NRC Form 366 (9-83)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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APPROVES OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88

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# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88

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NRC Form 366A

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Plant Conditions:

Operational Condition: 1 (Power Operation) Reactor Power: 32% Reactor Pressure: 930 psig Reactor Temperature: 530 degrees Fahrenheit

#### Description of Event:

Technical Specification surveillance requirements 4.4.3.2.1 b and c state that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) (AD) leakage shall be demonstrated to be within Technical Specification limits by monitoring the primary containment sump (WK) flow rate and the drywell floor drain sump (WK) level at least once per four hours. On June 7, 1987 the RCS leakage limit surveillance interval, including the 25% maximum allowable extension, was exceeded by one hour.

Attachment 1 of surveillance procedure 24.000.02 "Shiftly, Daily, Weekly and Situation Required Surveillances" schedules the performance of the leakage monitoring every four hours beginning at 0000 hours. On June 7, 1987 the RCS leakage limit surveillance was required to be completed at 1200 hours. However, during shift turnover, a review of the logs by the control room Nuclear Supervising Operator (NSO) revealed that the calculations were not completed until 1400 hours.

Readings needed in order to determine whether or not the RCS leakage was within Technical Specification limits were started by 1200 hours. Prior to the completion of the final calculations, it became necessary for the control room NSO to perform a large number of unplanned activities in order to maintain plant operation. Before suspending the surveillance, the operator had reviewed the drywell sump level recorder trace (G11-RX01). The operator noted that the level as being less than 15 inches with a normal increasing slope. This indicated that an above normal leakage condition did not exist. Final calculations which documented this fact were completed at 1400 hours.

NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB EXPIRES: 8/31/88												
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#### Cause of Event:

This event was caused by a contributed personnel error (utility, licensed). Contrary to surveillance procedure 24.000.02, RCS leakage was not documented to be within Technical Specification limits once per four hours. The high level of non-routine activities in the control room contributed to this event.

#### Corrective Action:

The surveillance was successfully completed at 1400 hours demonstrating that RCS leakage was within Technical Specification limits. To prevent recurrence, instructions were given to Operations personnel on the importance of completing surveillance procedures on time as a part of their operational activities.

### Analysis of Event:

The Technical Specification surveillance requirement assures that RCS leakage is within acceptable limits. Successful completion of the surveillance at 1400 hours verified that the leakage limits of Technical Specification 4.4.3.2.1 were met. Subsequent to this event, a review of the sequence of events recorder printout from approximately 0800 hours to 1600 hours on June 7, 1987 revealed that sump high level alarms did not annunciate and that no automatic start of the sump pumps occurred.

## Previous Similar Events:

There have been other events involving missed surveillances but the mejority of these were caused by scheduling or procedural errors. LER 85-062 reported an event where a Technical Specification surveillance was not performed within the required time interval due to personnel error. 1

10CFR50.73



Nuclear Operations

Fermi 2 6400 North Divie Highway Newport, Michigan 48166 (313) 586-4000

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Detroit

August 21, 1987 NRC-87-0125

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

References: Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Facility Operating License No. NPF-43

> Transmittal of Licensee Event Report 87-021-00 dated July 6, 1987 NRC-87-0091

#### Subject: Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-021-01

Please find enclosed LER No. 87-021-01, dated August 21, 1987, for a reportable event that occurred on June 7, 1987. This LER has been revised to make a correction to the original LER. A copy of this LER is also being sent to the Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Girija Shukla at (313) 586-1617.

Sincerely.

W. S. Orser Plant Manager

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: A. B. Davis J. R. Eckert E. G. Greenman W. G. Rogers J. J. Stefano

> Wayne County Emergency Management Division