In Reply Refer To: Docket: 50-458

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Gulf States Utilities ATTN: Mr. James C. Deddens Senior Vice President, (RBNG) Nuclear Licensing P. O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Gentlemen:

Attached is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region VI exercise evaluation report dated August 14, 1987, pertaining to the River Bend Nuclear Generating Station exercise, and remedial drill, held on February 25, 1987 and March 25, 1987, respectively.

RABIA

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The report indicates FEMA observed deficiencies or areas recommended for corrective action.

If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Nemen M. Terc (817) 860-8129.

Sincerely,

J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch

Attachment: As stated

Gulf States Utilities ATTN: J. E. Booker, Manager-River Bend Oversight P. O. Box 2951 Beaumont, Texas 77704

Louisiana State University, Government Documents Department

Louisiana Radiation Control Program Director

NMEPB HAC' ap 9/15/87



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JEGagliardo

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Gulf States Utilities

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bcc to DMB (A045)

bcc distrib. by RIV w/report: Resident Inspector Section Chief, RPB/A NMTerc RIV File

bcc w/o report: RDMartin RLBangart WLFisher REHall RPB Project Inspector, RPB DRSP NMEPB MIS System GFSanborn DBMatthews, NRR



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

AUG 1 4 987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Congel Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations

FROM:

Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards

SUBJECT:

Final Exercise Report for the February 25, 1987, Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the River Bend Nuclear Generating Station and the Remedial Drill conducted March 25, 1987

Attached is a copy of the final exercise report for the February 25, 1987, exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the River Bend Nuclear Generating Station; and the remedial drill conducted on March 25, 1987. This final exercise report was prepared by the Region VI office staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The one deficiency identified as a result of this exercise was the unsuccessful activation of the siren system. However, the East Feliciana Parish officials promptly addressed and resolved this deficiency during a remedial drill conducted on March 25, 1987. Because of their promptness in responding to this deficiency, the report on the remedial drill is also included.

Therefore, based on the results of the exercise and the remedial drill, the offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness remain adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at the River Bend Nuclear Generating Station, and the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on September 25, 1985, remains in effect.

If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Field Operations Branch, at 646-3026.

10.

Attachments

8709010320



# RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT

Nuclear Power Plant: River Bend Nuclear Generating Station Applicant: Gulf States Utilities

> Location of Plant: State of Louisiana West Feliciana Parish St. Francisville, Louisiana

> > Date of Report: June 1, 1987

Date of Exercise: February 25, 1987

Date of Remedial Drill: March 25, 1987

Participants: State of Louisiana (Partial) Full Participation: West Feliciana Parish East Feliciana Parish Pointe Coupee Parish West Baton Rouge Parish East Baton Rouge Parish West Feliciana Hospital and Ambulance Service

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region VI 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201

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78pp.

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# ABBREVIATIONS

ANL	-	Argonne National Laboratory
ARD	-	American Red Cross
DOE		Department of Energy
DOT		Department of Transportation
EBS	-	Emergency Broadcast System
EOC	8	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	-	Emergency Operations Facility
EPA	-	Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ	-	Emergency Planning Zone
ERF	-	Emergency Response Facility
FEMA	-	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GSU	-	Gulf States Utilities
HHS		Health and Human Services
JIC	-	Joint Information Center
KI		Potassium Iodide
LNED		Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division
LOCA	-	Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LOEP		Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness
mR/h		Millirems per hour
NRC	-	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PAG		Protective Action Guide
PAR	-	Protective Action Recommendation
PAS	-	Protective Action Section
PIO	-	Public Information Officer
RAC		Regional Assistance Committee
RADEF	-	Radiological Defense
RBS	-	River Bend Station
RCS		Reactor Coolant System
RDO	-	Radiological Defense Office
REP	-	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
SOP	-	Standard Operating Procedure

• • •

SOP - Standard Operating Procedure USDA - United States Department of Agriculture

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### INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY

On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility for all off-site nuclear power facility planning and response.

FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Response Planning include:

- Taking the lead in off-site emergency response planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans ensuring that the plans meet the Federal criteria set forth in NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980).
- Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdictions.
- Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved Federal agencies. Representatives of these agencies listed below serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
  - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
  - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
  - U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
  - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
  - U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
  - U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

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#### **1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND**

The third radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the River Bend Station (RBS) was conducted on February 25, 1987. The State of Louisiana participated only partially to support the Parish governments in their full-participation activities. The initial qualifying radiological emergency preparedness exercise was conducted January 16, 1985, and was participated in by all agencies on a full-participation basis. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluated the off-site radiological emergency response capabilities in both of these exercises.

On February 26, 1987, two meetings were held — a morning meeting with the 15 member evaluation team to conduct a preliminary evaluation; and an afternoon meeting with Federal, State, local and utility participants to present preliminary findings. A critique for the general public was also held on February 26, 1987, at the Town Hall in St. Francisville, Louisiana.

Section 2 of this document provides narratives, Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action, and Areas Recommended for Improvement for each of the jurisdictions and field activities tested in the exercise. Section 3 provides a summary listing of Deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and Areas Requiring Corrective Action, including those needing priority attention. This summary is in tabular form t and provides space for State and local jurisdiction responses and schedule for corrective actions. There was one Deficiency and 10 Areas Requiring Corrective action found during the evaluation of this exercise.

On March 25, 1987 a Remedial Drill was held at the River Bend Emergency Operating Facility and the East Feliciana Parish EOC to demonstrate that the deficiency found in the February 25, 1987 exercise had been corrected. The Remedial Drill was a success and the deficiency relating to activation of the siren alerting system was resolved.

Section 4 compiles in tabular format, all FEMA Objectives met or Yet To Be Achieved, developed from NUREG-0654, as well as a summary sheet of those FEMA objectives which have not been satisfactorily met or tested to date.

The findings presented in the report were reviewed by the RAC Chairman of FEMA Region VI. FEMA suggests that State and Local jurisdictions take remedial actions in response to each of the problems indicated in the report and that the State submit a schedule for addressing those problems. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that such Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.

The following provides a brief overview of the exercise performances of the State of Louisiana and the Parish Governments. More explanatory discussions of performances by individual agencies are provided under the appropriate location in Section 2

#### 1.1 EXERCISE SUMMARY

#### State of Louisiana Operations

Activation and staffing of the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center was partial, with staff sufficient to support other organizations participating in the exercise. The LOEP executive room was staffed by the Assistant Secretary of OAQNE, and three other LOEP staffers. The LSEOC was staffed by the Director of Disaster Operations and Local Program Support, who acted as Director of the EOC, and by nine other individuals. These staffers did an excellent job in all activities tested except for recovery and reentry. They also demonstrated solid capabilities in areas that were not evaluated in this exercise, demonstrating their capability for dealing with a radiological emergency. No deficiencies needed to be corrected in this exercise, and none were observed in this exercise. Although two Areas Requiring Corrective Action were found as a result of the exercise, they are readily remediable and do not imply that the public would not be protected in a real emergency.

Five of the six objectives to be evaluated in this exercise were demonstrated. The undemonstrated objective related to recovery and reentry. The objectives met included two communications objectives, two public alerting and instruction objectives, and one operations management objective.

Requirements for corrections were made in order to assure that the timing of the sirens and the EBS broadcasts met Federal guidelines and to assure that both AM and FM EBS broadcasts are monitored by the State. The first EBS message preceded the sirens by a few minutes, when it should have started during or immediately after the siren's sounding. This mistake was immediately recognized by the LSEOC chief and was corrected in later broadcast simulations. The AM broadcast of EBS messages was monitored, but the communications room did not have a radio to monitor the FM EBS broadcast. With these and a few other minor exceptions noted in Sec. 2 of the report, the communications, public alerting, and EOC operations were carried out very effectively and professionally by all LOEP and LNED staff participating in the exercise.

### Local Government Operations

The five Parishes which have portions of their boundaries within the 10-mile Plume Exposure EPZ of River Bend Station participated in the exercise on a fullparticipation basis. Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans exist for each Parish, and elected officials, emergency staff and volunteer personnel participated in the exercise.

All participating Parishes demonstrated active interest, concern and enthusiasm toward their involvement in the emergency response efforts. In fact, the Parishes were prepared and staffed to respond to a far greater degree than was actually provided for them by scenario situations and other activities.

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As will be described in the individual activity site reports in Section 2 of this report, there was one Deficiency noted by the Federal Evaluators and several Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for Improvement were also noted. A Remedial Drill on the one Deficiency was held March 25, 1987 and the deficiency was resolved (see Section 2.2.2.1.1).

# 1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS

\*

Fifteen Federal evaluators participated in evaluating the February 25, 1987, exercise. These individuals, their agencies and their evaluation assignments are listed below:

Evaluator	Agency	Evaluation Location
Gary Jones	FEMA	Overall Coordinator, W. Feliciana Parish EOC
Dan Santini	ANL	State EOC (LOEP/LNED) (Baton Rouge)
Gene Nunn	FEMA	W. Feliciana Parish EOC (St. Francisville)
Leland Peyton	FEMA	Pointe Coupee Parish EOC (New Roads)
Carl McCoy	FEMA	Pointe Coupee Parish EOC (New Roads)
Travis Ratcliff	FEMA	W. Baton Rouge Parish EOC (Port Allen)
Les Poch	ANL	W. Baton Rouge Parish EOC (Port Allen) Port Allen Fire Station Decon. Center
Dana Cessna	FEMA	E. Feliciana Parish EOC (Jackson)
Bill Gasper	ANL	E. Feliciana Parish EOC (Jackson)
Gary Kaszynski	ANL	E. Baton Rouge Parish EOC (Baton Rouge)
Jim Cox	DOT	E. Baton Rouge Parish EOC (Baton Rouge) Zachary High School Decon Center (Zachary)
Phil Edgington	HHS	W. Feliciana Hospital (St. Francisville) Jackson High School Decon Center (Jackson)
Harry Harrison	FEMA	W. Feliciana Hospital (St. Francisville) Scott Civic Center Decon Center (New Roads)
Leon Zellner	FDA	Centroplex Reception/Care Center (Baton Rouge)
Tom Goertz	FDA	Centroplex Reception/Care Center (Baton Rouge)

The State of Louisiana also stationed one or more evaluators/controllers at each of the exercise sites who participated in site critiques and evaluations.

#### **1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES**

#### 1.3.1 GSU Exercise Objectives

The River Bend Station (RBS) emergency planning evaluated exercise objectives are based on Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements provided in 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities. Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter 82-33) was utilized in developing the objectives.

- A. As a result of coordination between GSU, the State of Louisiana, the Parishes of East and West Feliciana, East and West Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the following objectives were developed for the GSU evaluated exercise: (State and Parish objectives are discussed in Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3.)
  - Demonstrate emergency response integrated capabilities by activating the emergency organization and staffing the RBS Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), including the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and the Joint Information Center and by implementing access control to these facilities.
  - Demonstrate the adequacy of ERFs (except Joint Information Center) and their personnel, documents, and equipment to support, direct, and control emergency operations.
  - Demonstrate the reliability and effective use of on-site and off-site emergency communications equipment and procedures.
  - 4. Demonstrate the ability of appropriate individuals to direct the required emergency organizations and maintain continuity in the implementation of the emergency plan using the emergency implementing procedures.
  - 5. Demonstrate the ability of the emergency organization to .assess the initiating conditions for determining which

emergency action level has been reached and properly classifying the accident.

- 6. Demonstrate the ability to perform dose calculations utilizing radiological and meteorological information to determine the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment and make appropriate recommendations for off-site protective actions utilizing all relevant factors. No protective action recommendation or protective actions beyond 10 miles will be demonstrated.
- Demonstrate the ability of off-site field monitoring teams to use emergency equipment in performing radiological surveys and report results and the effective sharing of field team data among emergency response organizations.
- Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining on-site radiation levels.
- 9. Demonstrate decision-making for appropriate on-site protective actions.
- Demonstrate adequate facilities, equipment, and procedures for decontamination of on-site emergency workers and equipment, as required.
- Demonstrate the ability of the RBS emergency organization to provide the Joint Information Center with accurate and timely information so reports may be made to the news media.
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control exposures to GSU personnel within the Plant.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability to perform search and rescue, as required.
- 14. Demonstrate the ability to plan recovery operations and identify the need for additional resources as required.
- Demonstration of shift relief capabilities will be limited to a display of personnel assignment schedules.
- Demonstrate response to a medical emergency on-site and secondary off-site medical support personnel and agencies.
- 17. Demonstrate decision making and coordination with off-site agencies in terminating the emergency.

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- Demonstrate that a limited number of designated evacuees can be monitored for contamination at an Assembly Area.
- B. Areas of the RBS Emergency Response Plan which <u>WILL NOT</u> be demonstrated during this evaluated exercise:
  - Actual shift turnover in each ERF will not be demonstrated for long-term staffing. Long-term shift assignments will be demonstrated.
  - ERF evacuation and activation and operation of the Alternate Emergency Operations Facility.
  - 3. Relocation of the Joint Information Center.
  - 4. Off-hours augmentation of the ERFs.
  - Back-up communications and utilization will not be demonstrated.
  - 6. Off-site fire support agency.

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7. Post Accident Sampling System will not be demonstrated.

# 1.3.2 State of Louisiana Exercise Objectives (partial participation)

- 5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel (State EOC and LNED).
- 13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes (State EOC and LNED).
- 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion (State EOC and LNED).

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- 34 Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry (State EOC and LNED).
- 36 Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency.
- 37 Demonstrate ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner (State EOC and LNED).

NOTE: ARCA #1 from 2-26-86 exercise (State EOC, Objective 38) was cleared during Waterford-3 exercise 10-15-86; therefore, Objective 38 was not evaluated during this exercise.

## 1.3.3 Parish Exercise Objectives

West Feliciana Parish (Full Participation)

- 1 Demonstrate solity to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
- 3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
- 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities, equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations.
- 5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- 13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
- 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
- 15 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the Plume EPZ.
- 19 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the Plume EPZ.
- 20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
- 23 Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of on-site personnel.
- 29 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles. NOTE: This demonstration limited to availability and adequacy of procedures, since the emergency plan specifies that emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles are dispatched to East Feliciana Parish for decontamination.

- 30 Demonstrate adequacy of EMS transportation, personnel, and procedures for handling contaminated individuals including proper decontamination of vehicle and equipment.
- 31 Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
- 34 Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
- 36 Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.
- 37 Demonstrate ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.
- 38 Demonstrate capability to effectively process all incoming/ outgoing messages in a timely manner, including the documenting of both actual and simulated messages.
- 39 Demonstrate that authority exists in coordinating and activating a reception center (as necessary) in a timely manner. NOTE: West Feliciana Parish performs a coordinating function only, since the emergency plan does not specify that a reception center be operated anywhere in the Parish.

#### Pointe Coupee Parish (Full Participation)

- Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
- 3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. NOTE: This will clear ARCA #2 from the 2-28-86 exercise.
- 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities, equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations.
- 5 Denonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate location, organizations, and field personnel.
- 13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
- 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

- 15 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the Plume EPZ.
- 16 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
- 17 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
- 19 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the Plume EPZ.
- 20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
- 29 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.
- 34 Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
- 36 Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.
- 37 Demonstrate ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.
- 38 Demonstrate capability to effectively process all incoming/ outgoing messages in a timely manner, including the documentation of both actual and simulated messages. NOTE: This will clear ARCA #3 from the 2-26-86 exercise.
- 39 Demonstrate that authority exists in coordinating and activating a reception center (as necessary) in a timely manner. NOTE: Pointe Coupee Parish performs a coordinating function only, no reception center in the Parish.

#### West Baton Rouge Parish (Full Participation)

- 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. NOTE: This will clear ARCA #4 from the 2-26-86 exercise.
- 3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

- 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities, equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations.
- 5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- 13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
- 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
- 15 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the Plume EPZ.
- 17 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
- 20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
- 29 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.
- 34 Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
- 36 Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.
- 37 Demonstrate ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.
- 38 Demonstrate capability to effectively process all incoming/ outgoing messages in a timely manner, including the documenting of both actual and simulated messages.
- 39 Demonstrated that authority exists in coordinating and activating a reception center (as necessary) in a timely manner. NOTE: West Baton Rouge Parish performs a coordinating function only, since the emergency plan does not specify that a reception center be operated anywhere in the Parish.

#### East Feliciana Parish (Full Participation)

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- 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
- 3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
- 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities, equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations
- 5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- 13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
- 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
- 15 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the Plume EPZ.
- 20 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.
- 34 Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
- 36 Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.
- 37 Demonstrate ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.
- 56 Demonstrate capability to effectively process all incoming/ outgoing messages in a timely manner, including the documenting of both actual and simulated messages.
- 39 Demonstrate that authority exists in coordinating and activating a reception center (as necessary) in a timely manner. NOTE: East Feliciana Parish performs a coordinating function only, since the emergency plan does not specify that a reception center be operated anywhere in the Parish.

East Baton Rouge Parish (Full Participation)

- 1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
- 3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
- 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities, equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations.
- 5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. NOTE: This will clear ARCA #5 from the 2-26-86 exercise.
- 13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
- 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
- 15 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the Plume EPZ.
- 17 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
- 19 Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the Plume EPZ.
- 20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. NOTE: This will clear ARCA #7 from the 2-26-86 exercise (reception center monitoring personnel).
- 27 Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees. NOTE: This will clear ARCA #6 from the 2-26-86 exercise.
- 29 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emorgency workers, equipment, and vehicles.
- 34 Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
- 36 Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods. NOTE: This will clear ARCA #5 from the 2-26-86 exercise; see also Objective 5 above.

- 37 Demonstrate ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.
- 38 Demonstrate capability to effectively process all incoming/ outgoing messages in a timely manner, including the documenting of both actual and simulated messages.
- 39 Demonstrate that authority exists in coordinating and activating a reception center (as necessary) in a timely manner.

## 1.4 EXERCISE GUIDELINES AND PARTICIPANT INFORMATION

This Evaluated Exercise is the annual emergency preparedness evaluated exercise to demonstrate the readiness of the plant to respond to an abnormal plant situation. The following information should be understood by the participants prior to beginning the evaluated exercise.

- 1. It should be understood that the circumstances simulated for this evaluated exercise are unrealistic in certain aspects, which should not be construed as flaws in the scenario. Moreover, it is the reliable design and construction of nuclear power facilities that require unrealistic assumptions to be made in order to generate a problem that can affect the public. Thus, in order to achieve a sequence of events that will lead to a significant off-site radiological problem, the evaluated exercise scenario must contain an incredible plant situation, an unlikely series of equipment failures, or an improbable series of events combined with equipment failure.
- 2. The purpose of the evaluated exercise is to demonstrate actual integrated emergency response capabilities, including the use of emergency facilities and equipment. Personnel knowledge of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures is the primary aspect of evaluation. Demonstration of detailed knowledge of plant systems and equipment is of secondary importance for the exercise, since the plant conditions are simulated. For a real emergency this would not be the case. Although personnel knowledge of the plant is <u>not</u> being tested, the system evaluations and investigations should not be eliminated from discussions during the evaluated exercise since this adds to the realism of the response.
- 3. All emergency communications that relate to the evaluated exercise shall be identified as part of the exercise. Verbal communications should be initiated and closed by the statement, This is a drill.

- NOTE: Care should be taken to assure that individuals who may overhear or see evaluated exercise activities are not misled to believing that an actual emergency exists.
- 4. Manipulation of any plant operating system, valves, breakers or controls in response to this evaluated exercise are only to be simulated. There are to be no alterations of any plant operating equipment, systems or circuits during the response to this evaluated exercise. However, all actions should be performed unless stopped by a controller.
- 5. Any motor vehicle response to this evaluated exercise, whether it be ambulance, fire fighting equipment, police/security vehicles or field monitoring teams, should observe all normal motor vehicle operating laws, including posted speed limits, stop lights/signs, one way streets, etc.
- 6. Should any on-site security actions be required in response to this evaluated exercise, evaluated exercise participants are to cooperate as directed, and security representatives are to be prudent and tolerant in their actions.
- 7. Participants shall inject as much realism into the evaluated exercise as is compatible with the safe performance of such evaluated exercise, using caution to neither under-react nor overreact since media attention and public protection are both key aspects of this evaluated exercise.

To meet the evaluated exercise objectives, the following evaluated exercise guidelines have been developed:

- 1. The evaluated exercise is designed to be a free-play exercise. Prewritten or command messages are inserted by the evaluated exercise controller at given times to cause or influence particular emergency actions or responses. All other evaluated exercise actions are determined by participants' response to the simulated emergency conditions.
- Participants will respond to scenario conditions and take appropriate actions to protect workers and the general public. Mitigation or degradation of scenario conditions will not be allowed in the interest of controlling licensee, State and local involvement in the exercise.
- 3. The evaluated exercise will be conducted as scheduled in Section 4.D of the utility exercise plan.

- 4. The evaluated exercise will commence with a postulated plant condition necessitating the declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event with plant conditions deteriorating to the extent that a General Emergency will be declared.
- 5. The postulated accident conditions will result in a simulated radiological release which necessitates the consideration of protective actions for the general public.
- 6. Evaluated exercise participants will perform, as appropriate, mobilization of the emergency response organization, radiological monitoring and dose assessment, accident assessment, notifications to off-site agencies, protective action recommendations for emergency workers and the general public, and dissemination of simulated emergency information to the news media.
- 7. Actual plant emergency conditions will take precedence over scenario conditions. If this becomes necessary, the Lead Controller in the facility will be notified immediately.
- 8. Only the Plant Manager, Recovery Manager, or Lead Exercise Controller will have the authority to terminate the exercise.

### 1.4.1 Guidelines for Off-Site Participation

This exercise will include the full participation of all five risk parishes, but only partial participation of State agencies. The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) will demonstrate communications and decision-making capabilities. The State EOC will be activated only to the extent that these functions are exercised. Other State response organizations will not be activated at the State EOC. A State decision-making group composed of LNED and LOEP executives will be convened in the State EOC to coordinate and assist with simulated implementation of protective action recommendations should they be required. LNED will activate its headquarters to demonstrate communications capability only. An emergency response team will be dispatched from LNED headquarters to the licensee EOF to demonstrate accident assessment and protective action recommendations. LNED field monitoring teams will not participate in this exercise; all LNED field team activities will be simulated. (However, the licensee will operate offsite field teams.) Although not an evaluated objective, the State will demonstrate its media operations at the licensee's Joint Information Center. Capability for alert/notification of the public, institutions, and industries within the plume exposure pathway EPZ will be demonstrated consistent with the scenario, but sirens will not be sounded.

East and West Baton Bouge, East and West Feliciana, and Point Coupee Parishes will fully participate in the exercise (see separate list of objectives). This will include demonstration of the direction and control, decision-making, and communications functions. Their respective EOCs will be activated to the extent that these functions are exercised. The executive groups for each Parish will be convened for purposes of decision-making and the simulated implementation of protective actions should they be required. Personnel will not be deployed into the field for the implementation of protective actions. The Parishes will demonstrate media operations at the licensee's Joint Information Center. All of the risk Parishes, except West Feliciana, will activate and operate monitoring and decontamination stations for emergency workers, and East Baton Rouge will also activate a reception center for evacuees. (The other four Parishes are not required to operate reception centers.)

The capability for demonstrating the use of the alert/notification methods for the public, institutions and industries will be made consistent with the scenario. However, actual activation of the components of this system will not be demonstrated. The Sheriff and fire responders will participate to the extent that they engage in exercise-related communications and the operation of monitoring/decontamination stations. Transportation resources or other resources outside of the risk Parishes will not be activated, although they may be notified as part of exercise-related communications. Special facilities, including schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and jails will participate only to the extent that they will be included in exercise-related communications which effect those specific institutions.

Demonstration of EMS and hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated injured personnel will be performed by the West Feliciana Hospital and ambulance staff. (The victim will be an on-site Gulf States Utilities employee.)

#### 1.5 SCENARIO SUMMARY

Significant conditions postulated to exist at the onset of the 1987 RBS Emergency Preparedness Exercise include the following: RBS is operating at 100% power, near the end of core life (EOL). Reactor Coolant System Dose Equivalent Iodine 131 (DEI) activity is higher than normal: 0.15 µCl/gram, and has been slowly increasing over the past few weeks. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service (OOS) for replacement of a connecting rod bearing. (72 hr. LCO, since 2/24/87). The 1B Instrument Air compressor is OOS due to an unidentified electrical ground on the 13.8 KV circuit. RCS leakage is 0.5 gpm. The source has not been determined, but it is thought to be coming from a Recirc Pump Seal. Receipt inspections of new fuel are in progress, prior to the refueling outage which is scheduled to begin Friday, March 13, 1987.

Approximately 15 minutes after the exercise is initiated (0915), the Control Room will receive notification of a personnel injury at the Condensate/Demineralizer sample panel 72. When the First Aid Team arrives at the scene, they determine that the injury is severe enough to require off-site medical assistance, and that the victim is contaminated. Upon receipt of this information, the Shift Supervisor will notify West Feliciana Parish Hospital, declare an Notification of Unusual Event (per EIP-2-001, p. 15, NUE #17), implement EP-2-002, and initiate appropriate notifications. By approximately 1000 (01/00), the victim should be in the ambulance, enroute to the hospital.

Half an hour later (01/30), the Control Room will receive an alarm indicating a high level in DFR tank 5C. A check of the Plant Computer will identify the source of the leak as the steam tunnel. (A feed water leak inside the tunnel area is draining to the tank). Operators may perform additional inspections to attempt to better define the source.

At 1100 (02/00), the feedwater line will rupture upstream of isolation valve B21\*F065B. The reactor will scram on low water level, but an ATWS occurs: control rods do not insert. All expected isolations occur on high steam tunnel temperature (MSIVs, RCIC) and the turbine trips. The Standby Gas Treatment System starts, and HPCS starts and injects normally. If the operators attempt to bypass the RCIC isolation, the RCIC turbine will start and inject normally, but will trip shortly thereafter when a malfunctioning lube oil cooler isolation valve fails to open, and a bearing overheats. The Shift Supervisor/Emergency Director should declare an ALERT, based on the ATWS (EIP-2-001, p. 1%, ALERT #8), implement EIP-2-003, activate the TSC and OSC and initiate appropriate notifications.

Approximately 10 minutes after the ATWS, operators will be successful in scramming the reactor by manually opening the RPS breakers. The HPCS pump trips at about 1120 (02/20) due to electrical problems in the control circuity for the breaker. With RCIC and feedwater both unavailable, there is now no high pressure core cooling available. The reactor will heat up, and pressure increases. The SRVs are electrically inoperable, and do not respond to attempts to utilize ADS but do cycle as pressure reaches the safety setpoints. For the next hour, the SRVs cycle to relieve pressure resulting in a loss of coolant inventory, until at approximately 1215 (03/15), reactor water level reaches level 1 (-144"). Since pressure in the drywell has increased (due to the small RCS leak and the isolation of drywell cooling), the Emergency Director will declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (EIP-2-001, p. 23, SAE \$1), implement EIP-2-004, activate the EOF and JIC, and initiate appropriate notifications.

During the next hour, reactor water level will continue to decrease as the SRVs cycle and level eventually (approx. 1315) decreases below the top of active fuel (TAF) (-162-), resulting in additional cladding damage and the release of gap activity. (Approx. 15%). Troubleshooting and repair activities on the HPCS breaker will continue until approximately 1315 (04/15) when these efforts are successful in restoring the pump to service.

The HPCS pump will be started at approximately 1325 (04/25), and a rupture will occur immediately in the discharge line (at orifice R0-0002 on the 95' level). Isolation valve MOV-FOO4 fails to close completely, and check valve AOV-F005 does not reseat. These two valve failures open a release path by venting the reactor vessel to the Aux. Bldg., and then to the environment by way of the Standby Gas Treatment System. The Emergency Director will declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY based on the loss of all three fission product barriers, implement EIP-2-005, initiate notifications, and make protective action recommendations to the parishes.

At the time of the release, the wind in out of the north at 4 mph. The automatic recommendation at the time of the General Emergency will be to shelter within a 2-mile radius and 5 miles downwind (sectors H, J, K). This corresponds to Protective Action Sections (PAS) 1, 4, 9 and 16. This recommendation will remain in place until 1400, when the peak release occurs. At that time, the recommendation will be updated to evacuate within a 5-mile radius and 10 miles downwind, and to shelter the remaining, 10-mile radius. This corresponds to evacuation of PAS 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17 and shelter of PAS 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18. It is assumed that the default release duration of 8 hours will be used for the early projections.

By approximately 1400 (05/00) reactor pressure will have decreased below LPCS shutoff head, and the LPCS pump will begin to inject water and cool the core. When the reactor temperature less than 2120 (1430, 05/30), the release to the Aux. Bldg. will stop, and the remaining steam will be exhausted from the Aux. Bldg. by Standby Gas. As this occurs, radiation levels throughout the Aux. Bldg. will decrease until 1500 (06/00) when the last of the steam has been exhausted, and a team can be assembled and briefed to enter the area and shut MOV-FCO4.

Once the plume has exited the 10-mile EPZ (1530 06/30) and the team has shut MOV-FOO4, downgrading/termination discussions should begin, and reentry and recovery activities initiated.

The exercise will be terminated at approximately 1700 (08/00) by the Lead Exercise Controller when he has been informed that all objectives have been satisfactorily demonstrated.

# 1.5.1 Sequence of Events

Scenario Time	Actual Time	Summary
-00/15	0845	<ul> <li>Initial Conditions:</li> <li>100% power, EOL</li> <li>0.15 uCi/gram DEI</li> <li>1A EDG OOS</li> <li>1B Instrument Air Compressor OOS</li> <li>Aux. Boiler OOS-trouble shooting an electrical ground</li> <li>Receipt inspections of new fuel in progress</li> <li>RCS leakage: 0.5 gpm. Source thought to be Recirc. Pump seal</li> </ul>
00/15	0915	Contaminated injury - First Aid Team dispatched
00/20 (Approx.)	0920 (Approx.)	First Aid Team arrives at the scene
00/25 (Approx.)	0925 (Approx.)	First Aid Team requests ambulance victim determined to be contaminated. Shift Supervisor declares a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (EIP-2-001, p. 15, NUE \$17) and initiates appropriate notifications.
00/40 (Approx.)	0940 (Approx.)	Ambulance arrives on site.
01/00 (Approx.)	1000 (Approx.)	Ambulance departs with victim.
01/30	1030	Control Room receives alarm indication of increasing level in DFR tank 5C (a feedwater leak in the stream tunnel is draining to the tank). An operator should check the computer to identify the source of the leak.
02/00	1100	Feedwater rupture (at isolation valve B21*FD65B: common to all feed pumps), ATWS, turbine trip, MSIVs close due to high steam tunnel temperature as a result of the feed rupture. SGTS starts, HPCS starts and injects normally. Emergency Director declares an ALERT based on the ATWS (ELP-2-001, p. 18, ALERT #8).

# 1.5.1 Sequence of Events (Cont'd)

Scenario Time	Actual Time	Summary
02/10	1100	Operator scrams the reactor by manually opening the RPS breakers.
02/15	1120	HPCS trips.
02/15- 03/15	1130-1230 (Approx.)	SRVs cycle as pressure reaches their set- points, but ADS valves not electrically operable. Reactor water level decreases due to lack of high pressure make-up capability.
03/15	1215	Reactor water level reaches Level 1. Emergency Director declares a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (EIP-2-OU1, p. 23, SAE #1).
05/15 (Approx.)	1315 (Approx.)	Reactor water level reaches TAF.
04/15	1315	Repairs to HPCS completed.
04/25	1325	HPCS restored; discharge line immediately ruptures (Aux. Bldg. 95' level) at orifice R0-0002. MOV-FOO4 will not shut remotely. Reactor vessel vented to atmosphere by way of Aux. Bldg.
04/30	1330	SGTS monitors indicate significant radio- active release in progress. Emergency Director declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY (based on the loss of all three fission product barriers).
05/00	1400	Reactor pressure <lpcs begins="" head.="" inject.<="" lpcs="" off="" shut="" td="" to=""></lpcs>
05/30	1430	Reactor <2120. Release to Aux. Bldg. terminated. "B" loop of RHR in shutdown cooling.
06/00	1500	Remaining steam exhausted from Aux. Bldg. Radiation levels decrease. Repair team(s) assembled to shut F004 locally.
06/30	1530	Plume exits 10-mile EPZ; repair teams are successful in shutting MOV-FOC4. Downgrading termination discussions begin.
06/30-08/00	1530-1700	Reentry and recovery discussions.
08/00	1700	Terminate exercise.

#### **1.6 EVALUATION CRITERIA**

The River Bend exercise evaluations that follow in Sec. 2 of this report are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Sec. II of NUREG 0654-FEMA-1, Revision 1 (November 1980). Region VI evaluated the exercise utilizing the modular format. Federal evaluators were instructed to mark those sections of the report "not applicable" which did not correspond to the objectives for the exercise.

Following the narrative for each jurisdiction or off-site response activity, Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Actions and Areas Recommended for Improvement are presented with accompanying recommendations. Any identified Deficiencies would cause a finding that the off-site preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. At least one Deficiency in this category would necessitate a negative finding.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions include those activities where demonstrated performance during the exercise was evaluated and considered faulty; corrective actions are considered necessary, but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that in the event of a radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. This category should be relatively easy to correct in comparison to those classified as Deficiencies.

Areas Recommended for Improvement are also listed as appropriate for each jurisdiction or off-site activity.

### **2 EXERCISE EVALUATION**

On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP 1, Rev. 1 (November 1980), and exercise objectives and observations, an evaluation has been performed of the February 25, 1987 exercise at the River Bend Station. This evaluation, including Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for Improvement is presented herein. FEMA Region VI will maintain close liaison with the State and local governments in determining the required corrective actions (including timeframes for accomplishing the corrections) in accordance with established criteria and guidelines.

## 2.1 LOUISIANA STATE OPERATIONS

The following includes evaluations of the operations of the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) at the State EOC in Baton Rouge. LNED staff was also assigned to the River Bend EOF but evaluation was limited to observation of the products of their work as communicated to the State EOC. Since the State participated on a partial basis only, no field monitoring activities were conducted.

### 2.1.1 State EOC

Activation and staffing of the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center was not an objective for this exercise. Accordingly, staffing by LNED and LOEP personnel was partial, with staff sufficient to support other organizations participating in the exercise. The LOEP executive room was staffed by the Assistant Secretary of OAQNE, and three other LOEP staffers, one of which acted as the technical liaison between LNED and LOEP operations. The LSEOC was staffed by the Director of Disaster Operations and Local Program Support, who acted as Director of the EOC, by an Assistant EOC Director, a Resources Coordinator, two Radiological Officers, a representative of the Department of Highways, and two representatives of the Department of Agriculture. The utility sent two representatives to the LSEOC. The Communications Room was staffed by the Communications Director and three other In addition, two other LOEP staffers were used to keer a staff members. communications log and to run messages between locations in the EOC. The notification of the Alert ECL occurred from approximately 1117 through 1120. Notification for EOC staffers to standby was initiated using a calldown list at 1122. LOEP personnel in the building who were participating in the exercise were directed to staff the EOC operations room at 1134, and the EOC was officially activated. A PIO officer was dispatched to the JIC immediately after the EOC was opened by the Chief.

The LSEOC operations were very effectively managed, coordinated, and executed by all persons participating in the exercise. The LOEP and LNED staff participating all demonstrated excellent knowledge and capability, and performed their jobs well. The only weaknesses in the performance of individuals who manned the EOC involved the limited participation by other State agencies, and these were due in large part to the scenario constructed for the exercise. Periodic briefings were conducted. The plan and other necessary documents and displays were readily available and were used effectively.

The EOC facilities consist of a large operations room and separate areas for executive decision-making (the executive room) and communications. Telephones can be provided for each organization which would man the EOC during a full activation. Maps and status boards are well designed and were used effectively during the exercise. Although it was not required for the exercise, security was established after activation of the EOC, requiring that EOC staff sign in and out as they entered and departed the EOC.

With only minor exceptions, communications were very good. The RBS hotline to the utility, the Parishes, and Mississippi performed much better than in the previous exercise. Messages were understood and repetition was not required. In one case however, the hotline failed in its connection with East Baton Rouge Parish. During the second occasion that concurrence was to be achieved on PARs, East Baton Rouge was not on the hotline. The state immediately used commercial telephone to communicate with East Baton Rouge Parish on this occasion. The hotline had two outlets in the EOC, one in the communications room and one in the executive room. A separate dedicated hotline between the EOC communications room and the radio stations WFMF FM and WJBO AM (both of which are at the same location) used to transmit EBS messages had been set up. This communications link performed well. Multiple radio channels linking various governmental and emergency organizations are available at the EOC for use as backups during an exercise. These were not tested during this exercise. A dedicated FTS trunk line exists to FEMA Region VI office. Federal assistance was not requested and this line was not tested. Two telefax machines provided hard copy communications to and from the River Bend Station, the JIC, and the Parishes. These machines performed very well. The presence of two machines greatly reduces message delays resulting when separate messages are transmitted and/or received simultaneously. The Communications Director observed that one of the telefax machines at another location was relatively slow in transmitting messages, often taking as much as four minutes time. The EOC telefax machines were observed to transmit two pages of messages in a little over one minute's time. It is recommended that the location of the slow machine be determined and the machine be repaired.

Although the EBS message is to be broadcast over both WJBO AM and WFMF FM, the State EOC communications room did not have an FM radio to monitor FM EBS broadcasts. The AM broadcast was properly monitored by the State. One of the Parishes monitored the test broadcast on FM, so the EBS system was successfully demonstrated during the exercise.

With the exception of the short period of hotline failure to East Baton Rouge Parish, which was successfully resolved by using back-up communications, all of the tests of the communications equipment used at the LSEOC were successful. This demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations and organizations. In conjunction with the second set of PARs, the State responded to a request to alter the EBS message by using liquid paper on a prescripted message, blowing the liquid dry, and typing revisions in the same spot. It is suggested that a procedure using extra pages with inserts be considered. In the event that the revisions do not fit into the space left by prior deletions, the use of liquid paper would not suffice. It is suggested that deletions be denoted by striking the changed words, and the term "insert no. " be put into the spot, with the revisions listed on the extra page. This would allow immediate typing of the insert, avoiding the delay involved in waiting for liquid paper to dry. Alternatively, or additionally, it might also be desirable to double space the prescripted messages or add a wide margin to allow for readable short handwritten insertions in spaces between lines or in a margin.

Messages coming into and going out of the EOC were reproduced, distributed and logged and key operations staff maintained separate message and telephone logs. The State was consistently aware of the correct classification level, including the deescalation from Unusual Event to event termination. Appropriate discussion of the implications of conditions at each level also consistently occurred, and the State LNED and LOEP staff also showed a good ability to anticipate events. State agencies, with two exceptions, did not participate in the exercise. The message logs, status boards, discussions, and timely actions by the State at each Emergency Classification level demonstrated an ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.

Although recommendations for improvement have been made, the overall success of the communications function demonstrated the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.

The State EOC was actively involved in public alerting. At the Alert notification, the U.S. Coast Guard was placed on standby for halting Mississippi River traffic, and the FAA was placed on standby rerouting air traffic if necessary.

The only significant public alerting problems which were observed at the EOC during the exercise involved the initial sounding of the sirens and EBS message. A failure to instruct the radio station(s) to synchronize the initial sounding of the sirens with the transmission of the EBS message resulted in initiation of transmission of the EBS message at approximately 1413, followed by the announced 1417 time of sounding of the sirens. Procedurally, the proper timing should involve initiation of transmission of the EBS message at the same time as, or immediately following the siren activation. The sequence that did occur would not have been a danger to the public, since the EBS message would have been repeated continuously and would have been broadcast as the sirens sounded and thereafter. Nevertheless, it is recommended that the State modify its procedures and/or forms to assure that the proper sequence is followed in the future. One possibility is to keep all Parishes on the hotline until the radio station has received the EBS PAR message by telefax and has been instructed verbally on the separate hotline to await an order to broadcast the message. The Parishes could then be instructed to sound the sirens, followed by an order to the radio station to begin broadcasting. Since the radio station was confirmed as having received the copy of the EBS message at approximately 1407, such a procedure could have saved as much as 10 of the 42 minutes

that it took from utility declaration of the General Emergency at 1335 to the initial sounding of the sirens at 1417.

The EOC chief deserves credit for immediately noticing this timing mistake on the initial EBS message and for instructing the communications room Director to be sure to instruct the radio station regarding timing of later EBS message transmissions. The time was given verbally over the separate hotline to the radio station for the remaining simulated EBS broadcasts during the exercise. However, current procedures do not call for the time of requested broadcast to be noted on hard copies sent to the radio station. During evaluator reviews after the exercise, it became apparent that the time delay between transmission of the initial EBS message and the sounding of sirens by individual Parishes was not uniform. It is recommended that each Parish synchronize its clocks with one another and with that in the State EOC as soon as the EOCs are activated.

Since the EBS message timing problem discussed above would not have endangered the public and was quickly caught and corrected, the LSEOC successfully demonstrated its ability to execute the prescribed steps assigned to the ISEOC to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and to disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes after concurrence on the recommended PARs was achieved, that events having occurred at 1405.

Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the plume pathway hazards were developed jointly at the EOF by the Utility and LNED, and then were evaluated at the State EOC and the Parishes. The State EOC and the Parishes then used the RBS hotline for coordination and development of concurrence on PARs. The State EOC chief anticipated the initial prescripted EBS message by observing the meteorological conditions, and discussing probable release conditions with experts present in the EOC. She had the Emergency Resources Data Book opened to the correct prescripted message before the message was issued. This initial EBS message was sent to the radio station in about two minutes after concurrence was achieved, and the radio announcer read the message back to the observer over the separate hotline. By its actions in rapidly selecting, modifying, sending, and confirming EBS messages, the LSEOC demonstrated the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

The time from the first utility declaration of General Emergency at 1335 to sounding of the sirens at 1417 was 42 minutes, 19 of which were involved in discussions among the EOF recovery manager, the LNED, the LOEP, and the Parishes. These discussions are procedurally necessary to reach concurrence. The time from the utility recommendation for revised PARs at 1415 until the second sounding of the sirens at 1511 was 56 minutes, 28 of which were involved in the process required to achieve concurrence. In the second case, a delay was caused by the need to alter the prescripted EBS message, by the hotline failure mentioned previously, and by an apparent lengthy discussion of the PARS. The delays involved in reaching concurrence account for the biggest share of the time in getting PAR instructions to the public.

The time needed to develop concurrence is a result of the legal relationships and level of responsibility for protecting the public which exists among the State LOEP, LNED, and the Parishes. Given these relationships, it is difficult to imagine a better procedure for approving PARs and it is impossible and unproductive to assign responsibility for delays to any one level of government or agency of government. It is, however, possible that the existing procedure could operate more quickly, and the protection of the public be better assured, if the organizations involved would hold drills on rapidly implementing the procedure for reaching concurrence.

There were no radiological exposure control objectives in this exercise. The State EOC has the responsibility of arranging for provision of back-up equipment and personnel to the Parishes if requested, but none were requested by the Parishes in this exercise.

Although media coordination was not an objective of the exercise, press releases were issued through the JIC and were documented in the JIC's joint chronologies. GSU announcements originating at the JIC were received in the LSEOC to coordinate the information which was reaching the public. A rumor control problem involving a rumor that a ferry was shut down by its operator during evacuation was introduced into the exercise. The rumor was eventually determined to be false.

Although the exercise was intended to demonstrate the ability to determine and implement recovery and reentry capabilities, the State was not able to accomplish this objective for two reasons, only one of which it had control over. In order to demonstrate this objective it would have been necessary to show by discussion and simulated action, along with a written record of simulated actions, that key State agencies were able to perform their function at the EOC. The LOEP made the effort to enlist the participation of the two key agencies, the Highway Department and the Department of Agriculture. The Emergency Services Coordinator for the Department of Highways did not attend the exercise, and the single member of the Department to staff the Department of Highways position at the EOC had no training or prior experience. The Emergency Services Coordinator or the Department of Agriculture was present for an hour and a half, along with an assistant, during the time that evacuation and sheltering was being simulated. The time at the EOC was used to provide some training to the Department of Agriculture staffer, and explanations of Department of Agriculture responsibilities were given to that trainee. However, the two individuals from the Department of Agriculture departed the EOC at 1530, well before the recovery and reentry phase of the exercise.

Given the development of events under the scenario written for the exercise, both of these agencies made wise decisions on the use of their time and staff. Since the General Emergency was terminated at 1620 and no controller messages directing other actions existed, the State EOC played the exercise in real time. This meant waiting for the LNED staff at the EOF and LNED offices to provide the information that the LSEOC staff would need to take recovery and reentry actions. In cases where staffing of the EOC is not an objective (as in this exercise), it is recommended that agency staff needed to demonstrate particular objectives be told in advance, under the stipulation that they do not reveal the information, of the approximate times that they would have to staff the EOC to demonstrate those objectives for which they have responsibility. In one day exercises where recovery and reentry is to be demonstrated, it is also recommended that controller messages be used to simulate time jumps and plausible recovery and reentry conditions for the LSEOC and Parishes to use as a basis for demonstrating recovery and reentry objectives. The LNED could work on a separate simulated time track to allow demonstration of its capabilities.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

#### AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

87-1 Description: A failure to instruct the ZBS radio station(s) to synchronize their transmission of the EBS message, with the initial sounding of the siren system, resulted in the transmission preceding the siren signal by approximately four minutes. Proper procedure and timing would have the EBS message follow the siren signal. Additionally, initiation of the siren signal, at the various control points (Parishes), varied by several minutes, despite the agreement, during the conference call, on the time of initiation. The sirens should have been triggered simultaneously at all locations. (FEMA REP-10, E.5.2, E.6.2)

Recommendation: To insure proper timing of EBS messages, and siren activation, the State should: a) review EBS activation procedures with the EBS stations to assure that they are prepared to follow the proper timing sequence in an emergency, and, b) initiate, as soon as Parish EOC's are activated, actions to synchronize all clocks. This would insure the simultaneous activation of the sirens.

## AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Description: The Communications Director observed that one of the telefax machines at another location was relatively slow in transmitting messages, often taking as much as four minutes time.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that the location of the slow machine be determined and the machine be repaired.

 Description: The State responded to a request to alter the EBS message by using liquid paper on a prescripted message, blowing the liquid dry, and typing revisions in the same spot.

**Recommendation:** It is suggested that a procedure using extra pages with inserts be considered. In the event that the revisions do not fit into the space left by prior deletions, the use of liquid paper would not suffice. It is suggested that deletions be denoted by striking the changed words, and the term "insert no. " be put into the spot, with the revisions listed on the extra page. This would allow immediate tying of the insert, avoiding the delay involved in waiting for liquid paper to dry. Alternatively, or additionally, it might also be desirable to double space the prescripted messages or add a wide margin to allow for readable short handwritten insertions in spaces between lines or in a margin.

- Description: The delays involved in reaching concurrence account for the biggest share of time in getting PAR instructions to the public.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the organications involved in using the RBS hotline to aphieve concurrence on PARs hold drills on rapidly implementing the procedure for reaching concurrence.

 Description: The State EOC communications room did not have an FM radio available to monitor the FM EBS broadcast.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the State obtain an FM radio is order to monitor FM EBS broadcasts.

#### 2.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

### 2.2.1 West Feliciana Parish

#### 2.2.1.1 Parish EOC

The West Feliciana Sheriff's office received the Notification of Unusual Event via the "Hotline" at 0934. The deputy immediately followed his notification procedures in contacting the Folice Sury President, Civil Defense Director, Mayor and Sheriff. An up-to-date call list was available. A paging system was used to notify the Mayor of the event. At 0950 the Civil Defense Director called the Sheriff's office to transfer the communications responsibility to the Farish EOC located at the Fire Station in St. Francisville. LOEF was not notified by Omnifax that the communications switch had been implemented. Certain EOC staff members were requested to report to the EOC while others were put on stand-by status. At 1025 message #3 was received stating that the "Event had been terminated." This caused concern to the Civil Defense Director who immediately and appropriately contacted LOEP for verification and clarification.

The Alert was received at approximately 1119 in which the Civil Defense Director notified the remaining EOC members to report to the EOC. The Site Area Emergency was received at 1130 followed by the General Emergency at 1358. Full staffing of the EOC was in place by 1130. Mobilization of staff and timely activation of EOC staff was adequately demonstrated.
The Parish Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of the EOC operation. The Assistant Civil Defense Director also was involved in decision-making activities. Briefings were frequently conducted allowing input from each of the EOC staff members on the status of what they were doing. The Civil Defense Director kept his staff updated on changes in the emergency situation as they occurred.

To assist the Civil Defense Director and staff, two utility liaison individuals were available at the EOC to explain or clarify what was going on at the plant. They were called upon during the emergency event to explain certain things.

The EOC facility contains bunks, kitchen, back-up generator and is very adequate to support extended operations. The EOC, located in the Fire Station at St. Francisville, is located approximately three miles from the plant and well within the plume exposure area. There is a possibility that a set of wind and radiological release conditions could develop that could require the evacuation of the EOC. At this time, the Parish does not have plans established for an alternate EOC site. We recommend that the Parish give consideration to establishment of an alternate site, outside the plume EPZ, from which EOC operations could be conducted if required.

All communications equipment functioned well and messages were logged and distributed appropriately. Communications equipment included the RBS hotline; several commercial telephones, two-way radios with police/fire and special facility radios; as well as an omnifax G-3 and telecopier machine. The communicator was familiar with the operations of the equipment and followed proper communication procedures.

The EOC had excellent visual aids (status boards, message boards, maps, etc.) Posted in full view of all EOC staff members. A message runner posted all messages in a timely manner and the EOC staff constantly monitored the emergency classification levels and implemented appropriate measures as called for in their written procedures.

Access to the EOC was controlled and all personnel entering the EOC after the simulated radiation release were carefully monitored prior to entry. The Parish Radiological Officer (RO) in charge of exposure control effectively carried out his duties and responsibilities. Exposure control for emergency workers was demonstrated by the issue of dosimetry kits including a (simulated) TLD. RO very timely put together the number of kits needed, including assistance from two firemen in zeroing the dosimetry equipment. Readings were recorded every 30 minutes and routine survey monitoring was performed by the RO.

During the evacuation phase of the exercise, EOC staff (particularly the transportation officer) successfully demonstrated (simulated) effective and timely capability of arranging transportation for evacuees, including school children. The Sheriff also demonstrated an ability to effect an orderly evacuation of on-site plant personnel by actually dispatching a deputy to ensure coordination and direction of evacuees to the appropriate reception center. The Civil Defense Director initiated a call to ensure that the reception center was activated and ready to receive evacuees from West Feliciana Parish.

Access control point setups were simulated by illustration on a map. Both the Sheriff and the City Police were very knowledgable on where those control points were needed and the availability of manpower resources to carryout the responsibilities. There was coordination of law enforcement activities with the State Police for back-up support if needed.

Following decisions by the Civil Defense Director to implement protective actions, procedures were followed including timely activation of sirens within the 15minute time requirement. However, the Parish did not hear nor verify the notification of the EBS message over the radio following activation of the sirens. Therefore, it was not known whether residents within the Parish received and heard the emergency broadcast message. If the EBS is not heard over the radio at the EOC, an immediate call to LOEP should be made for confirmation. This should be a standard procedure.

Coordination with LOEP on the conference call concerning ability to formulate and distribute appropriate EBS messages to the public in a timely fashion was demonstrated by the Parish EOC.

Following termination of the emergency, the Civil Defense Director directed his EOC staff to review and discuss controlled reentry and recovery activities for residents of the evacuated areas. Each EOC staff member explained what problems they expected to have to deal with following such an emergency event. Good knowledge of the kind of problems that the Parish will be confronted with and resources and capabilities to handle the situation was adequately demonstrated during this tabletop discussion.

All exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 23, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39) for West Feliciana Parish EOC were met.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

## AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

87-2 Description: All EBS messages should be monitored at the EOC following activation of the sirens. EBS messages were not heard nor verified by West Feliciana Parish EOC. (NUREG-0654, II, E.5)

Recommendation: The Civil Defense Director should verify through LOEP when an EBS message is not heard over the EBS radio at the EOC. Procedures should be amended to include such action by the Civil Defense Director.

#### AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Description: The Parish EOC is located approximately three miles from the plant, well within the Plume Exposure Area. No plans have been developed for an alternate EOC facility should the fire station EOC become unusable due to plume exposure.

Recommendation: The Parish should give consideration to establishment of an alternate EOC facility, outside the plume exposure area, for use if required.

## 2.2.2 East Feliciana Parish EOC

### 2.2.3.1 Parish EOC

East Feliciana Parish EOC is located in the Town Hall in Jackson and lies within the 10-mile EPZ of River Bend. Should evacuation of the EOC be necessary, it would be relocated to Clinton, the Parish County Seat.

The Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) was received by the Parish Sheriff's dispatch at the warning point in Clinton at 0932. The NUE was transmitted over the Hotline telephone system from the River Bend Station (RBS). The Sheriff's dispatch center is manned on a 24-hour a day basis and is available to notify the appropriate emergency response personnel as required. The Civil Defense Director was notified by the Sheriff's dispatcher immediately following the receipt of the NUE via commercial telephone and he called in the communicator and the RADEF Officer. Following the activation of the communications center at the EOC, all communication responsibilities shift from the Warning Point to the EOC; this occurred at 1027.

Upon receipt of the Alert classification, at 1115, the Director notified the "minimal" staff (i.e., Police Jury, Director, Sheriff, PiO, RADEF Officer, and Communicator) and directed them to report to the EOC.

Full activation of all EOC staff was implemented following the upgrade in Emergency Classification Level (ECL) to Site Area Emergency at 1130. A written call list was used to notify the EOC personnel with full staffing completed at 1215.

The EOC was fully set up prior to the exercise day, all furniture, phones, displays and equipment were ready for EOC activities.

The EOC operations were capably demonstrated through the leadership of the Civil Defense Director. Staff members and the Director exhibited efficiency and creativity in deciding necessary actions for addressing the various situations presented by the scenario. However, periodic briefings involving all agencies represented at the EOC were not conducted. Lack of these detailed multiagency briefings detracted from the overall operations. Briefings were given by the Director only and consisted primarily of making the staff aware of any new information on plant conditions, met data or changes in ECLs. It would greatly enhance the operations if periodic briefings were conducted which included status reports from each agency at the EOC.

The EOC was located on the top floor of the Jackson Town Hall. The facility was adequately furnished in respect to furniture, space, lighting and telephones. A map designating the plume EPZ, with sectors labeled, was posted. The same map, assumedly, was used to designate evacuation routes. However, the routes were not easily discernable on the map. These routes are shown in the Plan.

Communications equipment, both primary and backup, is adequate for performing all communications operations. The Parish Communicators efficiently manned this equipment throughout the exercise. Conference calling was adequately demonstrated on the hotline with other parishes.

The ability to alert the public in the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes was not demonstrated by the EOC staff.

A protective action recommendation (PAR) was received via the executive hotline at 1345, indicating that a General Emergency had been declared at 1335 and a release had started at 1330. The PAR recommended that for East Feliciana Farish, Sector #9 should be sheltered and special facilities in that sector notified (via tone alert radios). At 1401, the hotline call with the other EOCs was initiated and the Parish concurred with the recommendations. The siren and EBS systems were scheduled to be activated a 1417.

At 1410, the EOC monitored an EBS transmission over the FM band prior to the specified time of 1417. Following this broadcast, the EOC was unable to receive any subsequent transmissions over EBS, even though the radio was monitored continually.

Sirens were triggered at the EOC as per written procedures at 1417. The visual display on the siren console in the EOC indicated that the sirens did not sound. The procedures to activate the sirens were followed a second time, with the same results. The EOF called the EOC at 1420 inquiring as to why the EOC hadn't activated the sirens. The EOC responded that they had attempted to activate the system twice. At this point, there was no action taken by either the EOC or the EOF in regards to the failure of the siren system. Another call was received at the EOC from the EOF at 1425 verifying that the sirens had definitely not sounded and recommending the activation of the back-up notification system (route alerting). (See Section 2.2.2.1.1, Remedial Exercise at E. Feliciana Parish EOC for follow-up information.)

Neither the EOC Director nor the proper authorities at the EOF attempted to activate the siren system after the acknowledgment that it had failed. Persons at the EOF should have taken control, when they realized that the system failed and triggered it, following up with a message to the EOC that they had done so. Additionally, the staff at the EOC should have been concerned that the sirens failed and made a request to the EOF for them to assume control and activate them.

The procedures for the Sheriff's department specify that at the General Emergency, following the approval of the PAR by the EOC; they have the option to activate and send into the field the route alerting teams. When the EOC received the General Emergency classification at 1345, the Sheriff's department sent teams into the field (simulated) to conduct route alerting by 1400. This was prior to the approval of the PAR by the EOC and before the hotline call with the other EOCs. The Sheriff's department representative at the EOC indicated that the route alerting would take between 30 and 45 minutes to complete. The Director was not advised of this activity until it was recommended by the EOF.

Tone alert radios located in special facilities were activated as requested in the PAR.

A second PAR was received from the EOF at 1445, requiring evacuation of East Feliciana's sectors 8 and 9, and sheltering in sectors 10, 11, and 12. At 1447, the hotline call was initiated with the EOCs, for concurrence of the PAR, and was concluded at 1455. The EOCs made minor changes to the PAR and agreed to activate the sirens at 1510. Again, appropriate procedures were followed to trigger the sirens and they failed to sound. The EOF called the EOC at 1519 and notified them that the sirens had failed and that they would activate them. Tone alert radios were activated and route alerting teams were sent into the effected areas.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely manner was met by the Parish EOC. Two separate EBS messages were formulated and transmitted during the exercise which required input and concurrence with East Feliciana.

The Parish PIO representative maintained contact by phone with counterpart at the Joint Information Center. Hard copies of messages and press releases were received and sent via the Omnifax. This equipment, although very slow, is the only method within the Parish by which hard copies of actions can be received or transmitted. The Omnifax appeared to be operating slower than machines in other parishes. This problem should be investigated to improve the efficiency of this operation. In most cases, considerable time is required for receiving these messages verbally via the hotline from time of phone call-down to message completion and verbal verifications.

The organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of the plume EPZ were demonstrated. Resources were activated to implement the evacuation, including simulated activities only.

The full performance capabilities were not tested due to the limited demonstrations of field activities as governed by the agreements in objectives. Players at the EOC would benefit through additional field demonstrations which would further involve their respective agencies.

The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was adequately demonstrated by the Parish RADEF Officer.

The ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry was demonstrated. The response demonstrated by the EOC consisted of simulated activities only. The Director took the primary role in conducting the overall activities, which involved open discussions on the expected actions to be taken by each agency.

The adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods was properly and efficiently demonstrated as was the ability by the EOC Director and his staff to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner.

The capability to effectively process all incoming/outgoing messages in a timely manner was hampered by the lack of a proper internal message handling and distribution system. There was no evidence of any inventory system for messages.

FEMA Exercise Objectives #1, 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, 20, 34, 36, 37, 38 and 39, assigned to East Feliciana Parish, were met. Objective 13 was not met. (See Section 2.2.2.1.1, Remedial Drill, for additional information.)

#### DEFICIENCIES

87-1 Description: The initial activation of the siren system was unsuccessful despite two separate attempts by the Parish Civil Defense Director to trigger it. The computerized activation system indicated that a failure had occurred and was substantiated by a hotline telephone conversation between the EOF and the EOC. Neither the EOC Director nor the proper authorities at the EOF attempted to activate the siren system after the acknowledgment that it had failed. Persons at the EOF should have taken control, when they realized that the system failed, and activated it, following up with a message to the EOC that they had done so. Additionally, the staff at the EOC should have been concerned that the sirens failed and made a request to the EOF for them to assume control and activate them. (NUREG-0654, II, E.6)

**Recommendation:** The mechanical cause of the siren failure should be determined and corrected. The system should be tested periodically to debug and locate potential problems.

Procedures and protocol in the activation of the siren system should be reviewed and altered, if necessary, to insure that this problem, procedurally, will not occur again.

Training should be provided to the Parish and EOF emergency staff on the procedures and protocol in siren activation. (See Section 2.2.2.1.1, Remedial Exercise, for follow-up information.)

#### AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

None

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## AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Description: Periodic briefings involving all agencies represented at the EOC were not conducted. Lack of these detailed multiagency briefings. detracted from the overall operations.

**Recommendation:** Periodic briefings should be conducted which included status reports from each agency represented at the EOC.

- Description: The Sheriff's Department initiated route alerting prior to the concurrence on PARs between the EOCs. In addition, the Civil Defense Director was not informed that route alerting had been begun until the EOF had recommended it following the siren failure.

**Recommendation:** Procedures should be modified and training provided to the Sheriff's Department staff at the EOC.

 Description: An internal message handling and distribution system was not used at the EOC. Message logs were not maintained for incoming/outgoing messages by the communications group or the PIO. There was no inventory system for messages demonstrated.

Recommendation: A message logging and distribution system for incoming and outgoing messages should be developed to control and track message flow and distribution.

- Description: The second EBS message did not include information on the siren failure.

**Recommendation:** Information on the siren failure should have been added to the prescripted EBS message used following the second PAR.

 Description: The EOC is located within the boundaries of the 10mile EPZ and may require evacuation. An alternate EOC has not been identified in the plan.

Recommendation: An alternate EOC should be specified in the plan along with procedures to relocate, if necessary. - Description: The EOC operations room was set up prior to the exercise day. All furniture, phones, displays and equipment were ready for emergency operations.

**Recommendation:** The EOC staff should demonstrate full activation and set up of the facility.

 Description: Evacuation routes were not depicted on the EPZ map displayed on the wall in the EOC operations room.

Recommendation: Evacuation routes should be marked and displayed on the wall map.

 Description: The full performance and response capabilities of the Parish were not tested due to the limited demonstrations of field activities.

**Recommendation:** Demonstration of additional field activities which would further involve emergency response staff, would be beneficial.

## 2.2.2.1.1 East Feliciana Parish EOC Remedial Drill - March 25, 1987

On March 25, a Remedial Drill was carried out at the River Bend EOF and the East Feliciana Parish EOC to demonstrate appropriate corrections to the siren alerting system that failed during the February 25, 1987 exercise.

Federal Evaluators at the Remedial Drill were: Gary Jones, FEMA RVI, at the EOF; and, Leland Peyton, FEMA RVI, at the East Feliciana Parish EOC.

The Remedial Drill was initiated at 10:02 a.m. by a hot-line call to the Parish indicating a (simulated) General Emergency at the River Bend Plant. A hard-copy FAX message, with the same text, was received at the Parish, while the hot-line call was still being received, at 10:06 a.m.

At 10:16 a.m., a hot-line conference call was received requesting concurrence on recommended Protective Actions to be broadcast on EBS, and a siren activation time of 10:25 was adopted.

At 10:25 a.m. the Parish EOC activated their siren control by pushing the 'all systems' and 'execute' buttons. Thirty seconds later the 'acknowledge' light indicated the system was activated. As this was a silent test, the Parish Coordinator called the EOF at 10:31 a.m. to request verification that the EOF computer indicated siren activation. He was advised that the system indicated activation of all sirens.

At 10:31 a.m., the Parish EOC monitored an EBS test on the radio in the EOC communications room.

The Remedial Drill was terminated by a hot-line call at 10:35 a.m.

The Remedial Drill successfully demonstrated FEMA Objective #13 and resolved Deficiency 87-1 from the March 25, 1987 Exercise.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

#### AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

None.

### AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

None.

## 2.2.2.2 Jackson High School Monitoring and Decontamination Center

Adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles, were tested at the monitoring and decontamination center in Jackson, Louisiana. The facility utilized was an abandoned school building which made the participant's task more difficult.

At approximately 1245, seven fire department volunteers arrived at the site to begin preparing the facility and area to receive emergency personnel and vehicles. Procedures were appropriate but activities were characterized by a lack of organized, coordinated effort. Site preparation took approximately 40 minutes.

At approximately 1340, two emergency vehicles arrived at the vehicle survey site. At this point, the center had not been notified that the vehicles would be arriving. At 1358, the center was notified of a general site emergency and at 1403 was told to proceed with monitoring and decontamination procedures. The two vehicles were appropriately surveyed, exterior, interior and under the hood, and both were found to be contaminated. Each vehicle was separately driven to the vehicle decontamination area by the driver. The site selected for vehicle decontamination was a flat, grassy area and was appropriately roped off. Knowledge of decontamination and resurveying procedures were appropriately demonstrated.

Personnel survey and decontamination procedures were also appropriately demonstrated. Survey techniques for the contaminated drivers was particularly well demonstrated. Pathways for clean and contaminated personnel were also separated. Personnel were familiar with proper disposal of contaminated clothing. Dosimeters were worn by exercise participants and were zeroed. In summary, the objective (#29) to demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers and vehicles was appropriately demonstrated. Although participant efforts were not always well organized and coordinated, the basic techniques for monitoring and decontaminating personnel and vehicles were well known and effectively demonstrated. Participants could use additional training in exit procedures, including proper removal of protective clothing.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

## AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

None.

## AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Description: Site preparation was not well organized or coordinated.

**Recommendation:** Participants should receive additional training in site preparation and organization and a well-trained individual should be designated to provide advice and instruction as needed.

- Description: Exit procedures, including proper removal of possibly contaminated clothing, were not well demonstrated.

Recommendation: Additional training should be provided to insure station workers remain free of contamination.

## 2.2.3 Pointe Coupee Parish

### 2.2.3.1 Parish EOC

Point Coupee Parish EOC functions were managed and demonstrated by 23 staff members and representatives of volunteer organizations.

Activation and staffing was demonstrated in three phases; Initial, at the Notice of Unusual Event Level, Partial, at the Alert Notification level, and Full, at the Site Area Emergency level. The entire staff was at the EOC ready for operations less than one hour following the call-up announcement.

Operations at the EOC were capably and energetically managed by the Parish Civil Defense Director. Written procedures were available for each EOC staff member and were used throughout the exercise. Frequent and comprehensive briefings were held during the exercise and excellent interaction between staff members was demonstrated. These activities corrected ARCA #2 from the 1986 exercise.

The EOC facility, new since the 1986 exercise, was somewhat small but proved to be adequate for the operations carried out. Appropriate display materials were mounted on the walls or were either available for display or were in the staff's procedure packages. The EOC is located on the ground floor of the newly refurbished Parish Courthouse in New Roads. It is approximately six miles from the River Bend facility and well within the plume exposure area. There is a possibility that a set of wind and radiological release conditions could develop that could require the evacuation of the EOC. At this time, the Parish does not have plans established for an alternate EOC site. We recommend that the Parish give consideration to establishment of an alternate site, outside the plume exposure area, from which EOC operations could be conducted if required.

Access to the EOC was controlled, beginning at the partial activation level, throughout the exercise period. The Parish Radiological Defense Officer demonstrated unusual competence and energy throughout the EOC activation period.

The initial Notice of Unusual Event was received by the Parish Sheriff's dispatch office. Procedures for Initial EOC Activation were then begun and the Parish Civil Defense Director and a Sheriff's communicator responded to the EOC. All subsequent messages were handled by the EOC communications facility. Primary communications capability was fully demonstrated with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. The dedicated "hotline" functioned well throughout the exercise and the FAX provided confirming hard-copy of each message from the EOF and JIC. The EOC communicator logged all incoming messages and provided the original to the Civil Defense Director, and a copy to the EOC Status Board keeper. No additional copies were made or used. No errors or discrepancies were noted in recording or handling the incoming messages. These activities corrected ARCA #3 from the 1986 exercise.

One problem that developed in the communications flow was a lack of clarity in termination of the Notice of Unusual Event. Pointe Coupee Parish still believed that the initial emergency action level was still underway; unexpectedly, a message was received that initiated a new message numbering sequence and, at the same time, an Alert Notification level. Some confusion was generated at the Parish and resulted in a short delay in initiation of a Partial Activation message to the EOC staff. We recommend that messages terminating emergency action levels be as clear and unequivocal as those that initiate such levels.

Public alerting and notification activities, for sheltering and evacuation of plume areas, were conducted in accordance with appropriate procedures and were timely and effective. Exposure control for emergency workers was considered and appropriate actions taken.

Following termination of the emergency the EOC staff reviewed projected recovery and reentry activities. The short exercise period did not permit full exploration of the range of these activities. All Exercise Objectives for the Pointe Coupee EOC were fully and successfully demonstrated. These included FEMA Objective Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 34, 36, 37, 38, and 39.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

### AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

None.

### AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Description: The Parish EOC is located on the ground floor of the Parish Courthouse approximately six miles from the River Bend Facility, well within the Plume Exposure Area. No plans have been developed for an alternate EOC facility should the Courthouse EOC become unusable due to plume exposure.

Recommendation: The Parish should give consideration to establishment of an alternate EOC facility, outside the plume exposure area, for use if required.

### 2.2.3.2 Scott Civic Center Monitoring and Decontamination Center

A radiation monitoring and decontamination facility was set up at the Scott Civic Center on the west side of New Roads. This facility would normally process local law enforcement and fire department personnel, although anyone requiring radiation monitoring and possible decontamination could be directed through this facility. At the Center, the rear portion was utilized including the elevated stage, dressing, loading dock and parking areas. The evaluator arrived at 1230 and while all four team members were already present, there was no pre-positioning evident. The footlocker containing equipment and supplies did contain numerous (a dozen or so) procedures for the actual operation of the facility. Both the vehicle monitoring station and the personnel monitoring stations were physically laid out in accordance with the procedure.

At 1350, two autos arrived. Driver #1 was dispatched to the personnel monitoring station and then directed back to the contaminated auto for driving to the vehicle decontamination station. The RM monitoring the vehicles made instrument probe sweeps much too fast (in excess of 1 foot/second) and at distances much too far (up to 8 in. to 10 in. from vehicle surface to instrument probe). The RM did use the GM headset but relied upon meter readings which generally accounts for the too rapid sweeps and too great a distance from probe to vehicle. Further, the RM failed to monitor most vehicle surfaces and also failed to monitor the interior of Vehicle #1. Personnel monitoring techniques appeared adequate and in conformance with the SOP. Subsequent personnel decontamination was simulated but was adequate.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

# AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

87-3 Description: Local personnel at the Pointe Coupee Parish Decontamination Station (Scott Civic Center) on February 25, 1987, failed to demonstrate adequate training in procedures for determining and removing radioactive contamination from vehicles. (NUREG-0654, II, K.5)

**Recommendation:** Provide at least one trained Radiation Monitor (RM) to the decontamination station and subsequently, at the decontamination station. Have the trained RM provide timely training in general decontamination procedures and local sitespecific procedures.

### AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

None.

#### 2.2.4 West Baton Rouge Parish

## 2.2.4.1 Parish EOC

The Parish EOC staff was alerted for exercise emergency duty at approximately 0940, following the Alert Notification Declaration, and arrived at the EOC soon thereafter. At the Site Area Emergency declaration, all remaining staff were called to report. The EOC was fully activated at 1130 except for the Fire Department representative and the Parish RDO. These two reported at 1210 and 1255, respectively. Actuation procedures are adequate and personnel are adequate with several back-up and cross trained individuals. Successful demonstration of this objective (#1) resolved ARCA #4 from the 2-26-86 River Bend exercise.

The Parish Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of the EOC operation. He was fully supported by the President of the Parish Police Jury and the members of the EOC staff. Open discussion of all decision-making took place and all staff members were kept aware of existing conditions at all times.

The EOC facility, although limited to one office on the second floor of the Parish Courthouse, which also contains all EOC communications equipment, is adequate to accommodate the necessary emergency staff. The facility contains the required maps, displays and equipment to operate effectively in an emergency. Back-up communications support can be provided by the Sheriff's communications section which is located on the third floor of the Courthouse. While the EOC does not have bunks or showers, there is a small court room adjacent to the EOC that could be utilized for sleeping and the jail located on the third floor can provide food, drinks and showers in an emergency. The one major drawback to the EOC is the noise level created by the communications equipment located in the same room. Only a partial partition separates the equipment from the EOC operations area. It is recommended that the communications area be fully partitioned and all communications equipment, and their operators, be located therein to remove noise and distraction from the operations area.

EOC Communications to all appropriate locations participating in the exercise was maintained throughout the day. The hotline, radios, telephones and Omnifax functioned without problems and provided for continuous contact as required. Communications procedures were, for the most part, adequate except for the fact that there was no central logging, processing or distribution point for all message traffic. This resulted in a lack of assurance that all actions required are handled and processed to a completed state.

It is recommended that the Parish create, at the entrance to the communications section of the EOC (see above) a message handling/logging desk where all messages (internal and external) are logged in, assigned a control number, distributed for action, and returned for close-out when action is completed. This procedure will provide a continuous log and a sequence of events that can be examined at any time for current status.

There are approximately 80 residents in that portion of the Parish included in the 10-mile plume EPZ. The alert signal for these residents is provided by a siren located in the area. Alert signals were initiated, from the EOC, in accordance with the timing agreed to during the conference calls on the "hotline." Although the siren activation times were 39 to 30 minutes, respectively, after the decision at the plant to declare Site Area and General Emergencies, they were within the 15-minute time limit following the conference call. New equipment is being installed in all EOCs that will reduce the delay between plant decision and alert to a few minutes. The conference call procedure used to discuss and/or develop the correct EBS message works well. Immediate agreement on message text and timing (subject to all clocks being in agreement) provides for simultaneous activation of all alert systems.

While evacuation of the plume EPZ was only simulated, evacuation operations, including traffic control for Parish evacuees and those passing through the Parish from other locations and management of any potential impediments to evacuation, were capably demonstrated. Road blocks were set up by Sheriff's Dept. and Highway Dept. personnel while the parish transportation coordinator was in constant radio contact with field forces. Exposure control for the emergency workers was demonstrated by the issue of dosimetry kits including a (simulated) TLD. Personnel displayed adequate knowledge of the kits and how to use them. Although the EOC is not in the plume EPZ, the Radiological Officer had instruments and dosimeters available for use at that facility should it become necessary.

The Parish EOC staff constantly monitored the emergency classification levels and implemented appropriate measures according to established written procedures. All actions called for, including the sounding of sirens, concurrence in an EBS message and the evacuation of threatened individuals were accomplished in an outstanding manner. The Parish dispatched a PIO to the Joint Information Center and the Utility dispatched a representative to the Parish EOC. These liaison officers did an outstanding job.

In the short period of time available, the EOC staff discussed controlled reentry and recovery for residents of the evacuated area of the Plume EPZ. They displayed a good knowledge of the limited problems that would be faced by this sparsely populated area of the Parish.

Therefore, all exercise objectives for West Baton Rouge Parish, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 34, 36, 37, 38, and 39, were met. However, the following recommendations for improvement should be considered.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

## AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

None.

## AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

 Description: The EOC operations area is somewhat noisy due to the lack of a full partition separating the EOC communications equipment from the operations area.

Recommendation: Install a full partition separating the communications area from the operations area and move all communications equipment into the partitioned area.

 Description: The EOC has no central logging, processing or distribution point for all message traffic. It is therefore difficult to insure that all message-generated actions are handled and processed to a completed state.

Recommendation: Create, at the entrance to the communications area of the EOC, a message handling/logging desk where all messages (internal and external) are logged, assigned a control number, distributed for action, and returned for close-out when action is completed.

## 2.2.4.2 Port Allen F.D. Monitoring and Decontamination Center

A monitoring and decontamination facility was set up at the Port Allen Fire Station. This facility would process local law enforcement and fire department personnel and other emergency personnel as necessary. Only one fireman was there to demonstrate monitoring and decontamination techniques for personnel and vehicles. To get the greatest benefit from these exercises, more fire department personnel should participate in the future. For the most part, the lone fireman demonstrated adequate knowledge of the vehicle and personnel monitoring techniques for the two vehicles that arrived at the station. However, he neglected to perform several listed procedures. These were (1) neglecting to use the headphone provided with the survey meter, (2) neglecting to cover the probe of the survey meter with a plastic bag, and (3) neglecting to monitor the vehicle's air cleaner and interior for contamination. Furthermore, the fireman did not report to the West Baton Rouge EOC when contamination (simulated) was discovered on the vehicles and personnel. Additional training of personnel needed in survey procedures so all procedures are followed closely.

The fire station was partially set up to show the basic flow of contaminated and noncontaminated personnel. The layout appeared to be adequate. The fireman discussed decontamination procedures and these appeared to be adequate. Contaminated washwater from vehicles would remain in the gravel parking lot and contaminated washwater from personnel would drain into the sewage system.

Finally, survey personnel had dosimetry available, but the dosimeters were only high range (0-200 R). More sensitive low-range dosimeters and TLDs were supposed to be available from the West Baton Rouge EOC, but they were never delivered.

Based on the problems encountered with lack of training in vehicle and personnel survey monitoring procedures, objective 29 for the decontamination center at Port Allen was met but the following corrective actions are required.

#### DEFICIENCIES

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None.

### AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

- 87-4 Description: Several listed procedures were not performed during the demonstration of monitoring and decontamination of vehicles and personnel (NUREG-0654, II, K.5). These were:
  - neglecting to use the headphones provided with the survey meter.
  - (2) neglecting to cover the probe of the survey meter with a plastic bag.

(4) neglecting to report to the West Baton Rouge Parish EOC when contamination was discovered.

Recommendation: Additional training for all personnel at the decontamination station is necessary so all procedures are followed.

87-5 Description: Low-range dosimetry (0-200 mR or 0-20 R) or permanent record dosimeters were not available during the exercise. (NUREG-0654, II, K.5)

Recommendation: Appropriate dosimetry should be delivered from the West Baton Rouge Parish EOC to the decontamination station.

## AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

 Description: Only one fireman was on duty during the decontamination demonstration.

**Recommendation:** For maximum benefit, more fire department personnel should participate in future exercises.

## 5.2.5 East Baton Rouge Parish

### 2.2.5.1 Parish EOC

The EOC Operations Officer managed response and activities for the East Baton Rouge Parish. The Civil Defense Director designated this individual to assume management responsibility. According to the Parish REP plan, the Civil Defense Director is responsible for "coordinating overall emergency operations." The plan does not specify designation of another individual to manage the EOC operations as was the case during the exercise. The EOC Operations Officer did a commendable job in coordinating response that was without field demonstration; all of the field activities were simulated except the communications van dispatch to Zachary and the Centroplex and Zachary evacuee and emergency worker monitoring facilities. Briefings at the EOC did not allow opportunity for agency representation to present status of implementing actions.

There is an excellent data system that presents specific information on "Protective Action Sections" (PAS). Scenarios are described and numbered; they depict all combinations of protective action recommendations for affected portions of the 10mile EPZ. Based on the scenarios, specific information such as sirens, population, access control locations, evacuation time estimates, and pertinent maps is provided for the affected PAS. A change was made to the second PAR received at approximately 1440.

The scenario (#53) calls for evacuees to be sent to the Assembly Center at LSU. It was decided that all evacuees would be directed to the previously activated Centroplex facility. The prescripted EBS message was correctly changed to account for the decision to direct all evacuees to the Centroplex. Other appropriate actions were taken to effect the change prescribed in the EBS message. One notable exception was observed. No management consideration was given to the number of monitors required at the Centroplex to handle the additional evacuees, or to requesting (simulated) the additional personnel. Thus, based on the scenario, and the decision to direct all evacuees to the Centroplex, there would have been insufficient capability for the facility to monitor and process the expected number of evacuees.

The EOC is an excellent facility for responding to a radiological emergency. Sufficient furniture, space and amenities were available to maintain operations and backup power was available. Most appropriate maps and status boards were available and updated as conditions changed. Some suggestions by the EOC staff were to include a large nuclear station schematic for use in utility representative presentations, obtain a larger "Emergency Action Log" status board and use more distinctive coloring on the EPZ map to designate sheltered and evacuated areas.

The "Notification Message Form" Number 7, indicating sheltering and evacuation of three protective action sections in East Baton Rouge Parish, was received at approximately 1440. Following introduction and completion of a change, at approximately 1455, to the prescripted EBS message to direct all evacuees to the Centroplex, the sirens were planned to be activated at 1511, this action was simulated at that time. Subsequently, there was no indication that any of the East Baton Rouge Parish sirens failed, thus no back-up public alerting was required.

The scenario #53 was implemented following receipt of the Notification Message Form #7 at around 1440. The appropriate prescripted EBS message was used based on the scenario. The EBS message for scenario #53 was disseminated; however, there was no radio available in the EOC to monitor the content of the EBS message. Thus, it could not have been discerned by the EOC staff if the intended instructions were appropriately broadcast over the EBS.

As part of the "Emergency Resources Data Book," general population data was reviewed to determine the number of evacuees affected by the protective action recommendations. Also, special transportation needs of individuals and facilities were reviewed, and information was provided on transient facilities and evacuation time estimates. All implementation actions were simulated as agreed to.

Internal EOC discussion took place regarding access control point implementation for the evacuation of the affected PASs in East Baton Rouge Parish. No field demonstration of establishing and maintaining access control points occurred, as agreed to for this objective. One school is included within the East Baton Rouge Parish protective action sections. According to the operations chief, this facility closes daily at noon and thus was not impacted by this scenario. However, it is suggested that a call to the school be made regardless of the time of day to assure the facility is vacant after noon.

Several requests from other Parishes for support from East Baton Rouge were handled properly.

A discussion took place in the EOC with regard to recovery and reentry, even though it was limited, individual agency representatives adequately presented what needed to be accomplished given the exercise scenario.

All emergency classification level changes were monitored and procedures were implemented in a timely manner.

Overall, the capability exists for handling incoming and outgoing messages with the East Baton Rouge EOC. Some suggestions for improving the system include:

- consistently specify during exercises that messages are for a "drill."
- assure that all portions of the "Notification Message Form" is filled out completely.
- EOC participants suggested that the "Communication Log" form be simplified.
- request that meteorological data be included on all "Notification Message Forms."

Thus, exercise objectives assigned to East Baton Rouge Parish, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 1: 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 34, 36, 37, 38, and 39, were met with the following code tive actions required.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

## AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

87-6 Description: Following the decision, made in accordance with pre-exercise simulation agreements, to activate only the Centroplex Reception/Care Center, no management action was initiated, at the EOC, to review the requirements (simulated) to process and monitor the anticipated number of evacuees. While the required resources may be available in the Parish, they were not called upon. **Recommendation:** The EOC should monitor resource requirements and act to insure that adequate personnel and equipment are available to process the expected number of evacuees at any designated monitoring/reception center.

87-7 Description: There was no radio available at the EOC to determine if the intended instructions were appropriately broadcast of the EBS. (NUREG-0654, E.5)

**Recommendation:** Provide the means for monitoring EBS messages to assure that appropriate messages were disseminated to the public.

## AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

 Description: The tlue telephone hotline did not function a few times during the exercise; back-up systems were effectively used.

**Recommendation:** Check the hotline system to ensure its operability.

 Description: A plant schematic, larger emergency action log, and more distinct coloring on the 10-mile EPZ map were suggested to improve capability.

**Recommendation**: Obtain the necessary equipment to improve the EOC's capability.

- Description: All represented agencies at the EOC did not participate in the briefings.

**Recommendation:** Allow agency representative opportunity to present status information on specific implementing actions.

 Description: Several minor internal message flow improvements are suggested.

**Recommendation:** Include "This is a Drill" on all messages; assure that the "Notification Message Form" is filled out completely; simplify the "Communication Log" form; and request meteorological data on all "Notification Message Forms."

 Description: The plan does not specifically allow the Civil Defense Director to designate authority for any other individual to manage emergency operations. **Recommendation:** Either follow the plan that gives direction and control authority solely to the Civil Defense Director, or change the plan to allow the Director to designate authority to another individual.

#### 2.2.5.2 Centroplex Reception/Care Center

The reception center at the Centroplex was staffed by representatives of the American Red Cross, Office of Family Security, Baton Rouge Fire Department and Baton Rouge Police Department. The staff appeared to be very well trained and experienced in performing all of the various individual duties. There was an adequate number of participants to demonstrate all of the various functions from registration to monitoring, decontamination and transfer to congregate care centers. It was not demonstrated but there are more than enough individuals trained and available for response to staff on a 24-hour basis.

Transportation for this exercise was by private automobile; mass transportation would be accomplished by school buses, private vehicles and other commercial and governmental vehicles as provided in the Parish plan.

Staff activation appeared to function without any major problems. The Civil Defense Director initiated the activation by calling the various organizations. They all arrived within an hour and were set up and prepared well before the arrival of any evacues.

At approximately 1210 members of the Baton Rouge Fire Department arrived at the Riverside Centroplex to issue survey equipment and set up the decontamination station. Staffing of the monitoring team and set up of the decontamination center was a complished in an orderly manner with the facility ready to receive evacuees at 1255.

Radiological monitoring of four vehicles belonging to evacuees sent to the Centroplex Reception Station was demonstrated by two monitoring teams each consisting of two firefighters from the Baton Rouge Fire Department. These teams demonstrated proper survey techniques by monitoring the interior and exterior of these vehicles for contamination. One team, however, confused the levels (meter readings) with the dose call-in levels. It is suggested that each monitoring team be provided with a copy of Attachment I-IV of the Response Flan which lists these levels and provides necessary instructions.

Each team member was equipped with a TLD, a 0-20 R pocket dosimeter and a 0-200 R pocket dosimeter. Members of monitoring teams were familiar with the interval in which dosimeters should be read as well as the dose levels which required notification of the EOC Director or the RADEF Officer.

FEMA Objective #20 requiring the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was adequately demonstrated. This clears ARCA #7 from the 2-26-86 exercise. According to the Training Officer in charge of the vehicle monitoring teams, vehicles entering the Centroplex area would be initially monitored at St. Louis and Government Streets. Vehicles determined not to be contaminated would be directed into two multilevel parking garages, while those which are contaminated are directed down St. Louis St. and around the Centroplex to another parking area. The contaminated vehicles are then remonitored and parked for decontamination at a later time.

It was observed that evacuees, when allowed to walk from the vehicles to the Centroplex to be monitored, provided an opportunity for the spread of contamination of the soles of shoes. It is suggested that the evacuees be monitored at the vehicle and plastic bags be provided or that plastic bags be provided to all individuals if monitoring cannot be performed at the vehicle.

During the exercise review, the Fire Dept. stated that no message was received at the Centroplex monitoring station stating the number of evacuees that could be expected.

The remonitoring of vehicles determined to be contaminated by the initial monitoring is redundant. The procedures should be changed to provide instructions to park vehicles, which have been determined to be contaminated by the initial monitoring, in a secure area for decontamination at a later time.

FEMA Objectives 20, 27, and 39 were met satisfactorily. The two previous ARCA Nos. 6 and 7 were also demonstrated and corrected.

#### DEFICIENCIES

None.

### AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

None.

## ARRAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Description: One monitoring team was not familiar with the readings for background radiation and contamination.

Recommendation: Each team should be furnished a copy of Attachment I-IV of the Response Plan.

- Description: Evacuees leave vehicles in the parking areas and enter the Centroplex lobby and wait to be monitored. If soles of shoes are contaminated, this provides an opportunity for the spreading of contamination. **Recommendation:** The control of contamination can be accomplished in more than one way, depending on the situation, number of evacuees and weather.

- (1) For small numbers of evacuees, you may choose to provide plastic bags for everyone upon leaving vehicle, or monitor the soles of shoes and provide plastic bags to only the contaminated individuals.
- (2) For large numbers and bad weather, you could provide plastic bags or apply tape to the soles of shoes.

#### 3.2.5.3 Zachary High School Monitoring and Decontamination Center

The East Baton Rouge Parish Monitoring/Decontamination Center is located at Zachary High School. This facility would process emergency workers and vehicles. The monitoring and decontamination demonstration was successfully performed by the Zachary Fire Dept. Zachary Police Dept. provided access control and communications. Upon arrival at the Zachary High School at 1230, the Zachary Fire Dept. and Police Dept. were already at the Monitor/Decontamination Center and were set up to receive entering workers and vehicles. The East Baton Rouge Parish emergency communications trailer arrived at the center at 1233. The communications trailer was placed adjacent to the vehicle Monitoring/Decontamination area. Communications with the East Baton Rouge Parish EOC was established.

At 1245, an East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff arrived with Radiological Monitoring equipment and dosimeter kits.

At 1400, two vehicles with drivers arrived at the Center. Both vehicles were monitored very thoroughly with CDV 700 survey meter with probe covered with a plastic bag. The vehicles were found to be contaminated and were directed to an abandoned swimming pool that had been filled with soil and gravel to be decontaminated.

The drivers were escorted to the High School Gym for monitoring with two CDV 700 survey meters. Both drivers were contaminated and were sent inside for decontamination. The decontamination as simulated both on the vehicles and the drivers. The decontamination procedures were discussed with the Zachary Fire Dept. personnel. The personnel were very familiar with the decontamination process. Vehicles would be wiped down if contamination is on the surface and gently hosed under fenders and tires. This procedure would take place over the abandoned swimming pool.

Personnel would be disrobed, their clothing and personal items placed into a plastic bag, then showered. After showering, they would be given clothing and then monitored again.

Thus, FEMA Objective #29 was demonstrated and met.

DEFICIENCIES

None.

## AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTION ACTION

None.

## AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

None.

## 2.3 UTILITY SUPPORT

## 3.3.1 West Feliciana Hospital and Ambulance Service

The two following FEMA Objectives were evaluated at the West Feliciana Hospital in Francisville, Louisiana.

- Demonstrate adequacy of EMS transportation, personnel and procedures for handling contaminated individuals including proper decontamination of vehicle and equipment.
- Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

At approximately 0923, the West Feliciana Hospital emergency room received a call from the River Bend Nuclear Station informing them of an injured worker. The call was received on a dedicated telephone line from River Bend. A communication check of the system is conducted weekly. At 0925, the emergency room dispatched an ambulance to the plant. Emergency room personnel were notified at 0928, that the injured worker had sustained a head wound that was contaminated. This information, as well as the degree of contamination was radioed to the ambulance at 0929. The ambulance radioed the hospital at 0947 to indicate blood pressure and pulse rate of the patient.

West Feliciana Hospital has a Radiation Emergency Area room which is permanently set up to receive contaminated individuals. The room has an outside entrance with a ramp extending to the arrival point of the ambulance. Hospital staff performed additional preparation and dressing-out in protective clothing in an appropriate and timely manner. When the ambulance arrived, hospital security was available to assist in ambulance security.

Medical treatment and decontamination procedures were demonstrated in an excellent manner. It was obvious that the staff had been well trained and were confident in demonstrating decontamination techniques. Two plant health physicists were available

and demonstrated their assigned tasks very well. One HP arrived at the hospital prior to the arrival of the patient and assisted with decontamination procedures and was particularly helpful in advising hospital staff regarding exit procedures. A second HP accompanied the patient from the plant and demonstrated appropriate ambulance security, monitoring and decontamination procedures.

In summary, FEMA Objectives #30 and #31 were demonstrated in an excellent manner by well trained personnel.

## DEFICIENCIES

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None.

## AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

None.

## AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

None.

# 2.3.2 Utility Issues

**Description:** The time delay between the utility decision that a General Emergency is occurring and the actual initiation of a siren followed by an EBS message needs to be reduced. A substantial portion of this time delay is in the period between the Utility/State decision, at the EOF, and the establishment of a conference call on the hotline.

Recommendation: New equipment, now in the process of being installed, will reduce this time delay period substantially. It is recommended that early activation of this equipment be implemented at all relevant sites.

# 3 TRACKING SCHEDULE FOR STATE/LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

Section 2 of this exercise report has provided a listing of deficiencies with recommendations noted by Federal evaluators during the most recent exercise conducted on February 25, 1987. The evaluations were based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of the NUREG-0654, FEMA-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980) and exercise objectives.

The FEMA Region VI Director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and support, Washington, D.C., that any Deficiencies and Required Corrective Actions noted in the exercise will be corrected and such corrections will also be incorporated into the emergency response plans as appropriate.

FEMA Region VI may request that the State of Louisiana and local jurisdictions participating in the River Bend exercise submit measures that they will take or intend to take to correct those problems found by the Federal evaluators. If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI will request that a detailed plan, including dates for scheduling and implementing corrective actions, be provided if such actions cannot be instituted immediately.

Table 1 provides by jurisdiction a consolidated summary of all Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action. The table is designed so that space has been allowed to add: (1) the proposed corrective actions that have been recommended and (2) the projected and actual date of completion.

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Deficiencies end Areas Requiring Corrective Actions with FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Correction	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corractive Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions and Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
STATE BCC DEFICIES: Sene AREAS REQUIRING CORRENTIVE ACTION: AREAS REQUIRING CORRENTIVE ACTION: AREAS REQUIRING CORRENTIVE ACTION: AREAS REQUIRING CORRENTING ACTION: A. Instruct the RSS redio station(s) to synchronise their transmission of the RSS message, with th. imitial sounding of the siren signal by sproximately four minutes. Proper procedure and timing would have the RSS message follow the siren signal by sproximately, initiation of the siren signal, at the verious control points (Parishes), varied by Several simutes, despite the agree- ment, during the confraence call, on the times of initia- tion. The sirens should have been triggered simultaneously at all locations. (FRMA REP- 10, E.S.2, E.6.2) Recommendation: To insure proper timing of ESS messages, and siren activation, the	Procedures will be revised to insure proper timing of 285 message(s) with siren elert rignals; and, to synchromise all clocks when Parish BDC's are activated.	12-30-67	Proposed action will adequately resolve this ARCA. Results will be evaluated at the next exercise.	

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Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions with 75MA/RAC Recommendations for Correction	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Cospletion Dete	PEMA Eveluation of State and Local Corrective Actions and Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
EACT FULCIANA NAMISH EDC DEFICIENCIES: DeFICIEN S)-1 Descriptions The initial activation of the siten system was unsuccessful despite two separate attrampts by the Parish Civil Defense birector to trigger it. The computer- ised activation system indi- cated that a failure had occurred and was substantiated by a hotime telephone conver- sation between the EOC and the EOC. Meither the EOC Director nor the proper authorities at the bOF attempted to activate the bOF attempted to activate the siten system after the system failed, and activated it, foilouing up with a message to the EOC that the system failed and ande a request to the EOC for them to astume control and activated them. (NUREC-ODS, II, E.6)	A Bessedial Drill was held, with the FOF and Parish EOC participating, on April 25, 1987.	4-25-61	The Parish siren activation pro- cedures were tested during the Remedial Drill. The procedures and system functioned in accordance with the plan in all respects and FEMA Region VI is satisfied that this deficiency has now been resolved.	4-25-87

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Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions with PEMA/RAC Racommendations for Correction	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Dete	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions and Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
Reconstruction: The mechanical cause of the siren failure should be determined and corrected. The system should be tested periodically to debug and locate potential probleme.				
Proceedures and protocol in the activation of the sires evetem should be reviewed and altered, if mecessary, to insure that this problem, procedurally, will not occur again.				
Training should be provided to the Parish and 80% emergency staff on the procedures and protocol in siren activation. (See Sec. 2.2.2.1.1., Remedial Exercise, for follow-up information.)				

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eficiencies and Areas equiring Corrective Actions ith PEMA/BAC Recommendations or Correction	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions and Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Com
CUMTE COUPEE PARISE, SCOTT CIVIC THTER MONITORING AND SCOMTANINATION CENTER				
DEFICIENCIES: None MEAN REQUIRIED COMMENCTIVE ACTION:				
87-3 Beeription: Local personnel at the Pointe Coupes Parish Decontemination Station (Scott Civic Canter) on February 25, 1987, failed to demonstrate adequate training in proced- ures for determining and removing radioactive contamin- ation from vehicles. (SUREC- 0654, II, K.5)				
Recommendations Provide at least one trained Radiation Monitor (RM) to the decontam- ination station and subse- quently, at the decontamin- ation station. Have the trained RM provide timely training in general decontem- ination procedures and local site-specific procedures.				

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beficiencies and Arean tequiring Corrective Actions with FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Correction	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions and Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
WEST BATOM ROBOC PARISN, PORT ALLEN FILK DEPT. MOMITORING AND DECOMPLANIMATION STATION DEFICIENCIES: None AREAS REQUIRING COMMENCTIVE ACTION:				
87-4 Descriptions Beveral listed procedures were not performed during the demonstration of monitoring and decontamination of vehicles and personnel (MUREC-0654, 11, K.5). These werel	Additional training will be provided to monitoring/decon. facility per- sonnel, with emphasis on procedures	12-30-87	Proposed action will adequately resolve this ARCA. Results will be evaluated at the next exercise	
<ol> <li>neglecting to use the headphones provided with the survey meter.</li> <li>neglacting to cover the probe of the survey meter with a plastic bag.</li> </ol>				
<ul> <li>(3) neglecting to monitor the vehicle's interior and air cleaner. and</li> <li>(4) neglecting to report to the West Baton Rouge Parish EDC when contamination was discovered.</li> </ul>				

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	Actual Completio	tiy ee.			ely vill be se
	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions and Determination of Adequacy or Inadequac	Proposed action will adequate resolve this APCA. Results v evaluated at the next exerci-			Proposed action will adequat resolve this ARCA. Results evaluated at the next exerci
	Proposed Completion Date	12-30-87			12-30-37
	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Additional training will be provided that atreeses the importance of timely requests for low-range dosimeters when the decon. station is activeted.			DOC procedures will be revised to insure resource requirements are reviewed, identified, and appropriate action is taken
TABLE 1 (Cont'd)	Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions with FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Correction	Recommendation: Additional training for all personnel at the decontamination station is necessary so all procedures are followed. 87-5 Bescription: Low-range dosimetry (0-200 mk or 0-20 k) or permanent record dosimeters were not available during the crarcise. (WWM-0-0534, II, K.5)	Recommendation: Appropriate dosimetry should be delivered from the West Reton Rouge Parish EOC to the decontamination station. EAST SATON ROUCE PARISH ROC	DEFICIESI Mone AREAS REQUIRING (USERDCTIVE ACTION)	87-5 Description: Pollowing the decision, made in accordance with pre-exercise simulation agreements, to activate only the Centroplex Reception Care Center, no management action wes initiated, at the EOC, to review the requirements

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Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions with FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Correction	State (5) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FIGNA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions and Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
(simulated) to process and monitor the anticipated number of evecuess. While the required resources may be available in the Parish, they were not called upon.				
Decommendation: The EOC should monitor resource requirements and act to insure that adequate personnel and equipment are available to process the expected number of evacuees at any designated monitoring/reception center.				
87-7 Bescripties: There was no radio available at the EOC to determine if the intended instructions were appropriate- ly broadcast of the EBS. (MUREC-0654, E.3)				
Recommendation: Provide the means for monitoring EBS messages to assure that appro- priate messages were dissemin- ated to the public.				

### 4.1 SUMMARY OF FEMA OBJECTIVES REMAINING TO BE MET

Table 2 on the following pages provides listing of those FEMA Objectives which, according to the FEMA RAC Chairman, have not been satisfactorily met or tested and which should be incorporated into the exercise objectives on or by the sixth year of the 6-year period in which all the objectives must be tested. These should b considered in the development of future exercise objectives; as well as those FEMA objectives which, although previously tested and satisfactorily demonstrated, must be tested and evaluated during any Full-Participation exercise of off-site State and Local response capabilities.

## 4.2 FEMA OBJECTIVES TRACKING - RIVER BEND STATION

Table 3 provides a comprehensive tracking system of FEMA Objectives, NUREG-0654 Reference Elements, Exercise Objectives, Jurisdictional Responsibility, Exercise Dates, Identified Deficiencies and Required Corrective Actions, and the Date Specific FEMA Objectives Were Met by State and Local agencies. This system will track the progress and status of this data through the 6-year exercise cycle in which all FEMA Objectives must be tested. TABLE 2 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met

FI	EMA Objective and NUREG Reference	Jurisdiction
11.	Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via inges- tion pathway exposure, based on field data; and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PACs and other relevant factors. (I.10, I.11, J.11)	State: Not tested 2-25-87
12.	Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (J.9, J.10.a/g)	State and Parishes: Not tested 2-25-87
19.	Demonstrate organizational abil- ity and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ. (J.9, J.10.g)	Parishes: Not tested 2-25-87, East Feliciana Not Applicable: W. Baton Rouge
22.	Demonstrate ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so. (J.10.e)	State and Parishes: Not Tested 2-25-87
28.	Demonstrate adequacy of facili- ties for mass care of evacuees. (J.10.h)	State and Parishes: Not Tested 2-25-87
32.	Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request and obtain Federal assistance. (C.l.a/b)	State: Not Tested 2-25-87
33.	Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure. (M.4)	State: Not Tested 2-25-87
34.	Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry. (M.1)	State: Not Tested 2-25-87
35.	Demonstrate the ability to effectively call upon and utilize outside support agencies when local capabilities are exceeded. (C.4)	State and Parishes: Not Tested 2-25-87

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Date FEMA Jective Met Local	Met 2-26-86 East, PtCo. Weel, EFel, Not met MBR 	2-26-86 All Parishes	Met 2-26-86 E88, M88, E88, M88, EFel, WFel, Not met PrCo. Met 2-25-83 All Parishes	Met 2-26-86 All Pariahes 
Ob State	2-26-86		2-26-86	2-26-86
Deficiency/Area Requiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.)				
Date of Exercise	2- <u>26-8</u> 6 2-25-87	2-26-86	2-26-85	2-29-89
cttonal (bility Local	м	м	м	н
Jurladi Respone State	м		м	*
Exercise Objactive Pebruary 25, 1987	Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.	Demonstrate the ability to alert Parish emargency response personnel, activate and staff Parish EOC	Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordiaata emergency activities.	Demonstrate adequacy of facilities, equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations.
statio-0654 Reference	8.1, 8.2 (54L)	A.2.0, A.4 (S6L)	A.1.4 A.1.0 A.2.5 (551)	6.3.s 8.2 8.3 (S&L)
PEMA Objectives	<ul> <li>Demonstrate shillty to mobilise staff and activate facilities promptly.</li> <li>(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation exercise)</li> </ul>	<ol> <li>Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Demonstrate shility to make decisions and to coordinata smargency activities.</li> <li>(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation exercise)</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>Demonstrate sdequacy of facilities, equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations.</li> <li>(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation exercise)</li> </ul>

NOTE: Abbrevistions - ABCA = Area Requiring Corrective Action ERE = East Batos Rouge Parish VBE = Meat Batos Boute Parish PrCo = Pointe Compee Parish UPel = Meat Pelicizes Parish EFel = East Pelicises Parish

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	PEMA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Raference	Exarcise Objective Pebruary 25, 1987	Jurisdi Bespossi State	t tonel bility Local	bete of Exercise	Deficiency/Area Requiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.)	Da Obje State	ste PEMA sctive Met Local
· ·	Demonstrate shility to commu- sicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnal. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation emarcies)	P. (94L)	Demonstrate shility to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.	pel	м	2-25-86 2-25-87		2-25-83	2-26-86 Met by PtCo. Partially Met by EBR, WBR, MFel, EFel (No Field Commun. tested) Met 2-25-87 All Partabes
<u>ن</u> ا	Demonstrate shility to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation exercise)	1.8 (1881)		м		·		58-91-1	
	Demonsitate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient redistion levels. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation exercise)	1.1. 1.11 (1.8-851) (1.11-9)		м				1-16-85	
	Desonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for messurement of atrhorns radio-lodigs concentra- tices as jow as 10 <sup>-</sup> yCL/cc in the presence of sobio gases. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation exercise)	6-1 (@)		M				1-16-85	

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				Juriadict	fomst		Beficiency/Area	Date FEA	
	PENA Objectivas -	MUREQ-0654 Beference	Exercise Objective February 25, 1987	Responsib State 1	stitty ocal	Date of Exercise	Requiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.)	Objective State	Met Local
	Demonstrate appropriate aquipment and procedures for collection, transport, smalpsis of samples of soil, vegetation, stor, water, and milt.	(198) 8*1		pel.				Partial- ly Met 1-16-85	
	(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full perticipation exercise)								
10.	Demonstrate shility to project dosce to the public vis plumo exporce based on plant and field dats; and to determine appropriate protective masaures based on PACs, svaliable shalter, evecuation tize setimates and all other appropriate fectors.	1.16 J.16 (1.10-5) (J.10- (J.10- 84L)		м				2-26-86	
	(Objective for which capebility should be demonstrated during each full participation axarcise)								
÷	Deconatrate ability to project dosaga to the public via ingea- tion pathway argomure, basad on field data; and to determine appropriate protective massures based on PACs and other relevant factore.	01.1 11.1 11.1 (\$)		м					
12.	Demonstrate ability to impla- ment protective actions for ingcation pethwey heards.	(8-11.L, 4.L) (1.8, 9.L) (1.11.L)		м					
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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tte PEMA Active Met Local	Met 2-26-36 All Pariakes  Net 2-25-67 WFel, PtCo, WMS, EBR Not met - EFel. 	Met 2-26-85 All Parishes 	Met 2-26-86 WFel Not tested EFel, NBR, EBR, PLCO Met 2-25-87 All Partabea	Met 2-26-86 Wrei, Efei, WBR, EBK Not tested Ptco Met 2-25-87 PtCo
Ba Obje State	Nec 2-25-87	Met 2-25-87		
Defictency/Araa Requiring Corrective Action (by Trecking No.)	2-23-87 Daficiency 87-1: E. Peliciana Fariah 	2-23-87 ARCA 87-2 W. Peliciana Parish 		
bate of Exercise	2-26-86 2-25-87	2-26-86 2-25-87	2-26-86 2-25-87	2-26-86 2-25-87
ctfonal fbflity Local	м	ж	м	м
Juriadi Raspona State	м	м		
Exercise Objective Pebraary 25, 1987	Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPE and diesominate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.	Demonstrate shillty to formulete and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely faction.	Demonstrate organisational ability and resources mecessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EFL.	Nemonstrate organizationel ability and resources necessry to deal with impediants to evacuation, as inclement usather or traffic obstructions.
SCRED-0654 Reference	8.6 Aep. 3 (841)	E.5 E.7 (SAL)	9.9 J.10.6 J.10.( (381)	(188) A.Ci.L
FEMA Objectives	<ol> <li>Bemonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EP2 and diseeminate an initial isstructional message within 13 winstes.</li> <li>(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full perticipation exercise)</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>demonstrate shility to formmiste and distribute appropriate instructions to the public is a timely fachlor.</li> </ul>	<ol> <li>Demonstrate organizational ability and rescurces soces- esty to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EP2.</li> <li>(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation emercise)</li> </ol>	6. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources macas- sary to deal with impediments to evecuation, as inclement weather or traffic whetruc- tions.
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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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tte PEMA sttive Met Local	2-26-86 Not tested, EBN, PLCo, WBR Net by MFe1, EFe1 Net 2-25-87 PLCo, WBR, EBR	Met 2-26-86 All Parishes	Met 2-25-87 WFei, PrCo, EBR	2-26-86 Met by all Parish EOCs; Not met EBR Reception Center Met 2-25-87 All Parishes	
Da Obje State				1-16-85	2-26-86
Deficiency/Area Bequiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.)				ABCA 87-5 MBR Parish 2-25-87	
Gete of Exercise	2-26-86 2-25-67	2-26-86	2-25-67	2-26-86 2-25-87	2-26-86
ttiomail bility Local	M	м	м	м.	
Jurisdi Responsi State				м	м
Exarcise Objective Pebruary 23, 1987	Demonstrate the organizational shility and resources mecessary to control access to an evacuated area.		Democestrate organizational ability and resources mecessary to effect an orderly evocuation of achools within the plume EPI.	Democatrate the ability to contin- woraly monitor and control emergency worker argonure.	
MURED-0654 Bafartanca	J.10.j (54L)	J.10.6 (182)	9.1 9.10.5 (148)	8.13.a 6.13.b (1881)	J.10.f (8ål)
PENA Objectives	17. Demonstrate argamizational ability and resources maces- sary to control access to an evacuated area.	18. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources macas- sary to affact an ordarly evecuation or mobility- impaired individuals within the plome EP2.	19. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources meced- mary to effect an orderly evecuation of schools within the plume EFL.	<ol> <li>Demonstrate shillty to contis- uously monitor and control emergency worker expoeure.</li> <li>(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation exercise)</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Demonstrate ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteris, whether to issue Ki to emergency workers and/or tha general population.</li> </ol>

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Exercise Objective Pebruary 25, 1903     Jurtadictional Basponsibility State local     Date of Base of State     Date FEMA (Objective Ne.)       Representing Pebruary 25, 1903     Requiring Corrective State     Objective Ne.       Representing Pebruary 25, 1903     Rate iccal     Exercise       Representing Pebruary 25, 1903     R     Requiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.)     State     U       Representing Pebruary 25, 1903     R     Representing Action (by Tracking No.)     State     U       Representing Percenting Percenting Percenting     R     R     2-23-07     Net 2-22       R     R     R     R     2-20-06     Net 2-24       R     R     R     R     R     2-20-06     Net 2-24		t ocel		18-1	1shes	7	Lahea O	O	Lahea 0
Exercise Objective     Jurisdictional     Dute of Responsibility     Dute of Requiring Corrective     Deficiency/Area       February 25, 1987     State local     Exercise     Action (by Tracking No.)     State       February 25, 1987     Z     Z     Z     Z     Deficiency/Area       February 25, 1987     Z     Z     Z     Z     Deficiency/Area     Deficiency/Area       Benometres ability to effect an orbit personnel.     Z     Z     Z     Z     Z       Benometres ability to effect an orbit personnel.     Z     Z     Z     Z     Z       F     X     Z     Z     Z     Z     Z       Benometres     Z     X     Z     Z     Z	Dete FEMA	jective Net Lo		Net 2-25 Wfei	Met 2-26 All Pari	Net 2-26		1-16-85	1-16-85 
Therecise (b)jective     Justiadictional     Deficiency/Area       Pebruary 23, 1987     Masponsibility     Deficiency/Area       Pebruary 23, 1987     Kate Local     Emercise       Pebruary 23, 1987     K     Kaquiring Corrective       Pebruary 23, 1987     K     Kaquiring Corrective       Pebruary 23, 1987     K     Kaquiring Corrective       Pebruary 23, 1987     K     K       Rescription     K     K       Rescription     K     2-35-87       Pebruaries ability to affect an of on-site perconnael.     K     2-25-87       K     X     Y		State			2-26-86	2-26-86		2-26-86	2-26-86
Exercise Objective     Jurisdictional     Date of       Pebruary 25, 1987     State local     Date of       Responsibility     State local     Date of       Embonetrate shility to effect an of envise     Z     Z       Enderly evecuation of envise perconnel.     Z     Z       T     Z     Z       T     Z     Z	Beficiency/Area	Requiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.)							2-13-87 ABCA 87-6 E. Baton Bouge Parish
Exercise Objective Juriedictional Pebruary 25, 1987 Responsibility Responsibility Exercise incol Remonstrate ability to effect an erderly evecuation of on-site perconnel.	1	Bate of Exercise		2-25-87			-		2-26-86 2-25-87
Exercise Objective Barpool February 25, 1907 Barpool Response tate bemonstrate shility to effect an erderly evecuation of on-site personnel. X	ctional	Local	м	м	м		-	м	M M
Exercise Objective February 25, 1987 Demonstrate ability to effect an erderly avecuation of om-site personnel.	Juriadi	State	м		м	м		м	jai
	Buarrelas (M lastias	Pebruary 25, 1987		Demonstrate shility to effect an stderly evecuation of em-site parsonnel.					Demonstrate the adaquacy of proce- dures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuases.
		PEMA Objectives	Demonstrate ability to emply and administer K1, cace the decision has been made to do so.	Demosotrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of om-site personnel.	Desonstrate ability to brief the wodin in a clear, accurate and timely messer.	Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of infor- mation released.		Democstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control is a coordinated fashion	Democetrate shility to setshilsh and operate rumor control is a coordineted fashion Demonstrate adequacy of proce- dures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
FEMA Objectives Demonstrate ability to supply and administer Kl, once the decision has been made to do so. Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of empire personnel. Demonstrate ability to brief the eedia in a clear, accurate and timaly manaer. Demonstrate ability to provide devance coordination of infor- mation released.			22.	23.	24.	23.		26.	26. 27.

TABLE 3 (Onst'd)

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Het 2-25-87 Utility Support Page 7 of 9 Met 2-26-86 Utility Support Utility Support Net 2-25-87 Utility Support WFel, WBR, EFel, PrCo Net 2-26-86 EBR Met 2-25-87 Ali Parishes Net 2-26-86 Local ..... Not tested Date PCMA Objective Met 2-26-86 State Requiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.) 2-25-87 ABCA 87-3 Pointe Coupee Parish 2-25-87 ARCA 87-4 Deficiency/Area Eate of Exercise 2-26-86 2-26-86 2-26-86 2-25-86 . Jurisdictional Responsibility State Locel 84 Utility Support Bupport --Demomstrate adequate equipment and procedures for docontamination of emergency workers equipment and vehicles. Dumonatrate adequary of hospital facilities and procedures for handling conteminated individual transported Demonstrate adaquecy of EMS trans-pottation, personnal and procedures for hemdling contamimated individuals including proper decontamination of whicle and oquipment. Februery 25, 1967 froe 255. RUED-0654 Reference R.5.8 E.5.b (S&L) (198) C.1.6 C.1.b (S) L.1 (S&L) M.A (8) trensportation, personnel and procedures for handling contami-nated individuals including proper decontamination of Demonstrate adaquacy of bospital (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full perticipation (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decostamina-tion of menrgency workers equipment and vohicles. (Objective for which capability Demonstrate ability to identify need for, raquest, and obtain Demonstrate ability to estimate facilities and proceedures for handling contaminated indishould be demonstrated during each fuil participetion exercise) Demonstrate adequacy of RMS total population exposure. vehicle and equipment. FEMA Objectives Federal assistance. skercise). exsrcise) viduale. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

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PENA Chjectives	MUREO-0654 hafereace	Exarciso Objective Februery 25, 1987	Juriadi Respone State	ctfomel ibility Local	Bata of Exercise	beficiancy/Area Requiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.)	D 0bj State	ate FEMA ective Met Local
M. Desonastrate shility to determinate and implement appropriate masteres for controlled recovery and reentry.	M.1 (36L)	Demonstrate shiltry to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reantry.	м	м	2-26-84 2-25-87		Not Tested 2-26-86  Not Tested 2-25-87	Not Teated 2-26-86 EBR, WBR, PrCo, EFel, WPel 
<ol> <li>Demonstrate the shility to affec- tively call upon and utilize outside support agancies when local capabilities are exceeded.</li> </ol>	C4 (S&L)		Pd	pet				
<ul> <li>bility and effective use of bility and effective use of emargency communication equip- ment and the adequacy of communications procedures and arthods.</li> <li>(Cbjective for which capability should be demonstrated during each full participation exercise)</li> </ul>	(198)	Demonatrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communi- cation equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.	84	pag	2-25-85		2-26-86 2-25-87	2-26-86 Partially Net All Partiahes No field com. trested-WFel, W88, PtCo. Field W88, PtCo. Field Com Not Met 2-25-87 Met 2-25-87 All Partiahes
7. Demonstrate shillty to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement pro- cedures in a timely measure.	9.4 (188)	Demonstrate shiity to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures is a timely manner.	M	м	2-25-85 2-23-87		2-26-86 2-25-87	2-20-80 Mer by UBR, EBR, EPel, WFel, FICO Mer 2-2587 Ail Parisbes

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	FEMA Objectives	INPEC-0654 Inference	Emercise Objective February 25, 1987	Juriedi Responsi State	ctional [bility Local	Pste of Exercise	Deficiency/Area Requiring Corrective Action (by Tracking No.)	Dati Objec State	e FEMA cive Met Local
38	Demonstrate capability to effec- tively process all incoming/out- going messages is a timely manner including the documenting of both actual and simulated messages.	1 (1981)	Demonstrate capability to affectively process all incoulng/outgoing messages is a timely menser, including the docummenting of both actual and simulated messages.	M	ы	2-25-85		1-16-85 10-15-86 Waterford 11 11 exercise	2-26-86 Met by Wfei, Efei, EBR, WBR, Not Met PtCo 
39.	Demonstrate that suthority exists in coordinating and activating a reception center (as macessary) in a timely manaer.	4.2.1 4.3 (36L)	Demonstrate that authority axists in coordinating and ectivating a reception center (as macesary) in a timely mennar.		м	2-26-86 2-25-87			2-26-86 Not Trested EFel, WBR, PtCo; Met 2-26-86 MFel, EBR 