

WILLIAM T. COTTLE Vice President Nuclear Operations June 7, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-29
RWCU Isolation Due to Flow
Perturbations
LER 89-007-00
AECM-89/0107

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 89-007-00 which is an interim report.

Yours truly,

LOT Com

WTC:mtc Attachment

cc: Mr. T. H. Cloninger (w/a)
Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/a)
Mr. N. S. Reynolds (w/a)
Mr. H. L. Thomas (w/o)
Mr. H. O. Christensen (w/a)

Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter (w/a)
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. L. L. Kintner, Project Manager (w/a) Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14B20 Washington, D.C. 20555

P. O. BOX 756

GRAND GUF NUCLEAR STATION PORT GIBSON, MISSISSIPPI 39150

(601) 437-6809

8906130093 890607 PDR ADUCK 05000416

Attachment to AECM-89/0107

MRC Form (9-83)	296-				I.IC	ENSE	E EVE	NT RE	PORT		U.S. NU	CLEAR	REGULAT VED OMB 5: 8/31/88		
FACILITY	NAME (1	)	TO THE PERSON NAMED AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON NAMED AND ADDRES	THE RESIDENCE OF STREET, STREE		-	************	******			DOCKET NUMBER	(2)	AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY OF	PA	GE (3)
GI	rand (	Gulf	Nucle	ar Statio	n - Uni	t 1					0 15 10 10	1014	1116	1 0	F 0 14
TITLE (4)			************		SERVICE SERVICE SERVICE SERVICE SERVICES	***************************************					<del></del>				
RV	VCU I	solat	tion D	ue to Flo	w Pertu	rbati	ons								
PRINTED PRINTE	NT DATE	ENTREMPORTUNICA PROPRIE	1	LER NUMBER (	NAMES OF THE OWNERS OF THE OWNER,	aget and manager a reason in	PORT DAT	E (7)		DTHE	FACILITIES INVO	LVED I	1)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		FACILITY NA	AMES	DOCKE	T NUMBER	R(S)	
		*******		*****					NA			0 15	1010	101	1.1
0   5	0 8	8 9	8 9	00017	-010	d 6	0 7	8 9				0   5	1010	101	11
OPE	RATING		THIS REP	DRT IS BUBMITTE	D PURSUANT	TO THE R	EQUIREME	ENTS OF 1	O CFR 8: 10	Check one or more	of the following) (1	11			
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 010			20.4	05(e)(1)(i) 05(e)(1)(ii) 05(e)(1)(iii) 05(e)(1)(iv) 05(e)(1)(v)		20.406 80.36(c) 80.73(c) 80.73(c) 80.73(c)	0(1) 0(2) 0(2)(i) 0(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(xii)			ostract IC Form		
NAME						ICENSEE	CONTACT	POR THIS	LER (12)			TELEPH	ONE NUM	BER	
Rona	ld By	rd/Li	censi	ng Engine	CONTRACTOR OF STREET	EACH CO	OMPONENT	FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPO	6 0 1 AREA CODE				1812
CAUSE	SYSTEM	СОМР	DNENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER		NPRDS		
						************				111					
			ш	111			<del>ng sasandinassa q</del>				111			-	
		-	normal or names man	SUPPLEME	NTAL REPORT	EXPECTE	ED (14)			***************************************	EXPECTE	D	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Δ		-	***	UBMISSION DATE		-	NO				DATE (1)	ON	0 1	112	9 1 0

On May 8, 1989 the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system isolated on a leak detection differential flow signal while shifting RWCU operation from the pre-pump to the post-pump mode at a reactor pressure of 27 psig. Operators checked instrumentation to ensure no actual leak had occurred and restored RWCU to service in the post-pump mode.

An Evaluation of the RWCU system operation and design was performed. It was determined that a reactor pressure of 27 psig may not supply sufficient net positive suction head (NPSH) to facilitate switching RWCU operation to the post-pump mode. Additionally, erroneous flow indications may result when establishing or ceasing blowdown due to the valve lineup sequence in relation to the location of the flow element.

Operating Instructions have been changed to require shifting from pre-pump to post-pump modes, and vice-versa, at approximately 100 psig reactor pressure. Valve lineups have also been modified to prevent erroneous flow indications during future blowdown modes of operation. Additional design enhancements are being considered.

MCAECM89060602 - 3

NRC Form 366

NRC Form 3667 19-63)	•		LI	CENS	SEE	EV	EN	TA	EF	POR	Т	(LE	ER	) T	EX	т	cc	N'	TIN	U	ATIO	ON				U.S.	API	PINES	0 0	мв 1				BION
FACILITY NAM	4E (1)	CONTRACTOR OF STREET	*******	Title and the second	A-HORAN HOUSE	HOUSE SERVICE AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IN COLUMN TO THE PERSON NAMED IN COL	gasta and		*******	ETHA NIGHTHAN	Do	OCK	ET I	NUM	BER	(21)	mentos	natura en	PENNANDA PAR	T	-	ing name	LEF	N.	PABE	ER (6	j			DATE SALES	P.	AGE	31	
											1									I	YEAR	T		SEG	UEN	TIAL		NUMB	ON					
Grand	Gulf	Nucle	ar	Stat	ion	-	U	nit	1		0	1	5	0	0	10	14	1	116	5	819	1		0	10	17	_	01	0	0	12	OF	0	14
TEXT IV more a	ance is reas	ulradi, uan au	rich Vinne	W NRC &	ere: 996.	R'w/ 1	171						-			-		-							-			-						

### A. REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

On May 8, 1989 the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system isolated on a leak detection differential flow signal while shifting RWCU operation from the pre-pump mode to the post-pump mode. The automatic isolation of the RWCU system containment isolation valves is reported as an ESF actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

### B. INITIAL CONDITIONS

The plant was in mode 2, Startup, with a reactor pressure of 27 psig.

### C. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On May 8, 1989, the plant was in a startup evolution. At 27 psig reactor pressure, operators began shifting RWCU (EIIS code:CE) operation from the pre-pump mode (pump discharge flow through the heat exchangers) to the post-pump mode (pump suction flow through the heat exchangers) when erratic differential flow indications and alarms were received. After the transfer was made and the alarms cleared, operators re-established RWCU blowdown to the main condenser. Differential flow indications on both "A" and "B" channels became erratic. At 0919, approximately five minutes after establishing blowdown flow, the delta flow delay timer alarm annunciated. The delta flow timer is set to time out at approximately 45 seconds. Operators attempted to clear the delta flow signal by securing the RWCU pump and closing the filter demineralizer bypass valve, 1633-F044. The delta flow timer timed out and the RWCU system containment isolation valves automatically closed.

Operators checked instrumentation to ensure that no actual leak had occurred and restored RWCU to service in the post-pump mode.

## D. APPARENT CAUSE

An evaluation of system operation and design revealed the following:

- The Integrated Operating Instruction requires shifting RWCU operation to the post-pump mode above 25 psig reactor pressure for thermal protection of the seals and additional Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) (See LER 88-014). However, a review of this incident has revealed that a reactor pressure of 27 psig may not supply sufficient NPSH to eliminate flow perturbations while switching RWCU operation to the post-pump mode.
- Erroneous flow indications may result when establishing or ceasing blowdown to the condenser because of a vacuum in the blowdown line. This vacuum condition may cause an imbalance in the impulse lines to the flow transmitter.

NRC Form 386A (9-62)		ICENSEE E	VENT	REPO	RT (	LE	R) 1	(E)	(T (	CON	NT	INU	TAL	101	N		U.S	AP	PROVED O	ME N				SION
FACILITY NAME	E (1)		CONTRACTOR OF THE PERSON NAMED OF THE	ON OWNERS AND	DO	CKET	NUI	MBER	(2)	-	NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY O	******	Т	NA STREET	LE	R NLR	MBER (6	i)	NE COLUMN TO THE O		PJ	ACIE	(3)	and the same
													wg.	AR			ENTIAL	I	RUMBER		-			
Grand G	Gulf Nuclear	Station	- Uni	t 1	0	15	10	10	10	141	1	6	8	9	_	01	017	-	010	9	3	OF	0	14

o The RWCU leak detection flow transmitters are not temperature

compensated and induce minor flow indication errors due to the temperature change between different reactor operating conditions.

### E. SUPPLEMENTAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Integrated Operating Instructions have been changed to require shifting from pre-pump to post-pump modes of operation (and vice-versa) at approximately 100 psig reactor pressure.

Additionally, System Operating Instruction 04-1-01-G33-1 was changed to modify the blowdown lineup such that the final condenser isolation valve to be opened is the last valve next to the condenser when establishing blowdown. When securing blowdown, this valve will be the first valve closed to ensure vacuum is not drawn on blowdown flow instrumentation. The lineup will prevent erroneous flow indications during future blowdown modes of operation.

SERI is also evaluating the feasibility of the following long term actions:

- o a design change to move the existing flow element 1G33-NO11 upstream of flow control valve 1G33-F033 to ensure more accurate flow indications.
- a design change to the differential flow circuitry to include a new timer for a 300 gpm delta flow trip to be set at 10-15 seconds and the present timer for the 79 gpm delta flow trip to be set at 5 minutes. The time delay extension for the lower delta flow setpoint would allow for perturbations to clear during RWCU evolutions. The short time delay for a higher leakage rate would ensure rapid isolation for more significant flow transients.
- o the addition of differential flow indicators to the P680 Control Room panel. The indication is currently installed on a Control Room backpanel separated from the Main Control Room panel where system alignments are performed.
- enhancement of instrument venting procedures.

The result of these evaluations and actual changes to be implemented will be reported in an update to this report by January 12, 1990.

The magnitude of induced flow indication errors caused by reactor water temperature changes was evaluated and considered insignificant when compared to the effects of low NPSH and vacuum conditions in the blowdown line. Adjustments to compensate for temperature changes at this time are not warranted.

NRC Form 386A 19-631																эмв	LATORY COMMISS IS NO 3150-0104 785								
FACILITY NAME (1)		*****************	THE REAL PROPERTY.		-	DO	CKET	NUI	MEER	i ign	undniens	annanda.	-	Г	KONTRACK	LES	RNU	MBER (6			T	,	PAGE	31	
						1								YEA	in.		SEC	UENTIAL		MEVISION NUMBER					
Grand Gulf Nucle	ear S	tation		Unit	1	0	15	10	10	10	14	1	16	81	9	_	0	1017	-	010	0	14	OF	0	14

# F. SAFETY ASSESSMENT

There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. Containment isolation valves responded as designed. No actual unidentified RWCU leakage was present.