NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 2	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
Fire Seal Missing Due to Error In Construction Documentation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0
0 8	0 7	8 7	8 7	— 0 2 1	— 0 0	0 9	0 8	8 7	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
1		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Alan L. Holder, Protection and Loss Control Engineer	5 0 4 — 4 6 4 - 3 4 8 2

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1141 hours on August 7, 1987, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 was operating at 100% power when Operations personnel, performing a routine plant inspection, discovered that the fire seal for penetration VI A0126 was missing. The missing fire seal is located on the +46 foot elevation of the Reactor Auxiliary Building where a 4 inch vent line for the B Emergency Diesel Generator penetrates the floor through an 8 inch sleeve. A fire watch was promptly established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.11. It is probable that this condition existed since plant startup, therefore the plant was in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.7.11 between December 18, 1984 and August 7, 1987.

Further investigation revealed that penetration seal VI A0126 was inadvertently deleted from the penetration seal list in the spring of 1984, prior to the system turnover walkdowns and development of surveillance procedures. The seal therefore was never indicated as being required for inspection in the current "Penetration Table" nor contained in procedure ME-3-006, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals". The seal is expected to be repaired by September 30, 1987 and Station Modification 2001 has been issued to revise the appropriate documents.

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☆U.S.GPO:1984-0-454-481/18759

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 2	8 7	— 0 2 1	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1141 hours on August 7, 1987, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 was operating at 100% power when Operations personnel, performing a routine plant inspection, discovered that the fire seal for penetration VI A0126 was missing. The missing fire seal is located on the +46 foot elevation of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) (EIIS Function Identifier NF) where a 4 inch vent line for the B Emergency Diesel Generator (EIIS Function Identifier EK-GEN) penetrates the floor through an 8 inch sleeve (EIIS Function Identifier - SLV). A fire watch was promptly established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.11. It is probable that this condition has existed since plant startup, therefore the plant was in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.7.11 between December 18, 1984 and August 7, 1987.

Further investigation revealed that penetration seal VI A0126 was inadvertently deleted from the penetration seal list in the spring of 1984, prior to the system turnover walkdowns and development of surveillance procedures. The seal therefore was never indicated as being required for inspection in the current "Penetration Table" nor contained in procedure ME-3-006, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals". Since the top of this penetration is covered by a missile shielding enclosure and the bottom is against a corridor wall in the RAB, partially obscured by a ventilation duct, it is credible that verification walkdowns failed to detect its existence. The missing seal was detected due to a particularly heavy rainstorm which occurred at the time plant personnel were in the area and noted an apparent fluid leak. Operations personnel investigating the leakage found the missing seal. The seal is expected to be repaired by September 30, 1987 and Station Modification 2001 has been issued to revise the appropriate documents. The fire watch will be maintained until the seal has been repaired. Due to the fact that several complete plant walkdowns have been completed to detect undocumented penetrations, there is a high level of confidence that this was an isolated case and no other such penetrations exist.

This event is felt to be of minimal impact on the Fire Protection Program due to the presence of fire detection and suppression equipment on the interior side of the penetration. The exterior side is exposed to the atmosphere and contained within a missile shield cubicle on the roof of the RAB. With this isolation it is evident that a significant fire exposure did not exist in the areas on either side of the penetration. The automatic sprinklers and detection equipment were operable throughout this period except when proper firewatch patrols or backup suppression were implemented. Since this would have provided early warning to allow the fire brigade to extinguish any postulated fire in its incipient stage, and no fires have occurred in or near this area, this event did not pose a threat to the health and safety of the public.

Similar Events

Licensee Event Reports 86-011 and 85-037 reported deficiencies with fire seal arrangements

Plant Contact

A.L. Holder, Fire Protection and Loss Control Engineer, (504) 464-3482

Ref: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT / WATERFORD 3 SES • P. O. BOX B • KILLONA, LA 70066

MIDDLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM

September 08, 1987

W3A87-0106
A4.05
QA

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: Waterford 3 SES
Docket No. 50-382
License No. NPF-38
Reporting of Licensee Event Report

Attached is Licensee Event Report Number LER-87-021-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Very truly yours,

N.S. Carns
Plant Manager - Nuclear

NSC/DEB:rk

Attachment

cc: R.M. Martin, NRC Resident Inspectors Office, INPO Records Center (J.T. Wheelock), E.L. Blake, W.M. Stevenson, J.H. Wilson

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