#### Attachment 3

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2
Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications
Condensate Storage Tank and Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves
Marked Up Pages

August 1998

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# LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

## LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank shall be OPERABLE with a minimum contained volume of 150,000 gallons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. (165,000

#### ACTION:

With less than 150,000 gallons of water in the condensate storage tank, within 4 hours either:

- a. Restore the water volume to within the limit or be, in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours, or
- b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the fire water system as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and restore the condensate storage tank water volume to within its limits within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying the water level.

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#### PLANT SYSTEMS

## ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.7

Each atmospheric steam dump valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

- With one atmospheric steam dump valve inoperable, restore the a. inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 24 hours.
- With more than one atmospheric steam dump valve inoperable, restore b. one inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 24 hours.

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.7 Verify one complete cycle of each atmospheric steam dump valve at least once per 18 months.

## 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY F. EDWATER PUMPS

The OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater pumps ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 300°F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of off-site power.

Any single motor driven or steam driven pump has the required capacity to provide sufficient feedwater flow to remove reactor decay heat and reduce the RCS temperature to 300°F where the shutdown cooling system may be placed into operation for continued cooldown.

## 3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available for cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System to less than 300°F in the event of a total loss of off-site power. The minimum water volume is sufficient to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 10 hours with steam discharge to atmosphere.

## 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY

The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable due to discharge nozzle pipe eleustion above tank bottom, plus an allowance for vortex formation.

## 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY (Continued)

of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. The dose calculations for an assumed steam line rupture include the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secon by tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

## 3/4,7,1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

## 3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENTS (MFICS)

Feedwater isolation response time ensures a rapid isolation of feed flow to the steam generators via the feedwater regulating valves, feedwater bypass valves, and as backup, feed pump discharge valves. The response time includes signal generation time and valve stroke. Feed line block valves also receive a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases. Since the block valves are not credited with isolation, they are not required to operate as fast as the isolation valves although equal response times for all valves are specified. Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an MSI signal.

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## 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of  $70^{\circ}\text{F}$  and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RT<sub>NDT</sub> of  $50^{\circ}\text{F}$  and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

## 3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the reactor building closed cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

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## 3/4.7.1.7 ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES

The atmospheric steam dump valves (ASDVs) provide a method for maintaining the unit in HOT STANDBY, and to cool the unit to Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System entry conditions if heat removal by the condenser steam dump valves is not available. The ASDVs are normally operated from the main control room. Local manual operation of the ASDVs is provided. The ASDVs are OPERABLE as long as the valves can be opened from the control room, or locally at the valves.

#### Attachment 4

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2
Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications
Condensate Storage Tank and Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves
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#### PLANT SYSTEMS

## CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank shall be OPERABLE with a minimum contained volume of 165,000 gallons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

#### ACTION:

With less than 165,000 gallons of water in the condensate storage tank, within 4 hours either:

- a. Restore the water volume to within the limit or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours, or
- b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the fire water system as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and restore the condensate storage tank water volume to within its limits within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying the water level.

#### PLANT SYSTEMS

## ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.7 Each atmospheric steam dump valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one atmospheric steam dump valve inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 24 hours.
- b. With more than one atmospheric steam dump valve inoperable, restore one inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 24 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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#### 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS

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#### 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY

The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction

## 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY (Continued)

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#### Attachment 5

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2
Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications
Condensate Storage Tank and Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves
NNECO Commitments

# Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Condensate Storage Tank and Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves List of Regulatory Commitments

The following table identifies those actions committed to by NNECO in this document. Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Compliance at Millstone Unit No. 2 of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

Commitment	Committed Date or Outage
NONE	N/A