



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-424/86-109 and 50-425/86-48

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
 P. O. Box 4545
 Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425

License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109

Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: October 27-31, 1986

Inspectors: M. D. Hunt
 M. D. Hunt

11/24/86
 Date Signed

T. F. McElhinney
 T. F. McElhinney

11/26/86
 Date Signed

Approved by: T. E. Conlon
 T. E. Conlon, Section Chief
 Division of Reactor Safety

11/26/86
 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved in the areas of followup on employee concerns, Inspector Follow Item, Unresolved Item and Violations.

Results: One violation was identified, Inaccurate values for electrical penetration assemblies (EPA) loading calculations, paragraph 5.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project Engineering
- *L. B. Glenn, Manager, Vogtle Quality Concerns Program
- *W. T. Nickerson, General Manager, Project Procurement and Materials
- *E. D. Groover, QA Site Manager, Construction
- *G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance, Coordinator
- *B. C. Harbin, Manager, Quality Control (QC)
- *F. Page, Electrical QC Section Supervisor
- *R. E. Hollands, Compliance Superintendent
- D. Edenfield, Electrical Engineer
- H. H. Gregory, General Manager, Vogtle Construction Department
- H. Swain, Mechanical QC Section, Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, QC inspectors and office personnel.

Other Organizations

- *S. Pietrzyk, Assistant Project Engineer, Bechtel Power Corporation
- *S. Haytec, Project Field Engineering Electrical Supervisor, BPC
- D. Wieland, Site Manager, Westinghouse Electric Corporation

NRC Resident Inspector

*J. F. Rogge

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 31, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

(Violation) 424/86-109-01, Inaccurate Values For Electrical Penetration Assembles (EPA) Loading Calculations, (paragraph 5)

Inspector Followup Item 424/86-109-02, Review Space Requirements In MSIV Junction Boxes For Spliced Conductors, (paragraph 6)

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

(Closed) Unresolved Item 424/86-66-07; 425/86-31-07, Review Method Of Controlling Copies Of DRs. The inspectors examined the methods for handling Deviation Reports (DRs) from the origin to the final sign off. This item is the result of concerns by QC personnel regarding the sign off procedure for inspection of work performed and inspected as the result of a DR disposition. The concern is that the QC inspectors are inspecting completed DR work by the craft's copy of the dispositioned DR and then later on sign the original copy without confidence that the copy used to inspect is the same revision of the originally dispositioned DR.

A review of the DR disposition cycle was made by the inspectors. The QC originated DR is processed (logged and copied) by the DR clerk in the QC department before the original is forwarded to engineering for disposition. After engineering dispositions, the DR (the original) is returned to the DR clerk who forwards it to Quality Review personnel for review and sign off. The original is then returned through the DR clerk to the engineering section for distribution of the copies to the crafts for implementation. When the craft completes the work they request QC inspection and acceptance. The craft returns a copy of the completed DR to engineering who then forward the original to the DR clerk for QC sign-off by the inspecting QC inspector.

The concern about revisions of DR being made without issuance to the field was discussed with QC supervisory personnel. The system requires a quality review each time the DR disposition is revised. If a superseded copy is found in the field this would constitute a procedural violation. The DR clerk has copies of all DRs which are available to the QC inspector. The QC inspector also maintains a daily inspection log to which they may attach copies of any DR disposition which was inspected that day.

The system requires adherence to procedures and efforts on the part of various personnel to ensure that the proper revision of the DR is used by the craft and the QC inspector when performing their assigned tasks. Adequate information is available for all concerned to perform their assigned tasks and if procedures are followed the system will function as intended. This item is closed.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-424/86-61-06, Review 1500 PSI Pressure Rating For LTs-459, -460, and -461. This item was identified by NRC inspectors during a review of Readiness Review Module 20, Instrumentation and Control. During a walkdown of plant instrumentation, the inspectors found inaccurate nametag data for LTs-459, 460 and 461. These Westinghouse Veritrak level transmitters operate at pressurizer pressure, approximately 1850 psig. The nametag data stated a safe pressure of 1500 psig. Westinghouse initiated a Field Deviation Request (FDR) GAEM - 11008 to resolve this issue. The licensee states that Westinghouse tested and certified the transmitters to 2500 psig, which is acceptable for their intended use. The incorrect nametag data was due to Westinghouse failing to change the data after testing and upgrading the rating of the transmitters. When GPC personnel

received the transmitters they did not verify that the pressure rating was correct. They looked at the serial number and the specification sheet to verify that they were acceptable. This was in accordance with GPC receiving procedures. The licensee's corrective action was to initiate DR MD8866. This DR was to be dispositioned by crossing out the "1500 psig safe pressure" on the nametag. The inspectors reviewed the DRs, specification sheets, and the certification Data Sheets to verify that the transmitters were actually tested and certified to 2500 psig. The inspectors also performed a walkdown to ensure that the corrective action was completed as documented. Level Transmitter 461 had the 1500 psig rating crossed out and LT-460 was replaced with a Unit 2 transmitter which has the correct name plate data. Level Transmitter-459 is currently enclosed in fire wrapping, therefore no visual inspection could be performed at this time. This item is closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5. Independent Inspection (51053)

The electrical penetration assemblies (EPA) installed at this site have a manufacturer's load (moment in foot-pounds (ft-lbs)) restriction of 300 ft-lbs per unit to insure the integrity of the EPAs at the containment flange connection. These EPAs are the components used to connect all cabled located inside containment with power and signal cables outside the containment. There are many cable connections which are made in the terminal boxes mounted on the EPA both inside and outside the containment. Steel supports were added to these terminal boxes for spacing, support and separation of electrical cables that are terminated therein.

During a previous inspection (see Report No. 50-424/85-16), the inspector noted that the crafts were adding cable supports to the EPAs without a controlling procedure. Additionally, there was no procedure for QC review and acceptance at that time. This condition was identified as Violation 424/85-16-01, Inadequate Procedure For Installation And Inspection Of Cable Support For Electrical Penetrations. As a result of this violation, the licensee committed to calculate the weight added to the EPAs when all cables had been installed.

During this inspection, the inspector was approached by QC inspectors who presented a question regarding the calculation of the extra load added to the EPAs by the weight of the cable, cable supports and fittings. The concern was that the weight of only one foot of each terminated cables was being used in the calculation rather than accounting for the weight of the full length of each cable installed in the termination box. The instructions for collecting the data for these moment calculations are included as part of Field Procedure ED-T-19, Installation of Electrical Penetration Assemblies.

In reviewing this concern with the engineering supervisors, they acknowledged the oversight and revised the data sheets to ensure that the weight of the full cable lengths would be used in the calculations. The inspectors advised the licensee that this oversight could have resulted in the 300 ft-lb limit on each EPA being exceeded. This is identified as Violation 424/86-109-01, Inaccurate Values For EPA Loading Calculations.

A later meeting with the engineering supervisors revealed that changes had already been instituted as the result of the inspectors' findings. The inspectors were informed that the weight all cable entry fittings, armored cable connectors, pieces of unistrut support materials, fittings, bolting hardware and corrected cable weights were now being used. The inspectors reviewed a sample of data sheets with these values entered and found this to be factual.

It was noted that the licensee had taken a conservative approach to determining the total moment load by assuming that the total weight of all items added to each EPA is located at the furthest point from the EPA mounting flange. This distance would result in the longest moment arm and would produce the greatest calculated moment (ft-lb) value.

During this inspection, the inspectors were advised that this concern had been forwarded to the employee concern's section.

6. Employee Concerns

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been contacted at various times by individuals who expressed concerns relating to the construction quality control program at plant Vogtle. As a result of these concerns, the NRC inspectors interviewed various personnel, examined QC records, personnel records and engineering specifications and details. Numerous safety-related components related to the expressed concerns were examined during this inspection.

Meetings were held with various management employees in an effort to determine if concerns expressed to the NRC were part of the ongoing Quality Concerns Committee investigations. While the concerns were similar in nature it was determined that a separate examination of the concerns was warranted. The following is a list of the concerns examined during this inspection, a discussion of the method of evaluation used by the inspectors and the findings resulting from the examination of QA records, procedures, specifications, and discussions with various personnel.

- a. Concern: The Turbine-Trip-on-Reactor-Trip (TT-0-RT) circuit is routed as a non-train circuit despite the NSSS suppliers letter recommending that these cables be run as a special case (Class IE) (RII-86-A-0078).

Discussion: The cables in question run from each of the train A and B solid state protection system cabinets to the Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) cabinet. All cabinets are located in the control room complex. To obtain separation of these cables, the train A cables are routed through the lower cable spread room and the train B cables through the upper cable spread room.

Review of various correspondence revealed that the NSSS vendor had stipulated that in the event the TT-0-RT cables can not be installed to the Class IE standards, certain other requirements should be met. The licensee in conjunction with the architect-engineer (AE), the turbine manufacturer and the NSSS vendor resolved the matter in the following manner:

All cables containing TT-0-RT circuits have been designated as special circuits and protected by individual raceways. The installation drawings have been high-lighted to identify these cable and the special designate assigned to them. Additionally, notes have been added to the drawings which require engineering evaluation before these cables can be moved or altered. All cables have been separated or protected where both cable trains are installed in a common cabinet or component.

The NSSS vendor issued a letter dated January 24, 1985, concerning this arrangement and recommends that the IE designation be placed on the system and its implementation.

Findings: This allegation is substantiated in part. The initial NSSS requirement was not complied with; but the alternate method agreed to by all parties involved did provide adequate circuit protection and separation to satisfy the NSSS vendor requirements. It should be further noted that this electrical equipment is important to safety but is not classified or required to meet class IE requirements.

- b. Concern: Mechanical inspectors being hired as Level II are not qualified to be level II and GPC is "pencil whipping" the background and certifications for new individuals (2850016033).

Discussion: The Mechanical QC Section Supervisor is responsible for evaluating each candidate for hiring purposes.

The following is the procedure used for hiring mechanical QC Inspection personnel:

Resumes are reviewed and evaluated for the need of the project and selected personnel are interviewed.

When contractor supplied personnel are hired the contractor must verify the high school diploma, the last employer and the last job description.

All personnel are tested for proficiency in procedures for the tasks they are hired to perform. The test is determined by the work for which the person is hired and if the person passes the test requirements they are certified once they have met the experience requirements. Additionally, the last employer is contacted to verify the tasks performed.

Findings: The inspectors interviewed the person identified by the concerned employee. The results of the interview did not support the allegation or the statement attributed to him. On the basis of the review conducted by the inspector, the concern could not be substantiated.

- c. Concern: The concerned employee stated that an electrical inspector had told them that documentation had been sent to the QA vault even though the work had not been properly documented and log books were not properly documented (2850016020).

Discussion: The NRC inspector conducted interviews with the General Manager, Vogtle Nuclear Construction Department, who had interviewed the electrical inspector identified by the concerned employee. The electrical inspector also contacted the QA Site Manager, the QC Manager and Electrical QC inspection supervisor in 1985. The concern was a productivity problem based on the fact that the welding inspection preceded the electrical QC inspection and the weld records for electrical supports were being sent to the QA vault when the inspections were completed. The electrical QC inspector was then required to verify that the welds for each support had been inspected before completing the entire electrical support QC inspection package. This required a search of the QA vault records to locate or verify that the welds had been inspected/accepted.

In an attempt to improve this situation, a logbook was maintained to log the supports for which weld inspections had been completed. However, the logbook indicated weld inspections completed for which the records could not be located in the QA vault, were hard to find or lost and resulted in reinspection of welds for numerous supports.

To correct this situation, the licensee established a fire proof records storage area in the QC inspection office. The electrical support weld inspection records were moved from the QA record vault to the QC area and maintained there until the complete support inspection documentation package was assembled. The package was then forward to the QA records vault.

Findings: The concern was substantiated in that incomplete records were being sent to the QA vault. The electrical support welding inspection records were sent to the vault separately from the other portion of the electrical support package. Indications are that records were lost and reinspection of several electrical support welds were performed in order to complete the inspection package.

Licensee representatives admitted that this condition had existed and detailed the corrective actions taken to correct the problems caused by lost records or an inadequate logbook. In view of the fact that inspection of supports as a part of the recently completed Vogtle Readiness Review Module No. 19 revealed no deficiencies in the electrical support area, it appears that the corrective action taken by the licensee was adequate to correct the concern.

- d. Concern: Deviation Report No. SQ-427 relating to verification of adequate cable bend radius for a cable located in a junction box being voided incorrectly (RII-86-A-0281).

Discussion: The inspectors examined the QC documentation for the cable in question. The reasoning behind the voiding of the DR had been documented. In this instance, the concern was that the cable bend radius for a specific cable installed in a junction box (JB) at main steam Isolation Valve 1-HV-3006A could not be determined due to the congestion of cable splices located in the JB. The concerned employee submitted a DR regarding this condition which was voided by QC supervision.

It was noted that the cable in question had been terminated and QC accepted for cable training (installed bend radius) 21 days prior to the DR being generated by the concerned individual. Discussions with the engineering personnel revealed that the JB in question had been examined by engineering personnel and they determined that the bend radius of the cable in question was not violated. In view of the fact that the terminal blocks had been removed from the junction box and cable splices used to replace the terminal blocks it is conceivable that overfilling of this junction box could occur due to the space requirements of the splices versus the terminal block. These boxes will be examined during a subsequent inspection.

Finding: The DR should not have been written against the cable; however, it did identify a condition that required evaluation. If the subject JB's are crowded, then an evaluation should have been made to assure that the boxes are not causing cable/splice bend radius violations. This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 424/86-109-02, Review Space Requirements In MSIV Junction Boxes For Spliced Conductors.

7. Inspector Followup Items (IFI)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-61-07, Separation Requirements For PT-405, PT-457 and LT-462. This item involves two instances where Vogtle project separation requirements were not met for three transmitters. These two cases were identified by NRC inspectors during a Readiness Review (Module 20) walkdown of instrumentation installations. Pressure transmitter (PT) - 405 was found to have flexible lighting conduit in contact with the instrument tubing in two places. The licensee's corrective action was to initiate DR MD 8876 which was to be dispositioned by moving the flexible

lighting conduit 1" away from the instrument tubing. The inspectors reviewed DR 8876 and performed a field walkdown to verify that the corrective actions had been completed and that the work was performed in accordance with GPC Quality Assurance Program.

The second case of inadequate separation was found between PT-457 and LT-462. The inspection criteria states that the instrument tubing shall not touch each other. Contrary to this, the inspectors noticed that the tubing leading to PT-457 and LT-462 came in contact with each other. The licensee issued DR MD8875 to rework the tubing so that they don't touch. The inspectors reviewed the DR and performed a walkdown of the tubing to ensure that the proposed corrective action was completed. The tubing is no longer in contact; therefore, this item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-61-08, PI-0977 Was Not Installed According To Isometric Drawing. This item was identified by NRC inspectors during a review of Readiness Review Module 20. During a walkdown of plant instrumentation installations, the inspectors discovered that pressure indicator (PI) 0977 was not installed in accordance with isometric drawing 1X5DY00977-B, Rev. 0. The licensee states that note 2 on this drawing directs use of the drawing with Control Change Package (CCP) B1022M. This CCP contains information which shows the change that was being made to the instrumentation installation. Once the change was complete, note 2 was removed and the change was incorporated into the drawing. The inspectors reviewed the drawing and the CCP. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the instrument installation which verified that the instrument is installed in accordance with the isometric drawing. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-61-09, Review Conduit Installation For MOV HV2583B For Interference With Valve Position Indicator. This item was identified by NRC inspectors during a walkdown of electrical equipment for Readiness Review Module 6. The flexible power conduit was interfering with the valve position indicator for the Limitorque Operator 1-HV-2583B. The licensee initiated Operations Deficiency Report (ODR) T-1-86-2007. This ODR was deemed invalid due to construction DR ED-13888 which preceded the ODR. The DR resolved the problem by adding a support and clamp to hold the flexible conduit away from the valve position indicator. This work was performed for eight containment air cooling unit valve operators which had interference between the flexible conduits and position indicators. The inspectors reviewed the ODR and DR to verify that the licensee properly addressed this item. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of four of the valve operators to verify that the corrective action has been completed as documented. The corrective action was found to be adequate; therefore, this item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-61-11, Review Testing Justification For Low Torque Values On Raceway Hold Down Clips. This item is being closed out in conjunction with CDR 85-84. Refer to paragraph 8 of this report.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-61-12, Review Inadequate Separation Of Conduits IAE42R3S021 and INE423RX019. This item was identified by NRC inspectors during a field walkdown of raceways for Readiness Review Module 17. Conduits IAE423RS021 and INE423RX019 were found to be separated by 5/8" at one point where they crossed each other. The acceptance criteria used by GPC QC inspectors was 1", therefore, the separation of the two conduits was inadequate. The licensee initiated DR 3397 and Fire Separation Barrier Request (FSBR) 1092 to resolve this item. The licensee decided to use-as-is based on the new separation criteria contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 25, Table 8.3.1-4. This criteria allows the conduits to be any distance apart as long as they are not in contact with each other. The inspector reviewed the following documents:

- DR 3397
- FSBR 1092
- FSAR, Amendment 25, Table 8.3.1-4

The review of the documents revealed that the licensee's resolution of this item was adequate, therefore, this item is closed.

8. Construction Deficiency Reports (CDR) (10 CFR 50.55(e))

(Closed) CDR 85-24, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Wide Range Pressure Transmitters. This item involves the high inaccuracies of the wide range pressure transmitters located in High Energy Line Break (HELB) environment. The wide range pressure transmitters provide an input into the following functions:

- Cold Overpressurization Mitigation System (COMS)
- RHRS Initiation Permissive Interlock
- RCS Pressure Monitoring

This system has been designated as a post-accident monitoring system (PAMS) channel in Vogtle FSAR. The COMS function is only required in a benign environment, therefore, the HELB inaccuracies do not affect this system. The other functions that are provided an input by the wide range pressure transmitters can't function properly with the HELB environment inaccuracies. In order to ensure the functional capabilities of these transmitters, the licensee had taken the following measures:

- leave two pressure transmitter (0-3000 psig or greater) inside containment to provide an input for the COMS.
- locate four pressure transmitters (0-3000 psig or greater) outside containment in a non-HELB environment. These transmitters will provide inputs for the RHRS Initiation Permissive Interlock, PAMS, and the Post-Accident RCS Pressure Monitoring.

The inspectors reviewed the following documentation and drawings for wide range pressure transmitters PTs-403, -405, -408, -418, -428, and -438:

- Engineering Inspection Checklists
- Specification for Electronic Pressure Transmitters
- Turnover Documentation
- Drawings 1X5DS4A07, Rev. 14, 1X5DS4D07, Rev. 12, 1X5DS3A04, Rev. 5, 1X5DS3G06, Rev. 12.

The inspectors also performed a walkdown to verify that the transmitters were installed according to the drawings. The documentation review and equipment walkdown indicated that the licensee's corrective action has been completed and appears to be adequate. This item is closed.

(Closed) CDR 85-84, Electrical Cable Tray Hold Down Clip Spring Nuts Not Properly Torqued. This item pertains to the undertorqued spring nuts for the electrical cable tray hold down Z clips identified by the Readiness Review Team as finding 17-2. The inspection requirements for Z clip spring nut torque, listed in procedure ED-T-02, is 40 ft-lbs minimum. Readiness Review Finding (RRF) 17-2 found 24 out of 105 $\frac{1}{2}$ " diameter spring nuts below the minimum inspection torque requirements. The licensee analyzed the effects of low torquing of the spring nuts for the worst case conditions under the Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) loading. This evaluation was done for both the Z-clip connections to the support arm and for the eight strut nut connection of the support arm.

The factor of safety for both connections remained above the 1.1 minimum for both an OBE and a SSE loading condition. The licensee's corrective action included craft training to adhere to installation torque requirements and also increased QC attention so that to at least 50% of the cable trays that have the "Z" clip bolts are checked for proper torque. The licensee also completed a trend report on bolting for raceways for the period of October 1, 1985 to June 14, 1986. The trend included all bolted connections for raceway and raceway support installations. The expanded sample of "Z" clips was included in the trend. The reject rate was determined to be 2.4%, which is acceptable. An independent sample of Unit 2 "Z" clip spring nuts was inspected from August 28, 1986 to September 15, 1986. A total of 19 tray runs were inspected with a total of 74 "Z" clips being inspected in the Auxiliary Buildings and 179 "Z" clips in the Control Building. No torque problems were identified during this inspection. The inspectors reviewed the evaluation report submitted by the licensee, which determined that the "Z" clip nuts that are undertorqued may be used-as-is. This examination revealed that the low torquing of the "Z" clip spring nuts would not cause the factor of safety to drop below the 1.1 minimum. The inspectors also reviewed the results of the inspection done for the Unit 2 "Z" clip spring nuts. Based on the 0% failure rate for this inspection, and the 2.4% failure rate for the trending program done, the inspectors determined that the licensee has adequately addressed this problem and the corrective action is acceptable. This item is closed.

(Closed) CDR 86-104, Minimum Clearance Between Equipment And Supports For Seismic Separation. RRF 6-32 identified a concern with inadequate seismic separation between safety-related electrical equipment and cable tray supports. Impacts during a seismic event may occur which could affect the seismic qualification of the electrical equipment. The electrical construction specification (X3AR01, Section E8) was revised in November 1984, to require a separation distance of 2" vertically and 2.5 inches horizontally be provided between electrical equipment and raceway supports. The root cause of the problem was attributed to the late identification of the need to revise the construction specification providing a criteria for separation. At the time of the revision, some of the equipment had already been installed. The licensee walked down all of the safety-related electrical equipment and found eight supports that violated the revised construction specification. These supports have been modified to eliminate the separation problems and the licensee has modified construction procedures ED-T-02 and ED-T-04 to provide additional guidance in the area of equipment/support separation requirements.

RRF 6-37 identified another concern with inadequate seismic separation provided between electrical equipment and other equipment or walls. A seismic separation of 2" was required for electrical equipment located in the main control room. This RRF identified seven electrical panels with sheet metal drip shields that extended beyond the panels which could impact other equipment during a seismic event. The licensee determined that this potential impacting could affect the operation of the equipment. The root cause was determined to be inadequate separation criteria provided by the construction specification. The corrective actions for this problem include removing the drip shields for the seven electrical panel and revising construction specification X3AR01, Sections E2 and 12 to clarify that the separation requirements of two inches applies to the installation of all Class IE electrical cabinets and panels. The licensee also developed a formal procedure for conducting a walkdown review in this area.

The inspector reviewed the following documents:

- Maintenance Work Order for the removal of the dripshields: Numbers 18613463 - 68
- Change Control Package (CCP) B10278E, Revision 0
- Procedure ED-T-02, Revision 10, Exhibit 14
- Procedure ED-T-04, Revision 8, paragraph 5.5 and Exhibit 8, Part 1
- Construction Specification X3AR01, Revision 16, Sections E2.12. and E.8.L
- Construction Specification X3AR01, Revision 7, Section E12, C1.
- Deviation Reports Numbers: ED-10648, ED-08716, ED08717, and ED-08718
- Procedure FP-14, Final Program Seismic Separation

Review of the above documentation indicated that the licensee has completed the corrective actions for RRFs 6-32 and 6-37. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the following panels to verify that the dripshields had been removed: 1AY1A, 1CY1A, 1DY1B, 1AD11, 1AD12, 1CD11, 1DD11. The dripshields were removed as documented. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the following equipment to verify that the work outlined in the DRs had been completed.

480V SWGR 1AB04
480V SWGR 1AB05
480V MCC 1ABA

480V MCC 1ABC
480V MCC 1ABE
480V MCC 1ABF

The supports which violated the separation requirement have been removed/modified as documented. This item is closed.