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NOV 8 1978

Memo to security file -
Trip Report - October 17-19, 1976

EXXON NUCLEAR COMPANY, DOCKET NO. 70-1257,
NRC RE-ASSESSMENT VISIT

Scope of Assessment

An entrance briefing was conducted at 8:30 a.m. October 18, 1976.
Attendees were:

Exxon

L. Hansen, Security Specialist
L. Merker, Mgr., Aux. Systems
R. Collings, Chief Plant Security
D. Schnider, Sr. Safeguards Specialist

NRC

O. Smith, Licensing
B. Minilli, Licensing
E. Richard, Licensing
C. South, Test and Evaluation
W. Martin, IE:I (Representing IE:HQ)
M. Schuster, IE:V
O. Shackleton, IE:V

The re-assessment scope was described by Smith:

1. Threats to be considered include 3 dedicated, militarily trained outsiders armed with legal weapons with or without the help of one insider, and one insider working alone to systematically remove a strategic quantity of SNM over a period of time.
2. Scope of visit included the overall security program. See Appendix A for detailed scope.

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3. Findings, if contrary to current requirements will not, as a result of this visit, be identified as items of noncompliance.

Findings of Assessment Team

An exit briefing was held at 1:30 p.m., October 19, 1976. Attendees were:

Exxon

L. Hansen, Security Specialist
L. Merker, Manager, Aux. Ops.
R. Collings, Chief, Plant Security
B. Berst, Acting Manager, Mixed Oxide

NRC

Same as for entrance briefing.

Appendix B sets forth the findings of the assessment team, a copy of which was given to the licensee.

Judgement

It was the considered opinion of the team, that Exxon could meet the design threat.

Original signed by
M. D. Schuster

O. Shackleton

M. Schuster

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APPENDIX A

GROUP I

Security Organization

Guard Force

Size

Equipment

Training

Orders

Patrols

On/Off-Site Response

Clearances

Use of Force

LLEA Agreement

Perimeter Barriers

Illumination

Guard Force Turnover

Evacuation Procedures

PA Searches

Vehicles

Personnel

Articles

GROUP II

Operation of PCAS & SAS

Hardening

Visibility

Control of Access

On/Off-Site Communications

Alarm Systems & Devices

Testing & Records

Motion Alarms & Tests

Local Alarms

Criticality Alarms

Duress Alarms

Search Devices

Testing & Calibration

GROUP III

MAA Barriers

MAA Entry/Exit Searches

MAA Emergency Exits

Access to SNM Storage Area

Search/Screening of Waste,

Laundry & other materials

leaving the MAA

Use & Control of Seals

Doors

SNM Containers

Surveillance within MAAs

Incoming/Outgoing Shipments

Movement of SNM between MAAs

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX B

NRC Assessment Team Visit

October 18, 1976

Following is an outline of findings, recommendations and comments of an NRC Assessment Team Visit to the Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. on October 18 and 19, 1976.

Findings are categorized in the following manner, as appropriate:

- * License Condition
- + Proposed License Condition
- X Management Attention Item

General Comment: The team concluded that the facility (Exxon Nuclear Company) is capable of withstanding both the external (overt theft) and internal (covert diversion) threats, as defined by the NRC Team Chief during the entrance briefing.

Specific Findings:

- * a. The intrusion alarm signal transmitted by radio to an off-site monitored location (Centrifuge Test Facility - CTF) was not significantly distinct to unquestionably alert the person monitoring the system, and clearly distinguish an alarm from some other radio signal. Recommendation: Expedite procurement and installation of equipment that will render a distinct alarm signal. Meanwhile, require strict adherence to the policy to conduct communication checks every 15 minutes.
 - + b. Clarification is required on the use of force issue, as contained in guard instructions, as understood by security supervisors and as required by the generic license condition on this subject (and pending NRC rule change). Recommendation: Discuss any misunderstandings with the NRC Licensing Staff and align guard instructions with the agreed upon license condition.
 - + c. The Secondary Alarm Station is only marginally effective in that if it is not manned by a dedicated, Company employee and does not receive or monitor all alarms received in the Primary Central Alarm Station. Recommendation: That the minimum essential communications and alarm equipment be installed within an onsite location or within the CTF to perform the minimum functions of the Secondary Alarm Station, as discussed.
- [REDACTED]

Appendix B

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- X d. Established controls for access to the Central Alarm Station were not always strictly adhered to. Both doors were open on two occasions as NRC team members and maintenance personnel went in and out. Recommendation: Require strict compliance with the established procedure, without respect to the status of personnel desiring to enter.
- X e. Security communications and alarm equipment were not always inspected by a technically knowledgeable individual following installation of worn parts or "out of sight" maintenance. Recommendation: That following any such maintenance or installation of new parts on security communications or alarm equipment, the affected equipment /system be inspected by the Electrical Specialist Maintenance Engineer, in addition to the required check by a member of the security organization.
- X f. The Log Book and Type "E" fingerprint seals for the vault door were maintained in the same container, controlled by the same person, in the Shipping & Receiving Warehouse. The same was found to be true with the logbook for the Type "E" and paper seals for SNM containers (maintained in file drawer, Room 221, Pu Facility). Recommendation: Separate the seals from the log books, as discussed.

Odell Smith
Plant Security
Licensing Branch
NMSS, NRC