

March 31, 1998

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
ATTN: Mr. Gary J. Taylor
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065

SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY - SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

Dear Mr. Taylor:

This refers to the open meeting that was conducted at your request in the Region II office on March 17, 1998, for you to present information regarding your recent refueling outage performance and operator improvement initiatives. A list of attendees and a copy of your presentation handout are enclosed.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial, in that, it provided the NRC staff with additional information on your refueling outage and operator initiative plans.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

Orig signed by M. B. Shymlock for

Robert C. Haag, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-395
License No. NPF-12

Enclosures: 1. List of Attendees
2. Licensee Presentation Handouts

cc w/encls: See page 2

OFFICIAL COPY

180049

9804100188 980331
PDR ADOCK 05000395
P PDR

7045

cc w/encls:

R. J. White

Nuclear Coordinator Mail Code 802

S.C. Public Service Authority

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

P. O. Box 88

Jenkinsville, SC 29065

J. B. Knotts, Jr., Esq.

Winston and Strawn

1400 L Street, NW

Washington, D. C. 20005-3502

Chairman

Fairfield County Council

P. O. Box 60

Winnsboro, SC 29180

Virgil R. Autry, Director

Radioactive Waste Management

Bureau of Solid and Hazardous

Waste Management

S. C. Department of Health

and Environmental Control

2600 Bull Street

Columbia, SC 29201

R. M. Fowlkes, Manager

Operations (Mail Code 303)

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

P. O. Box 88

Jenkinsville, SC 29065

April Rice, Manager

Nuclear Licensing & Operating

Experience (Mail Code 830)

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

P. O. Box 88

Jenkinsville, SC 29065

LIST OF ATTENDEES

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. Jaudon, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Region II (RII)
M. Padovan, Project Manager, Project Directorate II-1, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation
M. Lesser, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII
R. Haag, Chief, Branch 5, DRP, RII
K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support, DRS, RII
W. Rogers, Senior Reactor Analysis, RII
D. Jones, Inspector, DRS, RII



South Carolina Electric and Gas Company

S. Byrne, Plant Manager
J. Archie, Manager Planning and Scheduling
A. Torres, RF-11 Outage Manager
M. Fowlkes, Operations Manager
M. Zaccone, Licensing Engineer

Distribution w/encls:

M. Padovan, NRR
 P. Fillion, RII
 R. Gibbs, RII
 R. Aiello, RII
 D. Jones, RII
 W. Stansberry, RII
 PUBLIC

NRC Resident Inspector
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Route 1, Box 64
 Jenkinsville, SC 29065

OFFICE	RII:DRP	RII:DRP							
SIGNATURE									
NAME	L. Gerner	P. Hopkins							
DATE	3/31/98	3/31/98	3/ /98	3/ /98	3/ /98	3/ /98	3/ /98	3/ /98	3/ /98
COPY?	(YES) NO	(YES) NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO


OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\SUMMITG17.SUM



South Carolina Electric & Gas

March 17, 1998



INTRODUCTION

Steve Byrne

OPERATIONS

Mike Fowlkes

REFUEL 10 UPDATE

Jeff Archie

SNUBBER TESTING

Alan Torres

SUMMARY

Steve Byrne




INTRODUCTION

Steve Byrne



OPERATIONS


Mike Fowlkes



OPERATIONS


"A SAFETY RICH CULTURE"

- ❖ Why was change necessary?
- ❖ What are we doing differently?
- ❖ How has it been received?
- ❖ What have been the results?




WHY WAS CHANGE NECESSARY?

- ❖ Six-Operator Errors from May 1996 to May 1997
- ❖ Benchmarking Visits to Other Stations
- ❖ Self-Assessments with CDSV Group
- ❖ Declining Performance at Other Stations



WHAT ARE WE DOING DIFFERENTLY?

- ❖ Observations and Feedback
- ❖ Improvements in Written Standards and Expectations
- ❖ Improved Professionalism
- ❖ More Involvement and Ownership in Training




WHAT ELSE ARE WE DOING DIFFERENTLY?

- ❖ Conservative Decision Making Seminars
- ❖ Supervisor (SRO) Dedicated to Corrective Action Followup
- ❖ Continual Emphasis on a Safety "Rich" Culture by Both Words and Actions




HOW HAS IT BEEN RECEIVED?

- ❖ Initial Reluctance to Change
 - ❖ Improved Standards and Expectations...
- ## THE WAY OF DAY-TO-DAY BUSINESS
- ❖ Eagerness for Continual Improvement Through Self-Assessment and Benchmarking
 - ❖ New Perspective for Management Involvement



WHAT HAVE BEEN THE RESULTS?

- ❖ No Significant Operator Errors Since May 1997
- ❖ Refueling Outage with NO Events Adverse to Safety or Plant Operations
- ❖ Improved Professionalism for Operations Staff
- ❖ Successful Results of New Licensed Operator Class
- ❖ INPO 1 Rating in Operations and Overall
- ❖ Favorable Observations in NRC Inspections



FOREMOST RESULT:

A Sense of Pride and Ownership in
Maintaining the Tradition of a
Safety "Rich" Culture



REFUEL 10

Jeff Archie



AGENDA

- ❖ Review of RF-10 Objectives
- ❖ Outage Process & Implementation Enhancements
- ❖ Significant Work Scope Completed
- ❖ Summary

REVIEW OF RF-10 OBJECTIVES

❖ Outage Start

– October 4, 1997


❖ Continued Excellence in Nuclear Safety

❖ Achieve Business Plan Objectives

– Dose \leq 95 Man Rem

– Duration \leq 35 Days


– Cost \leq 15 Million



SAFETY

Nuclear Safety

- ❖ No Safety Significant Events
- ❖ Expected Nuclear Safety Awareness Achieved
- ❖ No Reduced Inventory OPS
- ❖ Safety Over Schedule Philosophy Maintained



SAFETY

Industrial Safety


- ❖ Two Lost time Accidents
- ❖ No Contractor Lost Time Accidents
- ❖ Overall Safety Awareness Improved
Over RF-9 Resulting From Increased
Training and Supervisory Actions



OUTAGE EXPOSURE

- ❖ Projected To Be 95 Man-Rem
- ❖ Actual 170 Man-Rem
- ❖ Contributors
 - Unanticipated RCS Contamination Levels Resulting From Crud Burst
 - Elevated Dose Rates The Entire Outage
 - Emergent Snubber Testing Scope


V.C. SUMMER DOSE HISTORY




V.C. SUMMIT NUCLEAR STATION

EXPOSURE HISTORY

3 YEAR ROLLING AVERAGE







DURATION

❖ Breaker to Breaker Work Window of
34 Days 5 Hours

- Shortest Duration Outage to Date
- ≤ 35 Day Duration Goal Met
- Continues Expected Trend of Gradual
Incremental Improvement


VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION OUTAGE HISTORY





OUTAGE COST


- ❖ Business Plan Goal of ≤ 15 Million
- ❖ RF 10 Actuals Approximately
13.4 Million



RF-10

ENHANCEMENTS

- ❖ Teamwork and Communication
- ❖ Use of OPS Window Managers
- ❖ Manageable Plant Modification Scope
- ❖ Pre-Outage Task Reviews
- ❖ Resource Sharing Within Company



SIGNIFICANT WORK SCOPE COMPLETED


- ❖ Completion of 29 Modification Packages
- ❖ Fuel Handling Machine Upgrade
- ❖ Completion of Snubber Reduction
- ❖ Seal Maintenance on 'C' RCP
- ❖ ECT Inspections of 'C' Steam Generator

System Engineering Status of Plant System Performance September 1997

Risk Significant ITMR Systems

Other ITMR Systems

99 White GWWW A2	AH White YGGW A1	BS White GGGW A1	CC Green GGGG A2	CO Green GWWW A2	CR Green GGGG A2	CS Yellow GSGG A1	AA Green GGGG A2	AR Green GWWW A2	AS Green YTYG A2	BD Green GGGG A2	BP White GGGW A1	CE Green GGGG A2	CI Yellow GYTY A2
DG Green YTYT A2	ED Yellow GGGY A2	EF Green YTYG A2	ES Green YTYG A2	EV Green GGGG A2	IA Yellow GGTY A2	MS Green GGGG A2	CP White GWWW A2	CW Green GGGG A2	EC White GGWW A2	EE Green GGGG A2	EG Green GGGG A2	EH White YTYW A2	EM White GGWW A2
RC Green GGGG A2	RH White YWWW A1	RW Green GGGG A2	SF Green GGGG A2	SG White GGGW A2	SI Green GGGG A2	SP Green GGGG A2	ET White GGWW A2	EX White GGWW A2	FH Yellow YTYT A2	FS White GGGW A2	FW White YTYW A2	GS Green GGGG A2	HD White GGWW A2
SW White YGGW A1	TS Green GGGG A2	VL White GGGW A2	VU Yellow YTYT A1	XI White GGGW A1			HR White GGWW A2	HV Green GWWW A2	HY Green GGGG A2	IC Yellow YTYT A2	LD Yellow YTYT A1	LO Red RHHB A2	MB Green GGGG A2
							MC Green GGGG A2	MD Green GGGG A2	MH Green GGGG A2	MI Green GGGG A2	MU Green GGGG A2	NI Green GGGG A2	RM Green GGGG A1
							RS Green GGGG A2	SC Green GGGG A2	SO Green GGGG A2	SS White GWWW A2	TA Green GGGG A2	TB Green GGGG A2	TC Yellow YTYT A2
							TX White GWWW A2	WI Green GWWW A2	XE Red RHHB A2				



System Engineering


State of Plant System Performance


November 1997

Risk Significant ITMR Systems

Other ITMR Systems


99 Green WWWW A2	AH White GWWW A1	BS Green GGWW A2	CC Green GGGW A2	CO Yellow WWGW A2	CR Green GGGW A2	CS Yellow GGGW A2	AA Green GGGW A2	AR Green WWGW A2	AS Green YGGW A2	BD Green GGGW A2	BP White GWWW A2	CE Green GGGW A2	CI Yellow YYWW A2
DG Green YYGW A2	ED Green GYTW A2	EF Green GGGW A2	ES Green GGGW A2	EV Green GGGW A2	IA Yellow YYWW A2	MS Green GGGW A2	CP Green WWWW A2	CW Green GGGW A2	EC Green WWWW A2	FE Green GGGW A2	EG Green GGGW A2	EH White VWWW A2	EM Green WWWW A2
RC Green GGGW A2	RH Green WWWW A2	RW Green GGGW A2	SF Green GGGW A2	SG White GWWW A2	SI Green GGGW A2	SP Green GGGW A2	ET Green WWWW A2	EX Green WWWW A2	FH Green YYWW A2	FS Green GGGW A2	FW Yellow WWWW A2	GS Green GGGW A2	HD Green WWWW A2
SW White GWWW A1	TS Green GGGW A2	VL White GWWW A2	VU Yellow YYWW A1	XI White GWWW A2			HR Green WWWW A2	HV Green WWGW A2	HY Green GGGW A2	IC Green YYWW A2	LD Yellow YYWW A1	LO Green RRWW A2	MB Green GGGW A2
							MC Green GGGW A2	MD Green GGGW A2	MH Green GGGW A2	MI Green GGGW A2	MU Green GGGW A2	NI Green GGGW A2	RM Green GGGW A2
							RS Green GGGW A2	SC Green GGGW A2	SO Green GGGW A2	SS Green WWWW A2	TA Green GGGW A2	TB Green GGGW A2	TC Yellow YYWW A2
							TX Green WWWW A2	WI Green WWGW A2	XE Green RRWW A2				






SUMMARY

- ❖ Excellence in Nuclear and Industrial Safety Continue to be Part of Station Culture
- ❖ Equipment Issues and Operator Work-Arounds Eliminated as Part of Outage Scope
- ❖ Modifications Implemented to Enhance Station Reliability




SNUBBER TESTING AND INSPECTION

Alan Torres



AGENDA


- ❖ Pre-Outage Problems Found
- ❖ Outage Scope
- ❖ Outage
- ❖ Summary of Results



PRE-OUTAGE


❖ Problems Found During Snubber Reduction

- Increased Drag on Snubber Reduction Components
- Evidence of Fretting Corrosion found in PSA 1's and 3's




PRE-OUTAGE (CONT)

- ❖ PSA snubber is a mechanical shock arrester used for thermal and dynamic movement control.
- ❖ Fretting corrosion is the wearing away of the base material in fine particles.



PRE-OUTAGE (CONT)

- ❖ “Change” in Outage Strategy
 - Categorized Failure Mode Groups
 - ♦ Test all T/S PSA 1 & 3 Snubbers in RB Due to Generic Fretting Corrosion Concern during the outage
 - ♦ Put the Remaining in a 10% Sample Inspection Plan
 - Due to ALARA concerns all T/S PSA 1 & 3 Snubbers in RB were replaced



OUTAGE SCOPE

❖ Tech /Spec Snubber Inspection / Testing Plan

– “37” Randomly Selected

- ◆ Visual Inspection
- ◆ Functional Testing

– Visual Inspections


- ◆ Remaining 374 Tech Spec Snubbers



OUTAGE SCOPE (CONT)


❖ Snubber Reduction Program

- Snubber to Strut Replacements (174)
- Snubber Removal (100)
- Hanger Modifications (28)
- Spring & Strut Removal (21)
- Total of 274 Snubbers Tested




OUTAGE

- ❖ Same Failure Mechanism Found in Tech Spec PSA 1/4 & 1/2 Snubbers
 - Inspect and Test all Tech Spec PSA 1/4 & 1/2 Snubbers (Driven by Failures)
- ❖ Inspect and Test all Tech Spec PSA 1 & 3 Snubbers Outside RB



RESULTS

- ❖ Number of T/S Snubbers Visually Inspected - 411
 - One Visual Failure (Rotated Clamp)
- ❖ Number of T/S Snubbers Functionally Tested - 411
 - 44 Were Degraded
 - ◆ between 1.5 and 5% Drag Force
 - 29 Failed
 - ◆ > 5% Drag Force or Locked Up



SUMMARY

Steve Byrne