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I. INTRODUCTION

This testimony addresses the following contentions which concern the performance of the State of New Hampshire and participating New Hampshire municipalities in the June 28-29, 1988 FEMA Graded Exercise of the NHRERP:

- MAG EX-19; Bases B.1, B.2, and D which assert, among other things, that the licensee did not issue appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) to the State of New Hampshire and that, because of the high degree of reliance placed by New Hampshire on the licensee's PARs, the State of New Hampshire's PARs were also inappropriate. In particular, MAG asserts that the evacuation PAR for ERPA F communities was made too late, the shelter-in-place PAR for ERPA G communities was inappropriate, and the METPAC computer model is flawed and was used inappropriately.

- SAPL EX-2 which asserts that the exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the ability to provide sufficient buses and ambulances with properly trained drivers for transit dependent, special facility and special needs populations or that the buses that were deployed could be adequately routed.

- SAPL EX-12 which asserts that the procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees were

not demonstrated and that facilities were neither organized nor run effectively.

- SAPL EX-14 which asserts that there was an inadequate demonstration that appropriate protective action decisions will be made for the plume EPZ communities in that, in view of the radiation levels in the plume as the wind carried it over ERPA G, the evacuation PAR should have encompassed ERPA G communities.

- TOH/NECNP EX-2 which asserts that the State of New Hampshire demonstrated an inability to carry out protective actions on behalf of school children because instructions to the public regarding care of school children were confusing and inaccurate, bus drivers were unable to complete their assignments without assistance, protective action decisions regarding school children were made and carried out too late, and the State of New Hampshire failed to follow through on protective actions for school children.

II. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISIONMAKING

A. New Hampshire Protective Action Decision Process

The protective action decision process for the State of New Hampshire is implemented according to NHRERP, Volume 1, Section 2.5 and 2.6 and procedures referenced therein. The principal protective actions that would be recommended to the public by New Hampshire decisionmakers are shelter-in-place or evacuation. Either of these recommendations would be made

for groups of municipalities known as Emergency Response Planning Areas or ERPAs. (The ERPAs are depicted on maps in Attachment B hereto.) In New Hampshire there are five ERPAs, A, C, D, F, and G. ERPA A includes New Hampshire municipalities that border within approximately two miles of the plant in a radial direction; ERPA C, municipalities that border within approximately five miles of the plant to the west and west-northwest; ERPA D, municipalities that border within approximately five miles of the plant to the north and north-northeast; ERPA F, municipalities that border within approximately ten miles to the west, west-northwest, and northwest; ERPA G, municipalities that border within approximately 10 miles to the north-northwest, north, and north-northeast.

New Hampshire protective action decision procedures call for precautionary actions to be considered for beach populations during seasonal periods (May 15 - September 15) and to be considered for school populations when school is in session. Precautionary actions associated with closing New Hampshire beaches are considered as early as the ALERT emergency classification level. When a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, procedures instruct New Hampshire decisionmakers to recommend immediate evacuation of ERPA A municipalities - Seabrook, Hampton Falls, and Hampton Beach. When a declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY is accompanied by

specified plant conditions, i.e., post-LOCA monitor readings in containment of greater than 10,000 R/hr, Seabrook Station and NHRERP procedures indicate that evacuation is to be recommended additionally for ERPAs C and D - all of Hampton, North Hampton, Kensington, and South Hampton and for communities in a downwind direction to ten miles and shelter for the remainder of the EPZ. Expansion of protective action recommendations beyond these areas is premised on assessment of projected doses and comparison to the U.S. EPA Protective Action Guides or on consideration of other plant and environmental conditions.

B. Protective Action Decision Process During the Exercise

The protective action decision process during the June 28-29, 1988 Exercise for New Hampshire began with initial notification at 0919 that an ALERT had been declared at 0909 at Seabrook Station. No protective action recommendation accompanied the initial notification. Principal decisionmakers reported to the NH State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Concord by 1007. These were the Governor's representative, the Director of the Office of Emergency Management (NHOEM), and the Director of the Division of Public Health Services (NH DPHS). Liaison and accident assessment staff of NHOEM and NH DPHS staffed the NH Incident

Field Office (IFO) co-located with the NHY Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at Newington at 1057.

The NH State EOC decisionmakers at Concord made the initial precautionary decision at 1032 to close NH beaches and State parks in Hampton Beach and Seabrook Beach. This precautionary decision was made according to procedure based on time of year and the fact that the ALERT emergency classification level was continuing with uncertain prognosis. This decision was made in order to expedite and facilitate later protective actions by encouraging potentially heavy traffic to leave the area of greatest congestion and by discouraging further traffic from entering this roadway network. This precautionary decision was discretionary on the part of State of New Hampshire decisionmakers, did not call for actions to be taken by the general public or by special populations, and was not indicated by a potential hazard to the health and safety of the public. It was decided at the NH State EOC to activate the audible alert tone on designated beach sirens and to announce the beach closing by siren public address system at 1100. The Rockingham County Dispatch Center was notified at 1050 to activate the beach closing message on the beach siren public address systems in Hampton and Seabrook at 1100. A news release announcing the beach closing action was released to media at the media center at 1058, and a news conference at

the media center at 1114 announced the precautionary beach closing. This action was coordinated with the NHY Offsite Response Organization (ORO) at 1100.

Accident assessment was initiated by NH DPHS at 1115 at the NH IFO, and the first NH field monitoring team was dispatched from the EOF at 1235. The Seabrook Station Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Response Manager and EOF Coordinator conducted briefings for NH IFO staff on plant and environmental conditions approximately every half-hour. The briefings included information on the status of plant safety systems, including the status of Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleaning System Filters.

Periodically, NH IFO staff were provided follow-up information by the Seabrook Station ERO EOF Coordinator. This information included METPAC printouts generated at 15-minute intervals that included data on current meteorology, radiological release measurements at the plant stack, projected whole body dose rates and thyroid dose rates at distances of .6 miles and every one mile to 10 miles, and protective action recommendations that assume the release condition will continue for 2, 4, 6 or 8 hours. These results were considered by the Seabrook Station ERO for formulating PARs. Also provided at 15-minute intervals were Logger Trends that showed 15-minute averages for meteorological data, values for in-plant Radiological Data

Management System data points and containment pressure points, and instantaneous meteorological data. Reprints of Seabrook Station ERO status board information, Form ER 3.3H, were periodically provided which contained current and forecast meteorological information, and whole body and thyroid dose rate measurements taken by offsite monitoring teams and reported by affected sector. Representative copies of these information sources are Attachment A hereto.

The NH IFO staff provided a continual flow of information to the NH State EOC decisionmakers. Several mechanisms were utilized for this purpose. (1) An open accident assessment telephone line was maintained throughout the course of the exercise between NH DPHS accident assessment staff at the NH IFO and the NH DPHS staff at the NH State EOC. (2) Changes in conditions, protective action recommendations, and other significant information were relayed immediately from the NH IFO to the NH State EOC via speaker telephone located in both facilities. (3) Accident assessment data and worksheets were transmitted between the NH IFO and NH State EOC by telecopiers in both facilities. (4) Additional telecopiers were utilized for transmission of EBS messages, news releases, and other printed information between the two facilities.

In addition to the above mechanisms, a dedicated, microwave telephone system, known as the Nuclear Alert System

(NAS) or "orange phone," was available as a link to the NH IFO, NH State EOC, Seabrook Station ERO, NHY ORO, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This mechanism is reserved primarily for notification of emergency classification level changes and of protective action recommendations from the Seabrook Station ERO to offsite authorities.

At 1146, Seabrook Station ERO declared a SITE AREA EMERGENCY at Seabrook Station and notified the NH State EOC by the NAS. This notification resulted in several ensuing actions by the NH State EOC personnel that were prompted by implementing procedure checklists.

At 1152, the decision was made to advise school administrators to maintain school children in school until 1700 or until conditions required other actions. At 1240, NH Department of Education Staff, represented at the NH State EOC, completed notification of affected school administrative staffs of this decision. Simultaneously, the NH spokesperson at the Media Center announced the decision concerning the school recommendation. Subsequently, at 1245, a news advisory containing the school recommendation information was issued. This decision was coordinated with the NHY ORO at 1232.

At 1158, the decision was made to request the U.S. Coast Guard representative at the NH IFO to establish a five-mile safety zone. At 1205, the Governor of NH declared a state of

emergency. The NHOEM Director directed all EPZ sirens in NH to be sounded at 1215 and an EBS message announcing the SITE AREA EMERGENCY to be broadcast at 1220.

At 1216, the NH State EOC staff requested the FAA to restrict air space in the vicinity of Seabrook Station. At 1250, NH DPHS accident assessment personnel advised NH State EOC decisionmakers to recommend that livestock within ten miles be placed on stored feed. This decision was made accordingly and implemented by the NH Department of Agriculture, represented at the State EOC, according to that agency's procedures. A news release advising shelter and stored feed for livestock was issued at 1345.

At 1332, the Seabrook Station ERO declared a GENERAL EMERGENCY. While no release was in progress, plant conditions, as indicated by containment dose rates in excess of 10,000 R/hr, led to an immediate protective action recommendation by the Seabrook Station ERO of evacuation within a five-mile radius of the plant and to ten miles in downwind sectors and shelter for the remainder of EPZ. Notification of the NH State EOC of this PAR was completed at 1342. At this time, the wind was blowing from a westerly direction (from 280 degrees); and, therefore, no communities were in the downwind direction from five to ten miles. State of New Hampshire protective action decision procedures (NHRERP, Volume 4, Appendix F and Volume 4A, Appendix U)

reflect the plant condition criteria of the Seabrook Station ERO procedures. Consequently, at 1409, within approximately one-half hour of notification by the utility and following discussions with NH IFO staff and accident assessment personnel, NH State EOC decisionmakers decided to recommend evacuation of ERPAs A, C, and D and shelter in place for ERPAs F - Newton, East Kingston, Kingston, Brentwood, Exeter and Newfields - and G - Stratham, Greenland, New Castle, Rye and Portsmouth. ERPAs A, C, and D represent communities bordering within a five-mile radius of the plant. Public alert and notification of this initial protective action recommendation occurred at 1420. The U.S. Coast Guard was requested to expand the water safety zone to ten miles.

Subsequent to the initial protective action recommendation, NH IFO staff continued to be briefed at half-hour intervals by Seabrook Station ERO personnel on plant and environmental conditions. At 1500, the Seabrook Station ERO Response Manager and EOF Coordinator advised NH IFO staff of stack sample results showing a high iodine component and the presence of particulates. NH IFO staff was also advised that the Seabrook Station ERO was investigating the potential for decline in efficiency of the enclosure filters due to the moisture content of the containment air flowing through the filter banks. NH IFO staff was subsequently informed that no degradation of the enclosure filters had occurred or was

expected because the design basis of the filters included this condition. At 1515, the NH IFO staff and accident assessment personnel discussed the potential for expanding the protective action recommendation based on meteorological forecast information. The decision at the time was not to recommend expansion of the protective action recommendation, even though the meteorological forecast data were uncertain, because projected dose calculations and field measurement data did not indicate that PAGs would be exceeded in areas currently advised to shelter-in-place.

At the 1530 briefing, the Seabrook Station ERO recommended to the NH IFO staff that the evacuation of communities in ERPA F be carried out as a precautionary measure because weather forecast information and meteorological trends indicated potential wind shifts during the day that would place these communities in downwind sectors. At 1545, the NH IFO staff advised the NH State EOC decisionmakers of the Seabrook Station ERO recommendation. NH IFO accident assessment personnel continued to calculate dose projections for the affected area and considered additional meteorological information. At 1620, the NH IFO accident assessment staff discussed the results of its assessment with the NH State EOC staff and made the protective action recommendation of evacuation for ERPA F and continued shelter-in-place for ERPA G. The NH State EOC

decision-makers concurred with this recommendation at 1627, and the NHOEM Director directed sirens to be sounded at 1635 and an EBS announcement to be broadcast at 1640. It was further decided that school students in ERPA G should remain sheltered at school until 1900. Day 1 of the exercise terminated at 1900, except for activities associated with development of environmental sampling plans by accident assessment personnel of the four participating organizations in preparation for Day 2 of the exercise. ERPA G areas were assigned priority for post-plume sampling and measurement activities to determine the need for further protective actions for persons advised to shelter in place.

Maps of the EPZ communities and ERPAs which show the wind direction at the decision points discussed above and in the following sections, from the initial PAR decision at 1409 until termination of Exercise Day 1, are Attachment B hereto.

C. Delayed Evacuation of ERPA F was Appropriate

The initial protective action recommendation provided by the Seabrook Station ERO to NH State EOC decisionmakers was based on pre-established plant conditions cited in their respective protective action decision procedures. The plant conditions postulated by the Exercise scenario, containment dose rate in excess of 10,000 R/hr, call for evacuation of areas to a five-mile radius of the plant and to ten miles in downwind sectors and shelter of the remainder of the EPZ.

Both organizations therefore correctly followed their procedures in making the initial protective action recommendation.

At the time of the initial PAR decision, the wind direction was from 280 degrees at one mile per hour; wind direction was away from ERPA F communities. METPAC calculations at the time of the initial decision, based on projected doses, indicated shelter as the recommended protective action for areas within two miles of the plant. In-plant conditions indicated a more conservative PAR than that indicated by dose projections. Subsequent METPAC projections, run after the radiological release began at 1346, confirmed that the initial protective action decision was correct by indicating evacuation for ERPA A, C and D communities and shelter for ERPA F and G communities based on an assumed eight-hour release duration.

At 1530, with the wind direction from approximately 320 degrees at 3 miles per hour continuing away from ERPA F and with METPAC projections continuing to indicate shelter as the protective action recommendation for ERPA F communities, the NHY ERO Response Manager discussed with NH IFO staff the evacuation of ERPA F as a precautionary measure. This precautionary recommendation was based on the continuing release conditions, the delay in achieving cold shutdown, and the uncertainty of meteorological conditions. Weather

forecast data predicted that wind direction would shift during the day, coming from an easterly direction.

The Seabrook Station ERO made this precautionary recommendation a formal protective action recommendation by conveying it to the State of New Hampshire by State Notification Fact Sheet at 1540. The NH IFO staff discussed the recommendation with NH State EOC decisionmakers at 1545 and conducted further assessment of radiological conditions. At 1620, with the wind shifting to a more northerly direction (from 349 degrees) and METPAC continuing to indicate shelter as the protective action recommendation for ERPA F communities, the NH IFO staff recommended to NH EOC decisionmakers the evacuation of ERPA F communities as a precautionary measure because of uncertain meteorological conditions. At 1626, NH State EOC decisionmakers concurred with the recommendation and directed that sirens be sounded at 1635 and the EBS message be broadcast at 1640.

Between 1645 and 1900 of Day 1 of the Exercise, wind direction steadily shifted from a northerly direction (from 365 degrees) to an easterly direction (from 90 degrees). Day 1 of the Exercise ended with termination of the radiological release at 1900. As a postulated condition for Day 2 of the Exercise for subsequent ingestion pathway activities, and particularly to support ingestion pathway participation by the State of Maine, the exercise scenario shifted the wind

suddenly at 1915 to a southerly direction (from 200 degrees) after exercise activities on Day 1 terminated.

Prior to 1900 the plume did not pass over ERPA F communities. When the wind shifted, coming from 200 degrees at 1915, the plume was caused subsequently to pass over a small part of the Town of Exeter, beginning at approximately 1945. This was the only location in ERPA F that was affected by the plume.

Post-plume assessment confirmed that the decision to evacuate ERPA F at 1627 was a precautionary measure. The highest integrated doses that could have been incurred anywhere in ERPA F (the small part of Exeter) by the postulated radiological conditions, assuming that no protective actions were taken, were 568 mR whole body dose and 441 mR thyroid dose. These values are below the U.S. EPA PAG ranges.

D. Continued Protective Action Recommendation of Shelter-In-Place for ERPA G Was Appropriate

As discussed above, the scenario for Day 1 of the Exercise ended with termination of the radiological release at 1900. As a postulated condition for ingestion pathway activities on Day 2 of the Exercise, the scenario shifted the wind suddenly at 1915 to a southerly direction (from 200 degrees). Postulated meteorological conditions at this time included a thermal inversion which would have the effect of

lofting the plume over the New Hampshire EPZ communities in ERPA G into the State of Maine where precipitation would cause deposition from the plume. EBS messages of the State of New Hampshire did not advise persons who were sheltering in ERPA G when the plume would arrive nor did they advise these persons to open windows because the wind did carry the plume over ERPA G until after Day 1 of the exercise had terminated.

Whole body and infant thyroid dose rates for 15-minute increments between 1915 and 2245 of Day 1 were assessed by NH IFO accident assessment personnel on Day 2 of the Exercise. In addition, post-plume measurement and sampling data were analyzed by NH IFO accident assessment staff on Day 2 of the Exercise. Post-plume measurement and sampling data confirmed that the shelter-in-place protective action recommendation for ERPA G was conservative and correct. On Day 2 of the Exercise, NH State EOC decisionmakers maintained the protective actions recommended on Day 1 in effect until deposition data were available and dose levels were calculated according to procedures of NHRERP, Volume 4A, Appendix T. The first deposition analysis conducted on Day 2 indicated that no PAGs in ERPA G were exceeded. Consequently, the shelter-in-place advisory was lifted at 1230 on Day 2 of the Exercise.

Continuous dose rate analysis by NH IFO accident assessment staff, after the post-exercise termination wind shift caused the plume to be carried over ERPA G communities, showed that PAGs could not be exceeded in ERPA G. The highest integrated doses that could have been incurred in ERPA G by the postulated radiological conditions, assuming that no protective actions were taken and assuming that deposition from the plume had occurred, were 482 mR whole body dose and 356 mR thyroid dose. The decision to continue to recommend shelter-in-place for ERPA G was therefore not invalidated by the wind shift. To recommend evacuation of areas over which the plume passes regardless of projected doses and consideration of dose consequences is contrary to the concept of the PAGs and the provisions of the NHRERP, Volume 1, Section 2.6. NUREG 0654, II.J.9 provides that

"Each state and local organization shall establish a capability for implementing protective measures based upon protective action guides [PAGs] and other criteria. This shall be consistent with the recommendations of EPA regarding exposure resulting from passage of radioactive airborne plumes, (EPA-520-11-75-001 . . .)".

E. Independent Accident Assessment by The State of New Hampshire

New Hampshire emergency response personnel have an independent capability to operate METPAC at the NH State EOC in Concord and to run independent "what if" calculations using variable meteorological and release conditions. See

Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 26 (Protective Action Recommendations Made by NHY ORO During the Evacuation). This in fact was done during the exercise. The FEMA Exercise Report, Applicants' Exhibit 43F (hereinafter Exercise Report) at pages 163-164 of 428 notes that "what if" projections were done by New Hampshire accident assessment personnel, and FEMA observed that dose projections were expertly performed at the NH State EOC, indicating well-trained personnel.

In addition to the METPAC model, New Hampshire accident assessment personnel performed independent, confirmatory assessments using other methods as described in NHRERP, Volume 4A. The Exercise Report refers to the utilization by New Hampshire accident assessment personnel of these alternative methods and noted their excellent understanding of these various dose projection methods. The report further noted that the NH IFO accident assessment personnel used field team readings to project doses and performed comparisons with the METPAC projections to confirm initial dose projections based on plant conditions. The Exercise Report at page 163 of 428 concluded that the State of New Hampshire accident assessment personnel at the NH State EOC and at the NH IFO demonstrated the ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based upon plant and field data. Demonstration of this capability was exercise objective 10 which was evaluated by FEMA as met.

The Exercise Report found at page 162 of 428 that State of New Hampshire field teams demonstrated appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field measurements. The report noted that all required instrumentation was available and properly calibrated. Field measurements were relayed to the EOF promptly. The exercise report at page 151 found further that New Hampshire field teams demonstrated the capability to take samples of air and make measurements for airborne radioiodine. In addition, the New Hampshire field teams demonstrated the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity. The report noted that the samples were properly collected, bagged, labeled, and returned to the EOF where they were analyzed. The three findings cited above constituted exercise objectives 7, 8 and 9 which were evaluated by FEMA as met. The report further noted that NH IFO accident assessment personnel used field team air sample data to compare and then modify thyroid dose projections. This demonstrated an awareness of the presence of radioiodines in the environment.

The NHY ERO Response Manager and EOF Coordinator conducted frequent and regular briefings with NH IFO staff. The briefings were scheduled at thirty-minute intervals at a minimum, and there were often more frequent informal discussions by either the EOF Coordinator or Response Manager with NH IFO staff. The Exercise Report noted that

communications and information exchange between the IFO and the utility was timely and occurred at regular briefings in the EOF. Protective action recommendations of the Seabrook Station ERO were transmitted to New Hampshire emergency response personnel in two ways. First, they were transmitted to NH IFO staff by the Seabrook Station EOF Coordinator directly. Second, they were transmitted from the Seabrook Station ERO to the NH State EOC over the NAS using the State Notification Fact Sheet which requires verification that the transmittal was completed. Protective action recommendations were not "merely passed on copies of the METPAC printouts." In fact, the protective action recommendations made by the Seabrook Station ERO to New Hampshire officials were not confined to those indicated by METPAC, but were expanded recommendations that considered duration of release conditions, plant status and forecast wind shifts. The Seabrook Station ERO Response Manager and EOF Coordinator and the NH IFO staff discussed thoroughly in each case the nature of the protective action recommendations.

METPAC printouts were provided to NH IFO accident assessment personnel for the purpose of independent assessment of radiological consequences and projections. The Exercise Report notes that they were used extensively for this purpose. The Exercise Report at page 163 of 428 concluded that the State of New Hampshire demonstrated the

ability to make appropriate Protective Action Decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors. The FEMA evaluation concluded that this objective, exercise objective 11, was met.

F. Timeline for School PAR Decisions

NHRERP, Volume 1, Section 2.6 provides that precautionary actions for schools will be considered at a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. These actions may include school cancellation, early evacuation, and cancellation of extra-curricular activities. The Exercise Report noted that early dismissal of schools was considered by the Governor and the decision was made not to recommend early dismissal due to concern for the latch-key children.

Instead, a precautionary decision was made at 1152, within minutes of the declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY at 1146, to hold students in school until 1700. This decision was intended to maintain students in a location where protective actions could be readily implemented for school students in the event accident conditions escalated. This decision had the concurrence of the NH Department of Education representative at the NH State EOC. The Exercise Report noted that the Board of Education (meaning the Department of Education) notified all appropriate school districts of this precautionary action.

When the initial protective action recommendation of evacuation was made by the State of New Hampshire at 1409 for the general population in communities bordering within five miles of the plant, school students in those communities were evacuated with the general public. The shelter-in-place recommendation for the remainder of the EPZ communities applied to both the general public and the schools. The protective actions for the public and the schools were consistent, and clear instructions to the public about protective actions for school students were thereby facilitated. It was only after 1415 that dose projections for the affected communities indicated evacuation as the protective action recommendation; therefore, the evacuation recommendation was timely and effective.

In communities not affected by the initial evacuation recommendation, late dismissal of schools was extended from 1700 to 1900 or until parents picked up their children. The Exercise Report noted that EPZ schools and potential host schools were promptly notified of changes in the situation by the NH Department of Education. When the evacuation recommendation was extended by the State of New Hampshire to communities in ERPA F at 1640, school students were again evacuated with the general public. Dose projections for the affected communities did not indicate evacuation as a required protective action recommendation throughout the

duration of the emergency. Therefore, the evacuation of school students with the general public in ERPA F communities was timely and effective as a precautionary measure. When the Exercise for Day 1 terminated at 1900, only the school students in ERPA G communities continued to be sheltered in their schools in accordance with the recommendation of State of New Hampshire officials. Dose projections based on dose rate data extending beyond 1900 indicated that PAGs would not be exceeded in ERPA G communities and further protective actions would not be warranted. The exercise scenario for Day 1 ended with the assumption that these students would be picked up by their parents or would be transported to their homes after 1900.

In two instances, local protective actions for school students differed from the recommendation of State of New Hampshire officials. At 1230, Portsmouth officials implemented early dismissal of schools with the instruction to hold latch-key children at the schools until their parents could pick them up. A message was communicated from the City of Portsmouth EOC to the NH State EOC at 1319 which advised State of New Hampshire officials that 150 latch key children would be held in school until parents picked them up. The message is Attachment C hereto. At this time no protective actions had been recommended for any portion of the EPZ. In Brentwood, officials directed the local elementary school to

allow dismissal of school children at the normal time of 1500. The protective action recommendation for Brentwood at this time was shelter-in-place. The Exercise Report noted these deviations from the recommendation of state officials as Areas Requiring Corrective Action, and recommended additional training in the New Hampshire state plan and procedures to resolve this ARCA. The Exercise Report reflects the commitment of the State of New Hampshire to provide this training in 1989.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF PARS FOR SCHOOLS

A. Clarity of Public Instructions for Schools

News advisories and EBS messages pertaining to schools that were issued by the State of New Hampshire during the exercise are Attachment D hereto.

At 1045 of Day 1 of the Exercise, State of New Hampshire officials issued News Advisory #2 after the ALERT had been declared at Seabrook Station. News Advisory #2 announced the closing of beaches and state parks at Hampton and Seabrook by order of the Governor. News Advisory #2 made the following points:

- a. The beach closing was a precautionary action in response to an ALERT conditions at Seabrook Station.
- b. An ALERT presents no danger to public health and safety.

- c. The beach closing was based on policy adopted long before Seabrook was operational.
- d. There was no immediate threat to public health and safety, and no release of radioactive material had occurred.
- e. Residents of the EPZ were advised to listen to local news broadcasts for latest information on the incident and to review pre-distributed emergency information.

News advisory #2 did not advise beach area residents to take protective actions and did not affect school children of beach area residents. It did advise persons on the beaches and in state parks to leave those areas. Residents were advised to refer to pre-distributed emergency information calendars which contain information on actions that would be taken for school children and telephone numbers to call if further information were required.

Two hours later at 1245, after a SITE AREA EMERGENCY had been declared at Seabrook Station, the State of New Hampshire issued News Advisory #5 which announced that State of New Hampshire officials had determined that school students should be held in school until 5 p.m. (1700). At this time, there had been no protective action recommendations made for either the general public or for the schools. News Advisory

#5 stressed that this recommendation for the schools was a precautionary measure.

At 1313, the State of New Hampshire issued News Advisory #6 which acknowledged that Portsmouth schools had been dismissed by authority of local officials. News Advisory #6 reiterated that State's recommendation that all other school children be held in school until 5 p.m. (1700) and continued to stress that this recommendation was a precautionary measure.

At 1411, the State of New Hampshire issued an EBS message, to be broadcast at 1420, which announced the declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY and the initial protective action recommendation of the State of New Hampshire. This EBS message announced that further information and instructions from state officials would be forthcoming shortly, and advised listeners to stay tuned to the EBS station.

Accordingly, at 1425, the State of New Hampshire issued a follow-up EBS message, for broadcast at 1435, which provided more detailed information and instructions. Specifically, this message contained the following instructions for schools in the communities that were being evacuated:

Parents should NOT drive to school to meet children since schools are now being evacuated and the students are being taken directly to the reception

centers. The reception centers for each school is the same as the one for the town in which the school is located.

For schools in the communities advised to shelter the message said:

Schools, hospitals, and other institutions in the towns being sheltered are taking similar actions.

At 1601, the State of New Hampshire issued News Advisory #11 which said that school students in communities of the EPZ that had been advised to shelter-in-place at 1420 were to be held at school until 7 p.m. (1900). Parents in these communities were advised that they may pick up their children at school before 7 p.m. (1900).

At 1626, NH State EOC decisionmakers decided to expand the evacuation recommendation to the six communities in ERPA F because of a forecasted wind shift. An EBS message implementing this decision was broadcast at 1640. A follow-up EBS message was issued at 1650 which contained the same instructions for parents of school children contained in the previous 1435 EBS message referenced above.

Both the 1435 and the 1650 EBS messages announced that the respective messages would be broadcast every 15 minutes or until new information is available. Listeners were advised to stay tuned to the EBS station for the latest official information.

The EBS messages and news advisories issued by the State of New Hampshire pertaining to school students provided clear instructions to the public about actions recommended and implemented for schools. As a precautionary measure prior to protective actions being recommended or for those communities recommended to shelter-in-place, clear instructions were provided about the duration for which students would be held in school. For the communities for which evacuation was recommended, clear instructions were provided on actions taken for the schools and actions that should be taken by parents. Essential information pertaining to the safety of school students was to be broadcast repeatedly at frequent intervals.

The Exercise Report recommended that all information dealing with school children and protective actions, such as sheltering or school dismissals, should be broadcast as EBS messages rather than as news releases. FEMA recommended further training of public information staff to resolve this ARCA. The State of New Hampshire has committed to implement this recommendation (Exercise Report, page 281 of 428).

B. Demonstration of Ability to Traverse Bus Routes for Schools

The State of New Hampshire demonstrated the capability to mobilize bus resources for schools and to traverse bus routes for schools during the exercise. The extent of play

for demonstrating transportation resources for schools is described in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 23 Regarding Scope of Graded Exercise.

A total of 121 bus routes for schools (for the purposes of exercise demonstration, schools include public and private schools and day care centers) has been established as part of the NHRERP. The demonstration of bus routes was conducted in two phases. On Day 1 of the exercise sixteen routes were demonstrated using buses and drivers from providers under letters of agreement (LOAs) with New Hampshire. On Day 2, out of sequence with the exercise scenario, 102 routes were demonstrated by members of the New Hampshire emergency driver pool using personal vehicles.

Of the 118 total bus routes demonstrated, 16 school bus routes were demonstrated on Day 1 with actual buses under LOAs with New Hampshire traversing the routes. Of this number, 14 bus routes were completed successfully. Two bus routes were not completed or required controller assistance to complete.

On Day 2 of the exercise, 102 bus routes were demonstrated. Of this number, 97 bus routes were completed successfully. Five bus routes were not completed or required controller assistance to complete.

Of the 118 bus routes demonstrated for schools in the New Hampshire EPZ, 111 or 94 percent were demonstrated

successfully. There was no significant difference between the level of successfully completed routes driven by bus company drivers on Day 1 and by members of the emergency driver pool on Day 2. The Exercise Report at page 189 of 428 concluded that the capability to provide transportation resources to schools was adequately demonstrated.

For the seven bus routes which drivers failed or had difficulty completing, the Exercise Report attributed the difficulty to inadequate or inaccurate maps or to lack of bus driver training in following route instructions. The State of New Hampshire has committed to correcting and improving the maps and to providing additional bus driver training to resolve the noted Areas Requiring Corrective Action. See Exercise Report, page 282 of 428.

TOH/NECNP EX-2 points to "One driver [who] took almost 4 hours to run a route between the East Kingston Local Staging Area and the Portsmouth Transportation Staging Area (Draft Exercise Report at p. 225)." An accurate reading of the Draft Exercise Report indicates that the particular bus traversed a route from the East Kingston LSA (local staging area) to Peek-a-Boo Day Care (in East Kingston) to Salem Reception Center (Reception Center in Salem, NH) to Portsmouth TSA (state transportation staging area in Portsmouth, NH). The Draft Exercise Report reported the time to complete this route as 224 minutes. The Exercise Report

at page 181 of 428 corrected this route description to read Portsmouth Circle Business Center TSA to East Kingston LSA to Peek-a-Boo Day Care to Manchester Reception Center but did not indicate a time to complete the route. This correction agrees with exercise controller records, which also show that the route as described in the Final Report took 109 minutes to complete.

The above bus route, cited as an example by TOH/NECNP EX-2, was the longest bus route in the entire list contained in the Exercise Report beginning at page 181 of 428.

C. FEMA Evaluation

The Exercise Report found that the State of New Hampshire demonstrated the ability and resources necessary to implement protective actions for school children and that Exercise Objective #19 was met. See Exercise Report, page 180 of 428.

The prior deficiency in demonstrating the organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools found by FEMA in the February 26, 1986 exercise was resolved by the June 28-29, 1988 exercise. See Exercise Report, page 316 of 428.

IV. DEMONSTRATION OF THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BUSES, AMBULANCES, AND TRAINED DRIVERS FOR TRANSIT-DEPENDENT, SPECIAL FACILITIES, AND SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS

A. Mobilization of Transportation Resources

The NH State EOC Resources Coordinator, Pupil Transportation Safety Representative, and Emergency Medical Services Representative demonstrated the implementation of procedures for notification of transportation providers and mobilization of transportation resources between 0955 and 1132 of Day 1 of the Exercise. This demonstration consisted of initiating actual contact with the resource providers who are listed in NHRERP, Volume 4, Appendix I. Appendix I contains the names of the transportation companies, their respective contact persons and telephone numbers, and the numbers of vehicles and drivers available in accordance with letters of agreement. The NH State EOC personnel were instructed by an Exercise controller message to initiate contact with the transportation providers, to advise them of the Exercise being conducted, and to ask them if they were participating in the Exercise. Those that responded affirmatively were then asked for the number of vehicles that were then on hand and, therefore, available to be dispatched to the State transportation staging areas. Six bus providers and twelve ambulance providers agreed to participate. For the purposes of the Exercise, and in accordance with the

extent of play, a representation of each type of vehicle was actually provided and demonstrated. As part of the Exercise scenario, controllers interjected into the scenario the total number of vehicles that were to be assumed to be available. The following number of vehicles by category of vehicle were identified as available based on the total vehicle availability indicated in current letters of agreement:

<u>Type of Vehicle</u>	<u>Available</u>	<u>Required by the Scenario</u>
Buses	<u>530</u>	<u>324</u>
Vans	<u>40</u>	<u>13</u>
Ambulances	<u>34</u>	<u>22</u>
Wheelchair Vans	<u>16</u>	<u>12</u>

In addition to the drivers and ambulance crews indicated to be available from the transportation providers, a total of 87 drivers from the NH Department of Transportation and the NH National Guard were identified by controller message to be available as part of the emergency driver pool.

The State Transportation Staging Areas at the Rockingham County Complex in Brentwood and the Portsmouth Circle Business Center in Portsmouth were activated at 1103. At 1206, the NH State EOC directed transportation resources to the State Transportation Staging Areas. Twenty buses, one wheelchair van, and one ambulance were actually deployed on

Day 1 of the Exercise from several of the transportation providers to the State Transportation Staging Areas.

When the initial evacuation began at 1420, the NH State EOC Resources Officer received reports every half-hour from the NH IFO of transportation resources that were required and corresponding reports from the State Transportation Staging Areas of resources that were available. These reports provided a mechanism for monitoring and managing transportation resources required during the evacuation.

The NH IFO Local Liaison Officers, under the direction of the IFO Resources Coordinator, demonstrated the capability to initiate and maintain contact with the EOCs of participating communities and with special facilities of non-participating communities. Special Population Liaisons at the NH IFO demonstrated the capability to contact and determine assistance requirements of persons with special needs.

A total of 77 special needs routes have been identified in the New Hampshire EPZ communities. Of this total, 66 or 86 percent were demonstrated during the Exercise by actually being traversed. For the purposes of the Exercise, special needs routes included transit-dependent bus routes and bus routes for hospitals and nursing homes.

The demonstration of special needs bus routes occurred in the same manner as that for school bus routes. On Day 1

of the Exercise, 31 bus routes were demonstrated with actual buses under LOA with New Hampshire traversing the routes. On Day 2, out of sequence with the exercise scenario, 35 bus routes were demonstrated by members of the New Hampshire emergency driver pool using personal vehicles.

On Day 1, 22 bus routes were demonstrated successfully. Nine bus routes were not completed or required controller intervention.

On Day 2, 27 bus routes were demonstrated successfully. Eight bus routes were not completed or required controller intervention.

Of a total of 66 special needs bus routes demonstrated, 49, or 74 percent, were demonstrated successfully. Seventeen special needs bus routes, or 26 percent, were not completed or required controller intervention.

Further analysis of the completion rates of special needs bus routes during the Exercise, based on an examination of controller reports, reveals that most of the unsuccessfully completed routes were transit-dependent bus routes - those that involved driving vehicles along designated routes through each of the communities to pick up persons who need a ride. Of the 66 demonstrated special needs bus routes, 50, or 76 percent, were transit-dependent routes. Seven of the 66 special needs routes were

demonstrated for hospitals, and nine were demonstrated for nursing homes.

Of the seven hospital routes demonstrated, all were completed successfully. Of the nine nursing home routes demonstrated, eight were completed successfully. Of the 50 transit-dependent routes demonstrated, 34, or 68 percent, were demonstrated successfully.

Of the sixteen transit-dependent bus routes that were not completed, eight were attempted by contracted bus drivers on Day 1 and eight were attempted by emergency driver pool drivers on Day 2. The reasons identified by exercise controllers for the failure to complete the routes were divided between problems with the maps and problems with the drivers' ability to read the maps.

For those special needs bus routes which drivers failed or had difficulty completing, the Exercise Report attributed the difficulty to inadequate or inaccurate maps or to lack of bus driver training in following route instructions. The State of New Hampshire has committed to correcting and improving the maps and to providing bus driver training to resolve the noted Areas Requiring Corrective Action. See Exercise Report, page 281 of 428. Following the commitment to provide improved maps, a task force was formed by NHY for this purpose. This task force has expended several months of effort in determining and implementing improvements to maps.

These efforts are continuing. An example of the former and an example of the enhanced bus route maps are Attachment E hereto.

The completion rate of the transit-dependent bus routes is mitigated by several factors. (1) There is considerable excess transit-dependent bus capacity (approximately 50 percent more than the capacity assumed to be required). (2) Transit-dependent bus capacity was determined on the basis of the total number of respondents to the special needs survey who indicated that they would need a ride in an emergency. The assigned capacity does not consider ride sharing which would reduce substantially the capacity required.

Overall, the Exercise Report, at page 172 of 428, found that the capability to demonstrate transportation resources for special populations was adequately demonstrated. The two deficiencies from the FEMA Final Exercise Assessment of the February 26, 1986 Exercise cited in SAPL EX-2 were resolved by the June 28-29, 1988 exercise. See Exercise Report, pages 332 and 335 of 428.

B. Refueling of Vehicles

NHRERP, Volume 4, EOC Resources Coordinator procedures and Volume 4B, Pupil Transportation Safety Procedures, provide for advising vehicle providers to "ensure that vehicles are adequately fueled prior to being dispatched."

Current letters of agreement for refueling arrangements for New Hampshire transportation resources are contained in the NHRERP, Volume 5. There are currently letters of agreement with five refueling services in the vicinity of State Transportation Staging Areas, three of which are outside of the EPZ. The letters of agreement provide that the station owners will assist the State of New Hampshire with responding to an emergency at the Seabrook Station.

During the Exercise, one bus was deliberately dispatched from the bus yard to the Rockingham Transportation Staging Area with low fuel. After its arrival at the staging area, this bus was correctly sent by staging personnel to a refueling station with which there is an LOA. The refueling station demonstrated was Anderson's Sunoco, Route 125, Epping, NH. This station is several miles from the staging area and is outside of the EPZ. The operator of this station would, therefore, not have been advised to evacuate.

The Exercise Report at page 335 of 428 confirms the arrangements for refueling vehicles.

C. FEMA Evaluation

The Exercise Report concluded at page 172 of 428 that the State of New Hampshire demonstrated the ability and resources to implement appropriate protective actions for the permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations,

handicapped persons and institutionalized persons) and that exercise objective #18 was met.

V. REGISTRATION, MONITORING, AND DECONTAMINATION OF EVACUEES

A. Reception Center Activation

The host community Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) at Dover and Salem received notification promptly according to procedures. Both EOCs were notified at 1156 of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY at Seabrook Station, ten minutes after the declaration of the emergency classification. The host community emergency response organizations were promptly activated. The Salem EOC was staffed at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY by the following personnel: Police representative, Assistant Fire Chief, Health Officer, Civil Defense Director, Radio Dispatcher, Town Manager, School Principal, and American Red Cross representative. The Dover EOC was staffed at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY by the following personnel: Police representative, Fire Department representative, School representative, emergency medical representative, American Red Cross representative, Public Works Department representative, amateur radio network representative, the Acting City Manager, and the Host Facility Coordinator. Consequently, all constituent elements of the host community emergency organizations were available to provide direction

and resources in the event activation of host community reception centers would be required.

Notification of the GENERAL EMERGENCY was made to Dover at 1334 and to Salem at 1336, in both cases within a few minutes of the declaration of the emergency classification level at 1332. Subsequent notification of protective action recommendations for New Hampshire EPZ communities were provided to the Dover and Salem EOCs at 1411 and at 1422 respectively, within minutes of the protective action decision being made at the NH State EOC at 1409. In consequence of these notifications, both host communities were advised promptly of the necessity to activate reception centers for the arrival of evacuees.

In both Dover and Salem, fire department personnel began arriving at reception centers with equipment and supplies for setting up monitoring and decontamination operations by approximately 1430. Preliminary preparation of facilities was begun according to procedures. At approximately 1500, administrative and supervisory personnel from the New Hampshire Division of Human Services and Division of Public Health Services began to arrive at reception centers at both Dover and Salem to initiate activation of registration and of monitoring and decontamination services respectively.

The Exercise Report at pages 192-193 of 428 found that the reception centers at Salem and Dover were activated and

staffed in an efficient and effective manner, the report found that all necessary equipment and supplies were available, ready for use and adequately demonstrated. The report also found that the staff was knowledgeable in the procedures to establish and operate each function of the facility.

The activation process required approximately one and one-half to two hours to accomplish at both reception facilities. Monitoring and decontamination operations at Dover were activated at 1636. The activation process in Salem was interrupted twice by actual fire alarms at 1515 and again at 1635 when monitoring operations were about to be activated. After termination of the actual fire response at Salem, monitoring and decontamination operations were activated at 1655.

The Exercise extent of play prescribed that evacuee monitoring would be demonstrated by assignment of six monitors to monitor at least sixty evacuees within thirty minutes.

Fire department personnel participated in the Exercise at Salem and Dover in sufficient numbers to demonstrate adequately the activation of all elements of monitoring and decontamination operations. Full staffing of reception center operations was demonstrated to FEMA by provision of personnel rosters in accordance with Section 3.3.19 of

Applicants' Exhibit 61. See Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 4 (Decontamination and Reception Centers) Post Tr. 4740 at 18, for a discussion of reception center staffing and provisions for assistance from fire departments in surrounding communities in the operation of reception centers.

B. Organization of Reception Centers

The reception center operations including evacuee registration and monitoring and decontamination operations were organized according to the facility diagrams contained in NHRERP, Volumes 33, 35, 36 and 38, Appendix B (host community reception center procedures). The diagrams for the reception centers at Dover and Salem are Attachment F hereto.

Organization and full activation of reception center operations was achieved at 1636 in Dover and 1655 in Salem. Evacuees began to arrive at both reception centers at approximately 1500. The evacuees were pre-staged by the scenario, and many arrived early. Evacuees were not to arrive, according to the scenario, until 1530 or after. The fact that evacuees had to wait until reception center operations were organized and fully activated was an inconvenience, but this occurrence did not demonstrate an adverse impact on public health and safety.

Evacuee processing was demonstrated according to the procedures of NHRERP, Volumes 33, 35, 36, and 38, Appendix B

and as indicated on the attached diagrams. The exercise scenario for reception centers included vehicle and evacuee contamination which resulted in referral of evacuees to each location of the reception center. While some evacuees may have entered wrong areas, procedures for segregation of contaminated and non-contaminated individuals were not violated. The problem can be remedied by assignment of additional staff to direct evacuees from station to station within the facility. This recommendation was made by the Exercise Report for both reception centers, and it will be implemented. Additional police personnel and volunteers would be available for this purpose in an actual emergency.

SAPL EX-12 asserts that "An actual breakdown in the monitoring process occurred [at Salem] at 6:28 [1828] p.m." Controller records show that the monitoring demonstration segment of the Exercise was completed at 1815. Between 1820 and 1855, the DPHS Supervisor explained to FEMA evaluators the process for turnover of staffing for extended operations and presented rosters for staffing of extended operations. The exercise terminated at 1900.

At the Salem Reception Center, the DPHS Supervisor's radio did not operate properly due to "dead spots" within the corridors of the Salem High School. The difficulty was isolated and is readily correctable by having personnel move to areas in the facility where the radios will operate.

C. Monitoring of Evacuees

As noted in Section A above, the exercise extent of play prescribed that evacuee monitoring would be demonstrated by six monitors assigned to monitor at least 60 evacuees within thirty minutes. This equates to a rate of three minutes per evacuee. This is the rate of evacuee monitoring assumed by the analysis which determined the staffing requirements for the Reception Centers. The analysis is described in Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 4 (Decontamination and Reception Centers), Post Tr. 4740 at 12-13. Both the Salem and Dover demonstration achieved this rate. The Salem monitors processed 73 evacuees ranging in age from 18 months to 60 years. The Dover monitors processed 78 evacuees ranging in age from three months to 60 years. Controller reports indicate that monitoring rates ranged between one and one-half minutes and three and one-half minutes at Dover and between two and three minutes in Salem. Overall, the Exercise Report concluded that the average monitoring time was three minutes with a range of two to four minutes per person. In the case of both Salem and Dover, the Exercise objective was met and the rate for monitoring evacuees established in the NHRERP was demonstrated.

The Exercise Report, at page 193 of 428, indicates that headsets were available on a ratio of one headset per three instruments. The report points out that this did not allow

for a headset for each monitoring station and resulted in personnel having to watch the instrument dial and the position of the probe at the same time. The Exercise Report recommends that one headset be issued for each CDV 700 type monitoring instrument to ensure that each meter being used has a headset. The State of New Hampshire has acquired the additional headsets.

A system of METTAGs was utilized according to procedure to differentiate contaminated from non-contaminated evacuees. A METTAG color code is used to make this distinction. The color would determine the appropriate location to which the evacuee would be directed and allowed to enter. The Exercise Report noted at page 192 of 428 that evacuees were routed to appropriate locations as per the monitoring and decontamination procedures. In the isolated occurrences where monitors referred evacuees with certain color METTAGs to the wrong location or where the wrong METTAG color code was assigned, personnel at the location to which the evacuee was referred sent the evacuee back to the monitoring station. Such an occurrence happened occasionally when evacuees were referred to the registration area with an incorrect METTAG color code. A person is assigned in the registration area specifically to check METTAG color codes.

The FEMA Final Assessment of the February 26, 1986 Exercise noted a deficiency because insufficient staffing

levels were demonstrated for monitoring of evacuees within about a 12-hour period. The Exercise Report for the June 28-29, 1988 Exercise at page 427 of 428 determined that this deficiency was resolved. The inconsistencies in Appendix B of Volumes 33, 35, 36 and 38 of the NHRERP noted in the Exercise Report at page 427 of 428 were resolved by the August 1988 update of the NHRERP.

D. FEMA Evaluation

The Exercise Report concluded at page 191 of 428 that the State of New Hampshire demonstrated the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and that exercise objective 21 was met.

ATTACHMENT A

(Representative Information
Provided by NHY ERO to NH IFO Staff)

STATE NOTIFICATION FACT SHEET

BLOCK 1. "THIS IS: WJ Hall (Name) CS Mgr. (Title)
 AT SEABROOK STATION, SEABROOK, NEW HAMPSHIRE.

BLOCK 2. WE HAVE DECLARED A(N):
 TIME DECLARED 1332
 TIME TERMINATED _____
 UNUSUAL EVENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY
 ALERT GENERAL EMERGENCY

BLOCK 3. WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING:
 NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED (GO TO BLOCK 4).

NEW HAMPSHIRE		
SHELTER	EVACUATE	
()	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	SEABROOK
()	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	HAMPTON FALLS
()	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	HAMPTON
()	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	KENSINGTON
()	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	SOUTH HAMPTON
()	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	NORTH HAMPTON
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	BRENTWOOD
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	EAST KINGSTON
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	EXETER
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	KINGSTON
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	NEWFIELDS
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	NEWTON
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	STRATHAM
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	GREENLAND
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	NEW CASTLE
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	PORTSMOUTH
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	RYE

MASSACHUSETTS		
SHELTER	EVACUATE	
()	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	AMESBURY
()	(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	SALISBURY
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	MERRIMAC
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	NEWBURY
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	NEWBURYPORT
(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)	()	W. NEWBURY

BEACHES (Between May 15 and September 15)
 EVACUATE
 () Seabrook Beach
 () Hampton Beach
 CLOSE
 () Parker River National Wildlife Refuge
 () Plum Island Beach
 () Salisbury Beach

BLOCK 4. THE EMERGENCY: HAS BEEN TERMINATED IS CONTINUING
 BLOCK 5. A RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY HAS NOT OCCURRED HAS BEEN TERMINATED
 IS CONTINUING

BLOCK 6. AUTHORIZED BY: L. S. [Signature] STED/SED/IRM 6-28-88 / 1332 DATE/TIME

BLOCK 7. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE WITH YOUR NAME.

NEW HAMPSHIRE Dick Thome 1341 (NAME OF DISPATCHER) (TIME)
 MASSACHUSETTS AA CD ReDC 1345 (NAME OF DISPATCHER) (TIME)
 NHY ORO Morton Funk 1337 (NAME OF DISPATCHER) (TIME)

Call back and confirm by MA DC ReDC

VERIFY THAT ALL PARTIES ABOVE HAVE RECEIVED CORRECT INFORMATION BY ASKING ONE TO READ BACK THE INFORMATION.

Notification complete by 1345 WJH
 6/28/88
 Call back by MIA at 1359 WJH

06/28/88 14:55

NETPAC V4.0 -- PLUME TRACKING AND DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

SEABROOK STATION
PLUME POSITION AT 15:00
RELEASE CONTINUING

DATE AND TIME OF:	MO/DA/YR	HR:MIN	MO/DA/YR	HR:MIN
SHUTDOWN	06/28/88	13:30		
STACK RELEASE	06/28/88	13:45		
ANALYSIS	06/28/88	14:00	06/28/88	15:00

METEOROLOGY: (FROM 06/28/88, 14:45 TO 06/28/88, 15:00)

TOWER LEVEL	WIND (MPH)	SPEED (MPH)	WIND DIR (FROM)	DELTA TEMPERATURE (DEG F/100M)	PRECIPITATION (IN/15 MIN)	SOLAR RADIATION (LARGLEY/MIN)
ELEVATED	1.0	0.45	289	-1.6	-1.8	0.00
			MMN		B	0.73

RADIOLOGICAL: (FROM 06/28/88, 14:45 TO 06/28/88, 15:00)

LOCA = ³
 STACK CONCENTRATION 6.4700E+01 uCi/CC STACK RELEASE RATE 7.6300E+09 uCi/SEC FLOW RATE 1.1793E+08 cc/sec
 MONITOR READINGS USED IN CALCULATION

SITE BOUNDARY INFORMATION AT 15:00 ELEVATED RELEASE

1000 M RADIUS
 TOTAL ACCUMULATED GAMMA DOSE 1.58E+03 mR
 TOTAL CURIES IODINE RELEASED 6.56E+06 Ci
 GENERAL
 TOTAL ACCUMULATED THYROID DOSE 1.83E-01 R
 TOTAL CURIES IODINE RELEASED 1.08E+03 Ci

PLUME NO	DIST MI	ANG DEG	WHOLE BODY DOSE RATE INFORMATION			INFANT THYROID DOSE RATE INFORMATION			DISPERSION FACTORS		
			MODEL (mR/hr)	FIELD (mR/hr)	REL RATE (uCi/sec) USE	MODEL (R/hr)	FIELD (R/hr)	REL RATE (uCi/sec) USE	GAMMA T/O DEF. (S/MIN)	T/O DEF. (S/MIN)	DEPOSITION (U/MIN)
0	0.6	109	2.40E+03	0.8	2.84E+09	2.05E-01	0.5	4.55E+05	2.50E-06	2.77E-07	1.22E-05

PLUME POINT INFORMATION AT 15:00 ELEVATED RELEASE FLUME NO. 1

PLUME NO	DIST MI	ANG DEG	WHOLE BODY DOSE RATE INFORMATION			INFANT THYROID DOSE RATE INFORMATION			DISPERSION FACTORS		
			MODEL (mR/hr)	FIELD (mR/hr)	REL RATE (uCi/sec) USE	MODEL (R/hr)	FIELD (R/hr)	REL RATE (uCi/sec) USE	GAMMA T/O DEF. (S/MIN)	T/O DEF. (S/MIN)	DEPOSITION (U/MIN)
6	1.2	102	2.56E+02	1.2	1.21E+08	1.77E-01	1.1	1.95E+04	5.17E-06	5.49E-06	2.45E-08
5	1.0	102	1.33E+03	0.9	5.46E+08	8.36E-01	0.8	8.96E+04	4.53E-06	5.76E-06	2.58E-08
4	0.7	103	2.83E+03	0.8	1.32E+09	1.33E+00	0.6	2.17E+05	6.32E-06	3.79E-06	1.89E-08
3	0.5	104	3.59E+03	0.7	2.47E+09	2.59E-01	0.4	4.05E+05	4.36E-06	3.94E-07	1.76E-09
2	0.3	109	2.34E+03	0.7	2.84E+09	1.56E-08	0.2	4.65E+05	2.44E-06	2.07E-14	8.27E-17
1	0.1	109	6.16E+03	0.6	2.84E+09	0.00E-01	0.1	4.65E+05	6.41E-06	0.00E-01	0.60E-01

06/20/89 14:55

NEI PAC V4.0 -- PLUME TRACKING AND DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

ELEVATED RELEASE PLUME PROJECTION FROM 14:45
STRAIGHT LINE PLUME PROJECTION INFORMATION

DIST (MI)	ARRIVAL TIME (HR:MIN)	GAMMA D.R. (R/HR)	4 HR EYAC (R)	4 HR SHIEL (R)	4 HR EYAC GAMMA DOSE (MR)	4 HR SHIEL GAMMA DOSE (MR)	4 HR EYAC INF THY DO (R)	4 HR SHIEL INF THY DO (R)	4 HR EYAC INF THY EQ (R)	4 HR SHIEL INF THY EQ (R)	GAMMA T/D DEPLETED T/D DEPOSITION (1/MI*H)	(1/MI*H)
0.60	109	15:21	2.401E+03	2.054E-01	2.498E-06	2.727E-07	1.219E-07					
1.00	109	15:43	4.215E+03	2.445E+00	4.186E-06	3.251E-06	1.457E-08					
2.00	109	16:45	2.002E+03	2.284E+00	2.952E-08	3.037E-06	1.355E-09					
3.00	109	17:45	1.701E+03	1.220E+00	1.770E-08	1.757E-06	7.894E-09					
4.00	109	18:45	1.433E+03	9.272E-01	1.297E-06	1.251E-06	5.502E-09					
5.00	109	19:35	1.037E+03	7.637E-01	9.709E-07	8.270E-07	3.601E-09					
6.00	109	20:45	8.943E+02	6.203E-01	8.152E-07	7.037E-07	3.182E-09					
7.00	109	21:45	7.071E+02	5.301E-01	7.036E+02	6.127E-07	2.772E-09					
8.00	109	22:45	6.369E+02	4.077E-01	6.620E-07	5.411E-07	2.419E-09					
9.00	109	23:45	5.823E+02	3.641E-01	5.065E-07	4.837E-07	2.160E-09					
10.00	109	00:45										

PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS


DIST (MI)	ARRIVAL TIME (HR:MIN)	4 HR EYAC (R)	4 HR SHIEL (R)	4 HR EYAC GAMMA DOSE (MR)	4 HR SHIEL GAMMA DOSE (MR)	4 HR EYAC INF THY DO (R)	4 HR SHIEL INF THY DO (R)	4 HR EYAC INF THY EQ (R)	4 HR SHIEL INF THY EQ (R)
0.60	109	4.801E+03	4.372E+03	4.108E-01	3.091E-01	9.602E+03	8.642E+03	8.217E-01	7.159E-01
1.00	109	8.476E+03	7.507E+03	4.858E-01	3.673E+00	1.696E+04	1.517E+04	9.797E+00	8.571E+00
2.00	109	5.768E+03	5.188E+03	4.568E+00	3.426E+00	1.157E+04	1.038E+04	6.136E+00	5.794E+00
3.00	109	3.401E+03	3.061E+03	2.680E+00	1.580E+00	6.802E+03	6.122E+03	5.281E+00	4.621E+00
4.00	109	2.884E+03	2.765E+03	1.854E+00	1.391E+00	5.727E+03	4.872E+03	2.782E+00	2.475E+00
5.00	109	2.077E+03	1.885E+03	1.489E+00	1.137E+00	2.077E+03	1.898E+03	1.898E+00	1.655E+00
6.00	109	1.150E+03	1.610E+03	8.250E-01	9.302E-01	1.146E+03	1.220E+03	8.250E-01	2.131E+00
7.00	109	2.599E+02	1.417E+03	1.749E-01	7.952E-01	2.578E+02	2.834E+03	1.749E-01	1.855E+00
8.00	109	0.000E-01	1.267E+03	0.000E-01	6.924E-01	0.000E-01	2.533E+03	0.000E-01	1.616E+00
9.00	109	0.000E-01	1.142E+03	0.000E-01	6.112E-01	0.000E-01	2.297E+03	0.000E-01	1.471E+00
10.00	109	0.000E-01	1.048E+03	0.000E-01	5.451E-01	0.000E-01	2.096E+03	0.000E-01	1.274E+00
SHELTER - SALISBURY, ANESQUIRY, S. HAMPTON									
SHELTER - FENSLINGTON, N. HAMPTON, HAMPTON									
SHELTER - HAMPTON FALLS, SEAROOK									

DIST (MI)	ARRIVAL TIME (HR:MIN)	6 HR EYAC (R)	6 HR SHIEL (R)	6 HR EYAC GAMMA DOSE (MR)	6 HR SHIEL GAMMA DOSE (MR)	6 HR EYAC INF THY DO (R)	6 HR SHIEL INF THY DO (R)	6 HR EYAC INF THY EQ (R)	6 HR SHIEL INF THY EQ (R)
0.60	109	1.440E+04	1.284E+04	1.284E+00	1.136E+00	1.575E+04	1.728E+04	1.312E+00	1.541E+00
1.00	109	2.522E+04	2.276E+04	1.489E+01	1.347E+01	2.529E+04	3.035E+04	1.489E+01	1.817E+01
2.00	109	1.441E+04	1.566E+04	1.142E+01	1.256E+01	1.441E+04	2.075E+04	1.142E+01	1.717E+01
3.00	109	6.802E+03	9.187E+03	5.261E+00	7.254E+00	8.802E+03	1.224E+04	5.261E+00	6.902E+00
4.00	109	3.726E+03	6.706E+03	2.782E+00	5.100E+00	3.726E+03	9.943E+03	2.782E+00	6.949E+00
5.00	109	2.077E+03	5.608E+03	1.489E+00	4.072E+00	2.077E+03	7.470E+03	1.489E+00	5.584E+00
6.00	109	1.150E+03	4.830E+03	8.250E-01	3.812E+00	1.150E+03	6.480E+03	8.250E-01	4.652E+00
7.00	109	2.599E+02	4.251E+03	1.749E-01	2.911E+00	2.599E+02	5.667E+03	1.749E-01	3.976E+00
8.00	109	0.000E-01	3.800E+03	0.000E-01	2.539E+00	0.000E-01	5.024E+03	0.000E-01	3.422E+00
9.00	109	0.000E-01	3.439E+03	0.000E-01	2.242E+00	0.000E-01	4.506E+03	0.000E-01	3.027E+00
10.00	109	0.000E-01	3.148E+03	0.000E-01	2.002E+00	0.000E-01	4.197E+03	0.000E-01	2.711E+00
EVACUATE - SALISBURY, ANESQUIRY, S. HAMPTON									
EVACUATE - FENSLINGTON, N. HAMPTON									
EVACUATE - HAMPTON FALLS, SEAROOK									
SHELTER - NEWBURYPORT, NEWBURY, W. NEWBURY									
SHELTER - NEWBURYPORT, BRENTWOOD									
SHELTER - NEWBURYPORT, STRATHAM, EXETER									
SHELTER - KINGSTON, NEWFIELDS, GREENLAND									
SHELTER - PORTSMOUTH, RYE, NEW CASTLE									

Label Plus

- FUNCTION KEYS**
- 1-ROADS
 - 2-RADIS
 - 3-PUBLIC
 - 4-LABELS
 - 5-ZOOM
 - 6-REDRAW
 - 7-
 - 8-PT PEN
 - 9-PRINT
 - 10-EXIT

- ELV GAM
- T=15:00H
- 1.0 MPH
- 2.0 DEG
- ← 6.0 STAM
- STATE
- TOWER
- TRIVER
- ROADS



NT

LOGGER TREND

6/28/1988

1445

EMERGENCY RESPONSE WORKSTATION: TSC/EOF

POINT ID	POINT DESCRIPTION	VALUE	UNITS
..... MET DATA -- 15 MINUTE AVERAGES			
CO783	UPPER WIND SPEED (15 MIN AVG)	1	MPH
CO784	LOWER WIND SPEED (15 MIN AVG)	1	MPH
CO785	LOWER WIND DIR (15 MIN AVG)	287	DEG
CO786	UPPER WIND DIR (15 MIN AVG)	289	DEG
CO787	LOWER DELTA-T (15 MIN AVG)	-1.6	F(A)
CO788	UPPER DELTA-T (15 MIN AVG)	-1.6	F(B)
CO789	WET BULB (15 MIN AVG)	33.5	F
CO790	AMBIENT TEMP (15 MIN AVG)	68	F
CO791	DEW POINT (15 MIN AVG)	42	F
CO797	PRECIPITATION (15 MIN AVG)	0	IN'
CO798	SOLAR RAD (15 MIN AVG)	0.73	LANGLEY

..... RDMS DATA POINTS			
1AM106	CA CONTM POST LOCA TRN A	5.99E+04	R/HR(HI)
1AM107	CA CONTM POST LOCA TRN B	5.99E+04	R/HR(HI)
1AM104	CA LO RANGE PERSONNEL HATCH	5.99E+04	MR/HR(HI)
1AM105	CA HI RANGE PERSONNEL HATCH	5.99E+04	MR/HR(HI)
1NG222	CA PLANT VENT LO RANGE GAS	1.00E-01	UC/CC(HI)
1NG223	CA PLANT VENT MID RANGE GAS	6.47E+01	UC/CC(HI)
1NG224	CA PLANT VENT HI RANGE GAS	6.47E+01	UC/CC(HI)
1CC225	CA PLANT VENT DISCH RATE	7.63E+09	UCI/SEC(HI)
1GM801	CA MAIN STEAM LINE LOOP #1	5.99E+03	MR/HR(HI)
1GM802	CA MAIN STEAM LINE LOOP #4	5.99E+03	MR/HR(HI)
1GM803	CA MAIN STEAM LINE LOOP #2	5.99E+03	MR/HR(HI)
1GM804	CA MAIN STEAM LINE LOOP #3	5.99E+03	MR/HR(HI)
1NG217	CA VENT LO RANGE GAS	000	MR/HR
1NG218	CA VENT HI RANGE GA	000	MR/HR

..... CONTAINMENT PRESSURE POINTS			
A0500	CONTN PRESSURE POINT #1	0.0	PSIG
A0501	CONTN PRESSURE POINT #2	0.0	PSIG
A0502	CONTN PRESSURE POINT #3	.	PSIG
A3778	CONT ENCL/OUTSIDE ATMOS DP	.	IN WC

..... STEAM GENERATORS


A0778	SG E-11 A STM OUTL PRESS		PSIG
A0779	SG E-11 B STM OUTL PRESS		PSIG
A0780	SG E-11 C STM OUTL PRESS	590	PSIG
A0781	SG E-11 D STM OUTL PRESS		PSIG

..... MET DATA -- INSTANTANEOUS


A1626	UPPER WIND SPEED (INSTANT)	2	MPH
A1628	LOWER WIND SPEED (INSTANT)	2	MPH
A1627	UP WIND DIRECTION (INSTANT)	299	DEG
A1630	LWR WIND DIRECTION (INSTANT)	290	DEG
A1631	LOWER DELTA-T (INSTANT)	-1.6	F(A)
A1632	UPPER DELTA-T (INSTANT)	-1.6	F(B)
A1633	DEW POINT (INSTANT)	42	F
A1634	PRECIPITATION (INSTANT)	0	IN

ATTACHMENT B


(Maps of Wind Direction at
Decision Points During the Exercise)




Wind direction from
282 degrees at 1409
Exercise Day 1-time of
initial NHPAR decision
to evacuate ERPAS



Wind direction from
349 degrees at 1627 c
Exercise Day 1-time of
NHPAR decision
to evacuate ERPA F.



Wind direction from
89 degrees at 1900 of
Exercise Day 1-time of
termination of release
conditions and termination
of Exercise Day 1.



Wind direction from 200 degrees at 1915-after termination of Exercise Day

ATTACHMENT C

(Message From Portsmouth Civil
Defense Director to NH State EOC)

LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE

MESSAGE FORM

Originator Msg. Number: _____

Date: _____

Time: _____

Control Log Number: _____

Date: _____

Time: 1319

To: Port Portsmouth
Centroler

From: Port CO Director

Message Class:

- Incoming:
- Internal:
- Outgoing:

Action Class:

- Priority:
- Urgent:
- Informational:
- Routine:

Info To:

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Selectmen | <input type="checkbox"/> EMS/Rescue | <input type="checkbox"/> Transportation | <input type="checkbox"/> Status Boards |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Town Manager | <input type="checkbox"/> Public Works | <input type="checkbox"/> Shelter Coord. | <input type="checkbox"/> Federal Agencies |
| <input type="checkbox"/> C. D. Director | <input type="checkbox"/> Health Officer | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fire | <input type="checkbox"/> School Sup. | <input type="checkbox"/> <u>Ports-IFO</u> | <input type="checkbox"/> N.H.O.E.M. (Specify) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Police | <input type="checkbox"/> RADEF | <input type="checkbox"/> <u>Centroler</u> | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| | | | <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ |

Text:

1 150 latch key children

2 to be held at Schools

3 until parents can be notified

4 and children will then be

5 released to parents.

6 _____

7 _____

8 _____

9 _____

10 _____

Reply Requested

COMMUNICATIONS

Word Count _____

USE ONLY

Message Sent By: Radio

 Recvd () Teletype ()

Telephone () Messenger ()

Telefax ()

Message Sent To: IFO Centroler

Received From: _____

Date/Time Group: 6-28 1319

Date/Time Group: _____

Operator Name: DM

Operator Name: _____

ATTACHMENT D

(New Hampshire Exercise News Advisories
and EBS Message Pertaining to Schedule)



NEWS ADVISORY

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]

NO. 5

DATE/TIME: 12:45

APPROVED BY:

THIS IS A DRILL *** THIS IS A DRILL *** THIS IS A DRILL

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Page 1 of 1

CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE -- New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management officials and New Hampshire education officials have determined that children in schools in the Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone will be held in class until approximately 5 p.m.

Officials said this recommendation is caused by an incident at Seabrook Station in Seabrook. All private and parochial schools, kindergartens, and day care centers are included in this protective measure.

Governor John H. Sununu stressed that this recommendation is a precautionary measure and there is no release of radioactive material from the Seabrook plant. Richard Strone, Director of the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management said that parents of the affected children will be notified of further developments.

In a related matter, Emergency Management officials have requested the U.S. Coast Guard to impose an exclusionary zone of 5 miles affecting boat traffic in the vicinity of the Seabrook Power Station.

All state parks and beaches from the Hampton River north within the 10-mile zone have been closed.



NEWS ADVISORY

DATE/TIME: 6/28/88 1:13 pm APPROVED BY: [Signature]

THIS IS A DRILL *** THIS IS A DRILL *** THIS IS A DRILL

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Page 1 of 1

CLARIFICATION REGARDING SCHOOL CLOSINGS (PORTSMOUTH SCHOOLS CLOSED ON CITY'S AUTHORITY)

CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE — New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management officials and New Hampshire education officials have determined that children in schools in the Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone will be held in class until approximately 5 p.m.

However, the State Emergency Management officials have been informed that school children in the City of Portsmouth have been dismissed by the authority of City officials.

State Emergency Management officials and Department of Education officials urge that all other schools within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone hold their student populations until approximately 5 p.m.

Officials said this recommendation is caused by an incident at Seabrook Station in Seabrook. All private and parochial schools, kindergartens, and day care centers are included in this protective measure.

Governor John H. Sununu stressed that this recommendation is a precautionary measure and there is no release of radioactive material from the Seabrook plant. Richard Strone, Director of the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management said that parents of the affected children will be notified of further developments.

In a related matter, Emergency Management officials have requested the U.S. Coast Guard to impose an exclusionary zone of 5 miles affecting boat traffic in the vicinity of the Seabrook Power Station.

All state parks and beaches from the Hampton River north within the 10-mile zone have been closed.



NEWS ADVISORY

NO:

9

DATE/TIME:

6/28/88
14:31

APPROVED BY:

Page 1 of 3

THIS IS A DRILL *** THIS IS A DRILL

IMPORTANT EBS MESSAGE ... IMPORTANT EBS MESSAGE ... IMPORTANT EBS MESSAGE

The following Emergency Broadcast System message was released by the director of the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management, by authority of the Governor of New Hampshire.

The New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management advises that a General Emergency was declared by New Hampshire Yankee at 1:32 p.m. today at Seabrook Station.

A release of radioactive material into the air occurred at 1:46 p.m.

A General Emergency means that the release is expected to go beyond levels set by the United States Environmental Protection Agency outside the Seabrook Station site boundary.

The State of New Hampshire recommends immediate EVACUATION of:

- Seabrook
- Hampton Falls
- Hampton
- Kensington
- South Hampton
- North Hampton

People in the remaining towns of:

- Brentwood
- East Kingston
- Exeter
- Kingston
- Newfields
- Newton
- Stratham
- Greenland
- New Castle
- Rye
- Portsmouth

will be safer if they go indoors, close all doors and windows and SHELTER in place immediately.

The United States Coast Guard has been requested to prohibit boating in the ocean waters within 10 miles of Seabrook Station. All offshore boaters near the plant are being advised to relocate to waters farther than 10 miles from the plant.

more more more

EBRS

Page 2 of 3

For towns from which EVACUATION has been recommended, reception centers have been designated. Services offered at the reception centers and recommended for all evacuees include: monitoring for possible contamination; decontamination if necessary; information and message centers, and referral to congregate care centers.

For residents of Seabrook, South Hampton the reception center is Salem High School on Geremonty Drive in Salem.

For residents of Hampton Falls, North Hampton and year-round residents of Hampton the reception center is Dover High School on Durham Road in Dover.

For residents of Kensington the reception center is Memorial High School on South Porter Street in Manchester.

Parents should NOT drive to school to meet children since schools are now being evacuated and the students are being taken directly to the reception centers. The reception center for each school is the same as the one for the town in which the school is located.

If you have been advised to evacuate but do not have your own transportation or cannot get a ride from a neighbor or someone else, buses will travel along main roads in your community to take you to the reception center for your town. Wait indoors for an announcement stating when buses will begin traveling these routes in your town.

If you or another person in your home is bedridden, handicapped or need special evacuation help and previous arrangements have not been made with local emergency management officials, please call your local emergency operations center. If there is no answer, call the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management at 433-1419. If you have already registered, there is no need to call now. You will be contacted, and help will soon be on its way.

All people in the area to be evacuated are urged to be good neighbors and help one another by sharing rides and assisting others with problems.

Before leaving your home, make sure you have put out all fires and closed fireplace dampers. Lock all doors before you leave. Take blankets and pillows for your own use and any medicines which you take regularly. Pack enough clothing for several days.

If you are at home, lock up your emergency information brochure, which includes evacuation routes, bus routes and sheltering tips.

more more more

Page 3 of 3

Emergency information brochures also have been delivered to hotels, motels, businesses and beach and park facilities. Check the local telephone book for additional information. This information could be helpful in understanding future EBS messages.

If you live in a town where SHELTERING has been recommended, stay indoors and make sure all windows and doors are closed tightly. Turn off all fans, air conditioning and heating systems if they bring in outside air. Take a radio with you and move to the room with fewest windows and doors. Keep all members of your household indoors and stay tuned to your local Emergency Broadcast System radio station. Remain indoors until told by local or state officials that it is safe to go outside, or until further protective actions are recommended. If you are in your car, close all windows and vents while you travel to your destination.

Schools, hospitals and other institutions in the towns being sheltered are taking similar actions. Public officials have instructions for protecting children and other persons in their care until sheltering is no longer necessary. Parents and relatives are advised not to call the schools or other institutions nor to drive to schools to attempt to pick up their children. The safety of all concerned will be better served by permitting schools and other institutions to conduct their own sheltering plans over the next several hours.

Please do not use the telephone except in the case of a personal emergency.

Repeating: a General Emergency has been declared at Seabrook Station.

This message will be repeated every 15 minutes or until new information is available. Stay tuned to this station for the latest official information.

Actions recommended in this message are intended only for people in New Hampshire communities within 10 miles of Seabrook Station. Residents of northeastern Massachusetts should tune to a local Emergency Broadcast System radio station for information about those communities.

/end



NEWS ADVISORY

NO:

11

DATE/TIME:

6/28/88 16:01

APPROVED BY:

THIS IS A DRILL *** THIS IS A DRILL *** THIS IS A DRILL

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Page 1 of 1

SCHOOL CHILDREN TO REMAIN AT SCHOOLS UNTIL 7 P.M.

CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE -- New Hampshire Emergency Management and Department of Education officials have recommended that students who have been held at their schools and day care centers because of the emergency at Seabrook Station should be held at the schools and day care centers until 7 p.m.

Those parents who wish to pick their children up at those schools and day care centers before 7 p.m. may do so.

- 30 -

- 30 -



NEWS ADVISORY

11/3 message is news referred in testimony
James A. Higg
1655
6-28-88

NO: # 12

DATE/TIME: 16:57

APPROVED BY:

THIS IS A DRILL *** THIS IS A DRILL

Page 1 of 3

IMPORTANT EBS MESSAGE...IMPORTANT EBS MESSAGE...IMPORTANT EBS MESSAGE

The following Emergency Broadcast System message was released by the director of the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management, by authority of the Governor of New Hampshire.

Concord, NH — The New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management advises that a General Emergency was declared by New Hampshire Yankee at 1:32 p.m. today at Seabrook Station.

A release of radioactive material has occurred.

A General Emergency means that the release is expected to go beyond levels set by the United States Environmental Protection Agency outside the Seabrook Station site boundary.

The State of New Hampshire recommends immediate EVACUATION of:

- Seabrook
- Hampton Falls
- Hampton
- Kensington
- South Hampton
- North Hampton
- Brentwood
- East Kingston
- Exeter
- Kingston
- Newfields
- Newton

The people in the towns of:

- Stratham
- Greenland
- New Castle
- Rye
- Portsmouth

will be safer if they remain indoors, close all doors and windows and SHELTER in place immediately.

The United States Coast Guard has been requested to prohibit boating in the ocean waters within 10 miles of Seabrook Station. All offshore boaters near the plant are being advised to relocate to waters farther than 10 miles from the plant.

Page 2 of 3

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For residents of Kensington, Brentwood, Exeter, East Kingston and Newfields, the reception center is Memorial High School on South Porter Street in Manchester.

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If you or another person in your home is bedridden, handicapped or need special evacuation help and previous arrangements have not been made with local emergency management officials, please call your local emergency operations center. If there is no answer, call the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management at 433-1419. If you have already registered, there is no need to call now. You will be contacted, and help will soon be on its way.

All people in the area to be evacuated are urged to be good neighbors and help one another by sharing rides and assisting others with problems.

Before leaving your home, make sure you have put out all fires and closed fireplace dampers. Lock all doors before you leave. Take blankets and pillows for your own use and any medicines which you take regularly. Pack enough clothing for several days.

If you are at home, look up your emergency information brochure, which includes evacuation routes, bus routes and sheltering tips.

more more more

Page 3 of 3

Emergency information brochures also have been delivered to hotels, motels, businesses and beach and park facilities. Check the local telephone book for additional information. This information could be helpful in understanding future EBS messages.

If you live in a town where SHELTERING has been recommended, stay indoors and make sure all windows and doors are closed tightly. Turn off all fans, air conditioning and heating systems if they bring in outside air. Take a radio with you and move to the room with fewest windows and doors. Keep all members of your household indoors and stay tuned to your local Emergency Broadcast System radio station. Remain indoors until told by local or state officials that it is safe to go outside, or until further protective actions are recommended. If you are in your car, close all windows and vents while you travel to your destination.

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Please do not use the telephone except in the case of a personal emergency.

Repeating: a General Emergency has been declared at Seabrook Station.

This message will be repeated every 15 minutes or until new information is available. Stay tuned to this station for the latest official information.

Actions recommended in this message are intended only for people in New Hampshire communities within 10 miles of Seabrook Station. Residents of northeastern Massachusetts should tune to a local Emergency Broadcast System radio station for information about those communities.

/end


ATTACHMENT E

(Example of Former and Enhanced Route Maps)

NHY_UF-M:UE-M270805.DGN:J

ROCKINGHAM COUNTY FARM (STATE STAGING AREA)
TO
NORTH HAMPTON FIRE DEPARTMENT (LOCAL STAGING AREA)

Document Control Center
Control Number *MSA*



LEFT OUT OF COUNTY FARM ONTO NORTH ROAD
RIGHT (EAST) ON RT. 101 (BECOMES RT. 51)
EXIT AT RT. 101D, TAKE LEFT AT END OF RAMP (RT. 101D EAST)
CONTINUE ON RT. 101D STRAIGHT THRU LIGHTS AT RT. 1
RT. 101D BECOMES ATLANTIC AVE.
FIRE DEPT. IS ON LEFT SIDE OF ATLANTIC AVE.
JUST BEYOND RT. 1 JUNCTION AND BEFORE RAILROAD TRACKS

KEY

- ★ LOCAL STAGING AREA
- STATE STAGING AREA



REV	DATE	BY	CHKD	APPD	DESCRIPTION
0	11/17/05	MSA	JENK		

NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

ROCKINGHAM COUNTY
STATE STAGING AREA TO
NORTH HAMPTON LOCAL STAGING AREA

DEM - 270805

- LEGEND**
- STATE STAGING AREA
 - ★ LOCAL STAGING AREA
 - ⊕ CHURCH
 - ⚙️ TOWN HALL
 - 🚒 FIRE DEPARTMENT
 - 🏢 COMMERCIAL BUSINESS
 - 🚦 TRAFFIC LIGHT
 - ⛽ GAS STATION
 - 📖 LIBRARY
 - 🏰 WATER TOWER
 - ➡ ROUTE



NOTE: TOTAL TRIP LENGTH 13.2 MILES

LEFT OUT OF COUNTY FARM ONTO NORTH ROAD
 RIGHT (EAST) ON RT. 101 (BECOMES RT. 51)
 EXIT AT RT. 101D, TAKE LEFT AT END OF RAMP (RT. 101D EAST)
 STRAIGHT THROUGH INTERSECTION OF RT. 151 (POST RD)
 TAKE THE NEXT RIGHT ON RT. 101D (ATLANTIC AVE)
 CONTINUE ON RT. 101D STRAIGHT THRU LIGHTS AT RT. 1
 FIRE DEPT. IS ON LEFT SIDE OF ATLANTIC AVE.
 JUST BEYOND RT. 1 JUNCTION AND BEFORE RAILROAD TRACKS

REV	DATE	BY	CHKD	APPD	MAPPING TASK FORCE EX-5	DESCRIPTION

NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

ROCKINGHAM COUNTY
 STATE STAGING AREA TO
 NORTH HAMPTON LOCAL STAGING AREA


DEM 2708045

ATTACHMENT F

(Diagrams of Dover and Salem Reception Centers)

APPENDIX F1


City of Dover
Reception Center
and
Decontamination Center
Facility Layouts



Legend

- Assumed Evacuees / Vehicles Contaminated (dashed arrow)
- Clean Evacuees / Vehicles (solid arrow)
- Monitoring Areas (solid circle)

APPENDIX F1 FORM 1
RECEPTION CENTER & DECONTAMINATION CENTER A




APPENDIX F1 FORM 2
DOVER HIGH SCHOOL
(GROUND FLOOR)


Legend

- Assumed Evacuees Contaminated (indicated by a dashed arrow)
- Clean Evacuees (indicated by a solid arrow)
- Monitoring Areas (indicated by a black circle)
- Telephone (indicated by a 'P' symbol)
- Electrical Room (indicated by a 'E' symbol)

- Legend**
- Assumed Evacuees Contaminated
 - Clean Evacuees
 - Crowd Lines
 - Monitoring Areas
 - Telephone P
 - Restricted Access



APPENDIX F1 FORM 3
DOVER HIGH SCHOOL
(FIRST FLOOR)



Legend


Assumed Evacuees Contaminated

Telephone

Restricted Access

APPENDIX F1 FORM 4 STUDENT WAITING AREAS
DOVER HIGH SCHOOL
(SECOND FLOOR)


APPENDIX F1 FORM 5 DECONTAMINATION AREA A
DOVER HIGH SCHOOL




APPENDIX F

Town of Salem
Recreation Center
and
Decontamination Center
Facility Layouts

CENTER A
APPENDIX F1 FORM 2
RECEPTION CENTER VEHICLE MANAGEMENT DIAGRAM
SALEM HIGH SCHOOL




APPENDIX F1 FORM 3 RECEPTION & MASS CARE CENTER SALEM HIGH SCHOOL CENTER A



APPENDIX F1 FORM 4 RECEPTION & MASS CARE CENTER
 CENTER A

SALEM HIGH SCHOOL

SECOND FLOOR





ENTIRE SECOND FLOOR USED FOR
 STUDENT WAITING. If Needed.
 MASS CARE May Occupy Wing
 Occupied By Rooms 244-253.

Legend

- Assume Evacuees Contaminated —————>
- Clean Evacuees —————>
- Auditorium Capacity — 600
- Room 122 (Lower Level) — Childcare Facility
- Monitoring Area — ●
- Large Classrooms — (34) (204)
- Registration Area — [-----]
- Telephone — P
- Restricted Access — |

APPENDIX F1 FORM 5 RECEPTION & MASS CARE CENTER
SALEM HIGH SCHOOL CENTER A



- Legend**
- Assume Evacuees Contaminated ————>
 - Clean Evacuees ————>
 - Ambliorium Capacity — 600
 - Room 122 (Lower Level) — Chikicare Facility
 - Monitoring Area — ●
 - Large Classrooms — (34) (20)
 - Registration Area — *****
 - Telephone — P
 - Restricted Access — |—|


TO MASS CARE CENTER
 AND STUDENT
 WAITING IF NEEDED

Phone

BOTH LEVELS DESIGNATED
 FOR MASS CARE CENTER USE
 AND STUDENT WAITING
 IF NEEDED

APPENDIX F1 FORM 6 DECONTAMINATION CENTER

SALEM HIGH SCHOOL (LARGE GYM)



- Legend
- Assume Evacuees Contaminated
 - Clean Evacuees
 - Crowd Lines
 - Monitoring Area
 - Flux Coverage
 - Telephone (Ext 121) - P1
 - Telephone (Ext 122) - P2

APPENDIX F1 FORM 7 DECONTAMINATION CENTER A
SALEM HIGH SCHOOL
(FEMALE LOCKER AREA)

