TOLEDO EDISON

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Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Serial No. 1396

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Questions 6 and 26 of NRC letter dated December 17, 1986 (Log No. 2166) were responded to with Toledo Edison letter dated May 27, 1987 (Serial No. 1361). The responses committed Toledo Edison to provide the results of ongoing reviews by July 31, 1987. The reviews have been completed and are attached for your review and use.

Very truly yours,

FS:plf

attachment

cc: DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector
A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator (2 copies)

A006
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Question No. 6 - Independent Sprinklers and Hose Stations

Regarding [FHAR] Table 4-1, Sheet 4, except for the Turbine Building, identify any locations(s) where sprinkler systems and standpipe systems are supplied from a single water supply pipe and describe how "back-up" fire fighting capability will be provided if a failure in this pipe occurs.

Response

Toledo Edison has identified twelve rooms provided with sprinkler and hose stations supplied by a single water pipe outside the Turbine Building. Three of the rooms are provided with an alternate hose station and require no modification. The remaining nine rooms will be modified to provide separation between the sprinkler and hose stations.

The three rooms provided with alternate hose stations are:

Room	Room No.	Backup System
Diesel Generator 1-2 Room	319	Hose House (HH) 15
Main Workshop, Tool Crib, Supply Storage	336	Hose Connection (HC) 28
Service Water Valve Room	53	Hose Station (HCS) 20

The nine rooms requiring modification(s) are:

Room	Room No.
Diesel Fire Pump Room	51
Diesel Generator 1-1 Room	318
Day Tank 1-2 Room	320A
Day Tank 1-1 Room	321A
No. 2 Mechanical Penetration Room	236
No. 1 Electrical Penetration Room	402
Boric Acid Evaporation Room	235
Passage	227
Passage/Hatch Area	310/313

Toledo Edison has identified those locations where sprinklers and hose stations are supplied from a single water pipe. Design changes are currently underway for the nine rooms requiring modification to provide isolation capabilities between the sprinkler and hose station. The design changes will eliminate locations containing sprinklers and hose stations supplied by a common water source. These design changes and the procedure changes to designate the alternate hose stations will be implemented prior to the return to power from the sixth refueling outage.

Further Response

Toledo Edison believes that no further response is necessary to resolve this NRC question.

Question No. 26 - IE Information Notice 86-79

Provide a discussion regarding how you are addressing the concerns expressed in IE Information Notice 86-79.

Response

IE Information Notice 86-79 dated September 2, 1986 (Log No. 1-1461) is entitled "Degradation or Loss of Charging Systems at PWR Nuclear Power Plants Using Swing Pump Designs." IE Information Notice 86-79 discusses how the safety function of charging systems using a swing-pump design can be degraded or lost as the result of design deficiencies in interlocking circuitry or inadequacies in maintenance procedures.

Toledo Edison has determined that IE Information Notice 86-79 is not specifically applicable to Davis-Besse in that no charging pumps incorporating a swing pump design are utilized. However, a swing pump design is applied to the Component Cooling Water System and the Service Water System. Electrical Power is supplied to these systems by essential busses.

The swing pump configuration is similar for both systems. Each dedicated pump has a breaker on its respective essential bus. The swing pump incorporates two mechanically interlocked transfer switchgear breakers, each fed by an essential bus breaker.

The service water system requires that two pumps operate under normal operating conditions; only one pump is required to operate under accident conditions. The interlocks for this system allow for the operation of two pumps per bus for changeover.

The Component Cooling Water System requires one operating pump at all times. The interlocks for this system allow for one operating pump per bus.

The Service Water System and Component Cooling Water System pumps are considered to be safe shutdown components required in the event of a fire. Based on the above review, a failure of the type discussed in IE Information Notice 86-79 is not possible at Davis-Besse. No changes to the 10CFR50 Appendix R Compliance Assessment Report have been identified as a result of IE Information Notice 86-79.

Further Response

Toledo Edison believes that no further response is necessary to resolve this NRC question.