VOLUME 7
MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL CATEGORY

SUBCATEGORY REPORT 70900 PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE

UPDATED

TVA NUCLEAR POWER

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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 70900 SPECIAL PROGRAM

REPORT TYPE: Management and Personnel Subcategory REVISION NUMBER: 3

TITLE: Public Safety Service

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REASON FOR REVISION:

Incorporation of final TAS editorial comments.

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APPROVED BY:			
JOECSP HANAGER	5/3/81 DATE	MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)	DATE

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Preface

This subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The ECSP and the organization which carried out the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established by TVA's Manager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and report on those Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) employee concerns filed before February 1, 1986. Concerns filed after that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concerns Program (ECP).

The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns. Each of the concerns was a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thought was unsafe, unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate. The mission of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to thoroughly investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the NRC, and the general public. The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports: element, subcategory, category, and final.

Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for those concerns directly affecting the restart of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2. An element consists of one or more closely related issues. An issue is a potential problem identified by ECTG during the evaluation process as having been raised in one or more concerns. For efficient handling, what appeared to be similar concerns were grouped into elements early in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself. Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluation found more than one issue per element.

Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements. However, the subcategory report does more than collect element level evaluations. The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the element level. This integration of information reveals the extent to which problems overlap more than one element and will therefore require corrective action for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.

To make the subcategory reports easier to understand, three items have been placed at the front of each report: a preface, a glossary of the terminology unique to ECSP reports, and a list of acronyms.

Additionally, at the end of each subcategory report will be a Subcategory Summary Table that includes the concern numbers; identifies other subcategories that share a concern; designates nuclear safety-related, safety significant, or non-safety related concerns; designates generic applicability; and briefly states each concern.

Either the Subcategory Summary Table or another attachment or a combination of the two will enable the reader to find the report section or sections in which the issue raised by the concern is evaluated.

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The subcategories are themselves summarized in a series of eight category reports. Each category report reviews the major findings and collective significance of the subcategory reports in one of the following areas:

- * management and personnel relations
- industrial safety
- * construction
- material control
- · operations
- quality assurance/quality control
- · welding
- * engineering

A separate report on employee concerns dealing with specific contentions of intimidation, harassment, and wrongdoing will be released by the TVA Office of the Inspector General.

Just as the subcategory reports integrate the information collected at the element level, the category reports integrate the information assembled in all the subcategory reports within the category, addressing particularly the underlying causes of those problems that run across more than one subcategory.

A final report will integrate and assess the information collected by all of the lower level reports prepared for the ECSP, including the Inspector General's report.

For more detail on the methods by which ECTG employee concerns were evaluated and reported, consult the Tennessee Valley Authority Employee Concerns Task Group Program Manual. The Manual spells out the program's objectives, scope, organization, and responsibilities. It also specifies the procedures that were followed in the investigation, reporting, and closeout of the issues raised by employee concerns.

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ECSP GLOSSARY OF REPORT TERMS*

classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of in issue leads to one of the following determinations:

Class A: Issue cannot be verified as factual

Class B: Issue is factually accurate, but what is described is not a problem (i.e., not a condition requiring corrective action)

Class C: Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluation of the issue was undertaken

Class D: Issue is factual and presents a problem for which corrective action has been, or is being, taken as a result of an evaluation

Class E: A problem, requiring corrective action, which was not identified by an employee concern, but was revealed during the ECTG evaluation of an issue raised by an employee concern.

collective significance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the findings in a particular ECSP report by putting those findings in the proper perspective.

concern (see "employee concern")

revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.

criterion (plural: criteria) a basis for defining a performance, behavior, or quality which ONP imposes on itself (see also "requirement").

element or element report an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.

employee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thinks unsafe, unjust, inefficient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or a form equivalent to the K-form.

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evaluator(s) the individual(s) assigned the responsibility to assess a specific grouping of employee concerns.

- findings includes both statements of fact and the judgments made about those facts during the evaluation process; negative findings require corrective action.
- issue a potential problem, as interpreted by the ECTG during the evaluation process, raised in one or more concerns.

K-form (see "employee concern")

requirement a standard of performance, behavior, or quality on which an evaluation judgment or decision may be based.

root cause the underlying reason for a problem.

*Terms essential to the program but which require do led definition have been defined in the ECTG Procedure Manual (e.g., generic, specific, nuclear safety-related, unreviewed safety-significant question).

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Acronyms

AI Administrative Instruction

AISC American Institute of Steel Construction

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable

ANS American Nuclear Society

ANSI American National Standards Institute

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

AWS American Welding Society

OFN Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

BLN Bellefonte Nuclear Plant

CAQ Condition Adverse to Quality

CAR Corrective Action Report

CATD Corrective Action Tracking Document

CCTS Corporate Commitment Tracking System

CEG-H Category Evaluation Group Head

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CI Concerned Individual

CMTR Certified Material Test Report

COC Certificate of Conformance/Compliance

DCR Design Change Request

DNC Division of Nuclear Construction (see also NU CON)

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DNE	Division of Nuclear Engineering
DNQA	Division of Nuclear Quality Assurance
DNT	Division of Nuclear Training
DOE	Department of Energy
DPO	Division Personnel Officer
DR	Discrepancy Report or Deviation Report
ECN	Engineering Change Notice
ECP	Employee Concerns Program
ECP-SR	Employee Concerns Program-Site Representative
ECSP	Employee Concerns Special Program
ECTG	Employee Concerns Task Group
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
EQ	Environmental Qualification
EMRT	Emergency Medical Response Team
EN DES	Engineering Design
ERT	Employee Response Team or Emergency Response Team
FCK	Field Change Request
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
FY	Fiscal Year
GET	General Employee Training
HCI	Hazard Control Instruction
HVAC	Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning
11	Installation Instruction
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IKN	Inspection Rejection Notice

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L/R Labor Relations Staff

M&AI Modifications and Additions Instruction

MI Maintenance Instruction

MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board

MT Magnetic Particle Testing

NCR Nonconforming Condition Report

NDE Nondestructive Examination

NPP Nuclear Performance Plan

NPS Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedures System

NQAM Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSB Nuclear Services Branch

NSRS Nuclear Safety Review Staff

NU CON Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, see DNC)

NUMARC Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or Act)

ONP Office of Nuclear Power

OWCP Office of Workers Compensation Program

PHR Personal History Record

PT Liquid Penetrant Testing

QA Quality Assurance

QAP Quality Assurance Procedures

QC Quality Control

QCI Quality Control Instruction

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QCP	Quality Control Procedure
QTC	Quality Technology Company
RIF	Reduction in Force
RT	Radiographic Testing
SQN	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
SI	Surveillance Instruction
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRP	Senior Review Panel
SWEC	Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation
TAS	Technical Assistance Staff
T&L	Trades and Labor
AVI	Tennessee Valley Authority
TVTLC	Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council
UT	Ultrasonic Testing
VT	Visual Testing
WBECSP	Watts Bar Employee Concern Special Program
WBN	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
WR	Work Request or Work Rules
WP	Workplans

PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE

Subcategory Report 70900

Executive Summary

The 57 concerns in this subcategory were grouped into 5 issues. The major problems addressed were the administrative structure of Public Safety Service (PSS), supervisory performance, and certain operational activities of PSS.

The findings indicated that supervision of PSS at WBN needed improvement. The organizational structure of PSS at WBN was also a problem because it consisted of two separate units, ONP Operations PSS and the Division of Nuclear Construction (DNC) PSS. These organizational differences were confusing to ONP employees generally and to PSS officers in particular.

The causes of the issues are threefold: the fragmented organizational structure caused communication and coordination difficulties; insufficient supervisory training created the supervisory issue; and insufficient supervisory training in communication skills also lead to many of the overall employee doubts because PSS functions were often not well understood by general employees.

Two corrective actions are being taken to alleviate the problems.

The first was to merge the two separate WBN PSS organizations. Secondly, PSS at WBN has adopted the TVA Supervisory Training Program as an interim solution. This training for all PSS managers will be implemented in three phases:

Phase I: General Supervisory Training on policies, procedures,

and practices

Phase II: Individual Skills Assessment Program to determine skills

in need of improvement

Phase III: Skills Development Process to upgrade the skills

identified in Phase II

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1.0 CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUES

The 57 employee concerns in this subcategory raised five issues that were grouped into three elements: (1) administrative policies, (2) supervisory performance, and (3) certain operational activities of Public Safety Service (PSS) at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). There are no potential nuclear safety-related concerns in this subcategory. Employee concerns about the performance of regulated security activities are being addressed in the Operations Security Subcategory report 31200.

To locate the issue in which a particular concern is evaluated, consult the following attachments:

Attachment A, Subcategory Summary Table

Attachment B, List of Concerns by Issue

All Management and Personnel Category concerns having a technical component (including all concerns designated Nuclear Safety-Related) are shared with the appropriate technical category for investigation and resolution of that technical component. Report(s) sharing a concern with this report are identified in the entry for that concern on Attachment A.

1.1 Description of Issues

The five issues in this evaluation are:

A. Issue 70901 - Administration of PSS at WBN

Twenty-two concerns form this issue addressing work planning, coordination of PSS activities and communication of decisions and instructions.

The perceived problems are a lack of planning or of coordination of activities (i.e., scheduling, overtime, etc.) by management and inadequate and inconsistent communication of decisions and instructions to the officers.

B. Issue 70902 - Supervision of PSS Officers at WBN

Ten concerns form an issue involving work assignments for officers, direction of work activities, and the inability to make effective management decisions.

The perceived problem is that PSS supervision is inconsistent in all three areas.

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C. Operations activities of PSS at WBN

 Issue 70903 - Searches of toolboxes, vehicles, and lunch boxes

Eleven concerns form this issue addressing searches by security officers.

The perceived problems are that searches are either unnecessary or ineffective.

2. Issue 70904 - Disrespectful Flag Handling

Four concerns form this issue addressing the disrespectful display and handling of the American flag.

The perceived problem is that PSS officers do not always perform properly when handling the American flag.

3. Issue 70905 - Response to medical emergencies

Ten concerns form this issue addressing the casual way medical personnel responded to medical emergencies.

The perceived problem is that PSS officers do not always perform properly when responding to medical emergencies.

2.0 SUMMARY

2.1 Summary of Issues

The perceived problems with the management of PSS at WBN are addressed in this subcategory report by the following five issues: (1) ineffective administration, (2) inadequate supervision, (3) improper searches, (4) disrespectful flag handling, and (5) casual response to medical emergencies.

2.2 Summary of Evaluation Process

The evaluator has reviewed all the information available on the concerns in this subcategory. The information pertinent to the evaluation of the issues has been considered and incorporated in this report.

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The subcategory was evaluated by examining the concern files, by reviewing the documents which govern the management of WBN PSS, and by conducting interviews. Interviews were conducted to verify (where possible) the circumstances referred to in the concerns, to determine the adequacy of the procedures governing WBN PSS, and to determine how well those procedures are put into practice.

2.3 Summary of Findings

There are three major findings in this subcategory. (1) Management problems were created by naving two separate PSS organizations at WBN doing what is administratively one job. (2) Employees need a better understanding of some PSS procedures and activities. (3) Most PSS supervisors at WBN lack adequate managerial training.

2.4 Summary of Collective Significance

Some of the concerns addressed in this subcategory can be traced to confusions caused by the existence of one PSS organization for Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) Plant Operations and another for Division of Nuclear Construction (DNC) at the site. The consolidation of those two PSS organizations took place on June 9, 1986.

However, some of the other problems identified in the concerns are caused or at least made worse by the failure to provide PSS supervisors with adequate managerial training. The formal managerial training courses, which WBN PSS supervisors have been promised since 1980, should be provided.

2.5 Summary of Causes

The causes of the major findings were:

- 1. Fragmented organizational structure
- 2. Insufficient supervisory training
- 3. Lack of communication resulting in employee doubts

2.6 Summary of Corrective Action

Corrective action previously initiated included efforts to intensify and expand the use of established mechanisms as General a ployee Training (GET) and various communication dispatches.

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Corrective action as a result of this evaluation consisted of an interim Supervisory Training Program to be followed by a PSS management review which will determine what additional training is necessary.

3.0 EVALUATION PROCESS

The evaluation for this subcategory was conducted in accordance with the "Evaluation Plans for the Management and Personnel Group" and the "PSS Subcategory Evaluation Plan." The concern case files were reviewed. A review was also conducted of five WBN PSS Section Instruction Letters, Volume I Physical Security Instruction Manual (July 14, 1986) and three PSS division policies. Along with the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) evaluator's efforts, this subcategory report includes the review of nineteen Quality Technology Company (QTC) investigative reports on individual concerns. The comments from these reports were incorporated into the Findings Section (4.0). Interviews were held with five PSS management and staff support personnel. The interviews were to obtain clarification on PSS procedures and how they are communicated to the line-level supervisors and employees.

An attempt was made to verify specific events or actions mentioned in the concerns. Then the issues were evaluated by comparing how the management of PSS implemented the PSS procedures and ONP policies at WBN say it should be performed. An analysis was made of the collective significance of the findings. Causes were determined for the negative findings and the responsible line managers were notified.

4.0 FINDINGS

4.1 Issue 70901 - Ineffective Administration of the PSS at WBN

Discussion

ONP Operations PSS officers and DNC PSS officers raised twenty-two concerns about poor work planning, lack of coordination of PSS activities, and inconsistent communication of decisions and instructions. Before June 9, 1986, ONP Operations PSS officers and DNC on PSS officers at WBN reported to separate managers within PSS. ONP Operations officers reported to a Chief of Nuclear Operations at WBN who reported to the Manager of Nuclear Operations in PSS in Knoxville, while DNC officers reported to a PSS Captain at WBN who reported to the Manager of Area Operations in PSS in Knoxville. Both PSS Operations adhere to the same division administrative policies and procedures, i.e., uniforms, overtime, grooming, and management selection. However, the work activities and associated specialized training required are often different.

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This organizational difference caused communication and coordination difficulties and was considered confusing and sometimes inequitable by some officers. Two distinct PSS systems had been used on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), WBN, and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) since the 1970s. BFN and SQN now have only a Nuclear Operations Unit, and BLN currently has only an Area Operations Unit. On June 9, 1986, PSS units at WBN were consolidated under the management of the Chief of Nuclear Operations PSS.

Conclusion

The issue about faulty PSS administration at WBN was factual when the concerns were filed. However, the consolidation of the two PSS units should improve the consistency of work planning, coordination of activities, and communication of management decisions/instructions. With one chain of command, communication between officers and supervisors should improve, application of policies and procedures should be more consistent, and work assignments should be more equitable.

4.2 Issue 70902 - Inadequate Supervision of PSS Officers at WBN

Discussion

The ten concerns in the issue about work assignments, the directing of work activities, and decision making problem solving came from officers in both PSS units at WBN. More specifically, these concerns involved complaints about insufficient staffing during vehicle searches, inconsistent application of work rules by supervisors, and unfair duty assignments by supervisors. The perceived underlying problem is that PSS supervisors are deficient in supervisory skills.

Conclusion

This evaluation finds this issue to be factual. In 1980, PSS began developing formal management training courses for supervisors but has not implemented the program because of scheduling and staffing interruptions. In 1981, a formal process was instituted for identifying personnel interested in management positions/promotions. The new supervisory identification and selection process and the future training plans should help to alleviate some of the concerns about PSS supervision.

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4.3 Operation Activities of the PSS at WBN

The three issues in this element are about how searches (vehicles, toolboxes, and lunch boxes) are conducted, how the American flag is handled, and how medical emergencies are responded to.

4.3.1 Issue 70903 - Improper Searches

Discussion

The perceived problem expressed in the eleven concerns is that the searches are either unnecessary or ineffective. The issue is that searches cause delays and are demoralizing to the employees. The Joint Security Plan for WBN is an agreement between Office of Power, DNC, and PSS that was developed in 1977 and revised in 1984, to be used as a standard plan of security at all major construction sites in TVA. This plan authorizes the Project Manager to determine when vehicle and toolbox searches will be conducted by PSS. Vehicle searches have been conducted on TVA construction sites for many years and are authorized under TVA Code XI PROTECTION. This is a common practice at government installations and is recognized as an effective way of ensuring the safety and security of the employees and the facilities.

Toolbox searches by PSS began in 1980 at BLN, because of consistent shrinkages in tool inventories of approximately \$20,000 to \$30,000 a month. When it was announced at BLN that the toolbox searches were to be instituted, approximately \$60,000 worth of tools were found deposited on a loading dock. After several months of toolbox searches, the Joint Security Committee (representatives from Office of Power, DNC, and PSS) determined that the searches were effective in reducing the shrinkage of tool inventories. Because of the success experienced at BLN, the Joint Security Committee recommended that tool box searches be conducted at all major TVA construction sites.

Conclusion

This issue was not verified as factual. The control of tool inventories by this method is considered to be consistent with industry practice and should be promoted as good business practice and not a message of distrust to the employees. However, the manner in which this practice is carried out could determine the perception the employees have of the search program.

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4.3.2 Issue 70904 - Disrespectful Flag Handling

Discussion

There were approximately four concerns relating to improper handling of the American flag by PSS officers at WBN. Because specific details were unavailable because of confidentiality considerations, there was insufficient information available to verify the concerns as factual. WBN PSS does have a Section Instruction Letter 8.0 titled, "Handling and Displaying Of The Flag."

Conclusion

What may have sparked the concerns was the appearance of negligence on the part of officers in folding the flag. Procedure requires that the flag be dry before it can be folded. Therefore, a wet flag must be taken in to dry before being folded. Additionally, officers on flag duty occasionally receive an emergency call while taking down the flag and must then wait until after handling the emergency, to finish folding. Better employee understanding of PSS procedure might have made the concerns unnecessary.

4.3.3 Issue 70905 - Casual Response to Medical Emergencies

Discussion

There were approximately ten concerns about casual response to medical emergencies at WBN. The PSS personnel are a part of the Medical Emergency Response Team at WBN. along with personnel from Health Physics (HP). Shift Engineer's Office, and Medical Services. Representatives from each of these groups respond to medical emergencies in accordance with Section 10 of the WBN Implementing Procedure Document. Upon arrival at the scene of a medical emergency, the nurse from Medical Services supervises the care of the injured employee, and all other team members are there to support and assist in the management of the emergency. The Medical Emergency Response Team has an average response time of 5 to 7 minutes. There have been a few instances when it took longer because of insufficient or inaccurate information as to the location of the emergency. All members of the response team are adequately trained and qualified to perform their responsibilities on the team.

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Conclusion

These concerns were not found to be factual. Again, however, better employee understanding of how the ERT works might have prevented misconceptions.

5.0 COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE

The issues discussed in this subcategory have generic implications. The PSS operations at all TVA nuclear plants are similar; therefore, findings in this evaluation on supervision and operations activities may apply to PSS management at the other TVA nuclear plants.

Some of the concerns involving the administration of PSS at WBN should be satisfied by the improved coordination of activities and the improved communication of decisions and instructions that will follow from the consolidation of the two PSS units.

The concerns dualing with PSS supervision implied that PSS supervisors are deficient in supervisory skills. The evaluation found that the process used by PSS to select supervisors was impartial and objective. However, supervisory training other than on-the-job training has been limited to agency management courses. The PSS managers training program has not been effectively implemented since it was proposed in 1980. Full implementation of the training program is needed.

The purpose of those PSS activities that affect employees need to be shared with them. It is evident from this evaluation that even many PSS officers feel less than fully informed by their supervisors. As the most recognizable of the many organizations at WBN, PSS officers play a special role in setting the tone for other WBN personnel. Their supervisors need the "people skills" to help the PSS appear as a confident team.

This evaluation should not be seen as a blanket condemnation of PSS management. Rather, it points to the ways in which an adequate organization can become the excellent one it has the potential to be.

6.0 CAUSES

For the factual concerns about administration of PSS at WBN: Fragmented organizational structure (consolidation of units occurred on June 9, 1986).

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For the factual concerns about PSS supervision: Insufficient supervisory training for line managers. Such training needs, however, to be more than classroom exercises. The effective management of people requires an interaction of a rule of action and practice of that action.

For the perceptions reflected in the concerns about PSS operations activities: A lack of communications and understanding about PSS brought forth employee doubts.

7.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION

7.1 Corrective Action Previously Initiated

The two separate WBN PSS organizations were merged on June 9, 1986.

Efforts to further inform employees about Public Safety activities will be intensified and expanded by using such established mechanisms as the GET and the various communication dispatches.

7.2 Corrective Action as a Result of This Evaluation

PSS at WBN will adopt the TVA Supervisory Training Program as an interim solution to the lack of a PSS manager's training program. The Supervisory Training Program will be implemented in three phases: (CATD 709-NPS-01)

Phase I: General Supervisory Training on policies, procedures, and practices will be completed by all WBN PSS managers.

Phase II: Within four months of completing Phase I, each PSS manager will start the Individual Skills Assessment Process.

Phase III: Immediately upon the completion of Phase II, a manager will enter a Skills Development Process which will upgrade those skill areas identified by the Individual Skills Assessment as in need of strengthening.

Once all WBN PSS managers have completed the TVA Supervisory Training Program, PSS will review the results and (where necessary) develop managerial training courses covering the managerial skills uniquely necessary for PSS management.

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8.0 ATTACHMENTS

Attachment A, Subcategory Summary Table

Attachment B, Concerns Listed by Issue

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PAGE - 2 RUN , IME - 10:04:3' RUN DATE - 03/10/8.		REF. SECTION CAT - MP SUBCAT - 70	OF VEHICLES	AS A RESULT O YEE THE SECUR RRED TO ANOTH OTHER AND HE L MAS THERE. OFFICERS ARE		SPOND IN A TI INJURY EMERG	ID QIC, MITHH ITY, NO FURT RELEASED, CO N. C/I HAS N NO FOLLOM-UP	PERSONNEL WI SEARCHES, MAK OF TOOLS IN T PERSONNEL IF	FIDENTIALITY AFETY SERVICE ES IS TRUE. D KNOHLEDGE,
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER EE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY 09 OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES OF PSS AT MBN SEARCHES	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	DURING A ROUTINE SEARCH OF VEHICLES SECURITY FOUND ALCOHOL IN AN EMPLOYE	E'S (NAME KNOWN) CAN. AS A KESULI OF IDENTIFYING THE EMPLOYEE THE SECURITY OFFICER WAS TRAUSFERRED TO ANOTHER SITE. THE EMPLOYEE STATED THE VEHICLE BELONGED TO HIS MOTHER AND HE DID NOT KNOW THE ALCOHOL NAS THERE. CI FEELS PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS ARE "SETUP" ALL THE TIME. NO OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE.	TVA MEDICAL SERVICES ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE A HISTORY OF INCOMPETENCE AND A RE DANGEROUSLY SLOW TO RESPOND EVIDENCE IS 40 MINUTES TO RESPOND AND E VACUATE AN INBIVIDUAL MHO FELL OFF A SCAFFOLD (CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORM ATION TO PROVIDE)	MELY MANNER TO PERSONAL	ENCIES. DETAILS KNUMN TO GIC, MITHH ELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. NO FURT HER INFORMATION MAY BE RELEASED. CO NSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. C/I HAS N O FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOM-UP REQUIRED.	PUBLIC SAFETY MARASSING PERSONNEL TH UNNECESSARY TOOLBOX SEARCHES, ING/CHECKING INVENTORY OF TOOLS I HE TOOLBOXES & MARNING PERSONNEL TOOLS ARE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR.	EMPLOYEE DAY TO DAY CONFIDENTIALITY IS BREACHED IF PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE TAPPINNG TELEPHONE LINES IS TRUE. UNITS 182 (NO FIRST HAND KNOHLEDGE, READ IN NEMSPAPER)	
AUTHORI R POWER	CATEGO	CONCERN	910		910	910		910	910
ICE OF NUCLEAR OHCERN PROGRAM PROGRAM NFORMATION BY OPERATIONS A	INFORMATION BY OPERATIONS	HISTORICAL REPORT						IN-85-324-001	IN-85-334-002
OF EMPLOYEE	SUBCATEGORY: 709	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	2 2 3	Z HA NA	Z NA NA NA NA	2 NA NA NA NA Z	Z NA NA NA Y	Z HA NA NA NA Z	2 NA NA NA NA ZA NA
20	ISSUES	R PLT D 20C	S MBN	N MBN	N MBN	N WBN	S MBN	NEW	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
ECPS132J-ECPS132C REQUEST	PERS. 155	SUB	00509	70903	70905	70905	90805	70903	70901
\$132J UEST	00	CAT	H	₩	<u>∆</u>	₩ W	SF	Q. E.	<u>Q.</u>
REFERENCE - ECP FREQUENCY - REQ ONP - ISSS - RHM	CATEGORY: MP MGT.	CONCERN NUMBER	IN -85-142-00401 150087	0.5	IN -85-233-00601 T50005	IN -85-248-00201 150232	05	IN -85-324-00101 150052	IN -85-334-00201
	3								1

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

10:04:3

111

REF. SECTIO CAT - MP SUBCAT - 70					
CONCERN DESCRIPTION	INDIVIDUAL AUTOS BEING SEARCHED BY I NSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS CAUSING EMPLOYEES CONSIDERA BLE TIME DELAY. THIS OCCURRED AT 23 30 GN 1 JUNE 1985 AT THE MAIN PARKIN G LOT.	THERE IS A LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND EXPLANATION OR SPECIAL INFORMATION LETTERS ISSUED TO PUBLIC SAFETY OFFI CERS.	SECURITY PERSONNEL DISRESPECTFULLY H ANDLED THE AMERICAN FLAG, AND MADE D EROGATORY REMARKS TO AN INDIVIDUAL M HO POINTED OUT THE MISHANDLING. DET AILS KNOWN TO QIC, MITHHELD DUE TO C ONFIDENTIALITY. NO FURTHER INFORMAT ION AVAILABLE IN FILE. NO FURTHER I NFORMATION MAY BE RELEASED. CONST.	TVA MAHAGEMENT INDIVIDUAL (NAME KNOM N) GAINED UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS INTO W BNP TO "TEST" SECURITY SYSTEM. "TEST " MAS NOT ANNOUNCED, AND PUBLIC SAFE TY RESPONDED AS IF ACTUAL VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED. INCIDENT OCCURRED -19	APPROX. JUNE OR JULY 1983, A BLACK CRAFT WORKER HAS MAIKING TO THE BRASS SHACK AT HE END OF THE 1ST SHIFT AND FELL UNCONSCIOUS. TWO MHITE SECURITY GUARD STRIVED AT THE SCENE. ON E GUARD KICKED THE BOTTOM OF THE VICTIM'S FOOT. NEITHER SECURITY GUARD TRIED TO REVIVE THE VICTIM HAS DEAD MHEN THE AMBULANCE ARRIVED. CIFELT THE SECURITY GUARDS HID ARRIVED AT THE SCENE WERE HEGLIGENT FOR NOT TRYING TO REVIVE THE VICTIM. CI DO ES NOT KNOM THE IDENTITY OF GUAR
CONCERN	97.0	910	910	910	910
HISTORICAL REPORT	IN-85-340-001	IN-85-353-002		IN-85-445-805	IN-85-484-001
1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ HB	I N N N N S Z HA NA NA NA NA	I N N N N S S NA	2 NA	Z NA NA NA NA Z	Z NA
S H B F P L T	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	M KB	MBH MBH	X 88 X	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
SUB	70902	70901	70904	70901	70905
CAT	<u>E</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>A</u>	포	<u>Q.</u>
CONCERN NUMBER	IN -85-340-00101 150040	IN -85-353-00201 T50038	IN -85-444-00301 150253	IN -85-445-80501	IN -85-484-00101

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4:3		SECTIO, - NP IT - 70							
- 10:04:3 - 03/10/8									
TIME		CAT SUBCA							
PAG	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS ARE NOT ADEQUATELY SCREENED TO DETERMINE ABILITY TO PERFORM JOB. OFFICERS ARE MORE INTENT ON HARASSMENT THAN SECURITY AN EMPLOYEE (MAME UNKNOHN) MAS GIVEN SECURITY INDIVIDUAL (MAME KNOHN) MAS SECURITY INDIVIDUAL (MAME KNOHN) MAS SECURITY INDIVIDUAL (MAME KNOHN) MAS SEEN IN UNIFORM, USING A TVA RADAR OUN, GIVING SPEEDING TICKETS IN SPRING CITY.	PUBLIC SAFETY SHOULD HAVE A REGISTER ED NURSE RIDE IN THE AMBULANCE WHEN TRANSPORTING EMERGENCY CASES.	SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL FALSIFIED PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION/CERTIFICATION RE	CUKDS. (BELAILS TO SPECIFIC CASE KN OHN TO GIC AND WITHELD TO MAINTAIN C ONFIDENTIALITY). CONS. DEPT. CONCER N. CI HAS NO NORE INFORMATION. NO FOLLON UP REQUIRED.	KNOWN) WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR INCORRE	CI PERSUMPEL JUBILIFICATION, CERTIFIC ATION AND BOCUMENIATION. TO MAKE THE SERVICE STATED THAT CREDIT HAS GIVEN FOR PHYSICAL EXAM NHEN NONE HAS TAKEN AND MEAPONS QUALIFICATIONS NERE CHANGED. CI DECLINED TO PROVIDE ANY OTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. NO FOLL ON UP REQUIRED.	PUBLIC SAFETY SUPERVISION CHANGES REGULATIONS AT THEIR OWN DISCRETION. CI DECLINED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL IN FORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.	
AUTHORITY AR POHER AM SYSTEM	T CATEGOR	CONCERN	910	QTC	QTC		QTC		910
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POHER EE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY 09 ADMINISTRATION OF PSS AT MBN	HISTORICAL REPORT	IN-85-583-063	IN-85-592-001					IN-85-639-003	
EMPLOYE	EMPLOYEE CONCERN SUBCATEGORY: 709	REPORT APPL SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N		N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N		N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	HA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
	S	2	~ Z	2 2	1 2 2	2 2	1 2	2 7	7
20	UES	S H R PLT B LOC	N N	M WBM	S MBM	S MBM	S MBN	S S	N MBM
REFERENCE - ECPSI32J-ECPSI32C FREQUENCY - REQUEST DNP - ISSS - RHM CATEGORY: MP MGT. & PERS, ISSUES		SUB	70901	70905	60300	70902	60300	70902	70902
	CAT	₩.	M W	H	₩.	IH	₩ W	₫. ₩	
	CONCERN NUMBER	IN -85-583-00301 T50055	IN -85-592-50101 150056	IN -85-639-X0401 150134	05	IN -85-639-00101 150238		IN -85-639-00301 T50238	

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

PAGE - 5 RUN TIME - 10:04:3 RUN DATE - 03/10/8		REF. SECTIO CAT - MP SUBCAT - 70		
IME		CAI		
WBN SEARCHES		CONCERN DESCRIPTION	PUBLIC SAFETY DOES NOT CHECK BADGES	CLUSELT ENDUGN TO VERIFY THAT FICTOR ES ARE OF THE MEARERS. BADGE SHOULD BE SHOULD PAUSE LONG ENOUND WELLOYEES SHOULD PAUSE LONG ENOUGH TO ALLOW VERIFICATION (AS IS EQUIRED AT OTHER NUCLEAR FACILITIES SUCH AS OAK RIDGE.) TVA SHOULD NOT LET EMPLOYEES SIGN FOR OTHER EMPLOYEES CAN FOR GET THEIR BADGES. EMPLOYEES CAN EVEN BUNCH TOGETHER AND HELP DRUNK EMPLOYEES GET THROUGH THE GATE. TVA
Y (ECPS)	ES OF PSS A	CONCER	TVA SECURITY PUBLIC SAFE	ES ARE OF BEST ARE OF ES SIGN FOR BUNCH TOGOTEES GET THE REST ARE OF ES SIGN FOR BUNCH TOGOTEES GET TO BUNCH TOGOTEES GET THE BEST ARE OF ES GET TO BUNCH TOGOTEES GET TO BUNCH TOGOTES GET TO BUNCH TO BUNC
AUTHORIT AR FOWER	ACTIVITI	CONCERNO	QTC	
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY SUBCATEGORY: 709 OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES OF PSS AT MBN SEARCHES	INFORMATION B) OPERATIONS	HISTORICAL REPORT	IN-85-663-009	
EMPLOYEE	SUBCATEGORY: 709	2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ MB	2 NA NA NA NA	
20	UES	S H R PLT D LOC	N MBN	
REFERENCE - ECPSI32J-ECPSI32C FREQUENCY - REQUEST ONP - ISSS - RHM	MGT. & PERS. ISSUES	SUB	70903	
	& PE	CAT	₩ ₩	
		CONCERN NUMBER	IN -85-663-00901 150239	

INADEQUATE ORGANIZATION/QUALIFICATION OF MEDICAL RESPONSE TEAM. AROUND THE BEGINNING OF JUNE AND INDIVIDUAL MAS INJURIED ON THE JOB (NAME UNKNO WH) AND IT TOOK 55 MINUTES TO REMOVE HIM FROM THE BLOG CUNKNONN-LOCATION OF THEIR MAY AROUND THE BUILDING TO GET TO THE ACCIDENT SITE. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE. QIC IN-85-665-001 ZZ ZZ X X ZZ m 0 N MPN 76905 MP -85-665-00101 150067

TOOL BOX SEARCHES ARE UNFAIR. IF A 100L IS FOUND IN AN INDIVIDUALS TOOL BOX AND THAT INDIVIDUAL HAS NOT 'SI GNED' FOR IT, THE INDIVIDUAL RECEIVE S A LETTER. THIS IS DONE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE TOOL BELONGS TO ANOTHER EMPLOYEE OR IF IT IS A MISTAKE IN THE TOOL ROOM RECORDS. NO SPECIFICS GIVEN OR AVAILABLE.

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70903

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-85-700-00201 150079

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	SE DIE
THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM SOMETII S TAKES A LONG TIME TO ARRIVE AND MOVE AN INJURED PERSON.	SAFETY SERVE ONLY TO HARASS EMPLOYEE SAFETY SERVE ONLY TO HARASS EMPLOYEE S. CHECKS DO NOT PREVENT TREFT OF T VA MATERIAL, AS THEY ARE PERFONNED D URING WORK HOURS, ON TVA PROPERTY. THE MAIN RESULT OF TOOL BOX CHECKS I S TO HARASS EMPLOYEES WHO ARE PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO WORK THAN TO TOOL CONTROL.
910	910
IN-85-840-002	
I N N N N S Z NA NA NA NA NA NA	2 NA
N MBN	M MBM
70905	70903
포	<u>M</u>
IN -85-840-00201 T50086	IN -85-846-00501 150085
THE PARTY OF THE P	-85-840-00261 MP 70905 N MBN 1 N N N N IN-85-840-002 QTC 150086

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER.

PAGE - 10:04 RUN TIME - 10:04 RUN DATE - 03/10		REF. SECT		
	MBN SEARCHES	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	THE PUBLIC SAFETY SEARCH OF TOOL BOXES CREATES HATE AND LOW MORALE AMONG THE CRAFTS. INE CRAFTS. INE CRAFTS. INE CRAFTS. INE SOUR THE BOX WHICH HERE NOT ISSUED TO HIM. PUBLIC SAFETY REDUCT IN THESE TOOLS AS HAVING BEEN SAVED FROM THEFT, EVEN IF THERE IS A LOGICAL REASON FOR THE TOOLS BEING THERE TOTALES AMOUNTS OF THESE TOOLS ARE TOTALED SO PUBLIC SAFETY CAN BRAG ABOUT HOM MUCH TVA HAS "SAVED". THE EMPLOYEE CAN BE FIRED IF THIS HAPPENS THREE TIMES. NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE. NO FOLLOW UP REQ	
AUTHORIT AR POWER AM SYSTEM	Y CATEGOR ACTIVITI	CONCERN	910	
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POHER EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSIEM (ECPS) SUBCATEGORY: 709 OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES OF PSS AT 1		HISTORICAL REPORT	IN-85-883-001	
		1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	2 IN N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	
REFERENCE - ECPS132J-ECPS132C FREQUENCY - REQUEST ONP - ISSS - RHM	1 0	& PERS. ISSUES	SUB R PLT	MP 70903 N HBN
		CONCERN NUMBER	IN -85-883-90101	

PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE MANAGEMENT NEE DS TO GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER AND SCRUTINIZE THEIR CAPTAINS AND LIEUTENAN IS INSTEAD OF TRYING TO DURN THE OFF ICERS. C/I GAVE NAME OF ONE INDIVID UAL WHO CONTINUALLY "SCREMS-UP" WITH OUT ANY DISCIPLINARY ACTION BEING TAKEN. FURTHER DETAILS KNOWN TO QIC.	EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS AN INS UFFICIENT QUANTITY TO SUPPORTALL SHI FTS. NO FOLLON UP REQUIRED.	SECURITY OFFICERS DRESS CODE REQUIRE MENT TO HEAR TIES IS INAPPROPRIATE ON A CONSTRUCTION SITE. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.	PERSONNEL (DEPARTMENT KNOWN) MHO ARE CERTIFIED AS EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECH NICIANS SHOULD UNDERGO PERIODIC REFRESHER COURSES TO MAINTAIN PROFICIENCY. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NUC POWER CONCERN. O FOLLOW UP R
910	910	QTC	910
IN-85-907-001	IN-85-972-003	900-686-88-NI	IN-86-059-002
			N
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
ZZ	ZZ	ZZ	ZZ
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z Z	ZX	22	ZZ
N	77	~~	72
Z Z Z	N HBN	N MBN	N N
MP 70902 N MBN	70901	70901 N WBN	70901
Q. E	G.	d X	∆ ∑
-85-907-00191 T50092	-85-972-09301 150111	-85-989-00601 150104	-86-059-00201
TP	-	-	_

EQUIRED.

CA

TIME - 10:04:3 DATE - 03/10/8		REF. SECTIO CAI - MP SUBCAI - 70			
PAGE RUN RUN	TZSUBLATEGURI	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	ERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS (EMT) TO RECERTIFY, DUE TO THE FACT THAT EMT S RECEIVE NO PROFICIENCY MAINTENANCE IRAINING BETNEEN YEARLY REQUALIFICA FIGNS. MANY EMT PERSONNEL DO NOT FE EL ADEQUATELY EXPERIENCED TO PERFORM EMT FUNCTIONS. TVA SHOULD ESTABLISH A PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ENTERLE EXPERIENCE AND PROFICIENCY MAINTENANCE IRAINING FOR EMT PERSONNEL. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.	TVA SITE MANAGEMENT CONSIDERS EMPLOY EES TO BE THIEVES; REFERENCE THE PUB LIC SAFETY OFFICERS" SEARCH OF TOOLS BOXES. CI QUESTIONS NHAT PURPOSE T HIS ACTIVITY SERVES. CI HAS NO ADDI TIONAL INFORMATION. CONST CONCERN/I NVOLVED CRAFI-ALL/ON-GOING PROBLEM.	TVA IS MORE CONCERNED MITH WHAT GOES OUT OF THE PLANT THAN MITH WHAT COMES IN. REFERENCE THE LUNCH BOX CHEC
AUTHORIT	TION OF P	CONCERN	210	910	910
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR PONER EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) SUBCATEGORY: 709 ADMINISTRATION OF PSS AT WBN		HISTORICAL	IN-86-107-009	IN-86-128-602	IN-86-128-003
		1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ MB	2 NA	Z NA	I N N N N Z NA
32	JES	S H R PLT D LOC	Z GG X	N N	N MBN
REFERENCE - ECPS132J-ECPS132C FREQUENCY - REQUEST ONP - ISSS - RWM CATEGORY: MP MGT. & PERS. ISSUES	RS. 155	SUB	70901	70903	MP 70903
	& PE	CAT	호	<u>a.</u>	M M
	CONCERN NUMBER	IN -86-107-00901	IN -86-128-06201 150128	IN -86-128-00301 T50128	

PUBLISHED PUB SAF SCHEDULES ARE CHANGED MITHOUT SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO AFF ECTED PERSONNEL. THE PURPOSE OF THE SCHEDULES IS TO ALLON PUB SAF OFFICERS TO KNOW WHEN R WHERE THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO WORK. WHEN THESE SCHEDULES ARE CHANGED, PERSONAL PLAWS ARE UPSET, OFFICERS MAY BE IMPROPERLY DRESSED, OFFICERS MAY BE IMPROPERLY DRESSED, OFFICERS MAY BE IMPROPERLY DRESSED FOR NEW POSTS, ETC. WHEN CI QUESTIONED THIS PRACTICE, HE/SHE MAS TO LD "YOU'RE LUCKY TO HAVE A JOB". NU C POMER CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITION AL INFORMATION. KS AT THE END OF THE SHIFT. CI DOES NOT FEEL THAT THIS IS EFFECTIVE. C I HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. CO NST CONCERN/ON-GOING SITUATION.

QIC

IN-86-137-007

ZZ NN ZZ ZZ 12

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70901

d.W.

IN -86-137-00701 T50127

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PAGE

- ECPS132J-ECPS132C - REQUEST

CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER

PUBLIC SAFETY MORK SCHEDULES ARE OFT EN MODIFIED (AFTER ISSUE) WITH UTILI IY (U) DUTIES. THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE INCONVENIENT FOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE MADE PRIOR OFF DUTY PLANS. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. NUC PW R CONCERN. NO FOLLON UP REQUIRED.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS (EMT)
ARE, BY PROCEDURE, TO RESPOND IN PAI
RS 10 A MEDICAL EMERGENCY. HUNEYER,
THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS TO ASSURE T
HAT 2 EMTS ARE AVAILABLE FOR DUTY AT
ANY GIVEN TIME. NUCLEAR POWER CONC
ERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION

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IN-86-193-002

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IN -86-193-00201 T50125

NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.

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CONCERNS ARE GROUPED BY FIRST 3 DIGITS OF SUBCATEGORY NUMBER

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FOLLOW UP REQUIRED

REFERENCE - FCF FREQUENCY - REG ONP - ISSS - RHM	PS132	ECPSI32J-ECPSI32C REQUESI HM	51320	()	-		Ē	TE 0 EMPLOYEE	ENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER E CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM	FAR POWER	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR PONER OYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)	PAGE - 10:04:
CATEGORY: MP MGT.	05	PERS. 1	ISSUES	53	SUB	CAT	EGOR	EMPLOYEE CONCERN SUBCATEGORY: 709	INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATE ADMINISTRATION OF PSS AT WBN	SY CATEGOR	Y/SUBCATEGORY SS AT WBN	DATE 03/10/
CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB	SEAGI	PLT 100	- N	E E E	RELA	REPORT APPL SAF RELATED BF BL SQ MB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERNORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTIC CAT - MI SUBCAT - 76
IN -86-292-00101 T50252	₩.	70901	N EO	N	- N	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	ZZ	ZX	IN-86-292-001	910	INADEQUATE COGRDINATION BETWEEN PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND STAFF. PUBLIC SAFETY STAFF ARE GIVEN CONFLICTING ORDERS, AND WHEN ERRORS RESULT MANAGEMENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THE BLAME ON THE STAFF. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN FILE. NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT CONCERN.	PUBL PUBL ICTI I MA PONS MAT RIME
IN -86-298-00101	₩.	70961	Z .	Z E Z	2 NA	A X A	ZZ	NA		910	THERE IS NO WATER IN THE WORK AREAS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL. AT THE INTAKE PUMPING STATION, THEY HAVE HAD NO HATER SUPPLIED. LABORERS HAVE SEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO PROVIDE ANY. SAME CONDITION EXISTS MITH THE GUARD TOWNER POSITIONS. CONSTR. DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. FOLLOWUP NOT REQUIRED.	EAS THE HAVE HAVE GUA OUNS SITI
	F	70961	2	N RR	2 NA	ZZ	zz	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N		910	FETY PERSONNEL IN THE POWER BLOCK. SOME AREAS ARE VERY HOT. CONSTR. I PT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL NFORMATION. FOLLOWUP NOT REQUIRED.	SA DE L I
IN -86-298-00301 T50158	₩ W	70901	z	N	2 NA NA	ZZ	XX	N N A		910	PUBLIC SAFETY HAS REQUESTED A REFRIG ERATOR TO BE PLACED IN THEIR TRAILER EDPLE PER WORKING DAY. SUPERVISOR (KNOHN) HAS SAID "NO" NUNEROUS TIMES MITHOUT EXPLANATION. CONSTR. DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.	RIG 8 F R (ES FOR
DU 05 007 01701	2000	2000	**	*****								

13

IVA, WATTS BAR, DISRESPECTFULLY DISPLAYS AND HANDLES OUR AMERICAN FLAG.

(NAMES/DETAILS KHONN TO QTC AND RELEASE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD JEOPA RDIZE CI'S CONFIDENTIALITY). CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION AVAILABLE NO FOLLON UP REQUIRED

QTC

PH-85-003-013

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MP 70904

PH -85-003-01301

PAGE RUN TIME RUN DATE	
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR PONER EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)	EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY SUBCATEGORY: 709 OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES OF PSS AT MBN SEARCHES
REFERENCE - ECPS132J-ECPS132C FREQUENCY - REQUEST ONP - ISSS - RHM	CATEGORY: NP MGT. & PERS. ISSUES

- 10:04:3 - 03/10/8

			2000	200	-	- INCOME	OI FIRM I TONG	TITATION	of Englished Activities of 135 At Mon Schneifes	
CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB	S H R PLT D LOC		EPOR AF R F BL	REPORT APPL SAF RELATED BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERNORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	REF. SECTIO CAT - MF SUBCAT - 70
PH -85-025-00101 T50078	₩.	70903	20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2	2 N	NA NA NA	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N		910	LOCKS AND SOME HASPS TWISTED OFF STE AMFITTERS TOOLBOXES AT HBNP DURING D AY SHIFT ON 6/27/85, ADDITIONAL DET ALLS KNOWN TO QTC.	
MBP-85-019-30161	<u>a</u>	70907	Z Q X	2 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	MBP-5-019-001	316	THE WBNP AMERICAN FLAG WAS NEVER 10M ERED TO HALF-MAST IN RESPECT TO THE RECENT DEATH OF ANERICAN SERVICEMEN IN THE GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND AIR CRASH. THE ORDER TO NOT FOLLOM PRESIDEN T REAGAN'S DECLARATION CAME FROM KNO XVILLE. (KAMES/DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC AND MITHHEUD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY. NO FURTHER INFORMATION MAY BE RELEASED.) CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.	
MBP-85-019-00201	<u>~</u>	70964	N N	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	N N N	M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M	MBP-5-019-002	210	THE MBNP AMERICAN FLAG IS STILL BEIN G DISRESPECTFULLY HANDLED, E.G. ONE PERSON INSTEAD OF TWO ARE ASSIGNED TO RAISE OR LOWER THE FLAG AND THE FLAG IS NOT INMEDIATELY FOLDED AND STO RED IN ITS DESIGNATED PLACE. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.	
MBP-85-019-00301	ů.	70901	2	2 NA 2 NA	ZZ	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N		910	PUBLIC SAFETY IS TOO QUICK TO CONFIS CATE EVERY AVAILABLE TOOL BOX SO THE Y CAN REPORT MORE "STOLEN GOODS CAPT URED." CI ALLEGED THAT PUBLIC SAFETY MERIT RAISES ARE BASED ON THE NUMBER OF TOOL BOXES CONFISCATED. CONSTRUCTION PEPARTMENT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATIOE. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.	

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CI EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER TOTAL LACK OF CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO AN INJURE D EMPLOYEE BY PUBLIC SAFETY. NO ADD ITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE IN THE FILE. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.

QIC

N MBN

70905

MP

MI -85-044-X0501 T50250

TIME - 10:04:3 DATE - 03/10/8		REF. SECTIO CAT - MP SUBCAT - 70							
PAG RUN RUN	SS AT MBN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION	TVA PERMITTED PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER TRAINEES TO GRADE TEST PAPERS. (MAMES/DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND MITHHELD TO MAINTAIL N CONFIDENTIALITY). CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.	CI REPORTED MRONG DOING BY TVA INDUS TRIES. (NAMES/DETAILS TO THE SPECIF	IC CASE AKE KNOWN TO QIC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CI	SEQUOYAH - SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL (DE PARINENT & NAMES KNOWN) FALSIFIED PE	RSUNNEL WUALIFICATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS NS AND RECORDS. CI DECLINED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. NUCLEAR POHER DEPARTMENT CONCERN. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED.	CI STATED THAT, AT BELEFONTE, EXITING PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE THE IR LUNCH BOXES AND SACKS CHECKED BY SECURITY, BUT ENTERING CONTAINERS ARE NOT CHECKED. CI FEELS THAT A SEAR CH OF ENTERING CONTAINERS MOULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EMPLOYEE BRINGING SOMETHING IN THAT COULD DAMAGE THE PLANT. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.	TVA, BEING THE U.S.A GOVERNMENT, REQUIRES ALL CITIZENS TO BE "PATITED DGN N" WHEN ENTERING A SECURE AREA ON AN OPERATING NUCLEAR PONER PLANT, YET FOREIGH DIGHTARIES ARE EXEMPT FROM THIS REQUIREMENT. THIS EXEMPTION SE VERLY COMPROMISES THE SECURITY SYSTEM. NUCLEAR PONER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOWUP REQUIRED.
AR PONER	TION OF P	CONCERNORIGIN	910	910		QTC		910	910
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER EE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSIEM (ECPS)	INFORMATION B	HISTORICAL REPORT						XX-85-072-X01	XX-85-692-001
EMPLOYEE	SUBCATEGORY: 709	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ MB	2 NA NA NA NA ZA NA	2 2	I N N N N Z NA NA NA NA NA NA	2	I N N N N Z NA NA NA NA NA	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	Z NA
- ECPS132J-ECPS132C - REQUEST	ISSUES	S H R PLT D LOC	N MBM	S MBN	S MBN	S SQN	S SQN	z z	M H B B B
			SUB	70901	60300	76901	60300	70902	70903
\$132 PUEST	& PERS	CAT	¥	H	¥.	H	¥	∆. ∑	₩.
REFERENCE - ECP FREQUENCY - REQ ONP - ISSS - RWN	CATEGORY: MP MGT.	CONCERN HUMBER	MI -85-103-00201 T50217	MI -85-103-00301 150217	05	XX -85-043-X0401 150237	02	XX -85-072-X0101 T50242	XX -85-092-00101

ATTACHMENT B

PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE

List of Concerns By Element/Issue

The Public Safety Service Subcategory (70900) is comprised of 57 concerns broken into three elements which address five issues.

70901 - Administration of PSS at WBN

EX-85-117-002	IN-86-194-001
IN-85-334-002	IN-86-214-005
IN-85-353-002	IN-86-214-007
IN-85-445-005	IN-86-292-001
IN-85-583-003	IN-86-298-001
IN-85-972-003	IN-86-298-002
IN-85-989-006	IN-86-298-003
IN-86-059-002	WBP-85-019-003
IN-86-107-009	WI-85-103-002
IN-86-137-007	WI-85-103-003
IN-86-193-002	XX-85-092-001

70902 - Supervision of PSS Officers at WBN

IN-85-094-002	IN-85-907-001
IN-85-340-001	IN-86-160-001
IN-85-639-X04	IN-86-213-001
IN-85-639-001	IN-86-286-001
IN-85-639-003	XX-85-043-X04

Operations activities of PSS at WBN

70903 - Searches

IN-85-127-003	IN-85-846-005
IN-85-142-004	IN-85-883-001
IN-85-324-001	IN-86-128-002
IN-85-663-009	IN-86-128-003
IN-85-700-002	PH-85-025-001
	XX-85-072-X01

70904 - Flag handling

I	1-	8	5	-	4	4	4	-	0	0	3	
PH	1	8	5	-	0	0	3		0	1	3	
WE	BP	**	8	5	-	0	1	9	***	0	0	1
WE	P		8	5	_	0	1	9	_	٥	0	2

70905 - Medical emergencies

BFN-85-041-001	IN-85-665-001
IN-85-233-006	IN-85-717-001
IN-85-248-002	IN-85-840-001
IN-85-484-001	IN-85-840-002
IN-85-592-001	WI-85-044-X05