



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 140T0

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION  
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA  
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-321

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 4, 1987, (Reference 1), and supplemented by letter dated April 21, 1987 (Reference 2), the licensee requested a revision to portions of the Hatch Unit 1, Technical Specifications relating to primary containment isolation valves. Principally, the licensee's proposal utilizes the findings and recommendations in a staff SER dated October 30, 1986 (Reference 3). This evaluation assesses the Hatch, Unit 1, updated containment leak rate test program and its conformance to the staff SER of October 30, 1986, and to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

As discussed in the SER dated October 30, 1986, the staff found the licensee's updated containment leak rate test program and its associated modifications to the Hatch, Unit 1, Technical Specifications to be acceptable, except for the proposal to delete several Technical Specification tables which listed the containment isolation components. The staff also found acceptable the proposed exemption request for Appendix J regarding the MSIV testing pressure.

EVALUATION

The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal dated March 4, 1987. The majority of the proposed changes involve modifications to Technical Specifications (TS) Table 3.7-4, "Primary Containment Testable Isolation Valves." In its submittal, the licensee organized the requested changes into five separate items.

Regarding proposed change Items 1 and 2, the licensee requested deletion of selected containment isolation valves from TS Table 3.7-4. This table specifies valves that are required to be tested pursuant to Appendix J requirements. The licensee cites the staff's SER dated October 30, 1986 as a basis for the proposed deletions. As discussed in the staff's SER, piping systems that penetrate the torus and terminate below the water line of the torus do not have to satisfy Appendix J requirements since a supply of water in the torus is assured during post-accident conditions. Consequently, the licensee proposed to delete the affected isolation valves (as listed in its

March 4, 1987 submittal) from TS Table 3.7-4. Moreover, the licensee indicated that these selected valves will be tested in accordance with ASME code, Section XI, requirements. Thus, the staff finds the proposed changes are appropriate and consistent with our SER.

The licensee's letter of April 21, 1987 (Reference 2) withdrew the request for the changes originally proposed as change 3 in the letter of March 4, 1987 (Reference 1). Therefore, no change to the Technical Specifications is required for this item.

Regarding proposed changes for item 4, the licensee requested a number of changes to Table 3.7-4. These changes are editorial in nature and would correct several inaccuracies. Also, these changes do not alter testing requirements. The staff finds the proposed changes do clarify the TS and, therefore, are acceptable.

Lastly, regarding item 5, the licensee requested that a value of 28 psig pressure be inserted into TS Section 4.7.A.2.h, replacing the 1/2 Pa term. This TS section specifies the test pressure and the leakage criteria for leak testing the MSIVs. The licensee has indicated that 1/2 Pa is equal to 29.5 psig. As discussed in the SER dated October 30, 1986, the staff provided an evaluation allowing the MSIVs to be tested at a reduced pressure (an exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J) of 28 psig, but erroneously indicated the value is 1/2 Pa. But the evaluation was based on 28 psig. In addition, the licensee indicates that Hatch Unit 1 was originally licensed with a requirement that the MSIVs be tested at a test pressure of 28 psig. Moreover, the licensee notes that the inboard MSIV would begin to lift at a pressure of about 28.5 psig, resulting in a meaningless test.

Even though 28 psig is not equal to 1/2 Pa, the technical assessment as documented by the staff remains unchanged. Therefore, the staff concurs with the licensee's proposal to appropriately insert 28 psig in TS Section 4.7.A.2.h.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will have no significant impact on the environment (52 FR 21398 ).

#### CONCLUSION

Notice of opportunity for a prior hearing was published in the Federal Register on March 27, 1987 (52 FR 9980). No requests for a hearing were received.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

REFERENCES

1. Letter from J. P. O'Reilly, Georgia Power Company, to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated March 4, 1987.
2. Letter from L. T. Gucwa, Georgia Power Company, to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated April 21, 1987.
3. Letter from G. W. Rivenbark, NRC, to J. T. Beckham, Jr., Georgia Power Company, dated October 30, 1986.

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Dated: June 5, 1987