INSTRUMENTATION

REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.5 The remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channels given in Table 3.3-9 and the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls shall be OPERABLE with readouts displayed external to the control room.


APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE as required by Table 3.3-9, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With the ASP controls inoperable, restore the inoperable ASP controls to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies given in Table 4.3-6.
- 4.3.3.5.2 The ASP controls shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating each actuated component from the ASP.
- 4.3.3.5.3 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or the atmospheric alasm dump valves.



PLANT SYSTEMS

STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.7 At least three steam generator atmospheric steam dump valves (ASD's) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, and 3.

- ACTION:

 a. With one of the required ASD's inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 7 days restore the ASD to OPERABLE status, or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
 - b. With more than one of the required ASD's inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 24 hours restore at least two of the required ASD's to OPERABLE status or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
 - because of excessive seat leakage, close the associated block valve(s) and restore the ASD to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
 - d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.7 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5

3/4.7.1.7 STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES

The operability of the steam generator atmospheric steam dump valves (ASD's) ensures that the reactor decay heat can be dissipated to the atmosphere in the event of a steam generator tube rupture and loss of offsite power and that the Reactor Coolant system can be cooled down for Residual Heat Removal System operation. The number of required ASD's assures that the subcooling can be achieved, consistent with the assumptions used in the steam generator tube rupture analysis, to facilitate equalizing pressures between the Reactor Coolant System and the faulted steam generator. For cooling the plant to RHR initiation conditions, only one ASD is required. In this case, with three ASD's operable, if the single failure of one ASD occurs and another ASD is assumed to be associated with the faulted steam generator, one ASD remains available for required heat removal.

Each ASD is equipped with a manual block valve (in the auxiliary building) to provide a positive shutoff capability should an ASD develop leakage. Closure of the block valves of all ASD's because of excessive seat leakage does not endanger the reactor core; consistent with plant accident and transient analyses, decay heat can be dissipated with the main steamline safety valves or a block valve can be opened manually in the auxiliary building and the ASD can be used to control release of steam to the atmosphere. For the steam gererator tube rupture event, primary to secondary leakage can be terminated by depressurizing the Reactor Coolant System with the pressurizer power operated relief valves.