

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 5	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4) Unplanned Auto Start of Standby Gas Treatment System Trains During Action to Change Boundary of Equipment Clearance on Reactor Building Ventilation Dampers

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	1 4	8 9	8 9	0 0 7	0 0	0 4	1 1	8 9				0 5 0 0 0
												0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (8) 4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 1 0	20.402(b)	20.405(e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	20.405(a)(1)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME M. J. Pastva, Jr., Regulatory Compliance Specialist	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 9 1 1 9    4 1 5 7 1 - 1 2 3 1 1 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)     NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During the Unit 1 1988-1989 refuel/maintenance outage, with refueling completed and no activities in progress requiring Reactor Secondary Containment, unplanned auto-starting of the unit Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System trains 1A and 1B occurred at 2355 hours on 3/14/89. Actions were in progress to remove electrical fuse FU5, which is in the power supply to the Reactor Building ventilation dampers, as part of a change to the boundary of an equipment clearance involving the dampers. Following an Operations assessment of this event, the SBGT trains were secured and returned to standby readiness at 0005 hours on 3/15/89. This event had minimal impact upon plant safety.

This event resulted from unintentional deenergizing of the SBGT System trouble-start relay circuit when the circuit fuse FU4, which is located directly above FU5, was momentarily disconnected by the involved Control Operator (CO). The CO immediately realized his error and reconnected FU4 into the circuit. The disturbance of FU4, which along with FU5 is clearly labeled, is attributed to a mental error by the CO.

As corrective action to this event, the involved CO was counseled on the importance of adequately identifying plant components prior to performing plant evolutions.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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NOTE: If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's (17)

Event

Unplanned automatic starting of the Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment System trains during a change to an equipment clearance boundary in support of a plant modification.

Initial Conditions

The Unit 1 1988-1989 refueling/maintenance outage was ongoing, with refueling completed and no activities in progress that required establishment of Reactor Secondary Containment. At 0000 hours on March 2, 1989, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) A1-89-0297 was established on the secondary containment to permit removal of the Reactor Building secondary containment ventilation dampers (EIIS/VA/DMP) from service for Plant Modification (PM) 89-003. This PM corrects a design deficiency involving the dampers' actuators (EIIS/VA/75), which had previously been identified in LER 1-88-034. At 0654 hours on March 3, 1989, equipment clearance 1-472 was then hung to permit implementation of the subject PM. Subsequently, at shortly before 2355 hours on March 14, 1989, actions were in progress to make an approved change to the boundary of clearance 1-472 in order to support the involved PM work.

Event Description

In accordance with the involved clearance tag sheet, electrical fuse FU5 (EIIS/VA/FU), which supplies power to the ventilation dampers, was to be pulled. This fuse is located in Control Room backpanel XU-27 (EIIS/VA/P) and is situated directly above electrical fuse FU4 (EIIS/BH/FU), which is in the trouble-start relay circuit of the unit Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System trains 1A and 1B (EIIS/BH/FLT).

At 2355 hours, while intending to remove FU5, the involved Control Operator (CO) inadvertently placed fuse pullers onto and began to remove FU4, which broke electrical contact and caused the SBGT trains to automatically start, per design. The CO immediately realized his mistake and electrically reconnected the fuse. The starting of the SBGT trains was made apparent through Control Room alarm annunciation and indication.

Following an Operations assessment of the initiating cause of the event, the SBGT trains were secured and returned to standby readiness at 0005 hours on March 15, 1989.

Cause of Event/Corrective Action

This event is attributed to a mental error on the part of the involved CO, who had performed research regarding the subject change to the equipment clearance boundary. A review of the conditions in panel XU-27 indicates that both fuses FU4 and FU5 are clearly labeled for easy identification. As a result of this event, the involved CO was counseled to be cognizant of the importance of adequately identifying plant components prior to performing plant evolutions.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Event Assessment

This event would not have been more severe under other reasonable and credible alternative conditions, as the SBT System reverted to its design condition.

A review of plant documentation shows this event is an isolated occurrence where properly labeled equipment was inadvertently deenergized.



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project  
P. O. Box 10429  
Southport, NC 28461-0429  
April 11, 1989

FILE: B09-13510C  
SERIAL: BSEP/89-0318

10CFR50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1  
DOCKET NO. 50-325  
LICENSE NO. DPR-71  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-89-007

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,

J. L. Harness, General Manager  
Brunswick Nuclear Project

MJP/jee

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter  
Mr. E. G. Tourigny  
BSEP NRC Resident Office