GPU Nuclear

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June 19, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report

This letter forwards one (1) copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 89-012.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Fitzpatrick
Vice President & Director
Oyster Creek

EEF:BDe:dmd
(0705A:01)
Enclosures

cc: Mr. William T. Russell, Administrator
Region 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Alexander W. Dromerick
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Oyster Creek, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 1 1 9	1 OF 0 1 3

TITLE (4) REACTOR SCRAM CAUSED BY INADVERTENT MISPOSITIONING OF THE REACTOR MODE SWITCH WHILE REMOVING KEY FROM THE SWITCH LOCK

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
												0 5 0 0 0
0 5	2 0	8 9	8 9	—	0 1 2	—	0 0	0 6	1 9	8 9		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
M. Godknecht, Plant Engineer	AREA CODE 6 0 9 9 7 1 1 - 4 1 1 8 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 20, 1989, in preparation for a reactor startup, the reactor mode switch was moved from the SHUTDOWN position to the REFUEL position. The control room operator experienced difficulty while attempting to remove the key from the mode switch to lock the switch in the REFUEL position. While manipulating the key, the switch was moved out of the REFUEL position and contacts from the SHUTDOWN position were opened and a full scram signal was received. The cause of the occurrence is binding in the reactor mode switch key lock and excessive play in the mode switch due to mechanical wear. Since the reactor was shutdown and no rod movement actually occurred the safety significance of the event is considered minimal. Immediate action was taken after the scram signal to ensure that the Reactor Protection System responded normally. The scram was reset, and the switch was locked in REFUEL. Maintenance will be performed to attempt to ease the binding of the key in the lock on the reactor mode switch. Additionally, mode switch replacement is being evaluated.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DATE OF OCCURRENCE

The event occurred on May 20, 1989 at approximately 0623 hours.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

While attempting to remove the key from the reactor mode switch after positioning the switch to the REFUEL position, SHUTDOWN position contacts were momentarily opened and an automatic scram was initiated. This event is considered to be reportable as defined in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The plant was in cold shutdown, the reactor vessel was vented and the reactor coolant temperature was 178°F. The reactor mode switch was in the SHUTDOWN position.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On May 20, 1989, in preparation for a reactor startup, the reactor mode switch was moved from the SHUTDOWN position to the REFUEL position. The control room operator then tried to remove the key from the switch to lock it in the REFUEL position. When he experienced difficulty in removing the key another operator attempted to remove it. While manipulating the key, the switch was moved out of the REFUEL position enough to open contacts from the SHUTDOWN position and a full scram signal was received. The scram was reset within one minute and the mode switch was locked in the REFUEL position.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of the occurrence is binding of the key lock for the reactor mode switch and mechanical wear of the mode switch. Because the key was very difficult to remove from the lock an inordinate amount of manipulation was required before the key was removed. The extra manipulation used by the operator to retrieve the key caused excessive switch movement allowed by the mechanical wearing of the switch.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

As designed, placing the mode switch to the SHUTDOWN position activates the manual scram portion of the Reactor Protection System (EIIS Code JC) providing an additional method of tripping the Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic channels to ensure a reactor scram occurs. Since the reactor was shutdown and no rod movement actually occurred, the safety significance of the event is considered minimal.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Short Term

Immediate action was taken after the scram signal to ensure that the Reactor Protection System responded as required.

Long Term

Maintenance will be performed to attempt to ease the binding of the key in the lock on the reactor mode switch.

Mode switch replacement is being evaluated.

SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 87-047 - Reactor Scram Signal While Moving Reactor Mode Switch for Testing

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