ENCLOSURE 1

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

(TVA-SQN-TS-87-35)

LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES

Unit 1

3/4 4-15a

Unit 2

3/4 4-20

TABLE 3.4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION
63-560	Accumulator Discharge
63-561	Accumulator Discharge
63-562	Accumulator Discharge
63-563	Accumulator Discharge
63-622	Accumulator Discharge
63-623	Accumulator Discharge
63-624	Accumulator Discharge
63-625	Accumulator Discharge
63-551	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-553	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-557	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-555	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-632	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-633	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-634	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-635	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-641	Residual Heat Removal/Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-644	Residual Heat Removal/Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-558	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-559	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-543	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-545	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-547	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-549	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-640	Residual Heat Removal (Hot Leg)
63-643	Residual Heat Removal (Hot Leg)
87-558	Upper Head Injection
87-559	Upper Head Injection
87-560	Upper Head Injection
87-561	Upper Head Injection
87-562	Upper Head Injection
87-563	Upper Head Injection
FCV-74-1*	Residual Heat Removal
FCV-74-2*	Residual Heat Removal
FCV-87-7*	Upper Head Injection (Charging Header)
FCV-87-8*	Upper Head Injection (Charging Header)

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*These valves do not have to be leak tested following manual or automatic actuation or flow through the valve.

~~June 20, 1985~~
~~Amendment No. 39~~

TABLE 3.4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION
63-560	Accumulator Discharge
63-561	Accumulator Discharge
63-562	Accumulator Discharge
63-563	Accumulator Discharge
63-622	Accumulator Discharge
63-623	Accumulator Discharge
63-624	Accumulator Discharge
63-625	Accumulator Discharge
63-551	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-553	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-557	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-555	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-632	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-633	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-634	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-635	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-641	Residual Heat Removal/Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-644	Residual Heat Removal/Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-558	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-559	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-543	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-545	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-547	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-549	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-640	Residual Heat Removal (Hot Leg)
63-643	Residual Heat Removal (Hot Leg)
87-558	Upper Head Injection
87-559	Upper Head Injection
87-560	Upper Head Injection
87-561	Upper Head Injection
87-562	Upper Head Injection
87-563	Upper Head Injection
FCV-74-1*	Residual Heat Removal
FCV-74-2*	Residual Heat Removal
FCV-87-7*	Upper Head Injection (Charging Header)
FCV-87-8*	Upper Head Injection (Charging Header)

*These valves do not have to be leak tested following manual or automatic actuation or flow through the valve.

ENCLOSURE 2

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

(TVA-SQN-TS-87-35)

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION TO ADD REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

ENCLOSURE 2

Description of Change

The proposed change will add requirements for two flow control valves (FCV-87-7 and FCV-87-8) to Table 3.4-1, "Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves."

Reason for Change

The referenced safety evaluation report (SER) identified the need for inclusion of valves FCV-87-7 and FCV-87-8 to table 3.4-1. These valves are located in a line connecting the liquid waste disposal system to the upper head injection (UHI) system. The purpose of this line is leakage testing of the UHI check valves. The valves in table 3.4-1 are required to be operable in order to prevent leakage from the reactor coolant system (RCS) into a lower pressure system. The inoperability of these valves creates the potential of an intersystem loss of coolant accident (LOCA). As such, the subject valves should be listed in table 3.4-1 to ensure the appropriate limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements are satisfied.

Justification for Change

The UHI system, which has a design pressure below the RCS operating pressure, is connected to the RCS through two main injection lines that branch into four reactor head injection lines. The main injection lines are isolated from the RCS with series check valves. Test and drain lines connect between the series check valves. Each test and drain line has an air-operated globe valve which serves a pressure isolation function to protect the UHI system from pressures which exceed its design limit.

The UHI system is shown in figure 6.3.2-15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). TVA valves FCV-87-7 and FCV-87-8 are designated 1-9984A and 1-9984B on the FSAR figure since it is a vendor drawing. These valves are located in a line connecting the UHI system to the liquid waste disposal system and perform this pressure isolation function. These valves are designed, installed, and maintained as RCS pressure isolation valves. The subject valves are leak rate tested to the requirements of Surveillance Instruction (SI)-166.11, "UHI Check Valve Integrity." These valves have inadvertently been omitted in table 3.4-1. Since these valves are air-operated valves, it is not necessary to perform testing following manual or automatic actuation or flow through the valve. This is indicated by the asterisk in table 3.4-1.

The proposed change will add requirements to table 3.4-1 to include flow control valves FCV-87-7 and FCV-87-8. Inclusion of the subject valves will ensure that the condition of these valves is adequate to maintain redundant isolation and system integrity.

Reference

T. M. Novak's letter to H. G. Parris dated April 5, 1985, "Safety Evaluation Report on Sequoyah Inservice Test Program for Pumps and Valves (IST)."

ENCLOSURE 3

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

(TVA-SQN-TS-87-35)

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS
FOR ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTOR COOLANT
SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

ENCLOSURE 3

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report significantly increased?

   No. The proposed amendment to the technical specifications changes Table 3.4-1, "Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves," to include flow control valves FCV-87-7 and FCV-87-8. The omission of the subject valves from table 3.4-1 was an oversight. The subject valves currently undergo testing as pressure isolation valves as identified in Surveillance Instruction (SI)-166.11, "Upper Head Injection Check Valve Integrity." The proposed change will provide for the two valves to be subject to the limiting condition for operation for pressure isolation valves and the corresponding surveillance requirements (SRs). Thus, the proposed amendment will provide for increased administrative controls over the subject valves.

2. Is the possibility for an accident of a new or different type than evaluated previously in the safety analysis report created?

   No. Flow control valves FCV-87-7 and FCV-87-8 are designed, installed, and maintained as reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure isolation valves. The proposed amendment does not involve a change in hardware capabilities or a modification in the operation of the plant.

3. Is the margin of safety significantly reduced?

   No. The margin of safety has actually been increased. The proposed amendment will provide additional assurance that FCV-87-7 and FCV-87-8 will perform their intended function and provide for remedial action should it be determined that the valves are inoperable. Continued operability of these valves will ensure redundant isolation and system integrity are maintained.