

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)																		DOCKET NUMBER (2)										PAGE (3)																																									
Clinton Power Station																		050004611										1 OF 03																																									
TITLE (4) Licensed Operator Oversight During Review of Surveillance Impact Matrix Results in Inoperable Containment Isolation Function of Valve																																																																					
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																																			
MONTH			DAY			YEAR			YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR			FACILITY NAMES							DOCKET NUMBER(S)																																			
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1			2			0			3			8			7			8			7			-			0			6			9			-			0			0			1			2			3			1			8			7			05000						
OPERATING MODE (9)						1						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following: (11))																																																									
POWER LEVEL (10)						099						20.402(b)						20.405(c)						50.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(b)																																							
												20.405(a)(1)(i)						50.36(c)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)																																							
												20.405(a)(1)(ii)						50.36(c)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vi)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)																																							
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20.405(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)																																																									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																																																					
NAME																				TELEPHONE NUMBER																																																	
R. F. Schaller, Assistant Plant Manager - Operations, X 3205																				217935-8881																																																	
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																																																					
CAUSE			SYSTEM			COMPONENT			MANUFACTURER			REPORTABLE TO NRCDS			CAUSE			SYSTEM			COMPONENT			MANUFACTURER			REPORTABLE TO NRCDS																																										
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)						MONTH						DAY						YEAR																															
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																				X NO																																																	

## ABSTRACT

On December 3, 1987 with the plant in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) the Division 3 high drywell pressure transmitter was isolated from service for response time surveillance testing. When the two-hour time limit allowed by Technical Specifications for surveillance testing expired, the containment isolation function for the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) full flow test valve became inoperable. The condition was not identified until after approximately 39.5 hours of inoperability. The isolation instrumentation was then declared inoperable. Subsequently, the Division 3 high drywell pressure channel was placed in a tripped condition. The cause of the event is attributed to Staff Assistant Shift Supervisor (SASS) oversight of the containment isolation impact during review of the response time test impact matrix. The SASS was counselled for the oversight. This event was determined not to be safety significant since redundant instrument channels were available and since the HPCS full flow test valve was in the closed position throughout the event. The event is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to an operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Clinton Power Station	05000461	87	069	00	02	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 3, 1987, at approximately 0230 hours, with the plant in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at approximately 99% reactor [RCT] power, the Shift Supervisor (SS) identified that the plant's Technical Specifications had been violated. The SS identified this condition while conducting a review of the events that resulted in the violation.

The High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) [BG] was tagged out of service for planned maintenance at 0040 hours on December 1, 1987. The Division 3 high drywell pressure transmitter [PT] was isolated from service for response time surveillance testing. At 0230 hours on December 3, the SS realized that although the HPCS initiation function associated with the instrument had been taken into account, the containment isolation function for the HPCS full flow test valve [V] had been overlooked. Therefore, the instrument had been inoperable with respect to the isolation function since the time when the two-hour surveillance time limit permitted by Technical Specifications expired at 1152 hours on December 1. The SS then declared the isolation instrumentation for HPCS containment isolation inoperable. In accordance with Technical Specification requirements, a simulator was installed for tripping the Division 3 high drywell pressure channel. At 0322 hours on December 3, the Division 3 high drywell pressure channel was placed in a tripped condition.

No other automatic or manually initiated safety system responses were necessary to place the plant in a safe and stable condition. No other equipment or components were inoperable at the time of this event that contributed to this event.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is attributed to utility-licensed operator error. At 0920 hours on December 1, 1987, the Staff Assistant Shift Supervisor (SASS) reviewed the surveillance impact matrix for the high drywell pressure transmitter response time surveillance. Due to an oversight, the SASS took no action in response to the containment isolation impact noted on the matrix. The surveillance began at 0952 hours on December 1, 1987.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The SASS has been counselled on the failure to identify and take appropriate action for the inoperable containment isolation function of the HPCS full flow test valve.



## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/86

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TEXT (If no space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to an operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Review of the event indicates that the Division 3 high drywell pressure transmitter was inoperable for the containment isolation function of the HPCS full flow test valve from 1152 hours on December 1 until 1500 hours on December 3, 1987.

Inoperability of the high drywell pressure transmitter resulted in an inoperable isolation function for the HPCS full flow test valve for one channel. Logic for the isolation function of the HPCS full flow test valve is one-out-of-two-twice for the high drywell pressure trip.

Assessment of the safety consequences and implications of this event indicates that the event was not safety significant for existing plant conditions or other plant modes since redundant instrument channels were available. Inoperability of this pressure transmitter alone would not have prevented the HPCS full flow test valve from performing the containment isolation function. In addition, the HPCS full flow test valve was in the normally closed position throughout the event, and deliberate operator action is required to open the valve as there is no automatic open trip signal associated with the valve.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

LER 86-009-01 discusses containment isolation valves that became inoperable when test simulators were not removed from instrumentation within the surveillance time limits and resulted in inoperable instrumentation channels.

For further information regarding this event, contact R. F. Schaller, Assistant Plant Manager - Operations at (217) 935-8881, extension 3205.

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L45-87(12-31)-LP  
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ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY



CLINTON POWER STATION, P.O. BOX 678, CLINTON, ILLINOIS 61727

December 31, 1987

10CFR50.73

Docket No. 50-461

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Clinton Power Station - Unit 1  
Licensee Event Report No. 87-069-00

Dear Sir:

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 87-069-00:  
Licensed Operator Oversight During Review of Surveillance Impact Matrix  
Results in Inoperable Containment Isolation Function of Valve. This  
report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of  
10CFR50.73.

Sincerely yours,

*D. Z. Hattyschen for*

F. A. Spangenberg, III  
Manager - Licensing and Safety

RSF/krm

Enclosure

cc: NRC Resident Office  
NRC Region III, Regional Administrator  
INPO Records Center  
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety  
NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager

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