



Point Beach Nuclear Plant
6610 Nuclear Rd., Two Rivers, WI 54241

(920) 755-2321

NPL 98-0176

10 CFR 2.201

March 9, 1998

Document Control Desk
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Ladies/Gentlemen:

DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301
REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-266/98002(DRS) AND 50-301/98002(DRS)
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2


In a letter from Mr. John A. Grobe dated February 9, 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission forwarded the results of an inspection conducted by your staff at our Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The inspection was completed on January 20, 1998. The purpose of the inspection was to review the Point Beach physical security program. The inspection report included a Notice of Violation which identified three violations of NRC requirements.

We have reviewed the Notice of Violation and, pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, have prepared a written response to the violations as requested by your letter of February 9, 1998. Our written response to the violations is included as an attachment to this letter. //

We believe that the attached reply is responsive to the Notice of Violation and fulfills the requirements identified in your February 9, 1998, letter. JGH


New commitments that have not been previously docketed are identified by italics.

9803160093 980309
PDR ADOCK 05000266
G PDR



If you have any questions or require additional information regarding this response, please contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. J. Cayia".

A. J. Cayia

Plant Manager

Point Beach Nuclear Plant

Attachment

cc: NRC Regional Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
NRC Project Manager
PSCW

DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301

REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION

NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-266/98002(DRS) AND 50-301/98002(DRS)

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

During an NRC inspection completed on January 20, 1998, three violations of NRC requirements were identified. Inspection Reports 50-266/98002(DRS) and 50-301/98002(DRS) and the Notice of Violation (Notice) transmitted to Wisconsin Electric on February 9, 1998, provide details regarding the violations.

In accordance with the instructions provided in the Notice, our reply to the violation includes: (1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation; (2) the corrective action taken and the results achieved; (3) corrective action to be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

Violation 1:

"Paragraph 3.5.2 of Section 2.4 of the approved Point Beach Security Plan (PBSP) requires, in part, that vehicles shall have the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area searched for unauthorized material prior to entry into the protected area.

Contrary to the above, on January 6, 1998, an NRC inspector observed an inadequate search of a vehicle. The officer failed to recognize and search an easily accessible storage compartment located in the undercarriage of a semi-truck trailer. Previous corrective actions for similar violations were not totally effective. (50-266/98002-01(DRS); 50-301/98002-01(DRS))

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)."

Response to Violation 1:

Reason for Violation:

We concur this is a violation of NRC requirements as characterized in the inspection report. The violation resulted from a lack of attention to detail and lack of a questioning attitude on the part of the security force member who conducted the search. The indications of a flap covering this compartment were hinges and bolts used to keep the flap closed. These items were in line with the hooks and other components on the entire circumference of the steel frame of the flatbed used to tie down the cargo. The bolts and hinges were unique, however, and should have been detected by the searching officer. Two officers spent approximately one hour each performing the search of this vehicle. One officer erred by not observing the different "look" of the bolts and hinges which should have led to questioning the set-up further and discovering the compartment.

Corrective Actions Taken:

The officer received immediate feedback when the deficiency was brought to his attention. As noted in the inspection report, an adequate search of the area was performed prior to the vehicle being allowed on-site. Previous corrective action for a 1997 vehicle search failure included implementation of a

vehicle search book that had photos of unusual areas which had been missed during past drills/observations or areas that had the potential to be overlooked. Photographs of the compartment involved in this recent failure were added to the vehicle search book. All security force personnel examined these photos by January 16, 1998.

Starting in 1997, initial recruit classes receive their training at a local trucking company to enhance the hands-on portion of the vehicle search training. At the trucking company, the recruits receive training and demonstrate vehicle search skills on an over-the-road cab and trailer. Also, the class observes and discusses the differences in the cabs and trailers available at the trucking company. Veteran officers were afforded an opportunity to be involved in Wisconsin State Police training for vehicle searches as part of the corrective action for a previous search failure.

As a result of this oversight, a checklist was developed to assist the vehicle search officer to perform the search. The checklist includes obscure storage areas and potential hiding spots. One item on the checklist requires the review of the vehicle search book described above. Additionally, certain security ranks have been designed to perform vehicle searches, thus reducing the number of security force personnel conducting the searches. Having designated vehicle search personnel is expected to increase the proficiency of the search officers. The checklist practice and designated search personnel were implemented on March 4, 1998.

Corrective Action To Be Taken:

Wisconsin Electric is committed to the oversight of security personnel performing vehicle searches. To this end, Wisconsin Electric security management will directly observe and verify the adequacy of vehicle searches on a weekly basis through September 9, 1998. The selection of vehicles will be random and the observation will also serve to reinforce the standards and expectations of Wisconsin Electric security management regarding vehicle searches.

Date Of Full Compliance:

Full compliance with NRC requirements was achieved on January 6, 1998, when the vehicle compartment that had been overlooked during the initial search was appropriately searched prior to admittance into the protected area.

Violation 2:

"Paragraph 6.0 of Section 2.1 of the approved PBSP requires, in part, that an officer continuously monitor outages of the intrusion detection system (IDS) by using closed circuit television (CCTV) or being present at the affected alarm zone.

Contrary to the above, on two occasions on August 15, 1997, a partial outage of Zone 8 of the IDS was not continuously monitored by CCTV, nor was an officer posted at the affected IDS zone. The duration of the first occasion was 16 minutes. The duration of the second occasion was 53 minutes. Four security supervisors failed to recognize and implement a compensatory measure for an out-of-service IDS alarm. Both events were licensee-identified. Previous corrective actions for three similar events were not totally effective. (50-266/98002-02(DRS); 50-301/98002-02(DRS))

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)."

Response to Violation 2

Reason for Violation:

We concur this is a violation as characterized in the inspection report. Prior corrective actions failed to identify the root cause of this failure to enter adequate compensatory measures, and looked only at specific fixes (e.g., individual procedure changes). We did not implement proper compensatory measures within the specified time period for a failed intrusion detection zone. There was a lack of written direction for implementing compensatory measures for a MUX failure. This contributed to the failure of security personnel to implement the proper compensatory measures. Furthermore, there was no written direction in place for transitioning between full and device-specific compensatory measures and the written guidance in place was contained in three procedures with no transitioning steps.

A contributing factor was the layout of the e-field zone which added complexity to the compensatory measures needing to be implemented.

Additionally, overall command and control of the response was not adequate. Due to senior security management's inappropriately high level of involvement in this response, the shift commander assumed that he no longer was in command. Security management failed to assume an oversight role and as a result, became embroiled in the fix to the problem.

Corrective Actions Taken:

A 30-day security Licensee Event Report, LER 266/97-S02-00, was submitted to the Commission on September 15, 1997. The report contains details surrounding the event, causes for its occurrence, corrective actions taken, and corrective actions to be taken.

All corrective actions stated in the LER report were completed on schedule. A summary of these are as follows:

- (1) The MUX for e-field zone 8 was repaired on August 15, 1997. Following successful completion of the post-maintenance testing, the MUX was returned to service at 1024 hours. Compensatory measures were then terminated.
- (2) Compensatory measures were simplified by the elimination of two of the three compensatory measures practiced on August 15, 1997. This was accomplished via a procedure revision on August 21, 1997.
- (3) A compensatory measures checklist was implemented on August 23, 1997. The checklist delineates the specific cameras and compensatory measures required to provide required physical protection of each intrusion detection zone. A revision to the governing compensatory measures procedure was issued by September 30, 1997, that directs implementation of the checklist.
- (4) Checklists to address device and related zone-specific compensatory measures were developed and implemented by December 30, 1997.

Since the August 15, 1997, event, Wisconsin Electric has adequately implemented compensatory measures over 25 times without any subsequent failures. Wisconsin Electric feels that our ability to respond to events leading to the institution of compensatory measures is adequate. Security management's oversight of its ability to adequately implement compensatory measures will continue through the review of all security compensatory actions taken at Point Beach.

Corrective Actions to be Taken:

The engineering evaluation identified in security event report LER 266/97-S01-00 has been completed. Replacement of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant security computer hardware and software, as well as intrusion detection equipment, are planned over the next two years. Specific details will be shared with NRC Region III management and security personnel during routine management meetings and future inspections.

Date of Full Compliance

Full compliance with NRC regulations was achieved on August 15, 1997, when the compensatory measures were appropriately established for intrusion detection zone 8.

Violation 3:

"Paragraph 6.0 of Section 2.1 of the approved PBSP requires, in part, that outages of IDS zones will be continuously monitored by a non-response force security officer.

Contrary to the above, on January 9, 1998, an NRC inspector observed that an armed response officer was posted to continuously monitor an out-of-service IDS alarm zone. The observed action was determined to be a routine practice. (50-266/98002-03, DRS); 50-301/98002-03(DRS).

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)."

Response to Violation 3:

Reason For Violation:

We concur this is a violation of NRC requirements as characterized in the inspection report. Wisconsin Electric security management failed to adequately administer this security plan provision through lack of knowledge of its commitments and through the making of inadequate and unsubstantiated assumptions of its content. Additionally, the lack of control of plan revisions/rejections, understanding of plan change requirements, and inadequate security management oversight fostered a less than adequate implementation of this security plan provision. This lack of security plan knowledge and an inappropriately made assumption led to a violation of Paragraph 6 of Section 2.1 of the security plan.

Corrective Actions Taken:

Additional security posts were immediately added to each shift to ensure compensatory measures are performed in accordance with security plan requirements by non-response force personnel.

Corrective Action To Be Taken:

1. *Security management will emphasize security plan compliance through the development of an enhanced security plan change process and tracking system by August 1, 1998.*
2. *A security plan self-assessment program will be developed which reviews Wisconsin Electric's ability to implement this change process and tracking. The self-assessment program will be instituted by September 1, 1998.*

Date of Full Compliance:

Full compliance with NRC requirements was achieved on January 9, 1998, when compensatory measures were assigned to non-response personnel only.