestre, Jr. 6-13-89
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section date
Facilities Radiological Safety and
Safeguards Branch

Meeting Summary: An Enforcement Conference was held at NRC Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, on April 28, 1989, to discuss the findings of NRC/RI Inspection Report No. 50-286/89-03 and NRC resident Inspection Report No. 50-286/88-22 and other matters as outlined in an April 14, 1989 letter to the licensee. The inspections covered various aspects of the security program during the current outage. Violations of NRC requirements were identified, as follows: failure to conduct adequate searches of personnel, packages and vehicles entering the protected area; failure to provide adequate illumination within the protected area at night; failure to provide adequate assessment capabilities on the protected area perimeter; failure to maintain the protected area perimeter adequately; and, failure to report a security event to the NRC within 1 hour as required in 10 CFR 73.71. Another violation consisting of a failure to properly control access into the protected area was also identified. The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted about 4½ hours, during which the circumstances surrounding the violations and the licensee's corrective actions were discussed.

DETAILS

1. Meeting Attendees

a. Power Authority of the State of New York

W. Josiger, Resident Manager
W. Harrington, Corporate Director of Security
J. Hahn, Manager of Security
E. Sackman, Manager of Security Compliance
M. Peckham, Assistant to Resident Manager

b. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

M. Knapp, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
E. Wenzinger, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
P. Koltay, SRI, Indian Point 3
R. Barkley, Reactor Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects
R. Christofer, Enforcement Specialist
E. Sylvester, Senior Reactor Engineer - Physical Security
R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section
R. Bellamy, Chief, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch
W. Olsen, Reactor Engineer - Physical Security
T. Dexter, Physical Security Inspector
W. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector
D. Langford, NRR-PDI-1, Acting PM

2. Summary of Discussion

Mr. Knapp opened the meeting and the attendees were introduced. Mr. Knapp described the purpose of the enforcement conference and summarized the findings of the routine physical security inspection conducted on February 27 - March 3, 1989, and a resident inspection conducted in December, 1988.

Mr. Knapp expressed Region I's concerns regarding the apparent violations and noted the following:

- a. Failure to lock, for approximately 15 hours, an alarmed gate that provides access to the protected area, and to implement proper compensatory measures when the gate was discovered unlocked;
- b. Failure to provide adequate assessment capabilities for portions of protected area barriers and associated isolation zones;
- c. Inadequate lighting in portions of the protected area;

- d. Numerous examples of inadequate searches of personnel and hand-carried items prior to entry into the protected area;
- e. Two examples of inadequate searches of vehicles prior to entering the protected area;
- f. Unauthorized entry of a terminated contractor employee into the protected area (three days after the employee was terminated) by using another employee's badge; and,
- g. Failure to notify the NRC of this incident (item 2.f. above) within one hour of discovery.

Several other concerns were brought up during the enforcement conference, which included: security force staffing levels during the current outage; excessive use of overtime during the outage; and, indications of poor security force morale.

Mr. Josiger made an opening remark and then introduced Mr. Harrington who discussed the plant layout and security systems. Mr. Harrington used slides and overheads to show the Indian Point 3 protected area barrier, assessment and detection aids, the proximity of the plant to Indian Point 2, and the exterior plant security systems. He then introduced Mr. Hahn who discussed the security staffing situation in relation to the current outage and the personnel issues involved. Mr. Hahn stated that the proprietary security force had requested that no additional security personnel, i.e., temporary contractor personnel, be brought in for the outage and that this was taken by management to mean that the proprietary force members wanted to work the overtime. He stated that only in a few instances were Security Officers required to work a 16 hour day. This overtime issue was a concern mentioned by several of the security force personnel who were interviewed during the inspection conducted February 27-March 3, 1989.

Mr. Hahn also discussed several of the apparent violations at length and answered questions asked by the NRC attendees.

In commenting on the unlocked protected area gate (Item 2.a. above), Mr. Hahn stated that he could not determine why the gate was unlocked and why it was not discovered sooner by the security force. With regard to the inadequate assessment capabilities (Item 2.b. above), Mr. Hahn stated that Indian Point 3 management felt that the present assessment capabilities were adequate. Mr. Hahn also stated that he considered the protected area lighting problems that were discovered during the inspection, to be minor in nature. The numerous examples of inadequate searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were being addressed by Indian Point 3 management by instituting additional security force training and better oversight of the security force by supervision. The failure of the Indian Point 3 management to notify the NRC within one hour of a security reportable event, according to Mr. Hahn, was due to the licensee's inability to quickly assess whether a security event required a prompt report.

Mr. Hahn then turned the presentation over to Mr. Sackman who discussed the corrective actions already taken and those being planned. Mr. Sackman stated that the security supervisors will receive specific training to improve their sensitivity in the problem areas that were identified as well as other supervisory training. He closed with the statement that, in his opinion, the Indian Point 3 security program was basically sound and that recent events are not indicative of serious security problems at the plant.

Mr. Josiger then closed by reiterating that the security organization and program were sound, but needed attention in some areas that apparently had been overlooked because of the previous Category 1 SALP ratings that the program had received.

Conclusion of Meeting

Mr. Keimig commented on several of the positions expressed by the licensee's representatives and emphasized the importance of implementing an effective security program.

Mr. Knapp concluded the meeting by stating that the Region I staff would evaluate the information presented by the licensee during the enforcement conference, and that a decision regarding the appropriate enforcement action would be forthcoming. Mr. Knapp also emphasized that the licensee should review the entire security program rather than just correct the problems identified during the recent inspections since the NRC perceived that a management effectiveness problem may still exist at the plant.

ATTACHMENT A

INDIAN POINT 3 SECURITY ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

April 28, 1989

AGENDA

A. INTRODUCTION

By: William A. Josiger
Resident Manager
Indian Point 3

B. IP#3 SECURITY SYSTEM

1. HARDWARE

By: William Harrington
Director - Security

2. STAFF

By: John Hahn
Site Security Manager

C. CORRECTIVE ACTION

By: Eugene Sackman
Manager - Security Compliance

D. PAST PERFORMANCE

By: William A. Josiger

E. SUMMARY

By: William A. Josiger