



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555


March 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino
Commissioner Roberts
Commissioner Asselstine
Commissioner Bernthal
Commissioner Zech

FROM: Victor Stello, Jr.
Acting Executive Director
for Operations

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO RANCHO SECO AIT

Attached, for your information, are
follow-up instructions to the Rancho Seco AIT.
The various schedules and information asked
for by the Commission in SECY's March 6
SRM will follow separately.


Victor Stello, Jr.
Acting Executive Director
for Operations

Enclosure:
Memo fm Stello to Denton,
Taylor, and Martin
dated 3/13/86

cc: OGC
OPE
SECY

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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MAR 13 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director, NRR
James M. Taylor, Director, IE
John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V

FROM: Victor Stello, Jr.
Acting Executive Director
for Operations

SUBJECT: STAFF ACTIONS RESULTING FROM THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE DECEMBER 26, 1985 INCIDENT AT RANCHO
SECO (NUREG-1195)

An advance copy of the subject report was transmitted to you by memorandum dated February 15, 1986 from the Rancho Seco Team Leader, Frederick J. Hebdon. The report documents the Team's efforts in identifying the circumstances and causes of the December 26, 1985 incident, together with findings and conclusions which form the bases for follow-on actions.

You will note from the report that the licensee has completed troubleshooting the quarantined equipment; however, some additional analysis and testing of the Integrated Control System (ICS), and particularly the ICS Power Supply Monitor, is still planned by the licensee. Consequently, the results of future analysis and testing may form the basis for additional follow-on actions. The identification of these additional actions is a responsibility of the normal program offices. The responsibility for the follow-up and reporting on the licensee's continued analysis and testing is Region V.

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and assign responsibility for generic and plant-specific actions resulting from the investigation of the Rancho Seco incident as documented in NUREG-1195. In this regard, you are requested to review the enclosure which specifies staff actions resulting from the investigation of the Rancho Seco incident. You are requested to determine the actions necessary to resolve each of the issues in your area of responsibility and, where appropriate, identify additional staff actions or revisions as our review and understanding of this event are refined. Plant-specific actions required for plant restart should receive priority attention.

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In view of the importance of this subject, I intend to closely monitor the resolution of these items. By April 14, 1986, please provide a written summary of the plans, schedule, and status for each item within your responsibility listed in the enclosure or that you have identified. Further, I request that you prepare a written status report on the disposition of your items (and anticipated actions for uncompleted items) within 6 months. Every effort should be made to resolve these items promptly.

The enclosure is based on the Team's report and its presentation to the Commission on February 25, 1986. Accordingly, it does not include all licensee actions, nor does it cover NRC staff activities associated with normal event follow-up such as authorization for restart, plant inspections, or possible enforcement items. These items are expected to be defined and implemented in a routine manner. Overall lead responsibility for staff actions relating to facility restart is separate from this effort and rests with NRR. Thus, NRR is responsible for coordinating and promptly communicating the staff's requirements which must be resolved before operations at Rancho Seco may be resumed. Other offices involved in plant-specific actions are to coordinate their efforts with NRR.

Original signed by
Victor Stello

Victor Stello, Jr.
Acting Executive Director
for Operations

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/enclosure:
J. Davis, NMSS
T. Murley, RI
J. N. Grace, RII
J. Keppler, RIII
R. Martin, RIV

Distribution

AEOD S/F
AEOD C/F
CHeltemes
VStello
EDO Reading File

*See previous concurrence - Revised per Stello 3/13/86

OFC	:D:AEOD*	:EDO	:	:	:	:	:
NAME	:CHeltemes:jz:	VStello	:	:	:	:	:
DATE	:3/10/86	:3/13/86	:	:	:	:	:

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

STAFF ACTIONS RESULTING FROM THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE DECEMBER 26, 1985 RANCHO SECO INCIDENT
(Reference: NUREG-1195)

1. Issue: Adequacy of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
a. Verify the acceptability of the existing initiation and control of the AFW system. (Section 7.2)	NRR	Plant Specific
b. Determine the status of any licensee commitment to install the EFIC system, and determine the acceptability of the current schedule for installation. (Principal Finding #11)	NRR	B&W Generic Review

2. Issue: Completeness of various staff and licensee actions associated with control systems.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
a. In light of the ongoing B&W generic review, assess the need to reevaluate the actions taken by the staff and by the licensees in response to the findings, conclusions, and recommendations associated with BAW-1564; Bulletin 79-27; NUREG-0667; the February 1980 loss of NNI power at Crystal River; the March 19, 1984 partial loss of NNI at Rancho Seco; and BAW-1791. (Principal Finding #15 and Other Finding #11).	NRR	Generic
b. Assess the need to expand the scope of USI A-47 to include additional consideration of frequent events with undesirable consequences even if the consequences of a particular event are bounded by the FSAR analysis, and the degree to which events that are not significant at the referenced plants might be significant at other plants. (Principal Finding #15h)	NRR	Generic
c. Consider the need for issuing further generic communications.	IE	Generic

3. Issue: Adequacy of the design of the integrated control system (ICS).

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
Assess the adequacy of the design of the ICS. Particular features to be included are:	NRR	B&W Generic Review
a. Whether the ICS is sufficiently reliable to assure that the frequency of unnecessary safety challenges is acceptably low (i.e., is the ICS properly classified as a nonsafety-related system).		
b. Loss of remote (i.e., hand) power coincident with loss of automatic control. (Principal Finding #2)		
c. Results of SMUD's analysis to date of the power supply monitor. (Principal Finding #1)		
d. Results of SMUD's contractor analysis of the power supply monitor. (Principal Finding #1)		
e. Role of the power supply monitor as a potential single failure in the ICS and/or NNI. (Principal Finding #1)		
f. Results of a study of the response of the ICS upon restoration of power. (Other Finding #3)		
g. Acceptability of the failure mode of meters and recorders that are affected by a loss of ICS power. (Other Finding #4)		

4. Issue: Adequacy of the maintenance program for manual isolation valves.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
a. Evaluate the need for a maintenance program for manual isolation valves in safety-related systems. (Principal Finding #3)	Region V	Plant Specific

- b. Evaluate the adequacy of industry standards and NRC requirements regarding periodic testing and maintenance of manual valves in safety-related systems. (Principal Finding #3)

NRR

Generic

5. Issue: Adequacy of procedures and training.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
Evaluate the adequacy of the procedures and operator (licensed and nonlicensed) training, particularly with regard to:		
a. The degree to which event specific procedures (e.g., loss of ICS, station black-out) are needed to quickly recover from events that have been diagnosed by the operators, and to mitigate such events if the initiating condition cannot be immediately corrected. (Principal Findings #4 and #7)	NRR	Generic
b. The consistency between the EOPs and the ATOGs, and the adequacy of operator training on EOPs.	Region V	Plant Specific
c. The consistency between EOPs and NRC approved procedure generation packages.	IE	Generic
d. The adequacy of procedural guidance concerning: (1) when to trip auxiliary feedwater pumps and (2) the relative priorities of avoiding the PTS region and maintaining pressurizer level. (Principal Findings #5 and 6)	Region V NRR	Plant Specific B&W Generic Review
e. The adequacy of the training of nonlicensed operators in the use of valve wrenches, the methods for manually overriding and operating valves, and the use of various indications of valve position. (Principal Finding #9)	Region V	Plant Specific

f. The adequacy of the annunciator response procedures (e.g., the Annunciator Procedures Manual). (Other Finding #2)	Region V	Plant Specific
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g. The adequacy of the program to insure that all applicable procedures and operator training are reviewed and updated when plant modifications are made. (Other Finding #5)	Region V	Plant Specific
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6. Issue: Adequacy of the radiological control and emergency preparedness program.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
Evaluate the adequacy of the radiological control and emergency preparedness program, including procedures, operator training, equipment availability, and coordination between operating and health physics personnel. (Principal Finding #10 and other Finding #5)	Region V	Plant Specific

7. Issue: Adequacy of the FSAR accident analysis.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
Verify the adequacy of the Rancho Seco FSAR accident analysis, particularly the degree to which credit is given for the nonsafety-related ICS and the nonsafety-related Main Steamline Failure Logic. (Section 9) and (Principal Finding #14)	NRR	B&W Generic Review

8. Issue: Adequacy of required staffing.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
Evaluate the adequacy of plant staffing to deal with expected operational transients. (Other Finding #7)	NRR	B&W Generic Review

9. Issue: Adequacy of the troubleshooting program.

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsible Office</u>	<u>Category</u>
Evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's program to trouble-shoot damaged equipment in a controlled and systematic manner to determine the root cause and appropriate corrective actions. (Other Finding #9)	Region V	Plant specific