

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

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FACILITY NAME (1)

Fermi 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000341

PAGE (3)

1 OF 6

TITLE (4)

Introduction of Contraband into Protected Area

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	22	99	99	- S 0 1 -	00	10	22	99	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
OPERATING MODE (9)		1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
BATCH		97	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
LEVEL (10)			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		X	73.71
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Joseph H. Korte, Director - Nuclear Security

TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)

(734) 586-1095

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO	EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 0825 hours on September 22, 1999, a loaded 9mm handgun was discovered on the truck cargo area of a vehicle inside the protected area. The vehicle was a non-designated vehicle under escort by security personnel. The vehicle was brought into the protected area for the purpose of digging numerous fence postholes to support erection of a new security fence. The vehicle was searched prior to entering the protected area, however the weapon was located under a pile of hoses in the back of the vehicle and was not discovered by security personnel during the search. When the contractors set up equipment to perform work, one of the contractors removed a hose from the cargo area of the truck and discovered the weapon. The contractor immediately informed the security officer performing escort duties and backed away from the weapon. Both contractors stated that they had not seen the weapon before. This event has been entered into the corrective action program under Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) 99-17056. The root cause analysis team determined that the root cause of this event was an inadequate vehicle search, specifically, that a plan or method to search a vehicle involving multiple search personnel had not been developed prior to the event. Corrective actions include providing guidance in procedures and security training to address multiple personnel vehicle searches. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b)(1).

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Operational Condition: 1 (Power Operation)
Reactor Power: 97 percent
Reactor Pressure: 1023 psig
Reactor Temperature: 540 degrees Fahrenheit

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

At approximately 0640 hours on September 22, 1999, a vendor truck arrived at the Fermi 2 site to perform a job. The contractors were hired to dig numerous fence postholes to support erection of a new security fence. The truck was permitted into the trucklock and security began a vehicle search in accordance with Procedure MGA09, "Access Control," and the Physical Security Plan. One Response Force Supervisor (RFS), one trainee, and another officer (assigned as the Vehicle Search Officer (VSO)) were assigned to conduct the vehicle search. The VSO was also going to assume the Vehicle Escort Officer duties after the search was completed because there were no other Vehicle Escort Officers available at that time. The RFS and the trainee began searching the hood area and the truck cab while the other officer began searching the passenger side of the truck cargo area (rear truck bed and cabinets). At that point, a fourth officer entered the trucklock and began to search the driver's side of the truck cargo area. The fourth officer relieved the VSO of his vehicle escort duties. The vehicle search was completed and logged into the Nuclear Security Department Vehicle Gate Log and no contraband was discovered. The truck was allowed to enter the Protected Area at approximately 0754 hours with an assigned security officer (the fourth officer) performing escort duties.

At approximately 0825 hours, one of the contractors removed a hose from the cargo area of the truck and discovered the weapon. The contractor immediately informed the escorting security officer. The escorting security officer immediately took control of the weapon, and requested the RFS to report to the location. When the RFS arrived at the location, he took possession of the weapon. The weapon was a loaded 9mm handgun with 10 rounds of ammunition. The RFS instructed the escorting security officer to remain with the truck, and to maintain control of the contractors.

The RFS returned to the security building and informed the Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) of the discovery of the weapon. Security declared a Security Alert at 0828 hours because the weapon was discovered inside the Protected Area. A Detroit Edison Property Record was completed and the weapon and ammunition were stored and locked in the Security Armory. The two contractors were then escorted to the security building. The weapon was turned over to the Monroe County Sheriff's Department shortly after they arrived onsite at approximately 0923 hours. A check of the weapon's serial number was conducted by the Sheriff's Department and determined

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that the weapon was not stolen or registered to anyone in the State of Michigan. The contractors were then escorted back to the truck for out processing and left the Protected Area at approximately 1123 hours.

The Sheriff's Department turned the weapon over to the Michigan State Police for further investigation. The contractors accompanied the Sheriff's deputy to the Sheriff's Department where they were fingerprinted for comparison purposes to any prints that may be found on the weapon and released.

This event constituted a one hour NRC reportable event in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b)(1) per 10CFR73.71, Appendix G, Part I, 9(d), the actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a protected area, vital area, or transport. The NRC was notified of the event at 0917 hours on September 22, 1999 via Fermi 2 Event Notification Number 99-0008.

It was discovered during subsequent investigation and root cause analysis that the same vendor truck and contractors were granted access into the Protected Area to perform work the previous day, September 21, 1999. The truck arrived at Fermi 2 at approximately 0641 hours on September 21, 1999. Two officers and one trainee were assigned to conduct the vehicle search. One of the officers and the trainee began searching the vehicle hood area of the truck while the other officer began searching the truck cab and undercarriage. The vehicle search was completed and logged into the Nuclear Security Department Vehicle Gate Log and no contraband was discovered. The truck was allowed to enter the Protected Area at approximately 0755 hours with an assigned security officer performing escort duties. The contractors completed work that day and exited the Protected Area at approximately 1345 hours.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

This event was entered into the Fermi 2 corrective action program as Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) 99-17056. A root cause analysis was conducted to determine the root cause of this event. The root cause analysis team determined that the root cause of this event was an inadequate vehicle search, specifically, that a plan or method to search a vehicle involving multiple search personnel had not been developed prior to this event.

The root cause team also determined that several process barriers were inadequate and contributed to the event:

- Inadequate procedure - Fermi 2 Conduct Manual Procedure MGA09, "Access Control," did not include adequate guidance for vehicle searches when multiple security personnel are required to complete the search.

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- Inadequate communication – Pertinent information regarding the status of the vehicle search among the security search personnel was not discussed prior to, during, or after completion of the vehicle search.
- Inadequate training - Multiple personnel searching a vehicle is not adequately addressed in initial, continuing, or requalification security training.
- Management expectations -- Communication of what the expectations for responsibilities during vehicle searches involving multiple personnel were not clear, were confusing, and not understood. For example, the VSO has responsibility for signing the Vehicle Gate Log, but it is not clear if this signature is used to indicate vehicle arrival at the gate or if the VSO is responsible for conducting and overseeing that an adequate vehicle search has been performed.
- Inadequate immediate supervision – Immediate supervision was inadequate during the evolution and did not ensure teamwork in performing the search satisfactory. For example, confusion existed regarding supervisory responsibilities of the RFS while he was performing hands-on training during the search.

ANAYSIS OF THE EVENT:

This event had no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. Although, the weapon was introduced undetected into the Protected Area, the vehicle containing the weapon and the contractor personnel were continuously escorted by an armed security officer. There is no indication of malevolent intent. Upon discovery of the weapon, the contractor immediately backed away from the weapon, and informed the escorting security officer, who took immediate control of the discovered weapon. The contractor personnel fully cooperated with the Security Force and offsite authorities.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:**A. Immediate Corrective Actions:**

Security declared a Security Alert at 0828 hours on September 22, 1999 because the weapon was discovered inside the Protected Area. A Detroit Edison Property Record was completed and the weapon and ammunition were stored and locked in the Security Armory until the weapon was turned over to the Monroe County Sheriff's

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Department at approximately 0923 hours on September 22, 1999. A check of the weapon's serial number was conducted by the Sheriff's Department and determined that the weapon was not stolen or registered to anyone in the State of Michigan. The contractors were then escorted back to the truck for out processing and left the Protected Area at approximately 1123 hours. The Sheriff's Department turned over the weapon to the Michigan State Police for further investigation. The contractors accompanied the Sheriff's deputy to the Sheriff's Department where they were fingerprinted for comparison purposes to any prints that may be found on the weapon and released.

This incident was discussed during Security Department human performance stand down meetings, which were held on September 24 and 27, 1999. A remedial training program for security personnel was developed for vehicle search techniques. This training was conducted for all security shift personnel. The remaining security support personnel (i.e., management personnel) who are also certified to perform Watchperson duties, but typically do not perform vehicle searches on a regular basis, will be trained prior to performing vehicle search duties.

B. Long-Term Corrective Actions:

The General Supervisor, Security Operations distributed a memorandum on October 21, 1999, outlining the responsibilities and management expectations associated with the performance of vehicle search duties. During any vehicle search, the officer who has been assigned as the VSO has responsibility for ensuring that all areas of the vehicle are searched. When the VSO initials the Vehicle Gate Log, the VSO is indicating that he/she has performed or coordinated the search of the vehicle, in accordance with Conduct Manual Procedure MGA09. With regard to clarifying management expectation of the level of supervisory oversight during vehicle search activities, the Security Shift Supervisor's Activity Log contains an entry that requires a time to be entered. Entering a time for this activity indicates that an SSS/RFS is present in the trucklock and is observing a vehicle search from initiation through completion. This memorandum also included an increased frequency of training drills conducted on vehicle searches.

Conduct Manual Procedure MGA09, "Access Control," will be revised to include guidance for vehicle searches when multiple security personnel are required to complete the search. Included in the revision will be guidance to conduct a "pre-job briefing" prior to search activities that will involve more than one person. Also included will be a self-checking or peer checking mechanism, to ensure all steps have been completed. Procedure MGA09 will be revised by December 10, 1999.

Security Training Lesson Plans and Critical Task Certification Questions will be developed and/or revised to include "team" searches of vehicles. Training of all personnel in the department who are task certified to the position of Watchperson will be completed by December 31, 1999.

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A. Failed Components

None

B. Previous Similar Events

On September 18, 1996 a semi-tractor/trailer rig entered the trucklock for processing into the Protected Area and a VSO discovered an unloaded handgun with ammunition during the search. Search procedures and practices were effective in this event because the weapon was discovered before access was granted into the Protected Area. The cause of the event was determined to be that the driver did not declare possession of any prohibited items. The corrective action included placing a sign in the trucklock area that informs visitors that a vehicle search will be performed and requires visitors to declare any known prohibited items. However, this corrective action would not have prevented the September 22, 1999 incident from occurring because the contractors were unaware of the presence of the weapon on the vehicle.