

JUN 23 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: The File

FROM: Richard H. Odegaard, SGTB, NMSS
SUBJECT: GA TECHNOLOGIES - DHLW CASK

DISTRIBUTION w/o enc1:
Meeting Attendees
NMSS r/f
SGTB r/f
CEMacDonald
Meeting Notebook
NRC PDR w/encl

Attendees

<u>GA</u>	<u>DOE</u>	<u>SANDIA</u>	<u>NRC</u>
A. Zimmer	K. G. Golligher	M. M. Madsen	R. H. Odegaard
R. E. Nickell	Frank P. Falci	Jerry M. Freedmen	H. W. Lee
Rob Grenier			Ross Chappell
Maria A. Koploy			W. H. Lake
			C. E. Williams

Introduction

A meeting was held at the request of GA Technologies (GA) at Silver Spring, Maryland, on June 2, 1987, concerning the design of a new legal weight truck cask for defense high level waste (DHLW).

Discussion

GA made a Vu-Graph presentation (attached) of a proposed new legal weight truck cask for DHLW. The cask cavity would contain classified DHLW in a stainless steel canister (24" OD by 118"). The canister (3/8" thick) would be remotely welded shut after loading, the DHLW would contain about 500 A₂ quantities of plutonium. The canister and contents weigh about 5,500 pounds.

The cask is constructed of stainless steel (49½" OD by 162") and is provided with honeycomb impact limiters on the top and bottom sides. Honeycomb also protects the lid and a impact limiter is provided between the lid and the contents. The radial thickness of the side impact limiters is about 8 inches. The top (notched) and bottom of the cask is provided with a stainless steel (2-inch thick) annular impact limiters. The cask cavity (32½" ID by 118½") may contain a removable depleted uranium, stainless steel encased, shield liner. The cask lid is secured with 24, 1½" diameter bolts and sealed with two viton O-rings. The space between the O-rings has a penetration to permit leak testing of the lid cover/cask body seal. The cask is provided with one sealed penetration (gas sample port). The gross weight of the cask is about 48,300 pounds.

8706260012 870623
TOPRP EMVGAT
PDR PDR
C

Some aspects of the cask structural design were discussed as follows:

1. Half scale model tests for 30-ft free drop and puncture - The staff points out that the cask and the scale model should be fabricated in accordance with acceptable welding criteria such as those specified in NUREG/CR-3019 (By LLNL) and under a NRC approved Q. A. program.
2. One foot free drop - The one foot free drop test condition is a regulatory requirement. Therefore, the application should show the cask meets this requirement under the Normal Transport Condition.
3. Buckling - Based on cask dimensions, buckling appears unlikely. However, it is the responsibility of the applicant to show that cask will not buckle elastically or inelastically, under both normal or accident transport conditions. It was suggested to the applicant that ASME code case N-284 may be used to develop the buckling criteria.
4. Impact limiter - The application should provide force vs. displacement curves of the impact limiter for the drop orientations considered in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The curves may be developed either by direct testing or by appropriate analysis.
5. Tie-down device - Tie-down device which is a part of the package should be designed to withstand the 2-5-10 g forces specified in the regulations to be applied at the package centroid. The applicant was discouraged to use design criteria other than this regulatory requirement.
6. Inelastic analyses - The staff pointed out the complexity and difficulties with regard to inelastic analyses. Considerable time and effort would be needed to demonstrate that the analyses are reasonable and correct and that the underlying assumptions are technically sound. In addition, there are no established acceptance criteria for shipping containers based on inelastic analyses. Consequently, the applicant must justify the technical adequacy of the acceptance criteria used with the analysis. The staff indicated that a static inelastic analysis would not be acceptable. The staff also indicated that the application should consider oblique impact angles and slapdown. As an alternative to inelastic analysis, the staff suggested that an elastic analysis of the cask be performed and be used with Regulatory Guides 7.6 and 7.8.
7. Containment - The staff indicated that safety should not depend upon the particle size distribution of small fragment (powdered) contents that may be produced under accident conditions because of the uncertainties surrounding this approach. It was suggested that the applicant explore the possibility of designing the canisters to be

leak tight under the 30-ft free drop and puncture condition and thus provides a second containment barrier. The staff also suggested that the applicant investigate the effects on leak rate due to lateral movement of lid under impact and puncture and recompression of seal after decompression. The LLNL report on seals by R. Langland was also mentioned during the discussion.

An application could be submitted within two months.

Odegaard signed by
Odegaard signature

Richard H. Odegaard, Project Manager
Transportation Branch
Division of Safeguards and
Transportation, NMSS

Enclosure:
As stated

DFC :SGTB :SGTB :SGTB : : :
-----:-----:-----:-----:-----:-----:
NAME :RHODEGAARDEN rw :HWLEE :CRCHAPPELL : : :
-----:-----:-----:-----:-----:-----:
DATE :06/18/87 :06/18/87 :06/18/87 : : :
-----:-----:-----:-----:-----:-----:

INTRODUCTION



GA Technologies

- DOE
 - K. GOLLIKER
 - DOE DHLW PROJECT MANAGER
- GA TECHNOLOGIES
 - A. ZIMMER
 - M. KOPLOY
 - R. GRENIER
 - R. NICKELL
- PROJECT MANAGER
 - STRUCTURAL ANALYST
 - NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
 - ENGINEERING MANAGER
 - CONSULTANT ON STRUCTURAL CRITERIA
- SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
 - M. MADSEN
 - TASK LEADER

DHLW CASK



GA Technologies

- PURPOSE OF MEETING: NRC FEEDBACK ON TECHNICAL APPROACH
 - DESCRIBE CASK AND DESIGN APPROACH
 - PRESENT TECHNICAL APPROACH TO CERTIFICATION
 - IDENTIFY KEY TECHNICAL ELEMENTS
 - ACROSS THE TABLE DISCUSSION



GA Technologies

AGENDA

DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE CASK DESIGN

PRESENTATION TO NRC
JUNE 2, 1987


- | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. INTRODUCTION | A. ZIMMER | 5 MIN |
| 2. CASK DESIGN DESCRIPTION | A. ZIMMER | 10 MIN |
| 3. SARP SUMMARY | A. ZIMMER | 10 MIN |
| 4. TEST PROGRAM | A. ZIMMER/
M. MADSEN | 10 MIN |
| 5. TECHNICAL APPROACH | | |
| | • HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITION | |
| | STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASIS | |
| | — STRUCTURAL CRITERIA | R.E. NICKELL |
| | — ANALYSIS AND TEST RESULTS | M. KOPOVY |
| | • TIEDOWN DESIGN | M. KOPOVY |
| | • SINGLE CONTAINMENT DESIGN | A. ZIMMER |
| 6. DISCUSSION | ATTENDEES | |

CASK DESIGN DESCRIPTION



GA Technologies

L-113(4)
5-26-87



DHLW cask cut away

DHLW CASK IS A LEGAL WEIGHT TRUCK TYPE B PACKAGING



© 1987 GA Technologies

- PROVIDES SHIELDING AND CONTAINMENT
UNDER NORMAL AND HYPOTHETICAL
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
- WEIGHS LESS THAN 80,000 LB
LEGAL WEIGHT LIMIT

DHLW CASK IS DESIGNED TO BE VERSATILE, EFFICIENT, AND HAVE IMPROVED SAFETY PERFORMANCE



GA Technologies

- VERSATILITY FEATURE

- CASK CAN ACCOMMODATE DIFFERENT WASTE FORMS BY USE OF REMOVABLE SHIELD LINER

- EFFICIENCY FEATURES

- FULLY REMOTE HANDLING CAPABILITY REDUCES PERSONNEL EXPOSURE
- TRUNNIONS ARE USED FOR TIEDOWN AND ARE REPLACEABLE
- INTEGRAL IMPACT LIMITERS REDUCE HANDLING TIME

- SAFETY FEATURES

- INTEGRAL IMPACT LIMITERS
 - REDUCE PERSONNEL EXPOSURE
 - NON-COMBUSTIBLE
 - WILL NOT SEPARATE IN AN IMPACT
- THERMAL BARRIER PROTECTS SEALS
- INTERNAL IMPACT LIMITER PROTECTS CLOSURE FROM IMPACT OF CONTENTS
- LEAKAGE TEST PORT VERIFIES SEAL INTEGRITY



**DHLW CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY PROVIDES
RUGGED BARRIER TO RELEASE OF WASTE**

- TYPE 304 STAINLESS STEEL CONSTRUCTION
- 3 TO 4 IN. THICK CASK BODY WALL
- 4.75 IN. THICK BOLTED CLOSURE
- VITON O-RING SEALS
- GAS SAMPLING PORT IN CLOSURE

**DHLW DESIGNED TO TRANSPORT
DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE**

- GLASS MATRIX IN A WELDED STAINLESS STEEL CANISTER
- GLASS MATRIX STABLE (NON-GAS GENERATING)



GA Technologies



GA Technologies

**UPPER BOUND OF DWPF WASTE
IS DHLW CASK DESIGN BASIS**

CANISTER/GLASS VOLUME	27 FT³
100% FILLED CANISTER	5468 LB
TOTAL ACTIVITY	275,600 CURIES
DECAY HEAT	815 WATTS
SIGNIFICANT RADIONUCLIDES	
	GAMMA
	Ra-137m
	Eu-154
	Cs-134
	Co-60
	Rh-106
	Pr-144
	Sb-125
	NEUTRON
	Cm-244

SARP SUMMARY



GA Technologies

I-113(5)
5-26-87



GA Technologies

DHLW SARP FOLLOWS REG. GUIDE 7.8 FORMAT (PROPOSED REVISION 2)

CHAPTER 1	GENERAL INFORMATION
CHAPTER 2	STRUCTURAL EVALUATION
CHAPTER 3	THERMAL EVALUATION
CHAPTER 4	CONTAINMENT EVALUATION
CHAPTER 5	SHIELDING EVALUATION
CHAPTER 6	CRITICALITY EVALUATION
CHAPTER 7	OPERATING PROCEDURES
CHAPTER 8	ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
CHAPTER 9	QUALITY ASSURANCE



GA Technologies

ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT TEMPERATURES ARE BELOW DESIGN LIMITS

LOCATION	MAX TEMP (°F)		DESIGN LIMIT (°F)	
	NORMAL	ACCIDENT	NORMAL	ACCIDENT
SURFACE IN SHADE	117	NA	180	NA
SEALS	169	368	400	400
WASTE	253	440	572	572



GA Technologies

CASK INTEGRITY EXCEEDS REGULATORY CONTAINMENT CRITERIA

	ANSI N14.5 ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE	DESIGN CAPABILITY
NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT	1.5×10^{-3} atm-cm ³ /s	LEAKTIGHT
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS	5.5×10^{-3} atm-cm ³ /s	7.5×10^{-7} atm-cm ³ /s

• BASES

- SINGLE CONTAINMENT CASK DESIGN
- SOURCE TERM BASED ON FULL SCALE CANISTER TESTS
- GLASS MATRIX AND CANISTER PROVIDES CONFINEMENT OF WASTE PARTICLES



GA Technologies

CASK SHIELDING PROVIDES MARGIN AGAINST ALLOWABLE DOSE RATES

	DOSE RATE			LIMIT
	NEUTRON	GAMMA	TOTAL	
NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT				
CANISTER SURFACE, REM/HR	< 0.5	7600	7600	NA
CASK SURFACE, MREM/HR	24.0	22.0	46.0	200
2 M FROM TRANSPORTER, MREM/HR	4.0	2.7	6.7	10
INHABITED AREA, MREM/HR	0.42	0.3	0.72	2
HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS				
1 M FROM CASK SURFACE, MREM/HR	< 10.0	< 100.0	< 110.0	1000



GA Technologies

CRITICALITY CRITERIA CONFORM TO 10CFR71 FISSILE CLASS 1 REQUIREMENTS

- $K_{EFF} = 0.22$
 - INFINITE ARRAY OF WASTE CANISTERS
 - NON-FLOODED MORE REACTIVE

TEST PROGRAM



GA Technologies

L-113(6)
5-26-87

CASK DESIGNED BY TEST AND ANALYSIS



GA Technologies

- TESTS SHOW THAT CASK MEETS REGULATIONS DURING STRUCTURAL HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
 - CASK CONTAINMENT IS MAINTAINED
 - CASK STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED
 - CASK SHIELDING EFFECTIVENESS IS MAINTAINED
- PERFORM MODEL TESTING TO CONFIRM THAT ANALYSIS IS CONSERVATIVE



GA Technologies

CASK CONTAINMENT IS VERIFIED BY TEST

- HEDL MOCKUP LEAK TESTS PROVIDE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLOSURE SEAL DECOMPRESSION AND LEAKAGE
- HALF-SCALE MODEL TESTS PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ACTUAL SEAL DECOMPRESSION AFTER 30-FT FREE DROP AND 40-IN. PUNCTURE EVENTS
- ACTUAL SEAL DECOMPRESSION IS COMPARED AGAINST THE FULL-SCALE LEAK TESTS TO DETERMINE LEAK RATE OF CASK SEALS

DHLW CASK HALF-SCALE MODEL TESTING

MARCELLA M. MADSEN
SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

87TM6000.29



**EXTENSIVE TEST SERIES ENVELOPES MOST SEVERE
ORIENTATION FOR DROP AND PUNCTURE EVENTS**


ORIENTATION	REGULATORY SEQUENCE	TEMPERATURE	TEST DATE
BOTTOM END DROP	NA	AMBIENT	MARCH 13, 1986
CLOSURE END DROP	1	-20°F	APRIL 19, 1986
GAS SAMPLE / LEAK CHECK PORT PUNCTURE	1	AMBIENT	MAY 1, 1986
SIDE DROP I	2	AMBIENT	JUNE 27, 1986
CLOSURE PUNCTURE	2	AMBIENT	JULY 11, 1986
CG OVER BOTTOM CORNER DROP	NA	AMBIENT	AUGUST 22, 1986
SIDE DROP II	NA	AMBIENT	SEPT 11, 1986



86TS6000.03

PROTOTYPIC HALF-SCALE MODEL FABRICATED FOR IMPACT TESTING

- TESTING AT SANDIA COYOTE CANYON DROP FACILITY
- HALF-SCALE ALLOWS DIRECT SCALING OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS AND PROVIDES SPACE FOR INSTRUMENTATION
- SPARE PARTS INSTALLED WHEN PRIOR TEST DAMAGE WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT RESULTS
- COMPREHENSIVE QA IMPLEMENTED WITH DETAILED TEST PLAN DOCUMENTING PROCEDURES AND TEST RESULTS



86TS6000.02

**EXTENSIVE INSTRUMENTATION
IS USED TO VERIFY ANALYSIS
AND CONFIRM THE DESIGN**

- STRAIN GAGES
- ACCELEROMETERS
- STRAIN GAGED CLOSURE BOLTS
- DISPLACEMENT TRANSDUCERS

**DIMENSIONAL INSPECTION
RECORDS MEASUREMENTS**

- ASSEMBLED CASK
- INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS
- CLOSURE SEAL COMPRESSION



86TS6000.05

RADIOGRAPHY AND LEAK TESTING DOCUMENT SHIELDING AND CONTAINMENT PERFORMANCE

- RADIOGRAPHS INSPECT
 - SHIELDING LINER
 - CASK BODY WELDS
- HELIUM LEAK TEST CHECKS
 - CASK BODY WELDS
 - CLOSURE SEALS
 - GAS SAMPLE AND LEAK
CHECK PORT WELDS





06TS6000.04

DHLW FULL-SCALE CLOSURE SEAL
LEAKAGE TESTS CONDUCTED
AT WESTINGHOUSE HANFORD




87TM6000.31

FULL-SCALE CLOSURE
SEAL LEAKAGE TEST
CONFIGURATION



FULL-SCALE CLOSURE
SEAL LEAKAGE
TEST DATA





G.F. Technologies

TECHNICAL APPROACH

HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITION STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASIS

STRUCTURAL CRITERIA



GA Technologies

DHLW CASK STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA ARE BASED UPON ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES

- ELASTIC ANALYSIS CRITERIA OF REG. GUIDE 7.6 FOR BULK OF CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY
- FOR NORMAL CONDITION ONE-FOOT DROP, NO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN PACKAGING EFFECTIVENESS
- FOR HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT FREE DROPS
 - SCALE-MODEL TESTING, PLUS
 - BENCHMARKED ELASTIC-PLASTIC ANALYSIS

DHLW CASK DESIGN SATISFIES LOADING CONDITION/COMBINATION REQUIREMENTS

- GENERAL REQUIREMENTS,
10CFR71
- LOAD COMBINATIONS
 - 10CFR71
 - NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 7.8



GA Technologies



GA Technologies

ELASTIC-PLASTIC ANALYSIS APPROACH IS BASED UPON QUALITY ASSURANCE PRINCIPLES

- CODES USED FOR PRE-DROP-TEST PREDICTIONS
 - PREDICT PERFORMANCE OF SOLID IMPACT LIMITERS
- VALIDATION
 - WIDELY-USED ELASTIC-PLASTIC FINITE ELEMENT SOFTWARE
 - TWO CODES — DYNA2D AND HONDO-II — COMPARED ON TYPICAL HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
 - DYNA3D, HONDO-II USED FOR SCALE MODEL DROP TEST PREDICTIONS
- APPLICATION
 - INTERPRETATION OF DROP TEST RESULTS
 - SATISFACTION OF ELASTIC-PLASTIC DESIGN CRITERIA AT SPECIFIC LOCATIONS IN CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY



GA Technologies

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE COMPONENTS SATISFY ELASTIC DESIGN CRITERIA

- NO PERMANENT AXIAL DEFORMATION OF CLOSURE BOLTS
 - DIFFERENTIAL THERMAL EXPANSION STRETCHING STRESSES TREATED AS PRIMARY STRESSES
 - SEAL SURFACE BEARING STRESSES LIMITED TO YIELD LEVEL
 - TRANSIENT AND PERMANENT DEFLECTION/DEFORMATION LIMITED TO ALLOWABLE VALUES DETERMINED BY TEST



GA Technologies

ELASTIC DESIGN CRITERIA USED FOR MOST OF CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY

STRESS CATEGORY	NORMAL CONDITIONS	HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS	
		LESSER OF	NOT APPLICABLE
PRIMARY MEMBRANE STRESS INTENSITY	S_m	$\begin{cases} 2.4 S_m \\ 0.7 S_u \end{cases}$	SEAL SURFACES, S_y
PRIMARY MEMBRANE + BENDING STRESS INTENSITY	$1.5 S_m$	$\begin{cases} 3.6 S_m \\ S_u \end{cases}$	S_u ELSEWHERE
RANGE OF PRIMARY + SECONDARY STRESS INTENSITY	$3.0 S_m$		
BEARING STRESS	S_y		
PURE PRIMARY SHEAR STRESS	$0.6 S_m$	$0.42 S_u$	



GA Technologies

ELASTIC-PLASTIC DESIGN CRITERIA USED FOR SOME CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY LOCATIONS

STRESS CATEGORY	HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
PRIMARY MEMBRANE STRESS INTENSITY	$S_y + 1/3 (S_{uT} - S_y)$
PRIMARY MEMBRANE + BENDING STRESS INTENSITY	GREATER OF $\begin{cases} 0.7 S_{uT} \\ S_y + 1/3 (S_{uT} - S_y) \end{cases}$
RANGE OF TOTAL STRESS INTENSITY	DUCTILE TEARING STRAIN LIMITS
BEARING STRESS	SEAL SURFACES, S_y S_{uT} ELSEWHERE
PURE PRIMARY SHEAR STRESS	$0.42 S_{uT}$



GA Technologies

CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY BOLTING STRESS ALLOWABLES ARE BASED UPON ELASTIC DESIGN

STRESS CATEGORY	NORMAL CONDITIONS	HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
ELASTIC ANALYSIS		
MEMBRANE STRESS DUE TO INTERNAL PRESSURE	S_m	NOT APPLICABLE
MEMBRANE STRESS	$2.0 S_m$	LESSER OF $\left\{ \frac{S_y}{G}, S_u \right\}$
MEMBRANE + BENDING STRESS	$3.0 S_m$	S_u
PURE SHEAR	$0.6 (2.0 S_m) = 1.2 S_m$	LESSER OF $\left\{ \frac{0.6 S_y}{0.42}, S_u \right\}$
ELASTIC-PLASTIC ANALYSIS		
MEMBRANE STRESS	--	LESSER OF $\left\{ \frac{S_y}{0.7}, S_{uT} \right\}$
MEMBRANE + BENDING STRESS	--	S_{uT}
PURE SHEAR	--	LESSER OF $\left\{ \frac{0.6 S_y}{0.42}, S_{uT} \right\}$



GA Technologies

OTHER FAILURE MODES ARE EVALUATED USING WELL-ESTABLISHED DESIGN CRITERIA

- BRITTLE FRACTURE
 - CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY CONSTRUCTED OF AUSTENITIC STAINLESS STEEL WITH LIMITED CARBON CONTENT
 - DU LINER HELD IN PLACE, DID NOT FRACTURE FOLLOWING 30-FOOT DROP TESTS
- FATIGUE
 - ASME CODE, SECTION III, NB-3222.4
- BUCKLING
 - STRESSES LIMITED TO 2/3 OF CRITICAL BUCKLING STRESS
 - DUCTILE TEARING STRAIN LIMIT ALSO IMPOSED

ANALYSIS AND TEST RESULTS



GA Technologies

I-113(8)
5-26-87

**EXTENSIVE TESTING AND ANALYSES
DEMONSTRATE STRUCTURAL PERFORMANCE
DURING HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS**



GA Technologies


	TESTS	ANALYSES
30-FT FREE DROPS	✓ (5)	✓ (4)
PUNCTURE	✓ (2)	✓
THERMAL		✓
IMMERSION		✓



GA Technologies

ELASTIC-PLASTIC METHODS USED TO PREDICT BEHAVIOR OF SOLID IMPACT LIMITER

- CODES WIDELY USED IN INDUSTRY
 - HONDO II, DYNIA2D, DYNIA3D,





GA Technologies

1/2-SCALE TESTS VERIFY THE ABILITY TO SURVIVE DROP AND PUNCTURE EVENTS

- NO RUPTURING, TEARING, OR BUCKLING
- NO SIGNIFICANT DEFLECTION IN SEAL AREA
- NO DETECTABLE CHANGE IN SEAL LEAKAGE
- NO CRACKS DETECTED IN DU SHIELD LINER AT
MINIMUM AND ROOM TEMPERATURE
- NO DETECTABLE LEAKAGE OF THE WELDMENTS
- THERMAL BARRIER REMAINED IN PLACE



GA Technologies


DYNA2D AND HONDO II RESULTS COMPARED WELL

CRITICAL SECTION	STRESS TYPE	MAXIMUM STRESS	
		DYNA2D (VAX)	HONDO II (UNIVAC)
1 - CENTER OF BOTTOM OF CASK	P _m	24	25
	σ_{EFF} , CUTTER	42	41
	σ_{EFF} , INNER	37	37
2 - EDGE OF CASK BOTTOM	P _m	33	33
	σ_{EFF} , OUTER	40	40
	σ_{EFF} , INNER	36	34
3 - BOTTOM OF CASK SIDE	P _m	27	26
	σ_{EFF} , OUTER	42	41
	σ_{EFF} , INNER	38	37
3A - BOTTOM OF CASK SIDE	P _m	29	31
	σ_{EFF} , OUTER	49	48
	σ_{EFF} , INNER	66	61
4 - BOTTOM OF CASK SIDE ABOVE SHOULDER	P _m	25	26
	σ_{EFF} , OUTER	32	34
	σ_{EFF} , INNER	35	30
5 - CASK SIDE 24 IN. FROM BOTTOM	P _m	27	30
	σ_{EFF} , OUTER	26	27
	σ_{EFF} , INNER	33	33
6 - CASK BOTTOM BETWEEN CENTER AND EDGE	P _m	22	21
	σ_{EFF} , OUTER	42	40
	σ_{EFF} , INNER	37	36



GA Technologies

ANALYSIS SHOWS CASK WILL NOT RUPTURE OR TEAR DURING HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS



ANALYSES SHOW SEALING INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED

- BOLTS DO NOT YIELD
- SEAL COMPRESSION IS
CONSISTENT WITH ALLOWABLE
LEAK RATES*

*FULL SCALE SEAL MOCK-UP TESTS



GA Technologies




GA Technologies

ACCELERATIONS AND DURATIONS COMPARE WELL

ACCELEROMETER NUMBER	LOCATION	BOTTOM-END DROP		CLOSURE-END DROP		ANALYSIS/TEST RATIO
		TEST	ANALYSIS	TEST	ANALYSIS	
ACCELERATION						
1 AND 2	CASK BODY	530 g	773 g	1.46	275 g	334 g
3	CLOSURE	--	1822 g	--	475 g	1410 g
4	SHIELD SLEEVE	940 g	928 g	0.99	288 g	460 g
5	CONTENTS	890 g	838 g	0.94	93 g	242 g
DURATION						
1 AND 2 AVERAGE	TIME BEFORE CASK BODY REBOUNDS	4.65 msec	4.8 msec	1.03	9.4 msec	10 msec

*LARGE DIFFERENCE DUE TO CONTENTS BEING CONSERVATIVELY MODELED AS A SOLID HOMOGENEOUS ELASTIC MATERIAL; DURING TEST, CANISTER PINTLE BUCKLED AND ABSORBED MUCH OF ITS OWN ENERGY.



— GA Technologies —

SEAL TEST DATA DEMONSTRATES SIGNIFICANT DESIGN MARGIN


*TRANSIENT DURING THERMAL EVENT

H-709(14)
5-28-87

STRAINS COMPARE WELL



GA Technologies





GA Technologies


TEST DATA VERIFY ANALYTICAL APPROACH

<u>TEST</u>	<u>ANALYSIS</u>
CLOSURE END DROP --CLOSURE--	500 μe 1450 μe
CG OVER BOTTOM CORNER DROP --BOTTOM OF CASK BODY--	3300 μe 3460 μe



GA Technologies

ANALYSIS CONSERVATIVELY PREDICTS DISPLACEMENTS



CONCLUSIONS

- HALF-SCALE TESTS CONFIRM THAT THE DHLW CASK DESIGN IS CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE REGULATORY DROP ENVIRONMENTS
- THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH USED TO DESIGN THE DHLW CASK IS CONSERVATIVE



GA Technologies

TIEDOWN DESIGN




G.A. Technologies

I-113(9)
5-26-87



GA Technologies

DHLW CASK IS TRANSPORTED ONLY BY TRUCK



I-108(16)
5-26-87

THE TIEDOWN TRUNNIONS ARE DESIGNED BASED ON CONSERVATIVE CRITERIA

- 7 G VERTICAL, 4 G LONGITUDINAL,
4 G TRANSVERSE
- STRESSES ARE BELOW YIELD
- TRUNNION BOLTS PROTECT THE CASK
FROM EXCESSIVE LOADS



GA Technologies



GA Technologies

THE 7-4-4 G DESIGN ACCELERATIONS ARE CONSERVATIVE FOR TRUCK TRANSPORT

- 7-4-4 G ACCELERATIONS (ANSI N14.23) ARE BASED ON MEASURED TRUCK DATA
- 2-10-5 G ACCELERATIONS (10CFR71) ARE BASED ON RAIL DATA
- THE 7 G VERTICAL ACCELERATION (ANSI N14.23) IS CONSERVATIVE FOR TRUCK TRANSPORT
- THE 10 G LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION (10CFR71) IS DERIVED FROM TRAIN COUPLING LOADS
- THE 4 G LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION (ANSI N14.23) IS CONSERVATIVELY DERIVED FROM TRUCK TEST DATA

SINGLE CONTAINMENT DESIGN



GA Technologies

I-113(9a)
5-26-87



GA Technologies

WASTE FORM CONSISTENT WITH SINGLE CONTAINMENT CASK DESIGN

- BASES
 - CONTENTS IS IN SOLID FORM
- TESTS SHOW THAT <1 Ci OF PLUTONIUM IN RESPIRABLE FORM ($<10 \mu\text{m}$ AERODYNAMIC EQUIVALENT DIAMETER) IS GENERATED INSIDE CANISTER AFTER 30-FT FREE DROP AND PUNCTURE EVENTS
- CANISTER HAS NEVER RUPTURED DURING NUMEROUS 30-FT DROP TESTS

DISCUSSION



GA Technologies

I-113(10)
5-26-87