

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
3 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR
4 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW
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8 Sheraton Inn-Tulsa Airport

9 2201 N. 77th East Avenue

10 Tulsa, Oklahoma

11 Tuesday, September 3, 1986
12

13 THE INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF GARY V. JACKSON

14 convened at 1:37 p.m.
15
16

17 PRESENT:

18 H. BROOKS GRIFFIN, Interviewee
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23 PDR ADOCK 04008027
B PDR

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EXHIBIT 121
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I N T E R V I E W

MR. GRIFFIN: For the record, this is an interview of Gary V. Jackson, spelled, J A C K S O N, who is employed by the Sequoyah Fuels Corporation. The location of this interview is Tulsa, Oklahoma. The date is September the 3rd, 1986, and the time is 1:37 p.m. Present at this interview are Gary Jackson, and in behalf of the NRC, myself, H. Brooks Griffin. This interview is being transcribed by a court reporter.

Mr. Jackson, do you affirm that the information you are about to give in this interview is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MR. GARY V. JACKSON: Yes.

MR. GRIFFIN: Thank you.

GARY V. JACKSON,
was called to interview and, having been duly affirmed, testified as follows:

BY MR. GRIFFIN: :

Q Mr. Jackson, I believe we first, the Office of Investigations first interviewed you on March 26, 1986, and so this will be your second interview with the Office of Investigations. Although it's contained in, I believe, in earlier interviews, I want to go back over who else has interviewed you.

Following the accident on January the 4th, were you

1 interviewed by the NRC inspectors?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Were you interviewed also by the company attorneys or the
4 panel that Kerr-McGee put together to interview
5 employees? This would have been Mr. McDaniel, Joe Young,
6 and some other people.

7 A I don't recall any names, and I recall a very short
8 interview by Kerr-McGee attorneys.

9 Q Were you interviewed by any of the OSHA people following
10 the accident?

11 A I don't believe so.

12 Q Okay. Obviously --

13 A If I was, I've forgotten it.

14 Q So you've been interviewed -- this will be the, what?
15 Today is the third time you've been interviewed by the
16 NRC?

17 A I believe that's right.

18 Q Has anybody else -- other than the NRC and the company
19 attorneys, has anybody else interviewed you on any of
20 these issues related to the accident or otherwise?

21 A Not that I can recall.

22 Q All right.

23 A I still have a question in my mind about OSHA. I just
24 don't recall them having interviewed me; but, boy, I'd
25 just have to check.

1 Q That's okay.

2 A I've talked to a lot of people, but I wasn't interviewed
3 by anyone else.

4 Q Okay. Is your title still Area Supervisor?

5 A Area Manager.

6 Q Area Manager. At the time we interviewed you before,
7 what was your title?

8 A Area Supervisor.

9 Q So it's changed since then?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Have your duties changed?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Area Manager, is that Mr. Davenport's previous position?

14 A No. His position was Production Manager. It's a
15 different organizational structure right now, and Area
16 Manager actually is a new position created since the
17 change went forth.

18 Q Could you describe briefly what your new duties will be
19 when you go back into production, assuming Sequoyah Fuels
20 is given restart?

21 A The manager of the front end of the plant up through
22 denitration, plus solid waste disposal and waste
23 treatment.

24 Q Mr. Jackson, since you were interviewed before by the
25 Office of Investigations, we've had an opportunity to

1 summarize the testimony we took from all the Sequoyah
2 Fuels employees, and we've had a chance to look at all
3 this information we've gathered, plus we've had a chance
4 to summarize the testimony contained in the transcripts
5 from the Kerr-McGee attorneys and from the NRC
6 inspectors. So we've got just a mass of information
7 here, and we really didn't have a chance to analyze what
8 we had until the months after the interview; and before I
9 start asking you any specific questions today, I'd like
10 to kind of give you an understanding, an overview of what
11 we've found, because it influenced us, and we didn't
12 really have a full appreciation for just what we had
13 learned until we had a chance to analyze it.

14 I think I told you before in our, in the previous
15 interview, we had some NRC inspectors review the cylinder
16 status sheets for '84 and '85, and they found that quite
17 a few of the cylinders had been filled above maximum
18 allowable weights. For the purposes of this interview
19 today, what I would like to do is set some definitions so
20 that we will completely and absolutely understand each
21 other.

22 A Okay.

23 Q The procedure, and I'm referring to N280-1 Rev. 6,
24 specifies maximum allowable weights on 10 and 14 ton
25 cylinders. Those figures are 21,030 pounds for the 10

1 ton and 27,560 pounds on the 14 ton.

2 As I said before, for the purposes of this interview
3 today, when I make reference to overfilled cylinder, I
4 want that to mean anything above the maximum allowable
5 weights. If you will use my definition, then when I
6 refer to it we'll make sure we are understanding each
7 other. Do you accept that?

8 A No. It would be hard for me to talk in those terms
9 because -- and I think I know probably what you are
10 getting at, but could we define it some other way
11 because --

12 Q Well, the NRC --

13 A A cylinder that's -- the way we did it all the way back,
14 a cylinder could have more than those weights. Net
15 weight could be greater than the weights that you gave me
16 and were not considered overfilled until they had been
17 prepared for shipment, road ready, until they were ready
18 to go down the road, and there were no overfilled
19 cylinders in that case.

20 Q Well, if you don't specify a definition as to what an
21 overfill is --

22 A It would take me a little while to come to that
23 understanding.

24 Q Well, see, the NRC when it grants a license or permit to
25 a fuels facility, they require the facility to provide

1 procedures and the NRC expects that the facility will
2 abide by those procedures.

3 A Absolutely, sure.

4 Q And I think there's been a heightened awareness of the
5 NRC's expectations since the accident, and I've come to
6 the opinion from all the testimony that I've taken that
7 maybe prior to the accident a lot of people who worked
8 for Sequoyah Fuels apparently did not really understand
9 to what degree the NRC would hold them accountable to the
10 procedures that were made as commitments to their
11 license. The reason I wanted to use these figures for
12 the purposes of the interview are that, if in respect to
13 Rev. 6, if you heat a cylinder that contains more than
14 the maximum allowable weight, would you be violating that
15 procedure?

16 A The definition of maximum allowable weight is in regard
17 to the cylinder that's ready to be placed on the truck
18 and be shipped, in many cases. In many cases, it was
19 that, and you need to look at the history that's led up
20 to Rev. 6.

21 Q Right, the earlier revisions, I think the earlier
22 revisions did specify these maximum allowable weights,
23 did they not?

24 A They are significant because the same people that
25 operated the plant under Rev. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, also did

1 under 6 and -- well, in many cases. There's not that
2 much turnover. Then, too, those are significant things
3 in building the understanding of Rev. 6, that is, common
4 agreement on what overfill really was of the people who
5 were there doing the job.

6 Q Let me ask you a question. Did not the earlier revisions
7 specify these same numbers for maximum allowable weights?

8 A I'm sure they must have. I don't think they have
9 changed.

10 Q That's my understanding, that these weights are
11 mentioned. Of course, Rev. 6 contains the two warnings
12 about heating overfilled cylinders, and I understand that
13 distinction between Rev. 6 and the earlier revisions.
14 That's why I was focusing in on these specific numbers,
15 because as we go into the questioning here, if I ask you,
16 you know, for instance, if I ask you a question about
17 have you ever seen or heard about an overfilled cylinder,
18 then obviously we're going to have to have some
19 definition that we're both using so that we'll
20 understand, so that I'll understand your response.

21 A Okay. As measured by what? Overfilled -- what I'm
22 getting at is, what scales? Accountability scales or the
23 roughing scales at the drain station?

24 Q Right. I realize the accuracy of the increment levels is
25 different between the two scales.

1 A The amount of heat that was in the cylinder when it was
2 first brought into the drain station might be another
3 factor, which is also --

4 Q I'm aware of these things that do lead to amounts greater
5 than the maximum allowable weights. The reason I was
6 wanting to do this is -- use these figures, also, is: as
7 you already know from our earlier interview with you,
8 that in reviewing the cylinder status records, we found
9 that many of them had apparently been heated with that
10 100 to 120 pounds that had not been evacuated at the
11 drain station.

12 A Could you define it as procedural overfill versus gross
13 overfill, significant overfill maybe, but some overfill
14 is procedural, if nothing more by practice, as far as
15 exceeding the maximum net weight and evacuate back. It
16 was done by procedure, as I understand it.

17 Q Right, that's right. Of course, you know it better than
18 I do.

19 A I would hate to lump that. I can't bring myself to talk
20 about that sort of overfill in the same breath as
21 overfill that is of a significance that might be a safety
22 problem.

23 Q That's exactly why I wanted to use these figures because
24 I want to make two divisions here. I want to talk to you
25 about that 100 to 120 pounds that we discovered when we

1 reviewed the cylinder status records. I want to talk
2 about that as one issue, and then amounts greater than
3 that which could be --

4 A Okay. I can think of it in those terms.

5 Q You can call them significant. You can put any
6 definition you want to, to them, but that's the reason I
7 wanted to try to use this. I'll tell you what. You
8 don't have to use my definition, but when I say it, as
9 long as you understand what my question is, then maybe we
10 can achieve the same end.

11 A Okay.

12 Q Mr. Jackson, when our NRC inspectors compiled the
13 information from the cylinder status sheets for 1984 and
14 1985, they found that in 1985, 22 of 89 14-ton cylinders
15 and 535 of 629 10-ton cylinders were overfilled by
16 amounts of 100 to 120 pounds and apparently heated.
17 These figures are contained on the cylinder status
18 sheets. I think we showed those to you, some examples of
19 those. We also found, or the NRC inspectors found from
20 their review that in 1984, 69 of 72 14-ton cylinders and
21 525 of 526 10-ton cylinders were overfilled by 40 to 200
22 pounds and apparently heated, and the reason I'm giving
23 you these figures is so you'll have an understanding just
24 what a large number or large percentage of the cylinders
25 apparently went to the steam chest with amounts ranging

1 from 40 to 150, maybe 200 pounds.

2 Of course, as part of this, we found from our
3 interviews with chemical operators, present chemical
4 operators, former people who still work for Sequoyah
5 Fuels, and people who are no longer employed, we found
6 that the majority of the chemical operators said, yes,
7 this is true. These cylinders were going into the steam
8 chest without that 100 to 120 pounds having been
9 evacuated. So we had -- the review was consistent with
10 the testimony that we received from a majority of the
11 people that we interviewed.

12 A Has that been determined to be, to have been a safety
13 problem?

14 Q I think the NRC has determined that it is not of a safety
15 significance. That's my understanding based on the
16 discussions I've had with people on the technical side.
17 The reason is, as you well know, that the volume left in
18 the cylinder is such that it would not lead to a rupture
19 or any kind of damage.

20 A Sure.

21 Q But the purpose for discussing this issue is: we
22 determined that this particular situation existed. It
23 did not appear to be consistent with our understanding of
24 procedures. So we are addressing that as one issue, and
25 of course, we also addressed amounts greater than that,

1 that could have ranged into more significant amounts that
2 maybe or maybe not would constitute safety problems; but
3 for this part of the interview, what I want to discuss is
4 this 100 to 120 pounds.

5 As I said awhile ago, something on the order of 70
6 to 75 percent of the people that we interviewed that had
7 worked as chemical operators were aware that the
8 cylinders were being filled 100 to 120 pounds above the
9 maximum allowable weight described in the procedure and
10 that, for whatever reason, these amounts were not
11 evacuated as prescribed by the procedure.

12 A Is there any evidence that the NRC had even read N280-1
13 before the accident?

14 Q I haven't heard anybody say that.

15 A The reason I asked that, it seems strange that they would
16 just discover something that had been taking place that
17 much, if there was a problem, that they would discover
18 it, you know, since, you know, I guess our operations
19 being at least audited.

20 Q It's my understanding that the NRC inspectors have been
21 regularly performing inspections at Sequoyah Fuels over
22 the years. I don't have any explanation for you as to
23 why the NRC did not discover this particular situation
24 before. I will tell you this, though. In talking with
25 the chemical operators, we found something on the order

1 of a half dozen different reasons as to why cylinders
2 were going to the steam chest in an overfilled
3 condition. Some of them were, like, they were called to
4 perform other duties while draining was taking place.
5 A That part is a surprise to me, going to the steam chest
6 even that overfilled, because it's so easy to evacuate
7 right back. It just takes a very short period of time,
8 and the operator has every reason to want to evacuate the
9 cylinder back to a safe level before going out to the
10 steam chest by making a valve change, and that's a
11 surprise to me; and let me follow here and say that a
12 review of that status sheet, you really have to be
13 looking for that for it to jump out. This thing doesn't
14 just stick out to somebody like a sore thumb.

15 Q We discovered that in our interviews, not only with
16 chemical operators, but with supervisory levels, too,
17 that a lot of people did not realize that, figure that
18 was going on there, and we discussed that in our previous
19 interview with you, and I think we described it, that it
20 came to some people more like a boiler plate entry. In
21 other words, they really didn't think about it because
22 you saw the same number over and over and over again.

23 A That's right.

24 Q But one of the things -- another reason we found, one
25 other explanation we received was that evacuating back

1 through those filters was sometimes very difficult and
2 timely and that they, the people were reluctant to take
3 the time to do that. It was also understood that based
4 on a memo from Mr. McCoy, and I think we discussed this
5 in our previous interview, that the chemical operators
6 were strongly encouraged to get it as close to the
7 maximum allowable weights as possible because I think
8 there was a shortage of cylinders at that time and -- but
9 there are -- I can't remember all of them, but there were
10 a variety of explanations.

11 Some people said, well, we just drifted away from
12 the procedure over the years, and this was their
13 explanation. Some of them said that they had always done
14 it that way, they had been taught to do it that way, and
15 it never occurred to them the difference between the
16 procedure and what they were doing; plus another
17 explanation was that, I think one of the scales was
18 actually marked at a particular point that was above the
19 maximum allowable weight. They just filled it till it
20 got to that point.

21 Anyway, at this morning's meeting, my question --
22 well let me back up a little bit. I need to give you a
23 little bit more information. As we went into the -- I've
24 already told you that 70 to 75 percent of the chemical
25 operators said, yes, I know this to be true, that those

1 are going to the steam chest with 100 to 120 pounds,
2 roughly, over.

3 When we began talking to the supervisors, some of
4 the assistant shift supervisors said, yes, I'm aware this
5 is going on, and I think Mr. Bradley said he was
6 certainly aware of it. When we interviewed shift
7 supervisors, Mr. Swimmer said that, yes, he's aware that
8 these cylinders were going to the steam chest with that
9 100 to 120 pounds in it, and somehow over the years
10 people had, I think the most common thing I've heard is,
11 drifted away from the procedure. Mr. Reed said he was
12 aware that the cylinders were going to the steam chest
13 with this 100 to 120 pounds over. We talked to Mr.
14 Matthews who is, I believe, an area supervisor. If I
15 remember correctly, Mr. Matthews said, yes, he was aware
16 of the 100 to 120 pounds going into the steam chest.

17 We didn't have an opportunity to talk to
18 Mr. Davenport, so we were kind of cut off, but what I'm
19 trying to do is I'm trying to paint a picture for you
20 here that once we had a chance to analyze all our
21 information, we came to realize that chemical operators
22 knew it, and supervisory levels, different, you know, not
23 only just the assistant, but shift supervisors and area
24 supervisors. As a matter of fact, Mr. Matthews said that
25 he presumed that the shift supervisors and the area

1 supervisors were aware of this situation.

2 Now, it concerned me greatly that maybe in earlier
3 interviews with some of the supervisors, because we had
4 such diverse understandings of the situation at the time
5 and maybe some people had not understood, but what we
6 asked is or what we were trying to ask is: were you
7 either aware that these cylinders were going to the steam
8 chest without having been evacuated at the drain station
9 or had you heard rumors, hearsay, talk on site among the
10 employees, talk on site among the supervisors, that this
11 occurred?

12 A I can just completely interrupt you there and tell you
13 that I knew of no overfilled cylinder being heated. An
14 activity like that going on went on absolutely without my
15 knowledge, if it, in fact, did, and you say it did. I
16 trust what you found, you know, to be so; and in fact, a
17 couple of status sheets I think I looked over maybe your
18 shoulder before, and I saw there where the track record
19 actually showed that had occurred on one that I had
20 approved for final shipment, but I certainly didn't
21 recognize that when I signed it and, no; and if a
22 cylinder had been overfilled any amount, any amount, and
23 the operator called it to my attention, I'd say you got
24 to evacuate at the drain station. You absolutely don't
25 heat it and you don't.

1 Now, that was the procedure and there's been no
2 drift away from procedure. There may be in the case of
3 some individuals, but not from a management point.
4 There's been no drift from the procedure. That really
5 needs to be clarified. That's all important because you
6 don't tell a person to do something contrary to the
7 procedure, and I can't speak for even the production
8 manager; but, boy, I knew his heart, and he -- I know
9 that the guy never ever intended for somebody to heat an
10 overfilled cylinder any amount, one pound, five pounds,
11 pick a number.

12 Q Let me --

13 A He wouldn't.

14 Q -- make sure, Mr. Jackson, that I understand your answer,
15 specifically, to the question. Prior to the accident,
16 were you aware that cylinders were going into the steam
17 chest 100 to 120 pounds overfilled because they were not,
18 that 100 to 120 pounds was not evacuated at the drain
19 station as prescribed by procedure? My question is:
20 were you aware that that was occurring?

21 A No, I was not aware it was occurring.

22 Q Now, let me move on to the next part, and that is: I'm
23 going to ask you about your knowledge related to amounts
24 greater than the 120 pounds.

25 A Yeah.

1 Q When we talked to the chemical operators -- I don't
2 remember exactly what the percentage is, but it's almost
3 all of them -- there were some exceptions. Some told us
4 that they did not recall any instances where they had
5 ever encountered or heard about, heard rumors or talk in
6 the lunch room or over coffee or anything about it, but
7 most of them did, and as we compiled this information,
8 most of them said, yeah, I remember. I can't give you a
9 year, or I can't give you a particular date, or I don't
10 remember which operator it was, but most of the chemical
11 operators told us they had either seen overfills which
12 they had inherited from a previous shift in varying
13 amounts, some of them as low as, you know, a couple
14 hundred pounds, all the way up to huge amounts like 4,500
15 pounds, I think, was the highest figure we heard, but we
16 had heard many amounts in the 800 to 1,000 pound range.

17 And like I say, it's not that these people were able
18 to give us specific cylinder status sheet numbers or
19 particular dates or even tell us what year it was, but
20 most of them were aware, either through their own
21 activities on site or through discussion with their peers
22 who they trusted. They said, I got one 800 pounds over
23 out of the steam chest, and I had to sit right down there
24 at the scale room and evacuate back down, and most of
25 them had a story about one they remembered or one that

1 they heard about prior to the accident.

2 So then we went and talked to -- as we started
3 summarizing the testimony taken from the supervisors, we
4 found that many of the supervisors, some of the people I
5 named earlier on the other exception. Mr. Bradley, of
6 course, had several recollections. I think one around
7 Thanksgiving of 1985 he had experienced or it had come to
8 his attention that there had been a 1,700 pound
9 overfill. Mr. Reed, Mr. Swimmer, Mr. McCoy was aware
10 that there had been substantial or significant overfills
11 that had been heated. Mr. Matthews said he was aware of
12 this condition; and what I'm telling you is that most of
13 the people we talked to had either experienced it or
14 heard about it.

15 A Uh-huh.

16 Q So my question to you is, over the years -- I know you've
17 been out there a long time. You've worked as a shift
18 supervisor?

19 A That's right.

20 Q You've probably trained chemical operators?

21 A (Nodding head affirmatively.)

22 Q And I think -- I don't know. How long did you work as a
23 shift supervisor. Do you recall?

24 A No, I don't really, but it must have been two or three
25 years total. I was the shift supervisor twice.

- 1 Q All these people have told us they were aware of this.
2 As a matter of fact, one person told us that he knew that
3 you were aware of it because of his personal contact with
4 you over the years, and I'll get more specific about
5 that.
- 6 A I'd rather not know who it was.
- 7 Q Well, I want you to understand, the purpose of the
8 NRC's --
- 9 A Well, he's mistaken.
- 10 Q -- effort here is not to do finger-pointing.
- 11 A Sure.
- 12 Q We went in and talked to these people who knew about it,
13 did your supervisor know about it? Did the guy working
14 next to you know about it? Did the guy on the next shift
15 know about it? This is not finger-pointing. We're not
16 here to get people in trouble with each other.
- 17 A Okay. Go ahead.
- 18 Q But if somebody has a specific remembrance, we asked them
19 for it. We said, have you encountered this situation?
20 Did you tell your supervisor? And obviously since so
21 many people knew about it, yes, they knew about it, and
22 they were talking to somebody else about it, or the
23 person they heard it from, or who they reported it to.
24 So don't look at it as finger-pointing.
- 25 A Yeah, okay. Carry on, then.

1 Q As a matter of fact, to give you a specific here,
2 Mr. Anderson, Bobby Anderson, who is a senior control
3 room operator --

4 A Senior control room operator. He used to work the
5 shifting area on my shift. I can say this. Just let me
6 ad-lib a little bit. I have never known of a cylinder
7 being grossly overfilled, and by grossly overfilled, in
8 this case let's just define that even 500 pounds over. I
9 never knew of one. I wouldn't have believed it. The day
10 of the accident I did not. I really thought that was the
11 first one that had ever been overfilled. I might
12 believe, you know, the 300 pound overfill or something
13 because, I mean --

14 Q Let me tell you what Mr. Anderson had experienced and
15 let --

16 A Well, you may put something back in my memory that I've
17 forgotten.

18 Q Exactly. He said that, as a matter of course, he said he
19 would overfill a cylinder -- this is back in the
20 mid-70's, back when he worked for you.

21 A That's right.

22 Q Early to mid-70's, somewhere around there, and he said
23 that they would overfill them by about 2 to 400 pounds
24 and they would evacuate for, like, 30 to 45 minutes back
25 out.

1 A Can I stop you there? Let me respond to it one thing at
2 a time.

3 Q Sure.

4 A That I was not aware that that occurred. In fact his
5 instructions I think were 50 to 100 pounds over, and he
6 never once told me anything more than that.

7 Q Okay. Well, he was just telling us what had been -- he
8 said they had evacuated for 30 to 45 minutes to get these
9 gasses out of the cylinder. We asked him to speculate on
10 how much that would leave in there over. He said, well,
11 he thought maybe 100 to 150 pounds.

12 A Did he say he had to go to the steam chest to do that?

13 Q Yeah, because of the time involved, you know, because it
14 was over, what, over four hours or whatever.

15 A He never brought it to light.

16 Q We asked him --

17 A Was he aware of procedure at that time? Did it say to
18 not heat an overfilled cylinder? Was he aware -- I
19 believe Bob -- Bob hasn't -- something is not quite right
20 because Bob is a good solid operator.

21 Q See, he's reaching way back in time saying what he
22 understood, what his daily practice was. He said back
23 then, back in the mid-70's he said, yes, we did it.

24 A Even though the procedure back then might have not
25 spelled out, do not heat an overfilled cylinder. We

1 could go back and look and see what conditions he's
2 working --

3 Q I'm just telling you what this guy told me. It's not
4 what the procedures said. I'm telling you what Mr. Bobby
5 Anderson did back in the mid-70's, and he said that he
6 had seen cylinders back at that time that were as much as
7 600 pounds over. He said, you know, this wasn't
8 regular. He said that he had seen more at smaller
9 amounts. On some occasions 4, 500, and 600 pounds. So
10 when we talked to him about it, he had seen this, but it
11 had been a long time because he had been in the control
12 room a long time.

13 Now, more specifically when we were asking
14 Mr. Anderson about who the supervisors were that this
15 occurred, we asked him -- of course, he said, you know,
16 Mr. Bradley obviously knew. He recalled an incident that
17 occurred after the accident. Said on an occasion that --
18 A After January 4th?

19 Q After the accident. I'm going to relate to you his story
20 here. He said that he had overheard a conversation in
21 the office where the area supervisors are. I don't know
22 which building that is or where it is on the site. He
23 had been standing in the doorway, and he said he
24 overheard a conversation where you were discussing with
25 some area supervisors -- he didn't remember which ones--

1 that you had not seen any overfilled cylinders over the
2 years, and he said that this struck him because back when
3 he was working for you in the mid-70's, that he regularly
4 overfilled, and he believed you knew that, and indicated,
5 you know, to some degree or other you had trained him,
6 and it really struck him because he said, well, you know,
7 Mr. Jackson would have -- I know he knew that there had
8 been overfilled cylinders in the past; and, of course,
9 that's what we were asking him.

10 We said, have you ever in the time you've worked out
11 here heard about or seen overfilled cylinders. So he
12 related, and it really struck him that you were telling
13 these supervisors that you hadn't seen one because he
14 had, you know, he had worked closer with you, and he
15 presumed that you knew what he did.

16 A Well, on Bob's behalf he's been a pretty good solid
17 operator. Not perfect, but he's wrong, and he has never
18 to any of my recollection, all the way back -- I could go
19 back to childhood and then I'll stand on the house tops
20 and shout it. I did not know of overfilled cylinders,
21 and if Bob had an overfilled cylinder out there, he did
22 not make me aware of it. Now, I knew of the
23 instructions, whether they were actually as part of the
24 standard operating instructions or if they were other
25 types of instructions that we were given, guidelines for

1 the cylinders, fill the cylinder beyond the maximum fill
2 limit and evacuate back, you know, the 50 to 100 pounds.
3 That number just sticks there, but not to heat the
4 cylinder. It was done and immediately evacuated back.
5 In fact, it says then, and again before sampling.

6 Q I know what it says, Mr. Jackson. I'm telling you what
7 these people have seen and what was done. Procedure is
8 one thing. What people are actually doing as they walk
9 and talk in their daily lives, they have done it, and
10 they have seen it.

11 A That's true.

12 Q Now, when I talked to Mr. Matthews, you know, he said,
13 yes, you knew about the 100 to 120 pounds. He knew there
14 were overfilled cylinders that had been heated, and he
15 assumed other area supervisors were aware of this, too.

16 A In my case I didn't.

17 Q From Mr. Matthews' point of view and from the shift
18 supervisors' point of view and most of the operators'
19 point of view, this was common knowledge. Not that it
20 occurred every day, not that it occurred regularly, not
21 that it occurred on any recurring basis, but they were
22 aware that it had occurred. It was just one of the
23 problems that had to be faced at this site.

24 A Okay. If it happened four, five times, 10 times, I
25 didn't know about any one of those 10 times, so it just

1 missed me; but I can tell you I did not know.

2 Q I talked to Mr. Reed, and I said, Mr. Reed, help me out
3 here. Give me a feel for how often this type of problem
4 was encountered at the plant, and he was reluctant to try
5 to set some kind of figure on it because, you know, it's
6 a tough question, because he's here and part of its
7 hearsay and rumor and everything. I said, help us out
8 here. Help us get kind of a feel for how often this type
9 of situation with these overfills would become known to
10 people at the site. He said that, as best he could
11 offer, the best figure he could offer was maybe an
12 average of something like one a month.

13 A Let me ask this. Did anyone go back and check back those
14 years, for instance, when I was a shift supervisor, and
15 see if, in fact, there were any overfilled? I'm talking
16 about 1969, '70, '71, '72, if there were.

17 Q You mean as far as looking at the cylinder status
18 records?

19 A Status records or whatever.

20 Q No, we haven't.

21 A And, you know, calling on somebody to remember a lot of
22 years, I would be at the same disadvantage as Bob would,
23 but still I think my memory is, my recollection is it
24 didn't happen, it didn't happen.

25 Q Well, I'll tell you for the purposes of what the NRC is

1 trying to accomplish right now, you know, we're going to
2 have to rely on less than absolutely concrete evidence
3 just to demonstrate one thing or another. We talked to
4 these people at the site. These are all forthright,
5 straight forward people, you know, and if they tell me
6 that they have seen it before, I don't have any reason to
7 doubt their word on it. I don't see any of them as -- I
8 don't know why they would say it otherwise.

9 A Okay. At this point, you know, from this, looking at it
10 from today, I've heard a lot of things since the accident
11 and I would think --

12 Q I'm not interested in that, as far as our testimony
13 here. Well, I take that back. There is one part of that
14 I want to ask you about in a little while, but what I
15 need to know, if rumor or hearsay or coffee, talking over
16 coffee, prior to the accident had you ever heard of a
17 cylinder being overfilled and heated?

18- A No.

19 Q Prior to the accident?

20 A Prior to the accident, I really hadn't. If I ever did,
21 there was either some miscommunication that the person
22 telling me, that I didn't really truly hear. There's got
23 to be an explanation for it. If it really did and
24 someone says they told me, there's got to be extenuating
25 circumstances here.

1 Q I don't believe anybody ever said they told you.

2 A I never have been aware of a cylinder being overfilled,
3 ever. Now, Lord help me if I made a mistake and told you
4 something wrong, and if it ever should come to me and if
5 I ever remember it, I'll get ahold of you and tell you.

6 Q Mr. Jackson, I understand your testimony. That's all
7 we're trying to do is get your testimony here.

8 A I can be pretty flat footed, you might say, on that one.
9 I just -- we did not heat overfilled cylinders.

10 Q Or more specifically --

11 A Obviously it did occur, one ruptured; but, boy --

12 Q I just want to have an appreciation for the fact that
13 most of the people at the site that we interviewed are
14 aware that it occurred, so --

15 A I'm becoming aware of that now. Makes me wonder how much
16 sand I may have had my head in, but I just flat didn't
17 know about it.

18 Q Let me ask you, I'm going to ask you about the
19 conversation that Mr. Anderson was referring to with him
20 standing in the doorway, and he overhears you talking
21 about this issue about overfilled cylinders, knowledge of
22 overfilled cylinders. That seemed to have been the topic
23 of the discussion with the supervisors. Did the
24 supervisors -- at some point in time, do you recall any
25 discussions with any of the supervisors after the

1 accident in which they said, yes, I was aware that there
2 had been overfills that had been heated over the years?

3 A I'm not aware of the one he's talking about there.

4 Q Do you recall any discussions with supervisors since the
5 accident where they said, yeah, I've seen that before;
6 I've seen overfills. I've heard about or I know about
7 overfills that have been heated.

8 A The first that I was told about, I believe the plant
9 manager told me that he had just learned that Bill
10 Bradley alleged that a cylinder had been overfilled, and
11 I'm sure it's the one you are talking about, the 1,700
12 pounds. That's the first, and it was very much to my
13 surprise that we would even --

14 Q I don't think I made myself clear to you. What I'm
15 asking you is: did you, as in this scenario that
16 Mr. Anderson laid out -- he says he recalls an incident
17 where you were talking to supervisors about what
18 knowledge each of you had, whoever was in attendance to
19 this informal gathering, you know, what knowledge each of
20 you had related to overfilled cylinders, and he overheard
21 you saying, well, I have never seen one before. But what
22 I'm asking you is: did any of the other supervisors tell
23 you that prior to the accident they were aware of
24 cylinders that had been overfilled and heated?

25 A Not to my knowledge.

1 Q Okay. Well, based on what I told you earlier, of course,
2 I've already conveyed to you that some of the supervisors
3 have told me, yes, they were aware of it.

4 A I mean, I don't really know fully what their reluctance
5 would be, if that were the case, what their reluctance
6 would be to tell me that, and there may be a reluctance,
7 but --

8 Q Different issue, or same issue, but different situation.
9 One of the people that we've reinterviewed this past week
10 was Mr. Utnage, and we asked Mr. Utnage if he had
11 questioned any of the people on site, more specifically
12 supervisory people, about their knowledge of overfills
13 prior to the accident. Mr. Utnage is a very
14 conscientious fellow, and he has a desire not only to --
15 I mean, he didn't just want to wait and see what the NRC
16 found out, but he's been making inquiries on his own, and
17 we asked him if he discussed this with you, and he
18 indicated that he had. Do you recall a discussion with
19 Mr. Utnage or him questioning you about whether --

20 A I don't recall specific details of it, I'm sure, but I
21 know we talked on several occasions after the accident,
22 and no doubt that would have been at least one of the
23 things we would have talked about, yeah.

24 Q Do you recall what you told Mr. Utnage about your
25 knowledge of overfills that were heated?

1 A I don't recall. I'm confident that it would have been
2 the same as I've just told you. I would have no doubt I
3 probably did, but I just don't recall specifically
4 telling him, but if he asked me, again, I have no
5 knowledge of any overfill. I would have told him that.
6 It seems like the attorneys, Kerr-McGee attorneys asked
7 me that.

8 Q Oh, yes.

9 A What was my response to them? They jumped in on this
10 thing right away.

11 Q See, the NRC --

12 A Do you recall what I told the attorneys?

13 Q I don't have it here with me. I don't have that part of
14 your testimony, but I believe --

15 A It just had to be the same thing.

16 Q I believe that's what you told them.

17 A In fact, I believed it probably even stronger then than I
18 do now. It's been a little time now, but it was fresher
19 on my mind right then.

20 Q Well, as you might have gleaned from our conversation
21 here today, you know, we realized that after our first
22 interviews that some people, one of two things, either
23 weren't being candid with us or had misunderstood the
24 full extent or the full realm of the type of questions we
25 were trying to ask. So part of our reason for coming

1 back and reinterviewing was to make sure there was no
2 stone left unturned and no definition that wasn't
3 solidified, so that we could get the absolute bottom line
4 understanding of what each person knew. I think you also
5 may have developed an appreciation based on what I've
6 told you about the amount of knowledge --

7 A Yes.

8 Q Amount of people that were aware of this. Mr. Carr when
9 we interviewed him, you know, like those cylinder status
10 sheets, his point of view was: if my name -- I'd be
11 embarrassed if my name was on one of those that showed an
12 overage, even if it's just 100 to 120 pounds.
13 Mr. Matthews took the position that I don't, you know, I
14 knew it. I presumed everybody else knew it. I don't see
15 how they couldn't know it.

16 So, you know, we felt compelled in that you didn't
17 seem to know what everybody else knew, we felt compelled
18 to come back and try and make absolutely sure that Gary
19 Jackson had never heard of or heard about, rumor or
20 through his own personal observations ever heard of
21 overfilled cylinders.

22 A Seems kind of strange, doesn't it? It does. It seems
23 strange to me. I see reason for your concern. It
24 doesn't change the truth, but I see -- I have no real
25 explanation for it. My knowledge of the UF6 area for

1 the, say, for the five-year period, maybe 1980 or so, on
2 up to the time of the accident has been -- I don't want
3 to say knowledge. Keeping up just with what's really
4 going on down there wasn't -- well, let's say I've been
5 supervising a completely different area and would only
6 cover for the area supervisor, and just while he was on
7 vacation. That is, do some of the necessary things for
8 him while he was on vacation. That was about it.

9 Now, in the way of an explanation for this thing, it
10 could be the practice changed or something that I was not
11 aware of. That's the reason I keep thinking, well, we've
12 looked at a period of time and said we had this certain
13 number, this percentage of overfills or reheated
14 overfills, or whatever it is, in 1985 or '84. What about
15 1976 or so? Kind of makes me wonder how the two would
16 compare. I don't know. I don't have an explanation for
17 it. The thing, though, that I have, though, as the truth
18 for it is that I was not aware of it. Strange as it may
19 seem, that's --

20 Q That's what we're here for. I understand what you are
21 saying completely. We just wanted to be absolutely sure
22 that we understood, because like I said, this mass of
23 information from your fellow employees that had a
24 completely different understanding. Not that they
25 handled it every day, but they had encountered it. They

1 were aware of it. They had seen it or they had heard
2 about it.

3 A Am I hearing you right, that I'm the only one interviewed
4 that didn't know about it?

5 Q I'm not saying that.

6 A Okay, because that certainly would surprise me. I'd
7 start losing confidence in --

8 Q I will say this, that you are in a very small minority.

9 A That has reason for me to lose confidence in some of the
10 folks I work with. It's a surprise and --

11 Q Well, at this point in time the NRC is concerned--

12 A It's that broad.

13 Q The NRC at this point in time is concerned with making
14 sure we have adequately communicated our questions so
15 that the responses that we have received from the various
16 employees that we've interviewed have been accurate and
17 the full extent of their knowledge of this particular
18 type problem, and I think I perfectly understand what
19 your testimony is and --

20 A Yeah, right.

21 Q I mean, if you don't recall, I don't think there's any
22 way you can add to that. Well, listen, I appreciate you
23 coming in today. You were very cooperative in that I
24 know this is a good long ways from where you live and
25 work. I appreciate you coming up here, making yourself

1 available today.

2 Mr. Jackson, have I threatened you in any manner or
3 offered you any rewards in return for this statement?

4 A No.

5 Q Have you given this statement freely and voluntarily?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Is there anything that you would care to add to the
8 record?

9 A No.

10 Q Okay. Let me say again, I appreciate your cooperation.

11 (Interview completed.)

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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF OKLAHOMA)

) SS.

COUNTY OF TULSA)

I, Cathleen M. Harper, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Oklahoma, do hereby certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of the Investigative Interview of Gary V. Jackson, on Tuesday, September 3, 1986, at the Sheraton Inn-Tulsa Airport, 2201 N. 77th East Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma, were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Witness my hand this 3rd day of September, 1986.

Cathleen M. Harper

CATHLEEN M. HARPER

Certified Shorthand Reporter