

Honeywell

SUB-971

April 5, 1989

Bruce S. Mallet, Ph.D., Chief
Nuclear Materials Safety
and Safeguards Branch
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reference: Special Inspection Report No. 040-07982/88001(DRSS)

Dear Mr. Mallet:

The following information is submitted in response to the subject report and your letter on the same subject dated 24 March 1989.

As was identified during Ms. Casey's investigation, there did appear to be some confusion or misinterpretation by security guards with regard to the subject incident and subsequent emergency response duties. It is our position, however, that this misinterpretation was isolated to the specific security personnel involved at the time of the incident who perceived their job function as including emergency response in addition to their other duties. At no time were Security Guards directed to provide emergency support in the event of a depleted uranium fire by the Fire Department other than assist in directing the Fire Department to the fire area from a safe distance.

In response to the incident and apparent misinterpretation by the guards a training session was held with the subject guards on 17 June 1988 to clarify the emergency plan, provide background information relative to radioactive materials (specifically depleted uranium), and answer any questions which were offered. All three guards subject to the investigation were present. In addition, informal instruction on the hazards of depleted uranium and detailed instruction on the Honeywell, New Brighton, Building 502 Emergency Plan as it relates to the depleted uranium manufacturing area is provided to facility Security personnel upon their assignment to the facility. The Emergency Plan clearly states that if the depleted uranium area fire alarm sounds while a Security Guard is on Detex rounds (non-manufacturing hours): 1. No entry to the depleted uranium room is to be made; 2. The Fire Department is to be called; and 3. The Fire Department should be directed to the fire area from outside of the depleted uranium wing.

The Emergency Plan for Building 502, including the depleted uranium manufacturing area, is revised as needed on an annual basis with the most recent revision being February 1989. As stated above, the Emergency Plan clearly states the responsibilities of the Security Guards in the event of a depleted uranium fire.

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DEFENSE SYSTEMS GROUP

NRCLETTER

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Mr. Bruce Mallet

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
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Since the October 1988 investigation by Ms. Casey, our depleted uranium manufacturing operations have been discontinued due to a completion of the corresponding production contract commitments. All mixing, related handling and final disposal of depleted uranium grindings and chips is complete. Current activity in the area is comprised of limited cleanup and preventive maintenance activity. Concurrently, facility and contract management are evaluating options for continued depleted uranium business and ultimate area closure.

I believe this information will clarify the questions you have raised. If you have any additional questions or need any further information, please contact me at (612)638-5205.

Sincerely,

HONEYWELL INC.



James A. Fitzsimmons
Environmental Engineer
Building 502
MN30-2546