10CFR50.73

Vepco

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
P. O. BOX 402
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

June 6, 1989

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. N-89-012A
NO/DEQ: nih
Docket No. 50-338

License No. NPF-4

Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following updated Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit 1. This LER was updated to include additional valves that individually exceeded the allowable leakage of 0.60 La allowed by 10CFR50 Appendix J and Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.

Report No. LER 89-007-01

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their review.

Very Truly Yours,

G. E. Kane
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N. W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. J. L. Caldwell
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

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NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)

ADDITIONAL VALVES EXCEEDED LOCAL LEAK RATE LIMIT

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 3	2 8	8 9	8 9	— 0 0 7	— 0 1	0 6	0 6	8 9		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
G. E. Kane, Station Manager	7 0 3 8 9 4 - 5 1 1 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	B I	V	A 1 8 0	Y		X	B I	V	A 1 8 0	Y	
X	B I	V	A 1 8 0	Y		X	C C	V	M 3 6 0	Y	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During Type C Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) on March 28, 1989, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the combined "as found" leakage exceeded the allowable limit for the previous operating cycle. Three of the Service Water (SW) valves and two of the Component Cooling (CC) valves tested individually exceeded the total allowable LLRT leakage of 0.60 La allowed by 10CFR50 Appendix J and Technical Specification 3.6.1.2. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). A four hour report was made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).

A Work Request (WR) has been initiated for the failed valves. The valves will be inspected, adjusted, and retested to within acceptable leak rate prior to the end of the present refueling outage.

Failure of the valves to pass the LLRT could result in leakage from the containment atmosphere to the environment. However, closed system integrity was verified available for each penetration that individually exceeded the total allowable leakage. The system integrity would prevent direct leakage to the environment.

The health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

NRC Form 366B (9-83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FAILURE CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	PAGE (3)
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	8 9	— 0 0 7	— 0 1	0 2 OF 0 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	C C	V	M 3 6 0	Y					

NRC FORM 366B (9-83)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	8 9	— 0 0 7	— 0 1	0 3 OF 0 4

TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

1.0 Description of Event

During Type C Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) on March 28, 1989, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the combined "as found" leakage exceeded the allowable limit for the previous operating cycle. Three Service Water (SW) valves and two Component Cooling (CC) valves tested individually exceeded the total allowable LLRT leakage of 0.60 La allowed by 10CFR50 Appendix J and Technical Specification 3.6.1.2. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). A four hour report was made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).

The three SW valves (EIIS System Identifier BI, Component Identifier V), 1-SW-MOV-103A, 1-SW-MOV-103D, and 1-SW-MOV-104C, which failed to pass the LLRT, and individually exceeded the leakage limit for the previous operating cycle, provide isolation for the SW lines to the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers (EIIS System Identifier BE, Component Identifier HX) and containment. The two CC valves (EIIS System Identifier CC, Component Identifier V), 1-CC-572 and 1-CC-559, which failed to pass the LLRT, and individually exceeded the leakage limit for the previous operating cycle, provide isolation for the CC lines to the Containment Air Recirculation Fans (EIIS System Identifier BK, Component Identifier FAN).

2.0 Significant Safety Consequences and Implications

Failure of the valves to pass the LLRT could result in leakage from the containment atmosphere to the environment. However, closed system integrity was verified available for each penetration that individually exceeded the total allowable leakage. The system integrity would prevent direct leakage to the environment.

The health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

3.0 Cause of the Event

An initial evaluation attributed the cause of the Type C test failures to misadjustment.

4.0 Corrective Action

As an initial corrective action, a station Work Request (WR) was initiated in accordance with station procedures to inspect and adjust the valves as necessary.

The valves will be inspected, adjusted, and retested to within acceptable leak rate values prior to the end of the present refueling outage.

*U.S. GPO: 1988-520-569/00070

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	8 9	— 0 0 7	— 0 1	0 4 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

5.0 Additional Corrective Actions

Valve leakage and maintenance history is being monitored to determine the cause of failure for valves that repeatedly fail Type C testing. This trending will identify any necessary corrective actions.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence

Corrective actions identified will be evaluated and implemented as necessary.

7.0 Similar Events

Previous similar events have occurred at North Anna Power Station on Unit 1 on January 6, 1981 (LER 81-009/03L-0) and July 26, 1982 (LER 82-053/03L-0) and on Unit 2 on April 13, 1982 (LER 82-017/03L-0), May 18, 1983 (LER 83-040/03L-0), August 31, 1987 (LER 87-012), and March 20, 1989 (LER 89-003).

8.0 Additional Information

Unit 2 was in a refueling outage and was unaffected by this event.

The Unit 1 "as found" LLRT test procedure (1-PT-61.3) is approximately 94% complete. A supplemental report will be provided if additional valves individually exceed the leakage of 0.60 La allowed by 10CFR50 Appendix J and Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.

The three SW valves which failed the LLRT test and individually exceeded the leakage limit for the previous cycle were 1-SW-MOV-103A, 1-SW-MOV-103D and 1-SW-MOV-104C. LER 89-007-00 incorrectly reported 1-SW-MOV-104A as failing the LLRT instead of 1-SW-MOV-103D.