

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-331/OLS-87-01(DRS)

Docket No. 50-331


Licenses No. DPR-49

Licensee: Iowa Electric Light and Power Company
I.E. Towers
P. O. Box 351
Cedar Rapids, IA 52406


Facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center

Examination Administered At: Duane Arnold Energy Center


Examination Conducted: July 15-16, 1987

Examiners: 
R. D. Lanksbury

8/13/87
Date


E. A. Hare

8/13/87
Date

Approved By: 
T. M. Burdick, Chief
Operating Licensing Section

8/13/87
Date

Examination Summary

Examination administered on July 15-16, 1987 (Report No. 50-331/OLS-87-01(DRS))
Written and oral examinations were administered to two Senior Reactor Operator
(SRO) candidates.

Results: Both SRO candidates passed the written and oral examinations.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Examiners

R. D. Lanksbury, Chief Examiner

E. A. Hare

2. Exit Meeting

At the conclusion of the examinations, an exit meeting was conducted. The following personnel attended this exit meeting.

Facility Representatives

C. R. Mick, Operations Supervisor

D. Wilson, Training Superintendent

M. Meyer, Senior Instructor

R. J. Bucker, Acting Training Supervisor, Operations

NRC Representatives

R. D. Lanksbury, Operating Licensing Examiner

E. A. Hare, Operating Licensing Examiner

J. S. Wiebe, Duane Arnold Senior Resident Inspector

The following items were requested from the licensee:

- a. A copy of Technical Specifications Interpretations.
- b. Ensure complete and up to date material is sent to examiners, especially Technical Specifications. Reference material should not be sent too early (i.e., significantly before the required 60 days, unless so requested).

During the scenario walkthrough, the examiner noted a discrepancy in referenced Operating Instructions (OI) procedure numbers in the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) and the currently used OI numbers. The EOPs referenced the old two digit procedure numbering system. A new operating instruction numbering system was implemented which changed the number system to three or four digit codes. The EOP's have not been updated to reference the proper OI number. The examiner requested the facility to review their EOP and correct all reference material. This item was turned over to the Resident Inspectors for followup.

3. Examination Review

Specific facility comments concerning written examination questions, followed by the NRC responses, are enumerated in the attachment.

The examiners noted that significant portions of the facility supplied reference material were out of date at the time of the examination. This material ranged from the Technical Specifications themselves (which were outdated by several amendments) to the Operating Instructions (which in one case was outdated by two revisions). Investigation into the matter revealed that the changes had been issued as much as four months prior to the examination. The facility was requested to ensure that in the future reference materials were up to date.

ATTACHMENT

5.04

Facility Comment:

We agree with the answer key, however, we feel the question was misleading since "several hours" was not quantified. Also, this question required the candidate to make an assumption that is beyond the scope of his classroom training. The assumption he had to make was that the burnout of Xenon at that power level is less than the buildup of Xenon due to I-135 decay.

In operating the plant during a startup, he is trained to correlate rod movement at constant powers due to Xenon concentration changes. The Xenon concentration amounts, changes, and when they occur is more a function of the Reactor Engineer.

The training conducted on Xenon Equilibrium is based on conceptual knowledge of:

1. The Xenon production and removal terms.
2. Operational transient effects of Xenon concentration.
3. Relative changes in Xenon Reactivities for reactor startup, shutdown, and power operation.

We feel the question would have been clearer if "several hours" would have been quantified and a phrase explaining that Xenon burnout is insignificant.

Also, Answer "b" is vague so we feel it could be interpreted as the correct answer for the following reasons.

1. The phrase "rapidly insert" is meaningless because there is only one rod speed. The operator has no way to increase rod insertion other than to reduce the time between rod selection.
2. The phrase "high rate of Xenon burnout" is vague and he is not required to quantify Xenon burnout with a power level. He does not know whether it is a high rate of burnout nor is he required to know when the burnout rate is high. Also, when the different half lives of Iodine and Xenon (8 hours for Iodine and 9.2 hours for Xenon) are put into play it becomes very difficult to evaluate this phrase as being incorrect.

We request that credit be given for Letter a or b.

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. The facility reference material did not substantiate that b would also be an appropriate answer. In addition, "rapidly insert" rods is a generic industry term not related to rod speed, but rather to how quickly the operator performs the rod insertions. Sufficient information was provided to indicate to a knowledgeable operator that Answer 'b' would not be correct (i.e., Rx just critical means low neutron flux levels which implies low burnout of Xenon). To state in the question that Xenon burnout was minimal would make 'b' an obvious wrong answer and not worth using. It should be also noted that the candidates were briefed prior to the start of the examination that if any question was not clear they should ask the examiner for clarification. The question will be reviewed for any necessary revisions for clarity.

5.06 B

Facility Comment:

We agree with the answer key for 5.06 B, but we also feel that there are additional acceptable responses as stated in the reference used.

Several of the major sources of hydrogen are long term sources such as:

Radiolysis of Water
Corrosion of Zinc based paint
Aluminum corrosion

Since the question did not specify the time period, we request the answer key be modified to accept any of the major sources of hydrogen listed below:

Steam: Zirconium
Steam: Steel
Core: Concrete
Radiolysis of Water
Corrosion of Zinc based paint
Corrosion of Aluminum

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. The question asked for the principal source of hydrogen in containment following a LOCA. A Steam: Zirconium reaction is the major producer of Hydrogen as shown in MCD Page 6-22, Figure 6-F. The answer key will not be changed.

5.06 C

Facility Comment: Technical Specification Section 3.7 list a limit of 4% for Oxygen in the Primary Containment. The bases for Technical Specification 3.7 lists two values, 4% and 5%. System Description E-12 states that the alarm is set for 4%.

We realize that the Technical Specification bases and the alarm setting are set conservatively low to ensure that the flammability limit stated in Mitigating Core Damage is not exceeded. However, we believe it is more important for the operator to be trained using the Technical Specifications 4% limit since it is a licensed document.

The bases for Technical Specifications also implies there is more than one flammability limit, the 5% limit and the AEC (now NRC) recommendation of 4%.

The question also did not state the document that the operator should reference for the Oxygen limit. Since we believe it is absolutely imperative that the SRO is familiar with Technical Specifications and complies with Technical Specifications at all times, we feel an Oxygen limit of 4% is also a correct answer.

We request that full credit be given for stating that the Oxygen limit is 4%.

NRC Resolution: Disagree with comment. The candidates were specifically asked for the maximum flammable concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the containment following an LOCA. The question was for LOCA conditions - not normal operations as stated in your Technical Specification reference. The answer key has not be changed.

5.10

Facility Comment: We believe there is a math error in the answer key.

EOL period calculation is incorrect and should be 45 seconds.

This will also change the final answer to 17 seconds.

$$62 - 45 = 17$$

We request the answer key be changed to reflect an EOL period of 45 seconds, and a change of 17 seconds.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comments. The correct answer will be changed to BOL = 62, EOL = 45, Change = 62 - 45 = 17 seconds.

5.11 A

Facility Comment: The question did not ask for the reason or mechanism by which enhanced operation using barrier fuel is obtained. The question asked for the difference between barrier fuel and other fuels.

The answer key includes the difference in the first sentence. The second part of the answer key includes the mechanism by which cracking is inhibited.

We request that the second sentence of the answer for 5.11 A be deleted and full credit be given for stating that a layer of zirconium is bonded to inner surface.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. The second sentence will not be required for full credit. The answer key will reflect this change.

5.11 B

Facility Comment: Iowa Electric may or may not eliminate PCIOMR restraints. It is true that Preconditioning can be eliminated by use of barrier fuel. However, from an operational standpoint the main significance of barrier fuel is the ability of the fuel to accommodate large power changes without pellet-clad interaction failures. The operator has been informed that PCIOMR may still be followed in an abbreviated manner to provide additional conservatism.

The use of the term "target exposures" is more of a Reactor Engineer term than an operator term. The operator is more familiar with the term power level and we feel the two terms are synonymous.

We request full credit for answering in terms of allowing large power changes without fuel damage. We also request that no points be taken off if the operator does not state that preconditioning can be eliminated.

NRC Resolution: Partially agree with comment. The answer key specifically states either answer would be acceptable for full credit. Therefore, the candidate does not need to state that preconditioning can be eliminated to receive full credit. However, the examiner does not agree that power level and target exposures are synonymous terms. One aspect of a target exposure is power level. The other aspect is the amount of time at a given power level. Therefore, the two are not synonymous, but are related.

5.13

Facility Comment: This question involves a conversion from psig to psia, determination of the saturation temperature and a subtraction calculation to determine the number of degrees subcooled or superheated.

Any single mistake in this calculation such as improper or no conversion from psig to psia or a reading error on Table 2 could result in an incorrect response for both answers in the answer key.

We request that any single error in the calculation not be carried forward when grading the question.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. It is not NRC policy to double jeopardize a candidate when a question of this type is asked. A candidate would not lose full credit for a single error in his calculation.

5.15 B

Facility Comment: We agree with the answer key. We also feel there are alternate answers that are just as correct.

As per the attached reference (System Description C1 Page 47) we feel the below listed responses should also be given full credit:

1. Pump minimum flow valves
2. Pump minimum flow valves which open on low flow (400 gpm)

We request the answer key be modified and full credit be given for the above mentioned items or similar responses.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. Will also accept "Pump minimum flow valves" or "Pump minimum flow valves which open on low flow (<400 gpm).

6.01 A

Facility Comment: We agree that Technical Specifications list the five items listed in the answer key, but the list is for the second items and not the actual rod blocks. See attached Technical Specification Bases.

The attached System Description (I-8) and Figure of refueling rod blocks describe the refueling rod blocks in greater detail.

We feel that a better answer to the question would be to list four conditions that result in a rod block.

We request the answer key be modified to accept any four of the below list:

MODE switch in REFUEL and:

1. Trolley mounted hoist loaded with platform over or near core.
2. Frame mounted hoist loaded with platform over or near core.
3. Fuel grapple loaded with platform over or near core.
4. Fuel grapple no full up with platform over or near core.
5. Not all rods in and selection of a second.
6. Service platform hoist loaded.

MODE switch in STARTUP and:

7. Refueling platform over or near core.
8. Service platform hoist loaded.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. Will also accept the above mentioned list as answers.

6.02 AFacility Comment:

We agree with the answer key for each condition, however, we do not feel it is absolutely necessary for the operator to answer the question using terms such as "level error, level set, steam flow/feed flow error" in order to demonstrate understanding of the feedwater control system.

We feel the format of this question could be improved by separating the questions from the initial condition statement. It is very difficult for an operator to determine the question he is being asked if the questions are all written as one sentence next to the initial condition. It is also difficult for the operator to check his answers following a lengthy exam if the questions are not readily identifiable.

The answer key for the last 0.5 points states that the "feedwater control valves will open to match new higher level." This statement is confusing and we do not agree with this answer. If the "A" level detector fails low, then the feedwater control system will see a large level error signal no matter how far level increases. Reactor level will increase until the feedwater pumps trip at 211". (See attached System Description D-15, Page 11.)

We request full credit be given if the explanation includes a final resolution of the event, i.e., "level increases until feed pump trip" because we feel this shows understanding of feedwater control.

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. The question asked how the reactor level will initially respond (immediately following the failure). Therefore, feedwater pump trip at 211" is the final response due to increasing reactor water level. The answer key will not be changed. The candidate need not use the exact terminology used in the answer key to receive credit. The question will be reviewed for any changes necessary to enhance clarity.

6.02 CFacility Comment:

We request full credit be given if the explanation includes final resolution of the event, i.e., "Feedwater valves close due to Feed flow/Steam flow error until level drops enough for level error to counteract the flow error.

NRC Resolution: Agree in part with comment. The candidate need not have exact wording as the answer key to get full credit. Each candidate's response will be reviewed for its individual content.

6.03 B

Facility Comment: We do not agree with the answer key (prevent lockout) and feel it is more correct to answer that the diesel would fail to start.

OI 324 states that to prevent an inadvertent lockout, a start signal should not be initiated within one minute of resetting an engine trip. This precaution implies that diesel generator lockout may occur. It will not occur if a start signal occurs before the one minute time delay. We feel this precaution is in error and have sent a procedure change request to our Procedure Development Group.

The System Description for the Diesel Generator states that "to ensure there is not a failure to start, a start signal should not be initiated within 60 seconds of resetting a trip."

We feel this is the more correct answer based on review of the DAEC start circuitry and breaker control circuitry.

A short explanation of this circuitry follows:

A diesel generator trip will energize the SDR which seals in and energizes Relay "5" which shuts down the diesel generator fuel racks and prevents a restart.

Once the SDR is reset by clearing the "trip" condition and resetting PB4. The "5" relay is deenergized with a 60 second time delay before it drops out.

Until the "5" relay drops out, the diesel cannot be started because the air start solenoids will remain deenergized. The only way we feel a lockout could occur would be if the operator attempted to close the diesel generator output breaker without having the diesel running and a failure of the Sync check relay. (Sync check - 25, prevents breaker closure if both sources are not in phase.)

Since this entails a procedure violation and equipment failure, we feel this to be unlikely.

We request the answer key be changed to read the following.

The Diesel Generator will not start.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. Answer key will be changed to read as follows, "The Diesel Generator will not start."

6.05

Facility Comment: The lower limit to the Standby Liquid Control Boron Injection Rate is no longer applicable, and no longer in our Technical Specifications. The ATWS changes (10 CFR 50.62) required both pumps to start on SBLC initiation via one. Attached is a copy of Technical Specification bases which includes the lower limit. Our System Description (C-4 SBLC) which was the reference for the exam question will be revised.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. The answer key will be changed to reflect the deletion of the lower limit. Full credit will be given to a candidate that states the lower limit no longer exists.

6.07 B

Facility Comment: We believe the correct answer for 6.07 B is that the Recirc Drive Motor breaker will trip.

The Drive Motor breaker must be closed in order to start the sequence. If the field breaker has not closed within 15 seconds of the Drive Motor breaker closing, then the incomplete sequence timer will trip the Drive Motor breaker.

We request the answer key be changed to state that "The Recirc Drive motor breaker will trip."

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. The answer key will be changed to read as follows, "The recirc drive motor breaker will trip."

6.08 A

Facility Comment: The valves listed in Question 6.08 A were not correct in that these valve numbers were for the Head Spray Valves.

The answer key is also confusing for this question because two requirements are included in one statement (2/3 core coverage and LOCA signal). As stated in System Description C-1, Page 37 and Figure 17 (see attached). There are four (4) (not three) conditions that must be satisfied in order to open the containment spray valves after a LOCA.

These conditions are:

1. Drywell pressure greater than 2 psig and
2. Reactor vessel level is above -39 inches (2/3 core coverage) and
3. LPCI initiation signal present and
4. Containment Spray Valve Control Switch to MANUAL

We request the answer key be modified so that full credit is given for any three (3) of the above listed four (4) items.

We also recommend that MO numbers not be used in future questions unless necessary, in order to avoid confusion.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. The question will be changed requiring three out of four conditions. The answer key will be changed to include "Containment Spray Valve Control Switch in Manual." The examiners prefer to include valve numbers in case the candidate does not recognize the valve by name.

6.08 B

Facility Comment: As stated in System Description C-1, Page 37 and Figure 17, the Containment Spray Valve Control Keylock switch bypasses the -2/3 core coverage and the LPCI initiation signal.

As stated, this design allows the operator to open the containment spray valves following a LOCA if either:

1. Level is below -39 inches

OR

2. LPCI initiation signal is not present.

We request the answer key be changed to accept either of the conditions listed above.

NRC Resolution:

Agree with comment. The answer key will be changed to state as follows, "It allows opening of containment spray valves by bypassing the requirements for 2/3 core coverage (-39 inches) or LPCI Initiation signal present." Either answer will be given full credit.

6.10 D

Facility Comment:

This part of Question 6.10 is not defined in enough detail to ensure there is only one correct answer.

APRM B upscale is insufficient because the APRM Upscale alarm is a rod block. The APRM Upscale Trip is an RPS trip.

The operator could interpret the APRM upscale to be either the rod block or the scram.

It should be noted that upon checking the references used for this exam question, inconsistencies in terminology for the APRM upscale Trip and Alarm were found. Change forms have been promulgated to Material Development to correct these deficiencies.

We request the answer key be modified for Question 6.10 D to accept either "rod block" or "1/2 scram" as correct answers.

NRC Resolution:

Agree with comment. The answer key has been modified to accept either answer. The question will be reviewed for necessary changes so that only one answer will be acceptable.

6.12

Facility Comment: OI 388 precaution No. 3 states that the battery charger cannot supply emergency power by itself and would trip under this condition.

The question does not state that emergency loads are being supplied by the 250 VDC system when the battery is disconnected.

If emergency loads are not being carried and the battery is disconnected, the charger would probably not trip. System Description G-5 Page 14 also states the charger cannot supply current under all load conditions, meaning that the charger can supply loads under certain conditions.

As per Technical Specifications Section 3.8.B.2.C HPCI must be considered inoperable and requirements of 3.5 must be met. The question did not ask for a procedural response, therefore, we feel the candidates should not be held responsible for mentioning Technical Specifications.

We request the answer key be modified and full credit be given for any of the following response:

1. HPCI inoperable or
2. Charger will carry the system as long as Emergency loads are not started.

NRC Resolution: Agree in part with comment. The candidate was not asked the status of the HPCI system. The candidates were not held responsible for meeting DAEC Technical Specifications since that was not the nature of the question. Therefore, the answer "HPCI inoperable" will not be accepted. The answer key will be changed to add "or the charger will carry the system as long as Emergency loads are not started." Full credit will be given for this answer.

7.01

Facility Comment: We agree with the answer key, but we feel the bases for HCTL curve as stated in NEDC 30796 (see attached) states the same answers as Answer No. 2. We feel it is also correct to state that the pressure or energy contained

in the reactor is low enough so that a LOCA or SRV blowdown will still be adequately condensed by water in the torus.

We request that full credit be given if above answer is used for Answer No. 2.

NRC Resolution:

Agree in part with comment. The candidate need not have the exact wording as the answer key to get full credit. Each candidate's response will be reviewed for its individual content.

7.02

Facility Comment:

We feel that the question is a good question to ask on an oral or simulator exam, but is inappropriate to ask on a written exam for the following reasons:

- Iowa Electric's accredited SRO training program does not require the operator to memorize the EOP's. The operator must demonstrate the ability to use the EOP's at the simulator.
- The question is a complex problem requiring the operator to enter several EOP procedures. We believe a question of this nature would be appropriate for a written exam only if accompanied by the EOP's.
- ES402 states that the operator must have a complete understanding of immediate actions. We feel the question addresses those actions that are not immediate actions that the operator would take without a procedure.

Recommend Question 7.02 be deleted because it is beyond the scope of the SRO. If Question 7.02 is not deleted, then recommend the following changes.

1. Allow credit in each section based upon the candidate's assumptions and subsequent actions.
2. The answer key for Part A should take into account that the initial conditions stated that Boron Injection is not required, but the answer requires Boron Injection to be explained. This could be confusing to the candidate.

3. The answer key for Part B does not mention that MARFP also takes into account the minimum flow stagnation power level (8%) for no natural circulation. Maintaining pressure constant ensures that the RPV is being properly flooded. (Reference NEDO-30796 Page 8-149.)
4. The answer to Part C should also include operational considerations such as if Boron Injection is being used, or the Rx is shutdown. Again due to the nature of the question (i.e., written vs oral) it is difficult to assume that only some things are changing.
5. The answer to Part D should also include a discussion of the "quality" content of the water, (i.e., Rx water vs river water) and credit given accordingly.

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. This question does not require memorization of the EOPs. It simply describes particular plant conditions and corresponding actions taken in the EOPs and then asks why these actions are taken. Since the candidate is actually told what the EOPS require, the EOPs do not need to accompany the question for it to be answered. It is not unreasonable to expect an SRO to understand why he is taking particular actions in an emergency procedure. 10 CFR 55.43(b) prescribes emergency operating procedures as a basis for questions on the written exam. In addition, the question is supported with knowledge and ability ratings that are extremely high. This question is appropriate for a written exam in that its objective is not to see if the candidate has memorized the EOPs, but instead to determine if he really understands them. Requiring an SRO to know the basis of the emergency procedure is consistent with industry practice and guidance provided to NRC examiners. If as this facility comment implies, the SROs at DAEC do not understand the emergency procedures, then this would certainly cast doubt on their ability to understand and control emergency conditions. Since the facility received a satisfactory requalification evaluation in December 1986, it is assumed that SROs at DEAC do understand emergency procedures and that this comment was inappropriate.

1. All assumptions indicated by the candidates will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. However, all assumptions needed to answer the question correctly were given in the initial conditions.

2. Although in this instance boron injection is not required, the procedure does address this system whether or not it is required at that point. This question specifically provides further clarification that boron injection must be addressed in the answer to receive full credit.
3. The answer given in the facility comment for why RPV pressure is kept above MARFP is the same as that given in the answer key, but stated a little more specifically. The more specific answer given in the facility comment is not required for full credit, but would certainly be considered an appropriate answer.
4. These operational considerations are given in the initial conditions such as to arrive at the correct answers.
5. The quality content of the water is not listed in the references on the answer key. This facility comment was not accompanied by any further references to substantiate this. Therefore, the additional answer given in the facility comment is not acceptable.

In summary, both the question and the answer are considered entirely appropriate and remain in the exam as is.

7.03 A

Facility Comment:

The answer key references Page 25 of IPOI-2, but only lists four conditions as stated at the top of the page. In actuality, the page lists other requirements such as Drywell Deaerated, Oxygen concentration greater than 19.5% by volume, and IPOI-7 (Special Instructions). The question implies there are only four (4) conditions, but procedurally there are many more conditions that must be met. We request that full credit be given for any four (4) conditions that are stated per IPOI-7.

NRC Resolution:

Agree with comment. Full credit will be given for any four (4) conditions required prior to Drywell entry that are stated in IPOI-7. The answer key is changed to include the following, "5. Drywell is deaerated, 6. Oxygen concentration is greater than 19.5% by volume, 7. Ensure requirements of Plant Radiation Protection Manual are followed for Drywell/Steam Tunnel Inspection. 8. Verify containment air purge in progress. 9. Verify at least one CAD O₂ analyzer recalibrated for high O₂. 10. Verify

that the TIP detectors are in their shields and the drives deenergized. 11. Have Health Physics perform necessary surveys."

7.05 C

Facility Comment: Per EPIP 2.5, the OSS functions as the Emergency Coordinator until relieved.

EPIP 1.1 also directs the OSS to make the plant notifications per EPIP 1.2.

We believe that if the overall responsibilities of the OSS are evaluated using the entire Emergency Plan instead of one procedure it is true that the OSS acts as the Emergency Coordinator until relieved.

Iowa Electric's SRO candidates are trained to function as the Emergency Coordinator until relieved. If an event occurred that was classified as an alert or higher and the Emergency Coordinator has not relieved the OSS, then the OSS should maintain contact with the NRC.

We request full credit be given for a "true" answer in Part C and we also recommend this question be modified so there is only one correct answer.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. Since under varied circumstances the answer could be either True or False, this portion of the question has been deleted and the overall point value of the question modified accordingly.

7.06

Facility Comment: The question asks for specific items as addressed in only one part of the EPIP's. We believe that since the candidates are trained on all phases of the EPIP's and log entries into the OSS logbook are done in accordance with ACP 1410.3, Operating Logs, that credit be given for additional items that could be part of any log entry made by an OSS when dealing with emergencies. This would include additional items such as:

1. Time of log entry
2. Changes in plant operating status

3. Other entries. These might include, Deviation Report numbers, 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73 reports made.

We request the answer key be modified to include other logged items during an emergency per ACP 1410.3.

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. The candidates were specifically asked about the log entries required upon declaring an emergency classification of an event. The log entries called out in ACP 1410.3 are entries made during each shift. It is not stated that these entries are required to be logged during an emergency. The answer key will not be changed.

7.08 B

Facility Comment:

The answer key lists reasons why the minimum speed setting must be correct, yet the question does not ask why the minimum speed setting is correct. The question is asking for the consequence of improper minimum speed setting, namely that the pump would not start. If more of an answer was desired, than an "explain why" phrase should have been added to the question.

Given the wording of the question we request full credit be given for Part B, by stating that the pump would not start.

NRC Resolution:

Agree with comment. The answer key will be changed to state that "the RWCU pump would not start."

7.08 C

Facility Comment:

The answer key states that the pump will trip, but no mention is given for the actions that would possibly occur to the rest of the reactor water cleanup system (i.e., DEMIN BEDS going into HOLD). See attached. We request credit be given for answers pertaining to other parts of the system such as DEMIN BEDS going into HOLD.

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. The root cause of the reduced flow to the point where the Demin Beds go into hold is the pump having tripped (as stated in the answer key). If the candidate states additional items such as stated in the

comment, they will be accepted, but for full credit the candidate will have to state that the pump trips. The answer key will not be changed.

7.09

Facility Comment:

We do not see how candidate No. 3 can be accepted even though he exceeds 5(N-18).

- Even though 10 CFR 20.101 technically allows exceeding 5(N-18), we do not advocate exceeding of this limit nor do we believe any other agency would advocate exceeding 5(N-18).
- Both the National Council for Radiation Protection (NCRP) and the International Council for Radiation Protection (ICRP) recommend that 5(N-18) not be exceeded.
- Duane Arnold's Radiation Protection Training advocates conservatism for personnel exposure.

We request that full credit be given for rejecting candidate No. 3 based on exceeding 5(N-18).

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. You are correct in the fact that 10 CFR 20.101 technically allows an individual to exceed 5(N-18). More importantly, the individual is allowed to legally exceed this in the particular question. The document you referenced is not a legal document and can only recommend guidance. The 10 CFR is a binding document. Since no administrative limits are in place preventing an individual from exceeding 5(N-18) and an individual is legally able to receive up to 1.25 Rem/qtr. regardless of 5(N-18) the answer key will not be changed.

7.10

Facility Comment:

The question as written leaves off the part of trying to first shutdown the reactor by the normal method. This could be misleading to the candidate as he would be also looking at the operational conditions that would normally be followed prior to shutting down the reactor protection system. We believe credit should be given for answers that utilize those operating conditions.

We also request that full credit be given for stating that RPS should be reset so that the CRD system can provide adequate cooling to the CRD's (see attached).

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. The question asked, "What is the reason for this," not "what should be done" as was implied should be correct answer. No evidence was provided indicating that in the shutdown conditions that normally would exist when the RPS system is shutdown that CRD cooling is a concern. The only concern that is documented is that listed in the answer key. The answer key will not be changed.

7.11 A

Facility Comment:

We agree with your answer, but we also feel that credit should be given for other operational concerns created by a H/X low level.

- A low level could also result in cavitation of the RCIC pumps due to reduced NPSH.
- RCIC Turbine Trip - Turbine trips at 15" Hg abs. suction pressure.

We also feel credit should be given for stating the precaution is based on draining the H/X dry since the thermal shock is due to RHR-SW flow through the tubes of a hot dry H/X.

We request the answer key be modified to give full credit for any of the following.

1. Minimize thermal shock to H/X
2. Prevent cavitation of RCIC pump
3. Prevent RCIC Turbine trip
4. Prevent draining H/X dry

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. The material that was referenced does not substantiate that low level in the heat exchanger would directly cause a RCIC Turbine Trip. DAEC System Description C-1 RHR Page 43 states the following.

"The RCIC pump suction is also supplied from the Condensate Storage Tanks so that if the pressure from the RHR heat exchanger drops below the Condensate

Storage Tank pressure, a check valve opens to supply water from that source so that the RCIC pump is not in danger of losing suction pressure."

The facility answers requested to be added to the answer key are not correct. Prevent Draining the H/X dry was not accompanied by any further references to substantiate this would in fact happen. Therefore, the additional answer given in the facility comment is not acceptable. The answer key will not be changed.

7.11 B

Facility Comment:

The caution in OI 149 is not based on a loss of inventory to the Torus. Step (2) of Section 5.3 has the minimum flow valve closed and the breaker tagged open. Also, the caution directs the H/X Bypass Valve be throttled open instead of the LPCI outboard throttle valve. A note in Section 2.0 specifically warns against using the outboard throttle valve.

Failure to open the Bypass Valve within ten seconds will result in the RHR pump operating at shutoff head. This will result in inadequate minimum flow.

We request the answer key be modified and full credit be given for either of the following:

- Provide adequate minimum flow
- Prevent operation at shutoff head

NRC Resolution:

Agree with comment. The answer key will be changed to read as follows, "Provide adequate minimum flow for the pump or prevent operation at shutoff head."

The examiner would like to note that the IO referenced in the test was IO 149 Rev. 0 dated July 24, 1986. The licensee supplied reference was IO 149 Rev. 2 dated April 30, 1987, to support this comment. The NRC question was correct from the information supplied by the licensee.

7.13 A

Facility Comment:

The question as written could be confusing because of the use of the word "basis." This word could imply the Technical Specifications bases and could cause the

candidate to utilize them in developing his answer. We believe credit should be given as appropriate (i.e., use "reason").

We also request credit be given for other operational concerns that are generic for pumps operating at shutoff head such as:

1. Overheating of Pump
2. Seal Damage
3. Cavitation

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. This facility comment was not accompanied by any references to substantiate it. Therefore, the additional answers given in the facility comment are not acceptable for full credit.

7.14

Facility Comment:

The answer key references EOP-6, but the question is worded such that other means of shutting down the reactor can be used, other than EOP-6. We request credit be given to reflect other operational means, of scrambling the reactor to include the below listed and any other means identified by the candidate.

1. Locally trip the turbine (power above 30%)
2. Deenergize RPS MG Sets by opening breaker at 1B32 and 1B42.
3. Vent the scram air header.

NRC Resolution:

Agree with comment. The answer key will be changed to include the following. "c. Locally trip turbine (power above 30%) at Turbine front standard on operating deck; d. Deenergize RPS MG Sets by opening breakers at 1B32 and 1B42 located in the 1A3 and 1A4 switchgear room." Vent the scram header was not included since it was already discussed in 7.14b of the answer key.

8.03

Facility Comment:

The question is extremely long and multipart in nature. ES-202-E.12 states that multipart questions should be broken down into logical sequential parts. As currently written, we believe that the question is not clear in

stating the requirements expected of the candidate. The question contains both the long initial conditions section and the actual two part requirement of the candidate.

We agree with the answer key in part, however, we believe that credit should be given for actions taken that would check for the actual systems taken out of service and the operability requirements since Technical Specifications 3.13C and 3.13E states that only certain deluge, sprinkler systems, and hose stations are required to be operable. The information provided in the question is not complete, and would require the OSS to check on a P&ID exactly what systems were taken out of service.

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. The Region does not consider this to be an example of a multipart question as stated in the comment. An example of a multipart question would be Question 8.04 with two distinct points. This question simply listed a situation and then asked what action was required and how soon. Other similar questions, such as 8.11, were not commented on in this context. The question as stated says that a Technical Specification problem exists. Therefore the candidate does not need to know which specific portion of the deluge and sprinkler system or which hose station is inoperable since the required actions are the same and the LCO for that system is entered as stated in the answer. As far as what was requested of the candidate, it is clearly stated in the final sentence of the paragraph. The answer key will not be changed.

8.06

Facility Comment:

The question does not follow the Examiner Standards 202 in the following ways:

1. ES-202 E.12 states that multipart questions should be broken down into logical sequential parts.
2. ES-202 E.16 states that "if a specific number of responses are required, the question should clearly state that expectation"
3. ES-202 E.20 states that diagrams or sketches should be used as attachments to written examinations. It further states that the use of these attachments

provide an effective and easily interpretable way for the candidate to demonstrate his knowledge of the topic/concept.

As written, the question could be understood by the candidate as one question with three listed conditions together and answered accordingly. The answer key, as written, assumes that credit should be given to the candidate based upon his ability to correctly analyze the situation using all three of the conditions together. Furthermore, since a core map was not provided as an attachment, credit should be given to the candidate for stating the requirements that would be followed if this operational situation were to arise.

Finally, the answer key for condition No. 1 states that this situation would have no effect on plant operations. However, the two rods that are inoperable are in separate RSCS groups. (10-07 in Group A2 and 10-27 in Group B3). Since the original scenario has the candidate making preparations to start up the reactor, having these two control rods inoperable and in separate RSCS groups would place a very large operation restraint upon the plant. Technical Specification 3.3.A.2.f.(2) clearly states that all rods within a notch group containing an inoperable control rod shall be positioned within one notch of the inoperable control rod whenever the rod sequence control system is required to operable. We believe that credit should be given to the candidate for stating the possibility of this constraint, seeing as how a core map was not provided, and we do not require the candidates to memorize RSCS groups.

NRC Resolution:

Partially agree with comment. This question, as written, is consistent with other Region III examinations. Each question undergoes an independent QA review by a person other than the author to ensure it meets with the Examiner Standards. The number of responses depends on how the candidate interprets DAEC Technical Specification (also see response to Comment 8.03 and 8.08). The candidate should be familiar enough with a full core display/control rod positions without needing a diagram to assist him. As far as how credit will be given, each candidate will be individually graded for his ability to assess the situation. The question was not intended to require the candidates to have the RSCS groups memorized. The examiner will review all assumptions made at arriving at his answer. The answer for the first condition given will be changed to reflect the operational constraint imposed on the plant as noted in the comment.

8.08

Facility Comment: The question is stated, does not follow the Examiner Standards. ES-202 E.16 states that, "If a specific number of responses are required, the question should clearly state that expectation so the candidate will know when the answer is complete."

The answer key for Question 8.08, list five overtime guidelines that are violated, but there are seven total violations. We believe full credit should be given to the candidate for stating the general guidelines that are violated, rather than being specific and listing them individually.

NRC Resolution: Agree in part with comment. The question is not "open-ended" or "vague." The intent of this question is to see how well the candidate can evaluate a given situation and apply his understanding/knowledge of the overtime guidelines. Therefore, the number of responses are determined by his interpretation of AP 1410.1. Since the question by implication asked for all violations, this in effect is the same as asking "How many criteria have been violated." Credit will be given for the candidate stating the general guidelines violated as well (the specific answers in parenthesis were for the graders use only and are not intended to be required).

8.09 B

Facility Comment: The answer key for Question 8.09 B is directly derived from Section 6.3.2 of ACP 1406.3, revision of Procedures and Instructions. However, there are other places in ACP 1406.3 that describe situations that would utilize temporary procedure revisions. In addition, Figure 2 of ACP 1406.3, shows the temporary document change form, which contains a "temporary change information reviews" block that describes reasons for temporary changes. We believe full credit should be given for answers based upon these situations.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. After a review of the reference material, the following list will be added to the answer key. "5. When it's impractical to accomplish permanent revision to approved procedure. 6. Editorial. 7. Improvement. 8. New Procedure. 9. Inactivation or Reactivation. 10. Change of Safety Intent or Function.

8.11

Facility Comment: We agree with the answer key as written, however, we believe that full credit should be given to the candidate for describing the concerns about providing an isolable volume (i.e., 2/3 core coverage), as described in the System Description A-2, Reactor Recirculation System, when dealing with Jet Pump Operability.

NRC Resolution: Agree with comment. Will also accept "provides an isolable volume capable of being flooded after a recirculation line break (2/3 core coverage)" as alternative answer.

8.12 A

Facility Comment: The question is based upon a new Technical Specification change that is currently having a letter of interpretation written to clearly define the facilities stand on the issue. We believe that the question as written does not provide enough information for the candidate to fully answer the question. The candidate must spend time in developing an assumption of the scheduled due date of the surveillance to ensure the correctness of his answer.

We believe that credit should be given for answers that are correct when based upon the candidates assumptions and utilizing Technical Specifications 1.0, Definition No 26, Surveillance Frequency. Also, per ACP 1407.5, Surveillance Program, it is the surveillance performance coordinator's responsibility in setting up the due dates on the surveillance test procedures and not the OSS.

Using Definition No. 26, Surveillance Frequency, as stated in Technical Specifications the following information could be used in developing the candidates answer.

Technical Specifications quarterly (92 days) \pm 25% = 23 days prior to the scheduled due date, or 23 days after the scheduled due date.

Combined time interval for any three consecutive surveillance intervals shall not exceed 3.25.
92 days x 3.25 = 299 days.

Assuming January 1, 1987, is the earliest the OSS could run a Schedule Surveillance, places the due date at 24 January 1987. Using that due date the following applies.

RUN "A" 3 October 1986 (90 days prior to 1 January 1987)
RUN "B" 1 January 1987 (Given)
RUN "C" 16 April 1987 (Given)

Combined time interval A, B, C = 197 days

RUN NO. 1 1 January 1987 (23 days prior to 24 January 1987
due date)
RUN NO. 2 16 April 1987 (10 days prior to 26 April 1987
due date)
RUN NO. 3 19 August 1987 (Absolutely last possible date to
RUN with 27 July 1986 due date)

Combined time interval 1, 2, 3 = 230 days

NRC Resolution:

Disagree with comment. It is obvious from this comment that the facility does not understand the new Tech. Spec. regarding surveillance frequency. The facility proposed answer of August 19, 1987, is in violation of Tech. Specs. in two respects. The maximum allowable extension cannot exceed 25% of a surveillance interval. The time interval between April 16, and August 19, 1987 is greater than 25% (or 115 days maximum). Therefore, the date of August 19, 1987, is not correct. The combined interval between three consecutive surveillances cannot exceed 3.25 of the specified interval, 92 days in this case, or 299 days for a quarterly surveillance. The combined intervals for the surveillances from October 3, 1986 to August 19, 1987 is 321 days or 22 days longer than allowed by Tech. Specs. Therefore, the date of August 19, 1987, is again not correct. The facility is apparently keying in on dates and due dates for surveillances rather than intervals as specified in the Tech. Specs. This is obvious from their calculation of 230 days for the three surveillances conducted on January 1, April 16 and August 19, 1987 to show that they met the 3.25 requirement. This constitutes only two intervals vice the three required by Tech. Specs., but did comprise three dates. The answer key will not be changed.

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION

FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD
 REACTOR TYPE: BWR-GE4
 DATE ADMINISTERED: 02/02/15
 EXAMINER: HABE, E. A.
 CANDIDATE: _____

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATE:

Use separate paper for the answers. Write answers on one side only. Staple question sheet on top of the answer sheets. Points for each question are indicated in parentheses after the question. The passing grade requires at least 70% in each category and a final grade of at least 80%. Examination papers will be picked up six (6) hours after the examination starts.

CATEGORY	% OF	CANDIDATE'S	% OF	
VALUE	TOTAL	SCORE	VALUE	CATEGORY
24.50	24.50			5. THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION, FLUIDS, AND THERMODYNAMICS
25.00	25.00			6. PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN, CONTROL, AND INSTRUMENTATION
25.00	25.00			7. PROCEDURES - NORMAL, ABNORMAL, EMERGENCY AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL
25.00	25.00			8. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, CONDITIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
100.0				
100.00				
		Final Grade	%	Totals

All work done on this examination is my own. I have neither given nor received aid.

Candidate's Signature

QUESTION 5.06 (1.50)

The Duane Arnold containment atmospheres are inerted with nitrogen to limit the post LOCA oxygen content.

- a. What is the principal source of oxygen in containment following a LOCA?
- b. What is the principal source of hydrogen in containment following a LOCA?
- c. What are the maximum permissible concentrations (limit of flammable region) of hydrogen and oxygen (in volume percent) in containment following a LOCA?

QUESTION 5.07 (2.50)

Assume that the reactor is being started up from Cold Shutdown and a rod drop accident occurs early in the startup. Of the void, doppler, and temperature coefficients, which will act first, second, and third to limit the rapid power rise? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

QUESTION 5.08 (2.00)

The reactivity worth of a single control rod will _____, (For each statement below, indicate INCREASE or DECREASE.)

- _____ a. If the void content around the rod INCREASES.
- _____ b. If the moderator temperature DECREASES.
- _____ c. If an adjacent control rod is WITHDRAWN.
- _____ d. If Xe-135 concentration around the rod DECREASES.

QUESTION 5.09 (1.50)

HOW does xenon concentration affect peripheral rod worth following a scram from high power and WHY does this occur?

QUESTION 5.10 (1.50)

Suppose β_{eff} over core life decreases from 0.0072 to 0.0055. With equal insertions of 0.001 $\delta K/K$ of positive reactivity:

- Calculate the change in reactor period over core life. (1.0)
- What is the cause for this change in β_{eff} ? (0.5)

QUESTION 5.11 (1.50)

- Explain how barrier fuel differs from the previous types of fuel loaded into the core. (.75)
- How will this affect or change power operation at your facility with a full core loaded with barrier fuel? (.75)

QUESTION 5.12 (2.50)

Regarding MCFR (Minimum Critical Power Ratio):

- What PHENOMENON COULD exist in a fuel bundle if it were operated at an MCFR LESS THAN ONE (1.0) and WHAT is the concern if this phenomenon was to occur? (1.0)
- Why must the Technical Specification MCFR limit include a K factor when core flow is LESS THAN RATED? (1.0)
- HOW does CRITIC POWER change (INCREASES, DECREASES, OR REMAINS THE SAME) when inlet subcooling increases (core inlet water gets cooler)? (0.5)

QUESTION 5.13 (1.00)

A fluid is at 400 degrees F and 485 psig. Is it subcooled or superheated and by how many degrees?

QUESTION 6.01 (2.00)

List FOUR (4) rod blocks associated with refueling equipment. (2.0)

QUESTION 6.02 (4.00)

Assume the feedwater level control system is being operated in 3-element control using reactor level detector channel 'A'. Reactor power is at 85% steady state. For each of the instrument or control signal failures listed below, state how reactor level will initially respond (increase, decrease, or remain constant) and briefly explain why, in terms of what is happening in the Level Control System and Feedwater System immediately following the failure.

NOTE: A block diagram of the feedwater level control system is attached. (figure 2)

- a. Channel 'A' reactor level detector signal fails low.
- b. Loss of signal to 'B' feedwater control valve M/A transfer station.
- c. 'B' feedwater line flow signal fails high.

QUESTION 6.03 (2.00)

The following questions concern the starting of the Emergency Diesel Generators.

- a. Explain the concerns on why a diesel generator should not be run unloaded. (1.0)
- b. The reactor operator just reset a generator trip. If an attempt was made to restart the diesel before the one minute time lapse, what would be the status of the diesel? (1.0)

QUESTION 6.08

(1.50)

4. Four (4)

- a. List ~~the~~ THREE (3) conditions that must be met in order to open the Containment Spray Valves (MO ~~1900-1904~~) after a LOCA. (1.0)
- b. What is the purpose of the "Containment Spray Valve Control Keylock Switch"? (0.5)

QUESTION 6.09

(1.00)

The main turbine is at 1800 rpm in preparation for synchronizing the main generator to the grid.

What will happen if the "all valves closed" pushbutton is depressed? (Choose the correct answer from the following.)

- a. Nothing will happen since the synchronous speed select signal is sealed in.
- b. The turbine control valves and main stop valves will close, but the intercept valves will remain open.
- c. All of the control valves (TCVs and IVs) and main stop valves (MSVs) will close.
- d. The control valves (TCVs and IVs) will close, but the main stop valves will remain open.

QUESTION 6-10

(2.50)

For EACH of the following conditions, state whether a scram, half-scram, rod block, or no action is generated. For conditions that produce more than one action, state the more severe action (i.e. half-scram is more severe than a rod block). Consider logic only.

- a. Loss of one RPS MG set
- b. Turbine trip at 20% power
- c. Main steam lines B and D isolate, Mode switch in RUN
- d. APRM B upscale Mode Switch in RUN
- e. Scram discharge volume level is at 60 gallons, Mode switch in STARTUP

QUESTION 7.04 (1.50)

List the THREE (3) reasons why an operator would want cooldown rates above 100 degrees F/hr during Emergency Operating Procedure usage? (1.5)

QUESTION 7.05 (1.50)

In accordance with EPIP 1.2, Notification, the following are the responsibilities of the Operations Shift Supervisor (answer each as either TRUE or FALSE):

- a. Advise the Security and Support Supervisor upon completion of all required notifications and appraise him of problems encountered.
- b. Verify that the NRC is contacted within 1 hour of initial declaration.
- ~~c. For all events classified as an ALERT or higher, verify that continuous communications have been established with the NRC.~~

QUESTION 7.06 (1.50)

In accordance with EPIP 1.1, Determination of the Emergency Action Level, what THREE (3) items are required to be logged in the Shift Supervisor's Log upon declaring the emergency classification of an event?

QUESTION 7.07 (1.50)

Two cells of the 250 volt DC battery system are found to have a float voltage less than the required 2.13 volts. Does this affect the operability of this system and other plant systems? Explain your answer.

QUESTION 8.01 (2.00)

For the following refueling occurrences, choose the correct action.

Occurrences

1. Dropped fuel assembly within the reactor vessel.
2. Damaged fuel assembly with evidence of fission gas release (bubbles).
3. Loss of Water Level Situation.
4. Unexpected Subcritical Multiplication.

Actions

- a. Stoppage of core component movement only.
- b. Evacuation of refueling floor.
- c. Evacuation of refueling floor and drywell.
- d. Evacuation of refueling floor, drywell, torus, and torus area.

QUESTION 8.02 (1.50)

TRUE or FALSE?

- a. A Jumper and Lifted Lead Clearance Form shall only be completed prior to removing Jumper or Lifted Lead Tags.
- b. For Lifted Lead removal, return of the Lifted Lead Tag is sufficient verification that they have been reconnected.
- c. During normal surveillance testing, Jumper and Relay Block installation verification is not required; however, final Jumper and Relay Block removal verification by qualified personnel is required.

QUESTION 8.03 (2.00)

The reactor is at 100% power and the Fire Protection System Ring Header Flush is in progress when you take the shift as the Shift Engineer. During your review of the work in progress, you note that, per procedure, 2 valves have been closed to allow flushing of the cooling tower loop. At the time this occurred, 2 other post indicating valves on the main header were already closed to allow installation of 2 new fire hydrants. This situation resulted in isolating a section of the deluge, sprinkler, hose, and fire main systems for the last five hours. From a Technical Specification standpoint, this creates a problem. For the above situation, describe what actions should have been taken at the time the 2 valves were closed to isolate the cooling tower loop and in what time frame(s) per your technical specifications.

QUESTION 8.04 (2.00)

Concerning reactor coolant chemistry:

- a. DAEC Technical Specifications require that the iodine concentration in the reactor coolant shall not exceed 12 uCi/gm of dose equivalent I-131 for the 48 hours following a power transient. If this limit is exceeded, what TWO (2) actions to the Technical Specifications require the operator to take?
- b. When in the shutdown or refueling mode and with steaming rates less than 100,000 lbs/hr, conductivity shall not exceed 5 umho/cm and chlorides not exceed 0.1 ppm per the Technical Specifications. With steaming rates greater than or equal to 100,000 lbs/hr, conductivity shall not exceed 10 umho/cm and chlorides not exceed 0.5 ppm. Why are the limits for conductivity and chlorides allowed to go up when steaming rates are above 100,000 lbs/hr?

QUESTION 8.05 (1.50)

The Technical Specifications state the following "The two diesel generators shall be operable and there shall be a minimum of 35,000 gallons of diesel fuel in the diesel fuel oil tank".

What are the Technical Specification BASES for this amount?

EQUATION SHEET

$$\begin{aligned}
 f &= ma & v &= s/t \\
 w &= mg & s &= V_0t + \frac{1}{2}at^2 \\
 E &= mc^2 & a &= (V_f - V_0)/t \\
 KE &= \frac{1}{2}mv^2 & w &= \theta/t \\
 PE &= mgh \\
 V_f &= V_0 + at \\
 W &= -\sqrt{\Delta P}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Cycle efficiency} = (\text{Network out})/(\text{Energy in})$$

$$A = \lambda N \qquad A = A_0 e^{-\lambda t}$$

$$\lambda = \ln 2 / t_{1/2} = 0.693 / t_{1/2}$$

$$t_{1/2 \text{ eff}} = \frac{[(t_{1/2}) (t_b)]}{[(t_{1/2}) + (t_b)]}$$

$$I = I_0 e^{-\Sigma x}$$

$$I = I_0 e^{-\mu x}$$

$$I = I_0 10^{-x/\text{TVL}}$$

$$\text{TVL} = 1.3/\mu$$

$$\text{HVL} = -0.693/\mu$$

$$\Delta E = 931 \Delta m$$

$$\dot{Q} = \dot{m} c_p \Delta t$$

$$\dot{Q} = UA \Delta t$$

$$\text{Pwr} = W_f \Delta h$$

$$P = P_0 10^{\text{sur}(t)}$$

$$P = P_0 e^{t/T}$$

$$\text{SUR} = 26.06/T$$

$$\text{SUR} = 26 \rho / \lambda^* + (\beta - \rho) T$$

$$T = (\lambda^* / \rho) + [(\beta - \rho) / \bar{\lambda} \rho]$$

$$T = \lambda / (\rho - \beta)$$

$$T = (\beta - \rho) / (\lambda \rho)$$

$$\rho = (K_{\text{eff}} - 1) / K_{\text{eff}} = \Delta K_{\text{eff}} / K_{\text{eff}}$$

$$\rho = [(\lambda / (T K_{\text{eff}}))] + [\bar{\beta}_{\text{eff}} / (1 + \bar{\lambda} T)]$$

$$P = (\Sigma \phi V) / (3 \times 10^{10})$$

$$\Sigma = \alpha N$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{SCR} &= S / (1 - K_{\text{eff}}) \\
 \text{CR}_x &= S / (1 - K_{\text{eff}x}) \\
 \text{CR}_1 (1 - K_{\text{eff}1}) &= \text{CR}_2 (1 - K_{\text{eff}2}) \\
 M &= 1 / (1 - K_{\text{eff}}) = \text{CR}_1 / \text{CR}_0 \\
 M &= (1 - K_{\text{eff}0}) / (1 - K_{\text{eff}1}) \\
 \text{SDM} &= (1 - K_{\text{eff}}) / K_{\text{eff}} \\
 \lambda^* &= 10^{-5} \text{ seconds} \\
 \bar{\lambda} &= 0.1 \text{ seconds}^{-1}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$I_1 d_1 = I_2 d_2$$

$$I_1 d_1^2 = I_2 d_2^2$$

$$R/\text{hr} = (0.5 \text{ CE}) / d^2 (\text{meters})$$

$$R/\text{hr} = 6 \text{ CE} / d^2 (\text{feet})$$

Miscellaneous Conversions

$$1 \text{ curie} = 3.7 \times 10^{10} \text{ dps}$$

$$1 \text{ kg} = 2.21 \text{ lbm}$$

$$1 \text{ hp} = 2.54 \times 10^3 \text{ Btu/hr}$$

$$1 \text{ mw} = 3.41 \times 10^6 \text{ Btu/hr}$$

$$1 \text{ in} = 2.54 \text{ cm}$$

$$^\circ\text{F} = 9/5 ^\circ\text{C} + 32$$

$$^\circ\text{C} = 5/9 (^\circ\text{F} - 32)$$

$$1 \text{ BTU} = 778 \text{ ft-lbf}$$

Water Parameters

$$1 \text{ gal.} = 8.345 \text{ lbm.}$$

$$1 \text{ gal.} = 3.78 \text{ liters}$$

$$1 \text{ ft}^3 = 7.48 \text{ gal.}$$

$$\text{Density} = 62.4 \text{ lbm/ft}^3$$

$$\text{Density} = 1 \text{ gm/cm}^3$$

$$\text{Heat of vaporization} = 970 \text{ Btu/lbm}$$

$$\text{Heat of fusion} = 144 \text{ Btu/lbm}$$

$$1 \text{ Atm} = 14.7 \text{ psi} = 29.9 \text{ in. Hg.}$$

$$1 \text{ ft H}_2\text{O} = 0.433 \text{ lbf/in}^2$$




Figure 1 : T-S Diagram

Figure 2




Figure 2 Feedwater Control System

D-15 01
REV. 01
24 June 1985

Figure 3



Table 1. Saturated Steam: Temperature Table

Temp Fahr t	Abs Press Lb per Sq in p	Specific Volume			Enthalpy			Entropy			Temp Fahr t
		Sat Liquid v _l	Evap v _{lg}	Sat Vapor v _g	Sat Liquid h _l	Evap h _{lg}	Sat Vapor h _g	Sat Liquid s _l	Evap s _{lg}	Sat Vapor s _g	
32.0	0.08259	0.016027	3304.7	3304.7	-0.0179	1075.5	1075.5	0.0000	2.1873	2.1873	32.0
34.0	0.09600	0.016021	3061.9	3061.9	1.996	1074.4	1074.4	0.0041	2.1767	2.1802	34.0
36.0	0.10795	0.016020	2839.0	2839.0	4.008	1073.2	1073.2	0.0081	2.1651	2.1732	36.0
38.0	0.11749	0.016019	2634.1	2634.2	6.018	1072.1	1072.1	0.0122	2.1541	2.1623	38.0
40.0	0.12463	0.016019	2445.8	2445.8	8.027	1071.0	1070.0	0.0162	2.1432	2.1504	40.0
42.0	0.13143	0.016019	2272.4	2272.4	10.035	1069.8	1070.9	0.0202	2.1325	2.1527	42.0
44.0	0.14192	0.016019	2112.8	2112.8	12.041	1068.7	1080.7	0.0242	2.1217	2.1459	44.0
46.0	0.15314	0.016020	1965.7	1965.7	14.047	1067.6	1081.6	0.0282	2.1111	2.1393	46.0
48.0	0.16514	0.016021	1830.0	1830.0	16.051	1066.4	1082.5	0.0321	2.1006	2.1327	48.0
50.0	0.17796	0.016023	1704.8	1704.8	18.054	1065.3	1083.4	0.0361	2.0901	2.1262	50.0
52.0	0.19165	0.016024	1589.2	1589.2	20.057	1064.2	1084.2	0.0400	2.0796	2.1197	52.0
54.0	0.20625	0.016026	1482.4	1482.4	22.058	1063.1	1085.1	0.0439	2.0695	2.1134	54.0
56.0	0.22183	0.016028	1383.6	1383.6	24.059	1061.9	1086.0	0.0478	2.0593	2.1070	56.0
58.0	0.23843	0.016031	1292.2	1292.2	26.060	1060.8	1086.9	0.0516	2.0491	2.1008	58.0
60.0	0.25611	0.016033	1207.6	1207.6	28.060	1059.7	1087.7	0.0555	2.0391	2.0946	60.0
62.0	0.27494	0.016036	1129.2	1129.2	30.059	1058.5	1088.6	0.0593	2.0291	2.0885	62.0
64.0	0.29457	0.016039	1056.5	1056.5	32.058	1057.4	1089.5	0.0632	2.0192	2.0824	64.0
66.0	0.31626	0.016043	989.0	989.0	34.056	1056.3	1090.4	0.0670	2.0094	2.0764	66.0
68.0	0.33889	0.016046	926.5	926.5	36.054	1055.2	1091.2	0.0708	1.9996	2.0704	68.0
70.0	0.36297	0.016050	868.3	868.4	38.052	1054.0	1092.1	0.0745	1.9900	2.0645	70.0
72.0	0.38844	0.016054	814.3	814.3	40.049	1052.9	1093.0	0.0783	1.9804	2.0587	72.0
74.0	0.41550	0.016058	764.1	764.1	42.046	1051.8	1093.8	0.0821	1.9708	2.0529	74.0
76.0	0.44420	0.016063	717.4	717.4	44.043	1050.7	1094.7	0.0858	1.9614	2.0472	76.0
78.0	0.47461	0.016067	673.8	673.9	46.040	1049.5	1095.6	0.0895	1.9520	2.0415	78.0
80.0	0.50683	0.016072	633.3	633.3	48.037	1048.4	1096.4	0.0932	1.9426	2.0359	80.0
82.0	0.54093	0.016077	595.5	595.5	50.033	1047.3	1097.3	0.0969	1.9334	2.0303	82.0
84.0	0.57702	0.016082	560.3	560.3	52.029	1046.1	1098.2	0.1006	1.9242	2.0248	84.0
86.0	0.61518	0.016087	527.5	527.5	54.026	1045.0	1099.0	0.1043	1.9151	2.0193	86.0
88.0	0.65551	0.016093	496.8	496.8	56.022	1043.9	1099.9	0.1079	1.9060	2.0139	88.0
90.0	0.69813	0.016099	468.1	468.1	58.018	1042.7	1100.8	0.1115	1.8970	2.0086	90.0
92.0	0.74313	0.016105	441.3	441.3	60.014	1041.6	1101.6	0.1152	1.8881	2.0033	92.0
94.0	0.79062	0.016111	416.3	416.3	62.010	1040.5	1102.5	0.1188	1.8792	1.9980	94.0
96.0	0.84072	0.016117	392.8	392.9	64.006	1039.3	1103.3	0.1224	1.8704	1.9928	96.0
98.0	0.89356	0.016123	370.9	370.9	66.003	1038.2	1104.2	0.1260	1.8617	1.9876	98.0
100.0	0.94924	0.016130	350.4	350.4	67.999	1037.1	1105.1	0.1295	1.8530	1.9825	100.0
102.0	1.00789	0.016137	331.1	331.1	69.995	1035.9	1105.9	0.1331	1.8444	1.9775	102.0
104.0	1.06965	0.016144	313.1	313.1	71.992	1034.8	1106.8	0.1366	1.8358	1.9725	104.0
106.0	1.1347	0.016151	296.16	296.18	73.99	1033.6	1107.6	0.1402	1.8273	1.9675	106.0
108.0	1.2030	0.016158	280.28	280.30	75.98	1032.5	1108.5	0.1437	1.8188	1.9626	108.0
110.0	1.2750	0.016165	265.37	265.39	77.98	1031.4	1109.3	0.1472	1.8105	1.9577	110.0
112.0	1.3505	0.016173	251.37	251.38	79.98	1030.2	1110.2	0.1507	1.8021	1.9528	112.0
114.0	1.4299	0.016180	238.21	238.22	81.97	1029.1	1111.0	0.1542	1.7938	1.9480	114.0
116.0	1.5133	0.016188	225.84	225.85	83.97	1027.9	1111.9	0.1577	1.7856	1.9433	116.0
118.0	1.6009	0.016196	214.20	214.21	85.97	1026.8	1112.7	0.1611	1.7774	1.9386	118.0
120.0	1.6927	0.016204	203.25	203.26	87.97	1025.6	1113.5	0.1646	1.7693	1.9339	120.0
122.0	1.7891	0.016213	192.94	192.95	89.96	1024.5	1114.4	0.1680	1.7613	1.9293	122.0
124.0	1.8901	0.016221	183.23	183.24	91.96	1023.3	1115.3	0.1715	1.7533	1.9247	124.0
126.0	1.9959	0.016229	174.08	174.09	93.96	1022.2	1116.1	0.1749	1.7453	1.9202	126.0
128.0	2.1068	0.016238	165.45	165.47	95.96	1021.0	1117.0	0.1783	1.7374	1.9157	128.0
130.0	2.2230	0.016247	157.32	157.33	97.96	1019.8	1117.8	0.1817	1.7295	1.9112	130.0
132.0	2.3445	0.016256	149.64	149.66	99.95	1018.7	1118.6	0.1851	1.7217	1.9066	132.0
134.0	2.4717	0.016265	142.40	142.41	101.95	1017.5	1119.5	0.1884	1.7140	1.9021	134.0
136.0	2.6047	0.016274	135.55	135.57	103.95	1016.4	1120.3	0.1918	1.7063	1.8976	136.0
138.0	2.7438	0.016284	129.09	129.11	105.95	1015.2	1121.1	0.1951	1.6986	1.8932	138.0
140.0	2.8892	0.016293	122.98	123.00	107.95	1014.0	1122.0	0.1985	1.6910	1.8889	140.0
142.0	3.0411	0.016303	117.21	117.22	109.95	1012.9	1122.8	0.2019	1.6834	1.8845	142.0
144.0	3.1997	0.016312	111.74	111.76	111.95	1011.7	1123.6	0.2053	1.6759	1.8801	144.0
146.0	3.3653	0.016322	106.58	106.59	113.95	1010.5	1124.5	0.2088	1.6684	1.8758	146.0
148.0	3.5381	0.016332	101.68	101.70	115.95	1009.3	1125.3	0.2122	1.6610	1.8717	148.0
150.0	3.7184	0.016343	97.05	97.07	117.95	1008.2	1126.1	0.2156	1.6536	1.8676	150.0
152.0	3.9065	0.016353	92.66	92.68	119.95	1007.0	1126.9	0.2190	1.6463	1.8636	152.0
154.0	4.1025	0.016363	88.50	88.52	121.95	1005.8	1127.7	0.2224	1.6390	1.8596	154.0
156.0	4.3068	0.016374	84.56	84.57	123.95	1004.6	1128.6	0.2258	1.6318	1.8556	156.0
158.0	4.5197	0.016384	80.82	80.83	125.95	1003.4	1129.4	0.2291	1.6245	1.8516	158.0
160.0	4.7414	0.016395	77.27	77.29	127.96	1002.2	1130.2	0.2325	1.6174	1.8477	160.0
162.0	4.9722	0.016406	73.90	73.92	129.96	1001.0	1131.0	0.2358	1.6103	1.8438	162.0
164.0	5.2124	0.016417	70.70	70.72	131.96	999.8	1131.8	0.2391	1.6032	1.8399	164.0
166.0	5.4623	0.016428	67.67	67.68	133.97	998.6	1132.6	0.2424	1.5961	1.8361	166.0
168.0	5.7223	0.016440	64.78	64.80	135.97	997.4	1133.4	0.2457	1.5892	1.8323	168.0
170.0	5.9926	0.016451	62.04	62.06	137.97	996.2	1134.2	0.2490	1.5822	1.8285	170.0
172.0	6.2736	0.016463	59.43	59.45	139.98	995.0	1135.0	0.2523	1.5753	1.8248	172.0
174.0	6.5656	0.016474	56.95	56.97	141.98	993.8	1135.8	0.2556	1.5684	1.8211	174.0
176.0	6.8690	0.016486	54.59	54.61	143.99	992.6	1136.6	0.2589	1.5616	1.8174	176.0
178.0	7.1840	0.016498	52.35	52.36	145.99	991.4	1137.4	0.2622	1.5548	1.8137	178.0

*For states shown are meta stable

Table 1. Saturated Steam: Temperature Table—Continued

Temp Fahr. t	Abs Pres Lb per Sq in p	Specific Volume			Enthalpy			Entropy			Temp Fahr. t
		Sat Liquid v _l	Evap v _g	Sat Vapor v _g	Sat Liquid h _l	Evap h _{fg}	Sat Vapor h _g	Sat Liquid s _l	Evap s _{fg}	Sat Vapor s _g	
100.0	7.5110	0.016510	50.21	50.22	148.00	990.2	1138.2	0.2631	1.5480	1.8111	100.0
101.0	7.850	0.016527	48.172	48.189	150.01	989.0	1139.0	0.2667	1.5413	1.8075	101.0
102.0	8.203	0.016534	46.237	46.249	152.01	987.8	1139.8	0.2704	1.5346	1.8040	102.0
103.0	8.568	0.016547	44.383	44.400	154.03	986.5	1140.5	0.2742	1.5279	1.8004	103.0
104.0	8.947	0.016559	42.621	42.638	156.03	985.3	1141.3	0.2780	1.5213	1.7969	104.0
105.0	9.340	0.016572	40.941	40.957	158.04	984.1	1142.1	0.2787	1.5148	1.7934	105.0
106.0	9.747	0.016585	39.337	39.354	160.05	982.8	1142.9	0.2818	1.5082	1.7900	106.0
107.0	10.168	0.016598	37.808	37.824	162.05	981.6	1143.7	0.2848	1.5017	1.7865	107.0
108.0	10.605	0.016611	36.348	36.364	164.06	980.4	1144.4	0.2879	1.4952	1.7831	108.0
109.0	11.058	0.016624	34.954	34.970	166.08	979.1	1145.2	0.2910	1.4888	1.7798	109.0
200.0	11.526	0.016637	33.627	33.639	168.09	977.9	1146.0	0.2940	1.4824	1.7764	200.0
204.0	12.517	0.016664	31.135	31.151	172.11	975.4	1147.5	0.3001	1.4697	1.7698	204.0
208.0	13.568	0.016691	28.867	28.878	176.14	972.8	1149.0	0.3061	1.4571	1.7632	208.0
212.0	14.696	0.016719	26.782	26.799	180.17	970.3	1150.5	0.3121	1.4447	1.7568	212.0
216.0	15.901	0.016747	24.878	24.894	184.20	967.8	1152.0	0.3181	1.4323	1.7505	216.0
220.0	17.186	0.016775	23.131	23.148	188.23	965.2	1153.4	0.3241	1.4201	1.7442	220.0
224.0	18.556	0.016805	21.529	21.545	192.27	962.6	1154.9	0.3300	1.4081	1.7380	224.0
228.0	20.015	0.016834	20.056	20.073	196.31	960.0	1156.3	0.3359	1.3961	1.7320	228.0
232.0	21.567	0.016864	18.701	18.718	200.35	957.4	1157.8	0.3417	1.3842	1.7260	232.0
236.0	23.216	0.016895	17.454	17.471	204.40	954.8	1159.2	0.3476	1.3725	1.7201	236.0
240.0	24.968	0.016926	16.304	16.321	208.45	952.1	1160.6	0.3533	1.3609	1.7142	240.0
244.0	26.826	0.016958	15.243	15.260	212.50	949.5	1162.0	0.3591	1.3494	1.7085	244.0
248.0	28.796	0.016990	14.264	14.281	216.56	946.8	1163.4	0.3649	1.3379	1.7028	248.0
252.0	30.883	0.017022	13.358	13.375	220.62	944.1	1164.7	0.3706	1.3266	1.6972	252.0
256.0	33.091	0.017055	12.520	12.538	224.69	941.4	1166.1	0.3763	1.3154	1.6917	256.0
260.0	35.427	0.017089	11.745	11.762	228.76	938.6	1167.4	0.3819	1.3043	1.6862	260.0
264.0	37.894	0.017123	11.025	11.042	232.83	935.9	1168.7	0.3876	1.2933	1.6808	264.0
268.0	40.500	0.017157	10.358	10.375	236.91	933.1	1170.0	0.3932	1.2823	1.6755	268.0
272.0	43.249	0.017193	9.738	9.755	240.99	930.3	1171.3	0.3987	1.2715	1.6702	272.0
276.0	46.147	0.017228	9.162	9.180	245.08	927.5	1172.5	0.4043	1.2607	1.6650	276.0
280.0	49.200	0.017264	8.627	8.644	249.17	924.6	1173.8	0.4098	1.2501	1.6599	280.0
284.0	52.414	0.017300	8.130	8.147	253.27	921.7	1175.0	0.4154	1.2395	1.6548	284.0
288.0	55.795	0.017334	7.663	7.680	257.4	918.8	1176.2	0.4208	1.2290	1.6498	288.0
292.0	59.350	0.017378	7.230	7.247	261.5	915.9	1177.4	0.4263	1.2186	1.6448	292.0
296.0	63.084	0.01741	6.8259	6.8433	265.6	913.0	1178.6	0.4317	1.2082	1.6400	296.0
300.0	67.005	0.01745	6.4483	6.4658	269.7	910.0	1179.7	0.4372	1.1979	1.6351	300.0
304.0	71.119	0.01749	6.0955	6.1130	273.8	907.0	1180.9	0.4426	1.1877	1.6303	304.0
308.0	75.433	0.01753	5.7655	5.7830	278.0	904.0	1182.0	0.4479	1.1776	1.6256	308.0
312.0	79.953	0.01757	5.4566	5.4742	282.3	901.0	1183.1	0.4533	1.1676	1.6209	312.0
316.0	84.688	0.01761	5.1673	5.1849	286.3	897.9	1184.1	0.4586	1.1576	1.6162	316.0
320.0	89.643	0.01766	4.8961	4.9138	290.4	894.8	1185.2	0.4640	1.1477	1.6116	320.0
324.0	94.826	0.01770	4.6418	4.6595	294.6	891.6	1186.2	0.4692	1.1378	1.6071	324.0
328.0	100.245	0.01774	4.4030	4.4208	298.7	888.5	1187.2	0.4745	1.1280	1.6025	328.0
332.0	105.907	0.01779	4.1788	4.1966	302.9	885.3	1188.2	0.4798	1.1183	1.5981	332.0
336.0	111.820	0.01783	3.9681	3.9859	307.1	882.1	1189.1	0.4850	1.1086	1.5936	336.0
340.0	117.992	0.01787	3.7699	3.7878	311.3	878.8	1190.1	0.4902	1.0990	1.5892	340.0
344.0	124.430	0.01792	3.5834	3.6013	315.5	875.5	1191.0	0.4954	1.0894	1.5848	344.0
348.0	131.142	0.01797	3.4078	3.4258	319.7	872.2	1191.9	0.5006	1.0799	1.5806	348.0
352.0	138.138	0.01801	3.2423	3.2603	323.9	868.9	1192.7	0.5058	1.0705	1.5763	352.0
356.0	145.424	0.01806	3.0863	3.1044	328.1	865.5	1193.6	0.5110	1.0611	1.5721	356.0
360.0	152.010	0.01811	2.9392	2.9573	332.3	862.1	1194.4	0.5161	1.0517	1.5678	360.0
364.0	160.903	0.01816	2.8007	2.8184	336.5	858.6	1195.2	0.5212	1.0424	1.5637	364.0
368.0	169.113	0.01821	2.6691	2.6873	340.8	855.1	1195.9	0.5263	1.0332	1.5595	368.0
372.0	177.648	0.01826	2.5451	2.5633	345.0	851.6	1196.7	0.5314	1.0240	1.5554	372.0
376.0	186.517	0.01831	2.4279	2.4462	349.3	848.1	1197.4	0.5365	1.0148	1.5513	376.0
380.0	195.729	0.01836	2.3170	2.3352	353.6	844.5	1198.0	0.5416	1.0057	1.5473	380.0
384.0	205.294	0.01842	2.2120	2.2304	357.9	840.8	1198.7	0.5466	0.9966	1.5432	384.0
388.0	215.220	0.01847	2.1126	2.1311	362.2	837.2	1199.3	0.5516	0.9876	1.5392	388.0
392.0	225.516	0.01853	2.0184	2.0369	366.5	833.4	1199.9	0.5567	0.9786	1.5352	392.0
396.0	236.193	0.01858	1.9291	1.9477	370.8	829.7	1200.4	0.5617	0.9696	1.5313	396.0
400.0	247.259	0.01864	1.8444	1.8630	375.1	825.9	1201.0	0.5667	0.9607	1.5274	400.0
404.0	258.725	0.01870	1.7640	1.7827	379.4	822.0	1201.5	0.5717	0.9518	1.5234	404.0
408.0	270.600	0.01875	1.6877	1.7064	383.8	818.2	1201.9	0.5766	0.9429	1.5195	408.0
412.0	282.894	0.01881	1.6152	1.6340	388.1	814.2	1202.4	0.5816	0.9341	1.5157	412.0
416.0	295.617	0.01887	1.5463	1.5651	392.5	810.2	1202.8	0.5866	0.9253	1.5118	416.0
420.0	308.780	0.01894	1.4808	1.4997	396.9	806.2	1203.1	0.5915	0.9165	1.5080	420.0
424.0	322.391	0.01900	1.4184	1.4374	401.3	802.2	1203.5	0.5964	0.9077	1.5042	424.0
428.0	336.463	0.01906	1.3591	1.3782	405.7	798.0	1203.7	0.6014	0.8990	1.5004	428.0
432.0	351.00	0.01913	1.3026	1.3217	410.1	793.9	1204.0	0.6063	0.8903	1.4966	432.0
436.0	366.03	0.01919	1.2487	1.2680	414.6	789.7	1204.2	0.6112	0.8816	1.4928	436.0
440.0	381.54	0.01926	1.1976	1.2168	419.0	785.4	1204.4	0.6161	0.8729	1.4890	440.0
444.0	397.56	0.01933	1.1487	1.1680	423.5	781.1	1204.6	0.6210	0.8643	1.4853	444.0
448.0	414.09	0.01940	1.1021	1.1215	428.0	776.7	1204.7	0.6259	0.8557	1.4815	448.0
452.0	431.14	0.01947	1.0576	1.0771	432.5	772.3	1204.8	0.6308	0.8471	1.4778	452.0
456.0	448.73	0.01954	1.0151	1.0347	437.0	767.8	1204.8	0.6356	0.8385	1.4741	456.0

Table 1. Saturated Steam: Temperature Table—Continued


Temp Fahr t	Abs Press Lb per Sq In p	Specific Volume			Enthalpy			Entropy			Temp Fahr t
		Sat Liquid v _l	Evap v _{lg}	Sat Vapor v _g	Sat Liquid h _l	Evap h _{lg}	Sat Vapor h _g	Sat Liquid s _l	Evap s _{lg}	Sat Vapor s _g	
480.0	466.87	0.01961	0.97463	0.99124	441.5	763.2	1204.8	0.6405	0.8299	1.4704	480.0
484.0	485.56	0.01969	0.93588	0.95557	446.1	758.6	1204.7	0.6454	0.8213	1.4667	484.0
488.0	504.83	0.01976	0.89685	0.91862	450.7	754.0	1204.6	0.6502	0.8127	1.4629	488.0
472.0	524.67	0.01984	0.86345	0.88379	455.2	749.3	1204.5	0.6551	0.8042	1.4592	472.0
476.0	545.11	0.01992	0.82958	0.84950	459.9	744.5	1204.3	0.6599	0.7956	1.4555	476.0
460.0	566.15	0.02000	0.79716	0.81717	464.5	739.6	1204.1	0.6648	0.7871	1.4518	460.0
464.0	587.81	0.02009	0.76613	0.78622	469.1	734.7	1203.8	0.6696	0.7785	1.4481	464.0
468.0	610.10	0.02017	0.73641	0.75658	473.8	729.7	1203.5	0.6745	0.7700	1.4444	468.0
482.0	633.03	0.02026	0.70794	0.72820	478.5	724.6	1203.1	0.6793	0.7614	1.4407	482.0
486.0	656.61	0.02034	0.68065	0.70100	483.2	719.5	1202.7	0.6842	0.7528	1.4370	486.0
480.0	680.86	0.02043	0.65448	0.67492	487.9	714.3	1202.2	0.6890	0.7443	1.4333	480.0
484.0	705.78	0.02053	0.62938	0.64991	492.7	709.0	1201.7	0.6939	0.7357	1.4296	484.0
488.0	731.40	0.02062	0.60530	0.62592	497.5	703.7	1201.1	0.6987	0.7271	1.4258	488.0
492.0	757.72	0.02072	0.58218	0.60289	502.3	698.2	1200.5	0.7036	0.7185	1.4221	492.0
496.0	784.76	0.02081	0.55997	0.58079	507.1	692.7	1199.8	0.7085	0.7099	1.4183	496.0
480.0	812.53	0.02091	0.53864	0.55956	512.0	687.0	1199.0	0.7133	0.7013	1.4146	480.0
484.0	841.04	0.02102	0.51814	0.53916	516.9	681.3	1198.2	0.7182	0.6926	1.4108	484.0
488.0	870.31	0.02112	0.49843	0.51955	521.8	675.5	1197.3	0.7231	0.6839	1.4070	488.0
492.0	900.34	0.02123	0.47947	0.50070	526.8	669.6	1196.4	0.7280	0.6752	1.4032	492.0
496.0	931.17	0.02134	0.46123	0.48257	531.7	663.6	1195.4	0.7329	0.6665	1.3993	496.0
480.0	962.79	0.02146	0.44367	0.46513	536.8	657.5	1194.3	0.7378	0.6577	1.3954	480.0
484.0	995.27	0.02157	0.42677	0.44834	541.8	651.3	1193.1	0.7427	0.6489	1.3915	484.0
488.0	1028.49	0.02169	0.41048	0.43217	546.9	645.0	1191.9	0.7476	0.6400	1.3876	488.0
492.0	1062.59	0.02182	0.39479	0.41660	552.0	638.5	1190.6	0.7525	0.6311	1.3837	492.0
496.0	1097.55	0.02194	0.37966	0.40160	557.2	632.0	1189.2	0.7575	0.6222	1.3797	496.0
480.0	1133.38	0.02207	0.36507	0.38714	562.4	625.3	1187.7	0.7625	0.6132	1.3757	480.0
484.0	1170.10	0.02221	0.35099	0.37320	567.6	618.5	1186.1	0.7674	0.6041	1.3716	484.0
488.0	1207.75	0.02235	0.33741	0.35975	572.9	611.5	1184.5	0.7725	0.5950	1.3675	488.0
492.0	1246.26	0.02249	0.32429	0.34678	578.3	604.5	1182.7	0.7775	0.5859	1.3634	492.0
496.0	1285.74	0.02264	0.31162	0.33426	583.7	597.2	1180.9	0.7825	0.5766	1.3592	496.0
480.0	1326.17	0.02279	0.29937	0.32216	589.1	589.9	1179.0	0.7876	0.5673	1.3550	480.0
484.0	1367.7	0.02295	0.28753	0.31048	594.6	582.4	1176.9	0.7927	0.5580	1.3507	484.0
488.0	1410.0	0.02311	0.27608	0.29919	600.1	574.7	1174.8	0.7978	0.5485	1.3464	488.0
492.0	1453.3	0.02328	0.26499	0.28827	605.7	566.8	1172.6	0.8030	0.5390	1.3420	492.0
496.0	1497.8	0.02345	0.25425	0.27770	611.4	558.8	1170.2	0.8082	0.5293	1.3375	496.0
480.0	1543.2	0.02364	0.24384	0.26747	617.1	550.6	1167.7	0.8134	0.5196	1.3330	480.0
484.0	1589.7	0.02382	0.23374	0.25757	622.9	542.2	1165.1	0.8187	0.5097	1.3284	484.0
488.0	1637.3	0.02402	0.22394	0.24796	628.8	533.6	1162.4	0.8240	0.4997	1.3238	488.0
492.0	1686.1	0.02422	0.21442	0.23865	634.8	524.7	1159.5	0.8294	0.4896	1.3190	492.0
496.0	1735.9	0.02444	0.20516	0.22960	640.8	515.6	1156.4	0.8348	0.4794	1.3141	496.0
480.0	1786.9	0.02466	0.19615	0.22081	646.9	506.3	1153.2	0.8403	0.4689	1.3092	480.0
484.0	1839.0	0.02489	0.18737	0.21226	653.1	496.6	1149.8	0.8458	0.4583	1.3041	484.0
488.0	1892.4	0.02514	0.17880	0.20394	659.5	486.7	1146.1	0.8514	0.4474	1.2988	488.0
492.0	1947.0	0.02539	0.17044	0.19583	665.9	476.4	1142.2	0.8571	0.4364	1.2934	492.0
496.0	2002.8	0.02566	0.16226	0.18792	672.4	465.7	1138.1	0.8628	0.4251	1.2879	496.0
480.0	2059.9	0.02595	0.15427	0.18021	679.1	454.6	1133.7	0.8686	0.4134	1.2821	480.0
484.0	2118.3	0.02625	0.14644	0.17269	685.9	443.1	1129.0	0.8744	0.4015	1.2761	484.0
488.0	2178.1	0.02657	0.13876	0.16534	692.9	431.1	1124.0	0.8802	0.3893	1.2699	488.0
492.0	2239.2	0.02691	0.13124	0.15816	700.0	418.7	1118.7	0.8860	0.3767	1.2634	492.0
496.0	2301.7	0.02728	0.12387	0.15115	707.4	405.7	1113.1	0.8919	0.3637	1.2567	496.0
480.0	2365.7	0.02768	0.11663	0.14431	714.9	392.1	1107.0	0.8979	0.3502	1.2498	480.0
484.0	2431.1	0.02811	0.10947	0.13757	722.9	377.7	1100.6	0.9046	0.3361	1.2425	484.0
488.0	2498.1	0.02858	0.10279	0.13087	731.5	362.1	1093.5	0.9113	0.3210	1.2347	488.0
492.0	2566.6	0.02911	0.09614	0.12424	740.2	345.7	1085.9	0.9182	0.3054	1.2266	492.0
496.0	2636.8	0.02970	0.08979	0.11769	749.2	328.5	1077.6	0.9252	0.2892	1.2179	496.0
480.0	2708.6	0.03037	0.08380	0.11117	758.5	310.1	1068.5	0.9325	0.2720	1.2086	480.0
484.0	2782.1	0.03114	0.07749	0.10463	768.2	290.2	1058.4	0.9402	0.2537	1.1984	484.0
488.0	2857.4	0.03204	0.07095	0.09799	778.2	268.7	1047.0	0.9483	0.2337	1.1872	488.0
492.0	2934.5	0.03313	0.06579	0.09110	790.5	243.1	1033.6	0.9568	0.2110	1.1744	492.0
496.0	3013.4	0.03455	0.04916	0.08371	804.4	212.8	1017.2	0.9749	0.1841	1.1591	496.0
480.0	3094.3	0.03662	0.03857	0.07519	822.4	172.7	995.2	0.9901	0.1490	1.1390	480.0
484.0	3135.5	0.03824	0.03173	0.06697	835.0	144.7	975.7	1.0006	0.1246	1.1252	484.0
488.0	3177.2	0.04106	0.02192	0.06300	854.2	102.0	956.2	1.0169	0.0876	1.1046	488.0
492.0	3198.3	0.04427	0.01304	0.05730	873.0	61.4	934.4	1.0329	0.0527	1.0856	492.0
496.0	3208.2	0.05078	0.00000	0.05078	906.0	0.0	906.0	1.0612	0.0000	1.0612	496.0

*Critical temperature

Table 2: Saturated Steam: Pressure Table

Abs Press Lb/Sq In p	Temp Fahr t	Specific Volume			Enthalpy			Entropy			Abs Press Lb/Sq In p
		Sat Liquid v _l	Evap v _{lg}	Sat Vapor v _g	Sat Liquid h _l	Evap h _{lg}	Sat Vapor h _g	Sat Liquid s _l	Evap s _{lg}	Sat Vapor s _g	
0.0005	32.018	0.016027	3302.4	3302.4	0.0003	1075.5	1075.5	0.0000	2.1872	2.1872	0.0005
0.25	59.323	0.016037	1235.5	1235.5	27.382	1060.1	1087.4	0.0547	2.0475	2.0966	0.25
0.50	79.586	0.016071	641.5	641.5	47.623	1048.6	1096.3	0.0925	1.9446	2.0370	0.50
1.0	101.74	0.016136	333.59	333.60	69.73	1036.1	1105.8	0.1376	1.8455	1.9781	1.0
1.5	116.24	0.016407	233.15	233.15	93.70	1020.9	1113.1	0.1839	1.7594	1.9413	1.5
2.0	132.21	0.016592	184.40	184.40	118.26	1007.1	1118.1	0.2316	1.6847	1.9163	2.0
3.0	154.86	0.016719	138.26	138.26	143.26	993.7	1120.9	0.2811	1.6200	1.8971	3.0
4.0	173.03	0.016776	104.24	104.24	168.24	980.7	1121.9	0.3317	1.5641	1.8828	4.0
5.0	188.81	0.016834	80.070	80.070	193.24	968.1	1121.9	0.3834	1.5156	1.8732	5.0
6.0	202.34	0.017009	63.726	63.726	218.24	955.9	1121.9	0.4361	1.4724	1.8681	6.0
8.0	227.25	0.017151	47.994	47.994	243.24	944.1	1121.9	0.4898	1.4344	1.8661	8.0
10.0	248.02	0.017274	37.997	37.997	268.24	932.7	1121.9	0.5445	1.3999	1.8661	10.0
15.0	292.71	0.017383	26.156	26.156	293.24	921.7	1121.9	0.6002	1.3684	1.8681	15.0
20.0	302.93	0.017482	20.187	20.187	318.24	911.1	1121.9	0.6569	1.3394	1.8701	20.0
30.0	312.04	0.017573	15.456	15.456	343.24	900.9	1121.9	0.7146	1.3134	1.8721	30.0
40.0	320.28	0.017659	11.879	11.879	368.24	891.1	1121.9	0.7733	1.2900	1.8741	40.0
50.0	327.82	0.017740	8.4133	8.4133	393.24	881.7	1121.9	0.8330	1.2689	1.8761	50.0
60.0	334.79	0.017822	6.0306	6.0306	418.24	872.7	1121.9	0.8937	1.2500	1.8781	60.0
70.0	341.27	0.017899	4.7097	4.7097	443.24	864.1	1121.9	0.9554	1.2331	1.8791	70.0
80.0	347.33	0.017996	3.4364	3.4364	468.24	855.9	1121.9	0.9998	1.2181	1.8801	80.0
90.0	353.04	0.018033	2.7010	2.7010	493.24	848.1	1121.9	0.5071	1.2049	1.8811	90.0
100.0	358.43	0.018099	2.1958	2.1958	518.24	840.7	1121.9	0.5141	1.1934	1.8821	100.0
120.0	363.55	0.018115	1.6155	1.6155	543.24	833.6	1121.9	0.5206	1.1834	1.8831	120.0
140.0	368.47	0.018211	1.2656	1.2656	568.24	826.8	1121.9	0.5269	1.1747	1.8841	140.0
160.0	373.08	0.018277	1.0129	1.0129	593.24	820.3	1121.9	0.5329	1.1671	1.8851	160.0
180.0	377.53	0.018333	0.8147	0.8147	618.24	814.1	1121.9	0.5384	1.1604	1.8861	180.0
200.0	381.80	0.018399	0.6689	0.6689	643.24	808.1	1121.9	0.5438	1.1544	1.8871	200.0
220.0	385.91	0.018444	0.5673	0.5673	668.24	802.3	1121.9	0.5490	1.1490	1.8881	220.0
240.0	389.88	0.018490	0.4967	0.4967	693.24	796.7	1121.9	0.5540	1.1441	1.8891	240.0
260.0	393.70	0.018535	0.4419	0.4419	718.24	791.3	1121.9	0.5588	1.1396	1.8901	260.0
280.0	397.39	0.018580	0.3989	0.3989	743.24	786.1	1121.9	0.5634	1.1354	1.8911	280.0
300.0	400.97	0.018625	0.3625	0.3625	768.24	781.1	1121.9	0.5679	1.1314	1.8921	300.0
320.0	404.44	0.018670	0.3306	0.3306	793.24	776.3	1121.9	0.5722	1.1276	1.8931	320.0
340.0	407.80	0.018715	0.3017	0.3017	818.24	771.7	1121.9	0.5764	1.1240	1.8941	340.0
360.0	411.07	0.018760	0.2748	0.2748	843.24	767.3	1121.9	0.5805	1.1206	1.8951	360.0
380.0	414.25	0.018805	0.2500	0.2500	868.24	763.0	1121.9	0.5844	1.1174	1.8961	380.0
400.0	417.35	0.018849	0.2270	0.2270	893.24	758.8	1121.9	0.5882	1.1144	1.8971	400.0
420.0	431.73	0.018912	0.2064	0.2064	918.24	754.7	1121.9	0.6059	1.1099	1.8981	420.0
440.0	444.60	0.018934	0.1886	0.1886	943.24	750.7	1121.9	0.6217	1.1060	1.8991	440.0
460.0	456.28	0.018954	0.1724	0.1724	968.24	746.8	1121.9	0.6360	1.1026	1.9001	460.0
480.0	467.01	0.018975	0.1578	0.1578	993.24	743.0	1121.9	0.6490	1.0994	1.9011	480.0
500.0	476.94	0.018994	0.1443	0.1443	1018.24	739.3	1121.9	0.6611	1.0964	1.9021	500.0
520.0	486.20	0.02013	0.1318	0.1318	1043.24	735.7	1121.9	0.6723	1.0936	1.9031	520.0
540.0	494.89	0.02037	0.1201	0.1201	1068.24	732.2	1121.9	0.6828	1.0910	1.9041	540.0
560.0	503.08	0.02050	0.1090	0.1090	1093.24	728.8	1121.9	0.6928	1.0886	1.9051	560.0
580.0	510.84	0.02069	0.1000	0.1000	1118.24	725.5	1121.9	0.7022	1.0864	1.9061	580.0
600.0	518.21	0.02087	0.0920	0.0920	1143.24	722.3	1121.9	0.7111	1.0844	1.9071	600.0
620.0	525.24	0.02105	0.0850	0.0850	1168.24	719.2	1121.9	0.7197	1.0825	1.9081	620.0
640.0	531.95	0.02123	0.0790	0.0790	1193.24	716.2	1121.9	0.7279	1.0807	1.9091	640.0
660.0	538.39	0.02141	0.0740	0.0740	1218.24	713.3	1121.9	0.7358	1.0790	1.9101	660.0
680.0	544.58	0.02159	0.0690	0.0690	1243.24	710.5	1121.9	0.7434	1.0774	1.9111	680.0
700.0	550.53	0.02177	0.0640	0.0640	1268.24	707.8	1121.9	0.7507	1.0759	1.9121	700.0
720.0	556.28	0.02195	0.0590	0.0590	1293.24	705.2	1121.9	0.7578	1.0745	1.9131	720.0
740.0	561.82	0.02214	0.0540	0.0540	1318.24	702.7	1121.9	0.7647	1.0732	1.9141	740.0
760.0	567.19	0.02232	0.0490	0.0490	1343.24	700.3	1121.9	0.7714	1.0720	1.9151	760.0
780.0	572.38	0.02250	0.0440	0.0440	1368.24	698.0	1121.9	0.7780	1.0709	1.9161	780.0
800.0	577.42	0.02269	0.0390	0.0390	1393.24	695.7	1121.9	0.7843	1.0699	1.9171	800.0
820.0	582.32	0.02288	0.3500	0.3500	1418.24	693.5	1121.9	0.7906	1.0690	1.9181	820.0
840.0	587.07	0.02307	0.2787	0.2787	1443.24	691.3	1121.9	0.7966	1.0682	1.9191	840.0
860.0	591.70	0.02327	0.2254	0.2254	1468.24	689.2	1121.9	0.8026	1.0674	1.9201	860.0
880.0	596.20	0.02346	0.1800	0.1800	1493.24	687.1	1121.9	0.8085	1.0667	1.9211	880.0
900.0	600.59	0.02366	0.1400	0.1400	1518.24	685.1	1121.9	0.8142	1.0660	1.9221	900.0
920.0	604.87	0.02387	0.1050	0.1050	1543.24	683.1	1121.9	0.8199	1.0654	1.9231	920.0
940.0	609.05	0.02407	0.0740	0.0740	1568.24	681.2	1121.9	0.8254	1.0648	1.9241	940.0
960.0	613.13	0.02428	0.0470	0.0470	1593.24	679.3	1121.9	0.8309	1.0642	1.9251	960.0
980.0	617.12	0.02450	0.0260	0.0260	1618.24	677.5	1121.9	0.8363	1.0637	1.9261	980.0
1000.0	621.02	0.02472	0.0190	0.0190	1643.24	675.7	1121.9	0.8417	1.0632	1.9271	1000.0
1020.0	624.83	0.02495	0.0150	0.0150	1668.24	674.0	1121.9	0.8470	1.0627	1.9281	1020.0
1040.0	628.56	0.02517	0.0120	0.0120	1693.24	672.3	1121.9	0.8522	1.0622	1.9291	1040.0
1060.0	632.22	0.02541	0.0090	0.0090	1718.24	670.7	1121.9	0.8574	1.0617	1.9301	1060.0
1080.0	635.80	0.02565	0.0060	0.0060	1743.24	669.1	1121.9	0.8625	1.0612	1.9311	1080.0
1100.0	642.76	0.02615	0.0040	0.0040	1768.24	667.5	1121.9	0.8677	1.0607	1.9321	1100.0
1120.0	649.45	0.02665	0.0030	0.0030	1793.24	666.0	1121.9	0.8727	1.0602	1.9331	1120.0
1140.0	655.89	0.02727	0.0020	0.0020	1818.24	664.5	1121.9	0.8778	1.0597	1.9341	1140.0
1160.0	662.11	0.02790	0.0010	0.0010	1843.24	663.0	1121.9	0.8828	1.0592	1.9351	1160.0
1180.0	668.11	0.02859	0.0005	0.0005	1868.24	661.5	1121.9	0.8879	1.0587	1.9361	1180.0
1200.0	673.91	0.02938	0.0002	0.0002	1893.24	660.0	1121.9	0.8930	1.0582	1.9371	1200.0
1220.0	679.53	0.03029	0.0001	0.0001	1918.24	658.5	1121.9	0.9468	1.0577	1.9381	1220.0
1240.0	684.96	0.03134	0.0000	0.0000	1943.24	657.0	1121.9	0.9588	1.0572	1.9391	1240.0
1260.0	690.22	0.03262	0.0000	0.0000	1968.24	655.5	1121.9	0.9728	1.0567	1.9401	1260.0
1280.0	695.33	0.03428	0.0000	0.0000	1993.24	654.0	1121.9	0.9894	1.0562	1.9411	1280.0
1300.0	700.28	0.03648	0.0000	0.0000	2018.24	652.5	1121.9	1.0087	1.0557	1.9421	1300.0
1320.0	705.08	0.04472	0.0000	0.0000	2043.24	651.0	1121.9	1.0311	1.0552	1.9431	1320.0
1340.0	709.47	0.05078	0.0000	0.0000	2068.24	649.5	1121.9	1.0567	1.0547	1.9441	1340.0

*Critical pressure



Mollier diagram (h-s) for steam.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
3.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL	4.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL
<u>Applicability:</u>	<u>Applicability:</u>
Applies to the operational status of the control rod system.	Applies to the surveillance requirements of the control rod system.
<u>Objective:</u>	<u>Objective:</u>
To assure the ability of the control rod system to control reactivity.	To verify the ability of the control rod system to control reactivity.
<u>Specification:</u>	<u>Specification:</u>
A. <u>Reactivity Limitations</u>	A. <u>Reactivity Limitations</u>
1. <u>Reactivity margin - core Loading</u>	1. <u>Reactivity margin - core loading</u>
A sufficient number of control rods shall be operable so that the core could be made subcritical in the most reactive condition during the operating cycle with the strongest control rod fully withdrawn and all other operable control rods fully inserted.	Sufficient control rods shall be withdrawn following a refueling outage when core alterations were performed to demonstrate with a margin of 0.38 $\Delta k/k$ that the core can be made subcritical at any time in the subsequent fuel cycle with the analytically determined strongest operable control rod fully withdrawn and all other operable rods fully inserted.
2. <u>Control Rod Exercise</u>	2. <u>Control Rod Exercise</u>
a. Control rods which cannot be moved with control rod drive pressure shall be considered inoperable. If a partially or fully withdrawn control rod drive cannot be moved with drive or scram pressure, the reactor shall be brought to a shutdown condition within 48 hours unless investigation demonstrates that the cause of the failure is not due to a failed control rod drive mechanism collet housing.	a. Each partially or fully withdrawn operable control rod shall be exercised one notch at least once each week when operating above 30% power. This test shall be performed at least once per 24 hours in the event power operation is continuing above 30% power with two or more inoperable control rods or in the event power operation is continuing above 30% power with one fully or partially withdrawn rod which cannot be moved and for which control rod drive mechanism damage has not been ruled out. The surveillance need not be completed within 24 hours if the number of inoperable rods has been reduced to less than two and if it has been demonstrated that control rod drive mechanism collet housing failure is not the cause of an immovable control rod.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

- b. The control rod directional control valves for inoperable control rods shall be disarmed electrically and the control rods shall be in such position that Specification 3.3.A.1 is met.
- c. Control rods with inoperable accumulators or those whose position cannot be positively determined shall be considered inoperable.
- d. Control rods with a failed "Full-in" or "Full-out" position switch may be bypassed in the Rod Sequence Control System and considered operable if the actual rod position is known. These rods must be moved in sequence to their correct positions (full-in on insertion or full-out on withdrawal).
- e. Control rods with scram times greater than those permitted by Specification 3.3.C.3 are inoperable, but if they can be inserted with control rod drive pressure they need not be disarmed electrically.
- f. Inoperable control rods shall be positioned such that Specification 3.3.A.1 is met.

- b. A second licensed operator shall verify the conformance to Specification 3.3.A.2d before a rod may be bypassed in the Rod Sequence Control System.
- c. Once per week when the plant is in operation, check status of pressure and level alarms for each CRD accumulator.
- d. Once per quarter verify that:
 - (1) the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) vent and drain valves close within 30 seconds after receipt of a close signal, and
 - (2) after removal of the close signal, that the SDV vent and drain valves are open. Once per month verify that the SDV vent and drain valve position indicating lights located in the control room indicate that the valves are open.
- e. Once per operating cycle verify that:
 - (1) the SDV vent and drain valves close within 30 seconds after receipt of a signal for the control rods to scram, and
 - (2) open when the scram signal is reset.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

- 1) In addition, whenever the reactor is in the startup or run mode no more than one control rod in any 5 x 5 array may be inoperable (at least 4 operable control rods must separate any 2 inoperable ones). If this Specification cannot be met, the reactor shall not be started, or if at power, the reactor shall be brought to a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
- 2) All rods within a notch group containing an inoperable rod will be positioned within 1 (one) notch of the inoperable rod whenever the Rod Sequence Control System is required.
- g. During reactor power operation the number of inoperable control rods shall not exceed 8. Specification 3.3.A.1 must be met at all times.

B. Control Rods

1. Each control rod shall be coupled to its drive and have rod position indication available for the "full in" and "full out" position or completely inserted and the control rod directional control valves disarmed electrically. This requirement does not apply in the refuel condition when the reactor is vented. Two control rod drives may be removed as long as Specification 3.3.A.1 is met.

B. Control Rods

1. The coupling integrity shall be verified for each withdrawn control rod as follows:
- a. When a rod is withdrawn the first time after each refueling outage or after maintenance, observe discernible response of the nuclear instrumentation and rod position indication for the "full in" and "full out" position. However, for initial rods when response is not discernible, subsequent exercising of these rods after the reactor is above 30% power shall be performed to verify instrumentation response.
- b. When the rod is fully withdrawn the first time after each refueling outage or after CRD maintenance, observe that the drive does not go to the overtravel position.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

2. The control rod drive housing support system shall be in place during REACTOR POWER OPERATION or when the reactor coolant system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure with fuel in the reactor vessel, unless all control rods are fully inserted and Specification 3.3.A.1 is met.
- 3.a Whenever the reactor is in the STARTUP or RUN mode below 30% RATED POWER, and the control rod movement is within the group notch mode after 50% of the control rods have been withdrawn, the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE. If the system is determined to be inoperable in accordance with checks in Specification 4.3.B.3, power may be increased above 30% RATED POWER by increasing core flow.
- b. Whenever the reactor is in STARTUP or RUN modes below 30% RATED POWER the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE or a second Reactor Operator shall verify that the Reactor Operator at the reactor console is following the control rod program.
- c. If either Specifications 3.3.B.3.a or .b cannot be met, the reactor shall not be started, or if the reactor is in the RUN or STARTUP modes at less than 30% RATED POWER, control rod movement shall not be permitted, except by a scram. Limited control rod movement is permitted for the purpose of determining RSCS or RWM OPERABILITY and shall be verified by a second Reactor Operator.

- c. During each REFUELING OUTAGE observe that any drive which has been uncoupled from and subsequently recoupled to its control rod does not go to the overtravel position.
2. The control rod drive housing support system shall be inspected after reassembly and the results of the inspection recorded.
- 3.a. Prior to the start of control rod withdrawal towards criticality and prior to attaining 30% RATED POWER during rod insertion at shutdown, the capability of the Rod Sequence Control System to properly fulfill its function shall be verified by the following check:
- Group Notch - Test the six comparator circuits. Go through each comparator inhibit initiate test, if error and reset. After completion checks initiate test and verify completion of cycle indicated by illumination of test complete light.
- b. Prior to the start of control rod withdrawal towards criticality and prior to attaining 30% RATED POWER during rod insertion at shutdown, the capability of the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) shall be verified by the following checks:
- 1) The correctness of the Reduced Notch Worth Procedure sequence input to the RWM computer shall be verified.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
<p>4. Control rods shall not be withdrawn in STARTUP or REFUEL modes unless at least two Source Range Monitor Channels have an observed count rate equal to or greater than three counts per second.</p>	<p>2) The RWM computer on line diagnostic test shall be successfully performed.</p>
<p>5. During operation with Limiting Control Rod Patterns, either:</p>	<p>3) Proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod in each fully inserted group shall be verified.</p>
<p>a. Both RBM channels shall be OPERABLE, or</p>	<p>4) The rod block function of the RWM shall be verified by withdrawing the first rod as an out-of-sequence control rod no more than to the block point.</p>
<p>b. With one RBM channel inoperable, control rod withdrawal shall be blocked within 24 hours, unless OPERABILITY is restored within this time period, or</p>	<p>4. Prior to control rod withdrawal in STARTUP or REFUEL modes, verify that at least two Source Range Monitor Channels have an observed count rate of at least three counts per second.</p>
<p>c. With both RBM channels inoperable, control rod withdrawal shall be blocked until OPERABILITY of at least one channel is restored.</p>	<p>5. When a Limiting Control Rod Pattern exists, an Instrument Functional Test of the RBM shall be performed prior to withdrawal of the designated rod(s).</p>

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONC. Scram Insertion Times

1. The average scram insertion time, based on the de-energization of the scram pilot valve at time zero, of all OPERABLE control rods in the reactor power operation condition shall be no greater than:

<u>Rod Position</u>	<u>Average Scram Insertion Times (Sec)</u>
46	0.35
38	0.937
26	1.86
06	3.41

2. The average scram insertion times for the three fastest control rods of all groups of four control rods in a 2 x 2 array shall be no greater than:

<u>Rod Position</u>	<u>Average Scram Insertion Times (Sec)</u>
46	0.37
38	1.01
26	1.97
06	3.62

3. Maximum scram insertion time to rod position 04 of any OPERABLE control rod should not exceed 7.00 seconds.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTC. Scram Insertion Times

1. After each refueling outage all OPERABLE rods shall be scram time tested from the fully withdrawn position to the drop-out of the reed switch at the rod position required by Specification 3.3.C. The nuclear system pressure shall be above 950 psig (with saturation temperature) and the requirements of Specification 3.3.8.3.a met. This testing shall be completed prior to exceeding 40% power. Below 30% power, only rods in those sequences (A₁₂ and A₃₄ or B₁₂ and B₃₄) which are fully withdrawn in the region from 100% rod density to 50% rod density shall be scram time tested. During all scram time testing below 30% power, the Rod Worth Minimizer shall be OPERABLE or a second licensed operator shall verify that the operator at the reactor console is following the control rod program.

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 5.01 (1.00)

d.

REFERENCE

DAEC RXTH-SH-16, pg. 2-3
292003K110 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 5.02 (2.00)

True.

Using the equation $P = P_0 e^{-\lambda(t/T)}$
solving for time results in the equation:

$$t = T \times \ln(P/P_0)$$

From this it can be seen that since 5/1 yields the same value as 50/10,
and since all other factors in the equation are equal, the time is
equal. (2.0)

REFERENCE

DAEC Reactor Theory, Period Equation, Pg. 2
292003K108 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 5.03 (1.00)

b.

REFERENCE

DAEC Heat Transfer 14, Mitigating Reactor Core Damage 3-44
293009K107 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 5.04 (1.00)

a.

REFERENCE

DAEC RXTH-SH24-4
292006K107 Q 292006K108 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 5.08 (2.00)

- a. DECREASE
 - b. DECREASE
 - c. INCREASE
 - d. INCREASE
- (4 @ 0.5 pts each)

REFERENCE

DAEC RXTH-SH-29, pg. 4, SH-27, pgs. 4 and 5
292005K104 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 5.09 (1.50)

Peripheral rod worth will increase. (0.5) High Xe concentration in the center of the core (highest power before scram) will depress the thermal neutron flux in that region causing the relative neutron flux in the peripheral bundles to be higher, thus increase the relative rod worth in peripheral rods. (1.0)

REFERENCE

DAEC, RXTH-SH-29, pg. 2
292006K107 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 5.10 (1.50)

- a. BOL: $t = B - P = \frac{.0072}{.1} - \frac{.001}{.001} = 62$ seconds (0.33)
- EOL: $t = \frac{(0.0055 - .001)}{(.1)(.001)} = \frac{.0045}{.0001} = 45$ seconds (0.33)
- CHANGE $62 - \frac{45}{17} = 45$ seconds (0.33)
- b. Buildup of Pu-239 coupled with the burnout of U-235 causes a decrease in the effective delayed neutron fraction (B_{eff}). (0.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC Reactor Theory, SH-20, pg. 8
292003K106 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 5.11 (1.50)

- a. This design utilizes a layer of zirconium metal bonded to the inner surface of the cladding. ~~This liner inhibits cracking by easing the stress and chemical reaction between the pellets and cladding.~~ (0.75)
- b. With a full core load of barrier fuel, it is expected that operation to targeted exposures without pellet-clad interaction failures or operational constraints on load swings (preconditioning) can be achieved. (0.75)

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description A-4, pg. 8-9
293009K131 293009K137 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 5.12 (2.50)

- a. Transition boiling may occur (0.5). This could lead to fuel damage (0.5).
- b. To make the MCPR limit more conservative to account for the possibility of a sudden flow increase and the resultant power increase. (1.0)
- c. Increases. (0.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC - Thermodynamics, Heat Transfer, and Fluid Flow, pg. 13-1
293009K120 293009K127 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 5.13 (1.00)

$$485 \text{ psig} + 14.7 \text{ psig} = 499.7 \text{ psi}^a$$

$$499.7 \text{ psi}^b = 467 \text{ degrees F}$$

$$467 \text{ degrees F} - 409 \text{ degrees F} = 67 \text{ degrees F} \quad (.50)$$

Fluid is SUBCOOLED (.50)

REFERENCE

DAEC Thermodynamics 10-1
293003K123 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 6.01 (2.00)

1. Refueling platform positioned near or over the core.
2. Refueling platform hoists are fuel-loaded (fuel grapple, frame mounted hoist, monorail mounted hoist).
3. Fuel grapple not full up.
4. Service platform hoist fuel-loaded.
5. One rod withdrawn.

(4 of 5 required @ 0.5 pts each = 2.0)

REFER TO PAGE 25A .

REFERENCE

DAEC Technical Specifications 3.9.1, pg. 3.9-6
234000A302 234000K502 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 6.02 (4.00)

- a. Causes reactor level to increase [0.33] due to the level control system having a level error, level set > indicated level [0.5] resulting in the feedwater control valves to open to match new higher level [0.5].
- b. Reactor level should remain constant [0.33] because the 'B' M/A transfer station will lock up [0.5]. The 'A' feedwater control valve will control level [0.5].
- c. Causes reactor level to decrease [0.33] due to the level control system having a steam flow/feed flow error, steam flow < feed flow [0.5] resulting in the feedwater control valves to close to match new lower level [0.5].

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description pg. 6, 20-22, Figure 5, 6
259001K108 259001K109 259001K301 259001K302 ... (KA'S)

MODE switch in REFUEL and:

1. Trolley mounted hoist loaded with platform over or near core.
2. Frame mounted hoist loaded with platform over or near core.
3. Fuel grapple loaded with platform over or near core.
4. Fuel grapple not full up with platform over or near core.
5. Not all rods in and selection of a second.
6. Service platform hoist loaded

MODE switch in STARTUP and:

7. Refueling platform over or near core.
8. Service platform hoist loaded.

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HAPE, E. A.

ANSWER 6.03 (2.00)

- a. Operating an unloaded diesel increases the air blower temperatures to the maximum operating value due to decreased air flow, and may result in blower damage. (1.0)

or

Carbon-rich combustion products could collect in the E D/G exhaust ports and present a combustion hazard.

- b. ~~A diesel generator larkout would occur.~~ (1.0)

The diesel generator will start

REFERENCE

OI 324, pgs. 6 and 7

DAEC System Description E-2, pg. 33

264000A203 264000K401 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 6.04 (2.50)

- a. Because the regenerative HX has no flow through the secondary side, blowdown flow must be limited to the capacity of the NRHX in order to prevent overheating of the demineralizer bed. (1.0)
- b. Blowdown is used during startup, heatup, or hot standby operations [0.25] to reduce reactor water inventory [0.25].
- c. In order to prevent draining of the system, CV 2729 closes on low pressure sensed upstream (5 psig). This prevents draining the RWCU system to main condenser in the event CV 2729 is not fully closed. (0.5)

Also closes on 140 psig sensed downstream to protect the low pressure piping, prevents possible over pressurization. (0.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description E-4, pgs. 3, 13, 19

204000R109 204000K402 204000K407 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 6.05 (2.00)

The system discharge boron injection is limited such that the rate of increase in the concentration of natural boron in the primary coolant water is fast enough to override the rate of reactivity insertion caused by cooldown of the reactor following the xenon poison peak [1.0], ~~yet slow enough to ensure that there is sufficient mixing so boron does not recirculate through the core in uneven concentrations that could possibly cause nuclear power to rise and fall cyclically [1.0].~~

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description C-4, pg. 9 *See Sp. Rpt. 3-1 pg. 3-1*
 211000A107 211000K405 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 6.06 (2.00)

- a. (2) (1.0)
 b. (2) (1.0)

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description A-2, pg. 64
 202002A106 202002A107 202002K603 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 6.07 (1.50)

- a. If the field breaker is not shut within 15 seconds after the pump sequence is started. (1.0)
 b. The recirc MG drive motor breaker ~~does not close~~ (0.5)
will trip

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description A-2, pg. 39, Table 1, Figure 16
 202001K112 202001K407 202001K606 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 6.08 (1.50)

a. DW pressure greater than 2 psig.

(2/3 core coverage ~~X~~LOCA signal present) — reactor vessel level is above ~~X~~-39 inches.

Containment Spray Valve switch in manual.

(0.33 pts each = 1.0) *LPCI initiation signal is present*

b. It allows opening of containment spray valves by bypassing the requirement for 2/3 core coverage ~~x~~, (0.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description C-1, pg. 37
 226001K108 226001K113 ... (KA'S)

(-39") or/OR LPCI initiation signal

ANSWER 6.09 (1.00)

c.

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description D-11
 245000A103 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 6.10 (2.50)

a. half-scrum

b. no action

c. half-scrum

d. rod block or ...

e. scrum

(0.5 pts each)

REFERENCES

DAEC System Description I-7, pg. 4, 22, Figure 5
 DAEC System Description I-3, 4, pg. 33
 201001K107 212000K305 215005K101 239001K127 245000A201
 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 6.11 (3.00)

- a. The Turbine Steam Supply Valve (M0-2404) closed. (0.5)
- b. When level decreases to the initiation level (119.5'), the 2404 valve will reopen. (1.0)
- c. The turbine test circuitry would be automatically bypassed and the RCIC system would revert to flow control mode. (1.0)
- d. No [0.25]. The mechanical overspeed must be reset locally [0.25].

REFERENCE

DAEC System Description E-2, pgs. 17, 24, 25, 36, 38

217000A101 217000A103 217000A301 217000A402 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 6.12 (1.00)

The charger will trip [0.5] (on high emergency load starting currents) and power would then be lost to all associated loads [0.5] (both normal and emergency). *If the charger will carry the system as long as emergency loads are not started (0.5)*

REFERENCE

DAEC DI 388, pg. 5

263000K102 263000K201 263000K302 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 7.01 (1.00)

1. Below this range, torus heat capacity is less of a concern since the shutdown cooling system may be used for heat removal. (0.5)
2. Steam flow rates during SRV discharge will be sufficiently low to preclude unstable condensation. (0.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC EOP-2

NEDO 30796, Bases for Emergency Operating Procedures at DAEC, page 7-2

295019K104 295026A203 295026K102 295030K103 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 7.02 (3.50)

- a. To avoid rapid injection of cold unborated water during depressurization and the resulting reactivity excursion. (0.5)
Boron injection and CRD flow are continued to achieve reactor shutdown. (0.5)
- b. Kept above MARFP to provide sufficient steam flow through the open SRVs to ensure adequate STEAM COOLING to an uncovered core. (0.5)
Kept as low as practical to the control flooding rate and thus possible power excursions. (0.5)
- c. Would indicate that water is suddenly entering the RPV at a rate that is less than the rate of steam production and therefore, RPV water level is decreasing. (0.5)
- d. Motor-driven pumps are necessary because the RPV will be depressurized prior to flooding. (0.5) Systems injecting outside the shroud are preferred to minimize cold water reactivity addition. (0.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC EOP-1, pages 51 thru 55.

NEDO 30796, Bases for Emergency Operating Procedures at DAEC,
pages 8-145 thru 8-154

GE Emergency Operating Procedure Fundamentals, pages C6-1 thru C6-3

216006K324 295031G012 295031K304 295037G012 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 7.03 (2.50)

- a. Drywell inspections shall only be performed under the following conditions:
1. Shift Supervisors and Operators are notified of entry and exit times and appropriate log entries are made.
 2. The reactor is subcritical and < 5% reactor power.
 3. RPV pressure is below 400 psig.
 4. No evolutions are performed by operators that would significantly increase system pressure.

(4 @ 0.5 pts each = 2.0)

- b. Emergency entries beyond these restrictions must be approved by the Plant Superintendent. (0.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC IPOI-2, pg. 25
 223000G001 223001A106 223001K116

5. Small N permitted
6. Small N permitted
7. Small N permitted
8. Venting
9. Venting
10. Venting

ANSWER 7.04 (1.50)

1. To conserve water inventory
2. To protect containment inventory
3. To limit radioactive release to the environment

(3 @ 0.5 pts each = 1.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC EOP-C, Operating Cautions, pg. 9, Caution 15
 2900024204 290002G001 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 7.05 (1.50)

- a. False
- b. True
- ~~c. False~~

(2 @ 0.5 pts each)

REFERENCE

DAEC EPIP 1.2
294001K116 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 7.06 (1.50)

- 1. The event
- 2. The time declared
- 3. Action(s) taken

REFERENCE

DAEC EPIP 1.1
294001K106 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 7.07 (1.50)

Yes. [0.5] The 250 volt DC battery is considered inoperable [0.5] (if more than one cell is out of service).

The HPCI System shall also be considered inoperable. [0.5]

REFERENCE

DAEC DI 388, pg. 6, 14
Technical Specification 3.8.B.2.c.
263000A402 263000G005 263000K201 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 7.08 (2.50)

- a. 20%. (0.5)
- b. The pump starting current will not overcome the thrust force on the pump bearing assembly resulting in a locked rotor. (1.0)
or the pump will not start.
- c. The pump will trip off when the Mode Switch is shifted between positions. (1.0)

REFERENCE

GI 261 RVCU, pgs. 41 and 46
204000A401 204000K401 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 7.09 (1.50)

- Candidate #1 - Rejected, would exceed the 10 CFR 20 quarterly limit
- Candidate #2 - Rejected, would exceed the administrative quarterly limit
- Candidate #3 - Accepted, even though 5 (N-18) exceeded the limit only applies if going to 3000 mrem/qr. Candidate will not exceed any administrative or 10 CFR 20 limits

REFERENCE

10 CFR 20, DAEC Health Physics Procedure 3102.1, pg. 2
294001K103 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 7.10 (1.00)

To minimize wear on the CRD piston seals. (1.0)

REFERENCE

DAEC OI 256
201001K107 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 7.11 (2.00)

- a. To minimize thermal shock to the HX.
- b. ~~The minimum flow bypass valve will open causing a loss of reactor coolant inventory to the suppression pool.~~ *To ensure*

REFERENCE

DAEC DI No. 149

205000A110 205000K102 205000K502 217000G001 217000K105
... (KA'S)

ANSWER 7.12 (1.50)

By at least two independent indications [0.5] misoperation in automatic mode is confirmed [0.5], OR adequate core cooling is assured [0.5].

REFERENCE

DAEC DI Nos. 149, 150, 151, and 152

203000K401 206000K407 209001K408 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 7.13 (2.50)

- a. To prevent damage to the pumps hydrostatic thrust bearing. (1.0)
- b. LPCI loop selection logic will mistakenly assume normal 2 pump operation exists even though 1 of the pump discharge valves is closed since it uses pump delta-p to sense that a pump is running. (1.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC DI 264

202001A224 202001K116 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 7.14 (2.00)

- a. Turn off circuit breakers (BUS A CKT 02 and BUS B CKT 02) to Power Range Neutron Monitoring System (0.5) in the 1A3 switchgear room (0.5)
- b. Close air supply to Scram Valve Pilot Air Header located in Rx. Bldg. 757 level (Col. G6) (0.5) and Vent scram air header at PI-1841/PS-1842 (0.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC EDP-6 pg. 17, 21, 22, 23
295016A301 295016G006 ... (KA'S)

- c. Locally trip turbine (power above 30%) at turbine
and at turbine hall
- d. Scram air - to be supplied by turbine hall
and turbine hall

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 8.01 (2.00)

1. c.
2. b.
3. d.
4. a.

(4 @ 0.5 pts each = 2.0)

REFERENCE

DAEC Fuel and Reactor Component Handling Procedure #5, pgs. 9 and 10
DAEC Enabling Objective, FRCHF #5-3
234000A102 234000A401 234000G014 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 8.02 (1.50)

- a. False.
- b. False.
- c. True.

(3 @ 0.5 pts each = 1.5)

REFERENCE

DAEC Administrative Procedure 1410.6, pgs. 3, 6, 7
294001K107 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 8.03 (2.00)

Per Technical Specifications, if a deluge and sprinkler system is not operable, an hourly fire watch patrol with portable fire extinguishing equipment in all affected areas is required to be established within one hour [1.0] and with a hose station inoperable, a fire watch patrol with portable fire extinguishing equipment shall be established within one hour until an additional hose can be routed from an operable hose station to the unprotected area [1.0].

REFERENCE

DAEC Technical Specification 3.13 C and E and LER 86-015-00.
286000A105 286000G005 286000K401 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

(All rods with a control group control rod inoperable control rods shall be placed within the reach of the inoperable control rod).

ANSWER 8.06 (2.50)

1. Technical Specification 3.3.A.2.c. states that control rods with inoperable accumulators shall be considered inoperable, ~~however,~~ 10-07 and 10-27 do not affect plant operation. (0.75)
2. Technical Specification 3.3.C.2 states average scram insertion times for the three fastest control rods in a 2 x 2 array shall be no greater than 0.370 secs. from rod position 46. The three fastest rods have an average time of 0.369 secs and therefore, do not affect plant operation. (0.75)
3. Technical Specification 3.3.A.2.a. states a rod which cannot be moved by control rod drive pressure is inoperable and since 26-07 is within the 5 x 5 array of 10-07, Technical Specification 3.3.A.2.f.1 states the reactor shall be brought to cold S/D within 24 hours. (1.0)

REFERENCE

DAEC Technical Specification 3.3
201001C005 ... (KA'S)

ANSWER 8.07 (1.50)

- a. No. (0.5) The basic medical qualifications of 10 CFR 55 are no longer met. (0.5) (Will accept alternate wording such as "Unfit for Duty".
- b. Yes. (0.5)

REFERENCE

10 CFR 55.11, 55.41
294001A103 ... (KA'S)

ANSWERS -- DUANE ARNOLD

-87/07/15-HARE, E. A.

ANSWER 8.12 (2.00)

a. July 27, 1987 (1.0)

b. Failure to meet the time interval for a surveillance constitutes a failure to meet the operability requirement of the LCD. (1.0)

REFERENCE

DAEC Technical Specification 1.0, Definition 26
206000005 ... (KAS)

TEST CROSS REFERENCE

PAGE 2

QUESTION	VALUE	REFERENCE
08.02	1.50	EAH0001263
08.03	2.00	EAH0001264
08.04	2.00	EAH0001265
08.05	1.50	EAH0001266
08.06	2.50	EAH0001267
08.07	1.50	EAH0001268
08.08	2.00	EAH0001269
08.09	2.50	EAH0001270
08.10	4.00	EAH0001271
08.11	1.50	EAH0001272
08.12	2.00	EAH0001273

	25.00	

	100.50	