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NOV 8 1978

Memo to security file -
Trip Report - October 17-19, 1976

EXXON NUCLEAR COMPANY, DOCKET NO. 70-1257,
NRC RE-ASSESSMENT VISIT

Scope of Assessment

An entrance briefing was conducted at 8:30 a.m. October 18, 1976.
Attendees were:

Exxon

L. Hansen, Security Specialist
L. Merker, Mgr., Aux. Systems
R. Collings, Chief Plant Security
D. Schnider, Sr. Safeguards Specialist

NRC

O. Smith, Licensing
B. Minilli, Licensing
E. Richard, Licensing
C. South, Test and Evaluation
W. Martin, IE:I (Representing IE:HQ)
M. Schuster, IE:V
O. Shackleton, IE:V

The re-assessment scope was described by Smith:

1. Threats to be considered include 3 dedicated, militarily trained outsiders armed with legal weapons with or without the help of one insider, and one insider working alone to systematically remove a strategic quantity of SNM over a period of time.
2. Scope of visit included the overall security program. See Appendix A for detailed scope.

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3. Findings, if contrary to current requirements will not, as a result of this visit, be identified as items of noncompliance.

Findings of Assessment Team

An exit briefing was held at 1:30 p.m., October 19, 1976. Attendees were:

Exxon

L. Hansen, Security Specialist
L. Merker, Manager, Aux. Ops.
R. Collings, Chief, Plant Security
B. Berst, Acting Manager, Mixed Oxide

NRC

Same as for entrance briefing.

Appendix B sets forth the findings of the assessment team, a copy of which was given to the licensee.

Judgement

It was the considered opinion of the team, that Exxon could meet the design threat.

Original signed by
M. D. Schuster

O. Shackleton

M. Schuster

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APPENDIX A

GROUP I

Security Organization
Guard Force
 Size
 Equipment
 Training
 Orders
Patrols
On/Off-Site Response
Clearances
Use of Force
LLEA Agreement
Perimeter Barriers
Illumination
Guard Force Turnover
Evacuation Procedures
PA Searches
 Vehicles
 Personnel
 Articles

GROUP II

Operation of PCAS & SAS
 Hardening
 Visibility
 Control of Access
On/Off-Site Communications
Alarm Systems & Devices
 Testing & Records
 Motion Alarms & Tests
 Local Alarms
 Criticality Alarms
 Duress Alarms
Search Devices
 Testing & Calibration

GROUP III

MAA Barriers
MAA Entry/Exit Searches
MAA Emergency Exits
Access to SNM Storage Area
Search/Screening of Waste,
 Laundry & other materials
 leaving the MAA
Use & Control of Seals
 Doors
 SNM Containers
Surveillance within MAAs
Incoming/Outgoing Shipments
Movement of SNM between MAAs

Appendix B

- X d. Established controls for access to the Central Alarm Station were not always strictly adhered to. Both doors were open on two occasions as NRC team members and maintenance personnel went in and out. Recommendation: Require strict compliance with the established procedure, without respect to the status of personnel desiring to enter.

- X e. Security communications and alarm equipment were not always inspected by a technically knowledgeable individual following installation of worn parts or "out of sight" maintenance. Recommendation: That following any such maintenance or installation of new parts on security communications or alarm equipment, the affected equipment /system be inspected by the Electrical Specialist Maintenance Engineer, in addition to the required check by a member of the security organization.

- X f. The Log Book and Type "E" fingerprint seals for the vault door were maintained in the same container, controlled by the same person, in the Shipping & Receiving Warehouse. The same was found to be true with the logbook for the Type "E" and paper seals for SNM containers (maintained in file drawer, Room 221, Pu Facility). Recommendation: Separate the seals from the log books, as discussed.

Odell Smith
 Plant Security
 Licensing Branch
 NMSS, NRC