

DEC 01 1986

Docket No. 50-315

Docket No. 50-316

American Electric Power Service
Company
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. John E. Dolan
Vice Chairman
Engineering and Construction
1 Riverside Plaza
Columbus, OH 43216

Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated October 21, 1986, and associated final exercise evaluation on the offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted on June 10, 1986, for the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, which included the State of Michigan and Berrien County. This final exercise evaluation lists one Deficiency regarding the offsite emergency response plans for the area around the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant.

The Deficiency concerned problems associated with public alerting and instruction observed throughout the exercise. On September 22, 1986, a remedial exercise was conducted that rectified the Deficiency. Therefore, the Deficiency does not adversely impact the September 30, 1983 approval under 44 CFR 350.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

"Original signed by W.D. Shafer"

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W. D. Shafer, Chief
Emergency Preparedness and
Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure: As stated

See Attached Distribution

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Foster/ib

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YES

RIII

[Signature]
Snell
12/1/86

RIII

[Signature]
Burgess

12/1/86

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Shafer

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American Electric Power Service
Company

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DEC 01 1986

Distribution

cc w/enclosure:

W. G. Smith, Jr., Plant Manager
DCS/RSB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch
Resident Inspector, RIII
Ronald Callen, Michigan
Public Service Commission
EIS Coordinator, USEPA
Region 5 Office
Nuclear Facilities and
Environmental Monitoring
Section

cc w/o enclosure:

D. Matthews, EPB, OIE
W. Weaver, FEMA Region V



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

OCT 21 1986

PRIORITY ROUTING

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FILE X

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan
Director, Division of Emergency
Preparedness and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: *Richard W. Krihn*
Richard W. Krihn
Assistant Associate Director
Office of Natural and Technological
Hazards Programs

SUBJECT: Exercise Report of the June 10, 1986, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant.

Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report of the June 10, 1986, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, near Bridgman, Berrien County, Michigan. This was a joint, partial participation exercise for the State of Michigan and Berrien County. This county is within the plume exposure 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The final report, dated September 29, 1986, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V.

There was one deficiency in the June 10, 1986, exercise for Berrien County. The Deficiency was concerned with problems associated with public alerting and instruction observed throughout the exercise. These weaknesses included timeliness, message content, message information format, siren/EBS sequencing and reporting. The Deficiency was rectified at a remedial exercise on September 22, 1986.

The final exercise report includes results of the remedial exercise and the schedule of corrective actions prepared by the State of Michigan (with comments by FEMA Region V). Since this Deficiency was the subject of early remedial action it does not adversely impact the September 30, 1983, approval under 44 CFR 350.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.

Attachments
As Stated

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Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

September 29, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Associate Director
Office of Natural and Technological Hazards

ATTENTION: Ken Green, SL-NT-TH

FROM: Wallace J. Weaver, Chairman
Regional Assistance Committee *Wallace J. Weaver*

SUBJECT: D C Cook Final Exercise Report

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the June 10, 1986 D C Cook REP exercise. In response to the July 11, 1986 draft exercise report, the State of Michigan provided a schedule of corrective action for the weaknesses identified during the exercise. This schedule of corrective action dated August 26, 1986 is incorporated into the final exercise report along with the FEMA V response to the proposed corrective actions.

As part of the corrective action for the deficiency identified during the June 10, 1986 exercise, Berrien County conducted a remedial drill on September 22, 1986 to demonstrate the ability to effectively accomplish public alerting and instruction in a timely manner. FEMA V evaluated the remedial drill and incorporated the evaluation findings into the final exercise report.

The deficiency identified during the June 10, 1986 exercise was demonstrated to have been corrected during the remedial drill. Berrien County and the State of Michigan have addressed both the planning and implementation weaknesses identified in the draft exercise report. Specifically, the current implementation procedures incorporate most of the recommendations made in the draft exercise report. Further, none of the problems observed during the exercise recurred during the remedial drill.

The final exercise report also incorporated the relevant review comments which we received for the draft exercise report. We recommend that you transmit the enclosed final exercise report package to NRC. As noted in our letter to the State of Michigan, we will notify the State of your action with respect to the 44 CFR 350 approval and the final exercise report.

Enclosure

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Indiana and Michigan Electric Power Company
American Electric Power Company
Joint Exercise

Facility Location: Located near Bridgman, Michigan in Berrien
County on the shore of Lake Michigan

Exercise Date: June 10, 1986

Date of Draft Report: July 11, 1986

Schedule of Corrective Action: August 26, 1986

Date of Remedial Drill: September 22, 1986

Date of Final Report: September 29, 1986

Participants: State of Michigan (partial); Berrien County
(partial) and the Indiana and Michigan
Electric Power Company

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
REGION V
NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION
300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	Page 1
INTRODUCTION	Page 2
1. Exercise Background	Page 2
2. Participating and Non-participating State and Local Governments	Page 2
3. List of Evaluators	Page 2
4. Evaluation Criteria	Page 3
5. Exercise Objectives	Page 3
6. Summary of Exercise Scenario	Page 5
7. Summary of Remedial Drill Scenario	Page 6
8. State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used In The Exercise	Page 7
9. Exercise Findings in Past Exercises	Page 8
10. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved	Page 8
NARRATIVE	Page 10
1. State of Michigan	Page 10
2. Berrien County	Page 12
3. Evaluation of Remedial Drill	Page 17
SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS	Page 19
State of Michigan	Page 20
1. Deficiencies	Page 20
2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action	Page 21
3. Areas Recommended For Improvement	Page 22
Berrien County	Page 23
1. Deficiencies	Page 23
2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action	Page 24
3. Areas Recommended For Improvement	Page 25
SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIVE ACTION	Page 26
1. State of Michigan letter to FEMA V	
2. FEMA V response to the State of Michigan	

INTRODUCTION

1. Exercise Background

The June 10, 1986 exercise was the fifth joint exercise for the State of Michigan and Berrien County resulting from a simulated accident at the D C Cook Nuclear Power Plant. The first joint exercise was conducted on October 9, 1980 and involved full participation by the State of Michigan and Berrien County. Subsequent joint exercises were conducted on March 30, 1982, October 21, 1982, and January 25, 1984 and involved partial participation by the State of Michigan and full participation by Berrien County. As a result of the deficiency identified during the June 10, 1986 joint exercise, a remedial drill was conducted by Berrien County in conjunction with the utility drill scheduled for September 22, 1986. The State of Michigan participated in this drill in support of the Berrien County response activity. This report addresses the joint exercise which was conducted on June 10, 1986 as well as the remedial drill which was conducted on September 22, 1986.

2. Participating and Non-participating State and Local Governments

The 10-mile plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the D C Cook Nuclear Power Plant lies entirely within Berrien County and Lake Michigan. The 1980 permanent population within the 10-mile EPZ is estimated at 52,600. The influx of summer vacationers increases the population significantly. The exercise was partial participation for both the State of Michigan and Berrien County and was conducted during normal working hours. The remedial drill was partial participation for Berrien County and was conducted during normal working hours. The State of Michigan participated in a non-evaluated mode to support the Berrien County response activity.

The 50-mile ingestion EPZ encompasses all or part of the following Michigan Counties: Allegan, Cass, Berrien, Kalamazoo, St. Joseph and Van Buren. The ingestion EPZ also consists of all or part of the following Indiana Counties: Elkhart, Kosciusko, Lake, Laporte, Marshall, Porter, St. Joseph and Starke. The 1980 permanent population within the 50-mile ingestion EPZ is estimated at 823,100. The foregoing Michigan and Indiana Counties beyond the 10-mile EPZ did not demonstrate the procedures for implementation of ingestion pathway protective actions as this activity was beyond the scope of this exercise.

3. List of Evaluators

For the exercise there was a total of three federal evaluators observing offsite exercise activities. All three federal evaluators were from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Onsite exercise activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The offsite evaluator assignments were as follows:

Offsite Exercise Evaluation Team Director
Wallace Weaver, FEMA

State of Michigan Evaluator
Woodie Curtis, FEMA

Berrien County Evaluator
Wallace Weaver, FEMA

Joint Public Information Center Evaluator
Ray Kellogg, FEMA

For the remedial drill there were two federal evaluators observing offsite activities. Both federal evaluators were from FEMA. The offsite evaluator assignments were as follows:

Berrien County Evaluator
Wallace Weaver, FEMA

State of Michigan Observer
Dan Bement

4. Evaluation Criteria

The plans being evaluated during both the exercise and the drill were developed using the "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Revision 1). These criteria, and the exercrit based on these criteria, "Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation" dated June 1983, were used for exercise evaluation.

5. Exercise Objectives

Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the thirty-five standard objectives listed in Tab "M" of the "Modular Format For Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation" dated June 1983. The objective numbers listed below correlate to Tab "M".

The State of Michigan selected the following seven objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

Berrien County selected a limited number of objectives for demonstration during this exercise of their radiological emergency response plan. The County will fully demonstrate their response plan during the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant joint exercise in August of this year. Berrien County was evaluated in the areas of emergency management, particularly in implementation of protective actions, emergency operations facilities, communications, public alerting and instruction and public information activities. It should be noted, however, that EOC staff was involved in additional emergency response activities beyond the scope of the federal evaluation.

Berrien County selected the following eight objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

The objective of the remedial drill was to demonstrate the ability to implement the corrective action which had been taken to correct the deficiency identified during the exercise. As such Berrien County selected only the following two objectives for demonstration during the drill.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

6. Summary of Exercise Scenario

The D C Cook Nuclear Power Plant radiological emergency preparedness scenario, developed jointly by the utility and the State, considered weaknesses identified during past exercises in order to develop a scenario that would allow demonstration of past exercise weaknesses as well as allow demonstration of exercise objectives selected by the State of Michigan and Berrien County.

Representatives from the D C Cook Nuclear Power Plant, the State of Michigan, Berrien County and FEMA Region V conducted several conference calls during February, March and April 1986 to select the exercise objectives and to discuss the scope of the exercise. Submission of the scenario to FEMA Region V was according to deadlines outlined in NRC and FEMA guidance. Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company Incorporated reviewed the scenario for FEMA and found the scenario adequate to exercise the objectives selected. A summary of the exercise scenario follows.

At 0800, the initial conditions for the exercise are established. At 0815, an earthquake occurs registering 6.3 on the Richter Scale. The earthquake is felt onsite and results in a 1000 gpm leak in the RWST. An ALERT should be declared at this time.

At 0820, alarms are received in the Control Room indicating a fire adjacent to the Waste Gas Decay Tanks (WGDT). Immediately thereafter a "RWST Level at 350,000 gallons" alarm is received in the Control Room. At 0825, the WGDT that received gas products from the Unit 2 degas and Unit 1 dilutions explodes due to heat and high hydrogen concentrations. This explosion causes three studs on the adjacent WGDT manway to shear resulting in a gradual radioactive release. The explosion also results in a contaminated injured man.

At 0830, dose projections from the WGDT rupture indicate greater than 50 mR/hr whole body dose at the site boundary. Security reports a large quantity of water on the ground near the three large tanks just north of the Unit 1 containment. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared at this time.

At 0835, indication is received in the Control Room of a 35 gpm LOCA. Reactor shutdown is started at a rate of 50% per hour. Due to the earthquake the fire suppression system in the west RHR room actuated and has wet down the west RHR pump. The pump will eventually fail. At 0845, LOCA leak rate has increased to 80 gpm. An unmonitored release is occurring via the steam closure vent. The earthquake caused the containment penetration seal for a main steam line to fail. Containment temperature and humidity are increasing while containment pressure remains below the isolation setpoint of 2.9 psig.

At 0900, LOCA leak rate has increased to 1500 gpm and will remain steady then decrease with pressure. Safety injection is actuated. TSC, OSA, EOF and ENC/JPIC should be manned but may not be operational until 0915. At 0915, portal monitors in the Security Building alarm due to ongoing release.

At 0930, the leaking WGDT has emptied while the containment leakage continues. At this time a weather change will commence due to a low pressure zone passing through the area. The wind direction will shift from 210-220 degrees at present to 290-310 degrees over the next three hours. Wind speeds will generally increase and atmospheric stability will become less stable.

At 0945, doses at the site boundary are in excess of 250 mR/hr whole body and 1250 mR/hr thyroid with particulates present. Dose projections indicate less than 2 mR/hr at site boundary based on effluent monitors. A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared at this time.

At 1000, most central core thermocouples indicate 10% clad failure. Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 10% clad failure but readings are elevated. At 1015, AEO on earthquake inspection reports an air leak in the steam enclosure. This is actually containment atmosphere blowing out the steam line seal. At 1045, central core thermocouples indicate a 50% clad failure. Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitors do not support thermocouple indications but readings are elevated. The AEO that reported the air leak in the steam enclosure informs the Control Room he is contaminated.

At 1100, the Damage Control Team reports that the west RHR pump has been dried out and meggered. No electrical grounds are apparent and the pump breaker has been reset. The pump is now available and sump recirculation can be established. At 1130, sump recirculation has been established and the core is cooling. Release from containment continues. At 1145, weather conditions have stabilized somewhat. At 1200, release from containment continues but core temperature is decreasing.

At 1215, the source of containment leakage has been identified and repaired. The release is terminated. Dose rates at site boundary are 5-10 mR/hr due to surface contamination in the area. Dose rates in the 3-10 mile range remain evident. EOF continues to track the plume which is diminishing.

At 1315, a four hour time advance is initiated. Reactor has cooled and is stable. Post accident sample results indicate a 40% clad failure. Deescalation and recovery discussions are underway. At 1345, the exercise is terminated.

The actual exercise events, although somewhat accelerated, followed the exercise scenario. The ALERT was declared at 0818, the SITE AREA EMERGENCY at 0842 and the GENERAL EMERGENCY at 0857. Sheltering protective actions were initiated at 0907 (0-2 miles all sectors and 2-10 miles sectors A,B and C), 0943 (2-5 miles sector D), 1047 (2-5 miles sector E) and 1136 (2-5 miles sectors F,G,H,J and K). Evacuation of the 0-2 mile area around the plant was initiated at 0943. Two dairy advisories were issued during the exercise.

7. Summary of Remedial Drill Scenario

The remedial drill scenario was developed by the utility as part of their regularly scheduled drill. The scenario was developed so that Berrien County would have an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to implement their corrective action for the deficiency identified during the exercise. A summary of the drill scenario follows.

At 1215 initial conditions for the exercise are established. At 1230 a large break LOCA (1400 gpm) occurs. Reactor trip, turbine trip, safety injection and phase B isolation occur. As a result SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared at 1235. By 1250 governmental notifications should be completed by the plant.

At 1320 RWST low level alarm occurs. At 1335 switchover from RWST to sump recirculation has been completed and recirculation is on west RHR. At 1345 west RHR pump trips due to a burned out breaker. At 1400 core thermocouple maps indicate 50-100% clad failure. TSC/CR should request a DCT from OSA to substitute east RHR pump breaker for west RHR pump breaker.

At 1410 containment sump sample requested to evaluate core damage. RCS loop sample unattainable due to insufficient water supply in RCS. At 1415 containment area monitors indicate 5.4E3 R/hr indicating 0-50% fuel pellet overheat. At 1430 indication is received in the Control Room that VCR-107 and VCR-207 are open. Unit vent noble gas and iodine increase. GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared.

At 1445 offsite RMTs should be dispatched if not already performed. DCT should be dispatched to investigate VCR problem and close valves manually. Dose projections at EOF underway. At 1500 core thermocouple map indicates a 10-50% fuel overheat. At 1515 DCT reports RHR breaker substitution completed. Sump recirculation is reestablished as soon as possible.

At 1530 DCT at VCR report they have encountered turn back dose rate about 10 feet from VCR-207. Team members have whole body exposures of 2.7, 2.5 and 2.9 rem request guidance from OSA. At 1545 SEC authorizes VCR DCT to exceed 10CFR20 limits to close VCR-207. At 1600 VCR DCT reports VCR-207 is closed. Control Room verifies indication. At 1615 the drill is terminated.

The actual drill events followed the drill scenario. The SITE AREA EMERGENCY was declared at 1236 and the GENERAL EMERGENCY at 1345. Evacuation (0-2 miles in all sectors and 2-5 miles in sectors G, H, J, K and L) and sheltering (2-5 miles in all other sectors and 5-10 miles in sectors G, H, J, K AND L) protective actions were ordered at 1350. The evacuation (0-5 miles in all sectors and 5-10 miles in sectors G, H, J, K AND L) and sheltering (5-10 miles in all other sectors) protective actions were upgraded at 1515. The offsite drill was terminated at 1345.

8. State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used In The Exercise

During this exercise the State of Michigan planned to partially staff the State EOC in Lansing and the JPIC at the Lake Michigan Community College in Benton Harbor. The State of Michigan also planned to use the necessary communications systems to conduct emergency operations.

Berrien County planned to demonstrate their EOC facilities, emergency response staff (partial) and communications systems capabilities. The County also planned to have a spokesperson at the JPIC to demonstrate their ability to coordinate public information and rumor control. The prompt alert and notification system was not to be activated during the exercise but the procedures leading to public alerting were to be demonstrated.

During the remedial drill Berrien County activated their EOC facilities, emergency response staff (partial) and communications systems capabilities. The prompt alert and notification system was not to be activated during the drill but the procedures leading to public alerting were to be demonstrated.

9. Exercise Findings In Past Exercises

There were no exercise weaknesses identified for the State of Michigan during the January 25, 1984 D C Cook joint exercise. One area requiring corrective action was identified for Berrien County. It was agreed prior to this exercise that the corrective action for this exercise weakness would be demonstrated during the Palisades joint exercise in August. Therefore, this area requiring corrective action is continued in this exercise report.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NUREG-0654 criteria item J.12 The exercise objective to activate and provide the necessary resources for the reception and congregate care facility was not fully demonstrated. There was insufficient staff present during the exercise to operate both facilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Berrien County should fully demonstrate their reception and congregate care facility during the Palisades joint exercise in August 1986.

10. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved

The following three exercise objectives were not fully demonstrated during this exercise. They will have to be demonstrated during a future exercise.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

As a result of the remedial drill the deficiency identified during the exercise was observed to have been corrected. Thus objectives 13 and 14 were successfully demonstrated during the remedial drill.

The following exercise objectives were not fully demonstrated during the 1984 exercise and are continued in this report. They will be demonstrated during the Palisades exercise in August.

27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

The following exercise objectives have not yet been demonstrated during the current exercise cycle. Further the requirement for an unannounced exercise still remains.

11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs and other factors.
12. Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards.
30. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

NARRATIVE

1. State of Michigan

State staff of the Emergency Management Division and the Departments of Public Health, Agriculture, Transportation and Natural Resources were prepositioned at the State EOC prior to the exercise. The EOC staff demonstrated the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities from the State EOC. The staff displayed adequate training and knowledge of their respective duties and responsibilities. It was noted that several of the individuals in the EOC were participating in their first exercise. Periodic briefings were held by the Deputy Director, Emergency Management Division to update the staff on plant conditions and activities within Berrien County. The EOC staff was involved in decision-making pertaining to their respective responsibilities.

The facilities and displays were adequate to support emergency operations. Copies of the plan were available and most of the staff had excerpts from the plan which pertained to their respective agencies. Message logs were kept. Messages were appropriately handled, reproduced and distributed to EOC staff.

Primary, as well as some backup, means of communications were effectively demonstrated during the exercise. These systems included dedicated telephone, commercial telephone, the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN), teletype, datafax and radio. They were utilized to communicate with the utility, Berrien County, the JPIC, adjacent States and federal agencies. EOC staff effectively coordinated information with these various organizations throughout the exercise.

The EOC staff received the initial ALERT notification from the on-shift supervisor at the D C Cook Nuclear Power Plant at 0830 through the Michigan State Police Operations Office. This initial message advised of the seismic event and a fire onsite. As conditions worsened at the plant, the State was notified of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY at 0842 and the GENERAL EMERGENCY at 0905. At 0850, the Governor declared a State of Disaster in response to conditions at the plant.

Dose assessment and protective action recommendations were prepared by the State to support the emergency response activities of Berrien County. The actual computations with respect to protective action recommendations was not an exercise objective although the decision-making and implementation processes were. EOC personnel of the Department of Public Health calculated dose information received from the utility and plotted the field monitoring data on maps in the EOC. The computations were checked, the plume was defined and the information was provided to Berrien County and the JPIC for action. Protective action decisions for the plume exposure pathway were based on EPA exposure guidelines. The plant status, evacuation time estimates and weather conditions were considered as appropriate. The protective action recommendations were reviewed and updated as conditions warranted.

The Department of Agriculture had listings of current information and maps of the location of dairy farms and food processing plants. This information was provided to Berrien County for the protective action initiated at 0930 advising farmers within 30 miles of the downwind sectors to shelter dairy animals and place them on stored feed and water.

Rail, air and lake traffic were curtailed. The State further assisted the County with the evacuation and coordinated the simulated sheltering of evacuees with Berrien County.

The JPIC is located in the Theatre Building of the Lake Michigan Community College. The briefing room was set up to accommodate about 110 people. There is an elevated platform at the back of the room for TV cameras. Briefers were seated on a raised platform at the front of the room.

The media work area is spacious and well lighted. Tables, chairs, typewriters and other supplies were provided for use by the media. Eleven telephones were provided in this area during the exercise.

The State of Michigan was represented at the JPIC by three people, the briefing team moderator, a spokesperson and a telephone hotline monitor and communicator. There was adequate space and amenities available for the State and County information officers and their staffs.

The briefing team moderator, the State, County and utility spokespersons presented their material in a professional manner and handled most questions without difficulty. Several times they had to provide answers to questions at the next briefing.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Answers to questions which require research by the information officers should be provided to the media as soon as possible rather than waiting until the next briefing.

Commercial telephone is the primary communications link between the JPIC and the State EOC. This includes a datafax capability. The State Police radio system provides backup communications capability.

Four briefings were held during the exercise. Several others were scheduled and either cancelled or combined with a later briefing. The State, County and utility staffs coordinated their information with their respective EOC's and the briefing team members coordinated their remarks to ensure no conflicting comments. Maps and other displays were available and utilized by the briefers. Hard copy of the news releases were available during the briefings.

None of the printed releases issued at the JPIC to the media described the areas affected in terms other than sectors and undefined parts of Townships. The early news releases which announced the sheltering protective action recommendations did not include any information concerning the appropriate actions to be taken by the residents. The news releases concerning the evacuation protective action recommendation did not include any instructions for the public. One message advised residents to stay tuned to local radio or TV but did not provide information as to the appropriate stations. None of the news releases addressed the needs of the transient population.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NUREG-0654 criteria item E.7 News releases issued at the JPIC did not include instructions for either the resident or the transient population. The areas affected were described by sectors rather than in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries.

RECOMMENDATION: Information released at the JPIC reinforces the public instruction provided via EBS. These news releases should describe the affected sectors in familiar terms and provide appropriate instructions for the public. Hard copy of the EBS messages prepared by Berrien County would provide this information if made available at the JPIC.

Media kits containing information about the utility, nuclear power, the local area, radiation and the State, County and utility emergency response plans were available. Rumor control was established by the utility at the JPIC. In an effort to assure the accuracy of the media information the utility monitored local radio stations and the local outlets of the major TV networks.

2. Berrien County

The EOC staff, with the exception of the utility liason, were prepositioned in the EOC at approximately 0800. At 0821, the Sheriff's dispatch received and verified the ALERT notification from the utility. The EOC activity was initiated at approximately 0830 with a status briefing by each of the agencies represented in the EOC. These representatives included the County Board Chairman, the Chief of Staff, the County Sheriff, two Public Information Officers, two County Health officials, two Radiological Officers, the State Police liason and appropriate support staff. The Social Services activity was simulated by the County Health officials in the EOC. The utility liason responded in real time arriving at the EOC at 0917.

The County Board Chairman was the individual in charge of the emergency response. He conducted periodic staff briefings, six in all, throughout the day. However, one briefing immediately followed the Governor's order to expand the area requiring protective action. While this briefing did not impede the implementation of the protective action order, the attention of the EOC staff was divided between two important activities.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Staff briefings should be delayed until the EOC staff have completed implementation of emergency actions so as not to hinder these important activities.

Subsequent notification of the utility emergency classifications as well as the Governor's protective action orders were received directly from the State EOC and immediately announced to the Berrien County EOC staff by the State Police liason. Emergency classification levels were conspicuously posted in the County EOC. The EOC staff were independently involved in the implementation of the Governor's protective action orders. They each had a copy of the County's emergency response plan as well as procedures and checklists to facilitate their emergency response activity.

Each EOC staff member maintained a message log and reported on their activities during the staff briefings. As discussed below, these briefings could be expanded in scope. Message forms were prepared for most of the significant EOC activities. These message forms were not routinely forwarded to the State EOC via LEIN and on several occasions the County EOC was asked to provide status updates to the State for activities which had already been accomplished by the EOC staff.

Often the only EOC representative aware of the completion of a particular response activity was the individual responsible for the action. The EOC status board, which was not in use during the exercise, would alleviate some but not all of the information dissemination problems.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Each EOC representative should ensure that all emergency response activity is promptly reported to the other County EOC staff and properly recorded on message forms for dissemination to the State EOC in a timely manner.

The Berrien County EOC is a spacious facility with adequate resources such as furniture, telephones, etc., to support emergency response activity. Although not located in the 10-mile EPZ, the facility can support extended operations. Backup power was available but not demonstrated during the exercise. All appropriate maps were posted in the EOC with the exception of the State radiological monitoring points. Although not required, this map would be useful to the Radiological Officers, who indicated that they did not have a copy of this map for their use in the EOC.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: A copy of the State radiological monitoring points map should be available in the Berrien County EOC for the use of the Radiological Officers.

EBS had been placed on standby following receipt of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY notification. Berrien County initiated public alerting and instruction following the receipt of each of the seven protective action orders from the State EOC. Some problems were noted during the attempts at public alerting.

After receipt of the initial sheltering order at 0907, a message was prepared by the public information staff which directed activation of the sirens in the affected areas. Further, this message also contained some of the general sheltering EBS information to be released coincident with siren activation. Although ordered at 0912, siren activation did not occur until 0918 after the message was processed through the EOC message control station. Completion of the EBS message was delayed until 0920 because the prescribed sheltering message in the plan required adaptation and the prescribed descriptions were inappropriate for the 0-2 mile all sectors and 2-10 mile downwind sectors combination for the sheltering area. The boundary of the area affected had to be prepared from scratch utilizing a wall map. This message was then processed through the EOC message control station and released to the EBS at 0933. The information released to the EBS did not fully address the transient population but did include appropriate sheltering instructions for the resident population. The time of the siren activation and EBS release was erroneously reported to the State EOC as 0912, the time the message was initiated not the times that the actions were actually accomplished.

The second protective action order was a dairy advisory. The County EOC staff correctly noted that there were no dairy herds within 10 miles in the affected sectors (B and C). The State EOC indicated there were two farms affected. These two farms were actually in the adjacent sector (D) which was included as dairy advisories are issued by Township not sectors. The State EOC was correctly utilizing the Township as the boundary of the affected area and coordinating their notifications with the County. The State EOC staff indicated they would notify the farms in question and the County EOC staff prepared an EBS release to that effect.

At 0943, the State EOC notified the County of the Governor's decision to evacuate all sectors out to two miles and to expand the sheltering order to include sector D from 2 to 5 miles. However, there was a short interval (about two minutes) between the receipt of the evacuation and the additional sheltering orders by the Berrien County EOC staff. This resulted in the two protective actions being handled separately but concurrently by the EOC staff. An EBS message for the evacuation was read at 0951 but the sirens were not sounded in conjunction with the message. The sheltering EBS message was read at 1001 prior to siren activation in the affected sector (D) which occurred at 1004. Siren activation was again delayed by the need for the message to be processed through the EOC message control station prior to delivery to the Sheriff's dispatch which is the siren activation point. Also, the message is not delivered directly to the dispatcher but rather put into the dispatch center message box.

Two additional sheltering orders and a second dairy advisory were subsequently handled by the EOC staff. All were completed in a timely fashion although another siren/EBS sequencing problem (one minute) was experienced. These later EBS messages, but not the earlier ones, reaffirmed the early protective actions as well as providing public instructions for the newly affected areas. The EOC staff did not request or confirm the periodic repeat of the public instructions via EBS.

As previously noted, the prescribed messages and affected sector descriptions sometimes required additional editing before they could be utilized by the EOC staff. Further, the format of the EBS messages and the sector descriptions was such that the EBS message would have been difficult for the public to comprehend in several instances. While direction from the State EOC resulted in improvements in the clarity of the later EBS messages, the problems were not completely corrected.

DEFICIENCY: NUREG-0654 criteria elements E.5, E.6 and E.7 Problems associated with public alerting and instruction were observed throughout the exercise. These weaknesses included timeliness, message content, message information format, siren/EBS sequencing and reporting.

RECOMMENDATION: The weaknesses identified above in the area of public alerting and instruction will require immediate corrective action by Berrien County, with appropriate assistance from the State of Michigan. The corrective action required will be three-fold. First, the implementation procedures must be reviewed and upgraded. Several recommendations for consideration in this area have been identified and are listed below. Second, the appropriate Berrien County EOC staff should receive training on the revised implementation procedures. Third, the corrective action must be successfully demonstrated during another exercise. It is recommended that this demonstration of public alerting and instruction occur in conjunction with the drill scheduled for September 22, 1986.

The following list of recommendations should be considered by Berrien County and the State of Michigan during the preparation of their corrective action.

1. Remove the EOC message control station from the public alerting process until after it has been accomplished. Then provide copies of the appropriate messages to be disseminated to the State EOC and JPIC as required.
2. The EOC PIO or other County official should direct the time of the siren and EBS activations so that they are accomplished in proper sequence and in a timely manner. It would facilitate operations if these directives were provided verbally from the PIO directly to the appropriate EOC staff for implementation and then documented by written message.
3. The prescribed messages for emergency public instruction should be reviewed and revised as appropriate. All of the necessary information or as much of it as possible should be prescribed. The procedure for implementation should indicate which prescribed information should be utilized for the various protective action recommendations. It is suggested that the EOC Executive Group take an active role in reviewing the EBS message during its formulation.
4. The format of the emergency information should be such that it can be easily understood by the public. The use of familiar landmarks should be continued and the affected areas described in as simple a format as possible. "Blocking off" of the affected areas should be utilized to the maximum extent possible.
5. The EBS message should read as a single, concise document rather than as a series of unconnected statements combined with a message to EOC staff. Siren activation orders should not be included with the EBS message but rather handled separately.
6. Each new protective action recommendation which is released through the EBS should be accompanied by the appropriate siren activation.
7. Copies of the EBS messages should be provided to both the State EOC and the JPIC. Hard copy of the messages should be made available to the media at the JPIC.
8. Each subsequent EBS message should reaffirm the earlier protective actions by incorporating them with the new instructions as appropriate. This would limit the confusion which might occur from excluding the areas where protective action response was already underway.
9. The EOC staff should take positive action to ensure the periodic repeat of the EBS messages.

The County Sheriff simulated three activities during the course of the exercise which involved public alerting. First, the State EOC (DNR) requested assistance at 0914 to ensure the 10-mile evacuation of Lake Michigan around the D C Cook Nuclear power Plant. When the sheltering orders affected areas which included Spanish speaking transient workers, two Sheriff's deputies were dispatched to conduct route alerting in Spanish. In conjunction with the final sheltering order, the Sheriff's Department assisted with the precautionary evacuation of Warren Dunes State Park.

Berrien County was represented at the JPIC by a spokesperson. There was adequate space and amenities available for the State and County information officers and their staffs.

The briefing team moderator, the State, County and utility spokespersons presented their material in a professional manner and handled most questions without difficulty. Several times they had to provide answers to questions at the next briefing.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Answers to questions which require research by the information officers should be provided to the media as soon as possible rather than waiting until the next briefing.

Commercial telephone is the primary communications link between the JPIC and the Berrien County EOC. The lack of a datafax capability between the County EOC and the JPIC precluded the transmission of EBS messages to the JPIC and news releases to the County EOC. Backup communications capability is provided by Sheriff's radio and was demonstrated during the exercise.

Four briefings were held during the exercise. Several others were scheduled and either cancelled or combined with a later briefing. The State, County and utility staffs coordinated their information with their respective EOC's and the briefing team members coordinated their remarks to ensure no conflicting comments. Maps and other displays were available and utilized by the briefers. Hard copy of the news releases were available during the briefings.

None of the printed releases issued at the JPIC to the media described the areas affected in terms other than sectors and undefined parts of Townships. The early news releases which announced the sheltering protective action recommendations did not include any information concerning the appropriate actions to be taken by the residents. The news releases concerning the evacuation protective action recommendation did not include any instructions for the public. One message advised residents to stay tuned to local radio or TV but did not provide information as to the appropriate stations. None of the news releases addressed the needs of the transient population.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NUREG-0654 criteria item E.7 News releases issued at the JPIC did not include instructions for either the resident or the transient population. The areas affected were described by sectors rather than in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries.

RECOMMENDATION: Information released at the JPIC reinforces the public instruction provided via EBS. These news releases should describe the affected sectors in familiar terms and provide appropriate instructions for the public. Hard copy of the EBS messages prepared by Berrien County would provide this information if made available at the JPIC.

Media kits containing information about the utility, nuclear power, the local area, radiation and the State, County and utility emergency response plans were available. Although an exercise objective, rumor control was not demonstrated by Berrien County at the JPIC. Rumor control was established by the utility at the JPIC. In an effort to assure the accuracy of the media information the utility monitored local radio stations and the local outlets of the major TV networks.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NUREG-0654 criteria item G.4.c Rumor control was not demonstrated by Berrien County at the JPIC.

RECOMMENDATION: A coordinated rumor control function must be demonstrated by Berrien County at a future exercise.

3. Evaluation of Remedial Drill

EOC activation and staff mobilization were not exercise objectives. The EOC was prepared for operation and EOC staff were prepositioned prior to the initiation of the remedial drill. All EOC positions were staffed except for the school services. The utility liason arrived real time. Although only public alerting and instruction were to be demonstrated during the drill, the EOC was fully operational. The EOC staff responded to the scenario events and demonstrated all of their emergency response capabilities.

Communications were evaluated in so far as they supported the public alerting and instruction objectives. Communications between the Berrien County EOC and the State EOC in Lansing were effectively accomplished utilizing commercial telephone (including an open hot line), LEIN and a datafax machine. The datafax capability was new to the EOC and was used to transmit hard copy of the EBS messages and status reports to the State EOC. Although not demonstrated during this drill, the datafax machine will also be used to transmit hard copy information to the JPIC. The County EOC staff demonstrated the ability (simulated) to transmit an EBS message to the appropriate radio and television stations utilizing tone alert receivers to activate recording machines at the stations.

The SITE AREA EMERGENCY was declared at 1236 and notification was received in the County EOC at 1243. At 1312 Weco Beach and Warren Dunes State Park were evacuated as a precautionary measure by the Sheriff's Department. At 1315 the EOC staff prepared a general information message for the public and simulated its transmittal to the EBS stations. This message alerted the public to the fact that there was an incident in progress at the D C Cook facility and that a SITE AREA EMERGENCY had been declared. It further advised the public to stay tuned for additional information as it became available. The sirens were not sounded at this time because no protective actions had been ordered for the general public.

The GENERAL EMERGENCY was declared at 1345 and notification was received in the County EOC at 1350 along with the first protective action order from the State. Evacuation (0-2 miles in all sectors and 2-5 miles in sectors G, H, J, K and L) and sheltering (2-5 miles in all other sectors and 5-10 miles in sectors G, H, J, K AND L) protective actions were ordered by the State at 1350. The County EOC staff responded to the State action by preparing an EBS message to notify the public. The sirens were simulated sounded at 1400 followed by the simulated transmittal of the EBS message by tone alert receiver to the EBS stations. The prescribed EBS message for the sheltering order was amended to include sector K and provide instructions for the transient population. The message utilized familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe the affected sectors. However, due to the simulation, a portion of sector K did not receive full siren coverage. Had the sheriff's dispatch officer responsible for both the siren and EBS activation actually activated both he would have realized that he needed to activate sirens for sector K as well as sectors G, H and J. (Sector L is in Lake Michigan and does not have siren coverage.)

The additional sectors were on the last page of the EBS message and would have been seen had the dispatch officer actually gone through the message. In describing the procedures to the evaluator he did not read the full message. He did describe the procedure he would follow to complete both the siren and EBS activation. In discussion with the EOC staff, it was noted that when a prescribed EBS message is revised the reason for the revision should be noted at the top of the first page. This would ensure that the dispatch officer received the appropriate information to complete his tasks.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The use of prescribed messages should be continued. However, whenever a prescribed message is modified the appropriate sectors for siren activation should be noted at the top of the first page. The dispatch officer would then know which sirens to activate without checking the entire message.

The evacuation (0-5 miles in all sectors and 5-10 miles in sectors G, H, J, K AND L) and sheltering (5-10 miles in all other sectors) protective actions were upgraded at 1515. The sirens and appropriate EBS messages were sequenced, evacuation at 1523 and sheltering at 1528. All areas were covered by both the sirens and the EBS message content. The EBS message form had been marked to indicate that it was modified to include sector K. Again the EBS message utilized familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe the affected sectors. The prescribed EBS messages have instructions for the EBS stations as to the periodic repeat of the information to the public.

The deficiency identified during the June 10, 1986 exercise was demonstrated to have been corrected during this drill. Berrien County and the State of Michigan have addressed both the planning and implementation weaknesses identified earlier in this report. Specifically, the current implementation procedures incorporate most of the recommendations made in this report. Further, none of the problems observed during the earlier exercise recurred during this demonstration by Berrien County. Additional familiarity with the new procedures will only serve to enhance the County's response capability.

SUMMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

June 10, 1986
(Date)

1. Deficiencies

Michigan
(State)

Michigan
(Community)

NUREG
Item

Narrative Statement
of Weakness

Corrective Action
Proposed

Scheduled
Date

Actual
Date

NONE

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

June 10, 1986
(Date)

Michigan
(State)

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action

Michigan
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Weakness</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
E.7	News releases issued at the JPIC did not include instructions for either the resident or the transient population. The areas affected were described by sectors rather than in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries.			

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

Michigan
(State)

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

June 10, 1986
(Date)

Michigan
(Community)

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement

1. Answers to questions which require research by the information officers should be provided to the media as soon as possible rather than waiting until the next briefing.

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

June 10, 1986
(Date)

Michigan
(State)

1. Deficiencies

Berrien County
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Weakness</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
E.5, E.6 and E.7	Problems associated with public alerting and instruction were observed throughout the exercise. These weaknesses included timeliness, message content, message information format, siren/EBS sequencing and reporting.			

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

June 10, 1986
(Date)

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action

Michigan
(State)

Berrien County
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Weakness</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
E.7	News releases issued at the JPIC did not include instructions for either the resident or the transient population. The areas affected were described by sectors rather than in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries.			
G.4.c	Rumor control was not demonstrated by Berrien County at the JPIC.			

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

Michigan
(State)

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

June 10, 1986
(Date)

Berrien County
(Community)

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement

1. Staff briefings should be delayed until the EOC staff have completed implementation of emergency actions so as not to hinder these important activities.
2. Each EOC representative should ensure that all emergency response activity is promptly reported to the other County EOC staff and properly recorded on message forms for dissemination to the State EOC in a timely manner.
3. A copy of the State radiological monitoring points map should be available in the Berrien County EOC for the use of the Radiological Officers.
4. Answers to questions which require research by the information officers should be provided to the media as soon as possible rather than waiting until the next briefing.

SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIVE ACTION

STATE OF MICHIGAN



JAMES J. BLANCHARD, GOVERNOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE
COL. GERALD L. HOUGH, DIRECTOR

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIVISION
LOWER LEVEL
111 S. CAPITOL AVENUE
LANSING, MICHIGAN 48913
PHONE: 517 373-0817

August 26, 1986

Mr. Wallace J. Weaver, Chairman
Regional Assistance Committee
FEMA, Region V
300 S. Wacker, 24th Floor
Chicago, Ill 60606

RE: D.C. Cook-86 R.E.P. Exercise
Schedule of Corrective Actions

Dear Mr. Weaver:

Enclosed is the schedule of corrective actions for the State of Michigan and Berrien County for the D.C. Cook-86 R.E.P. Exercise.

The remedial drill scheduled for September 22, 1986, is aimed at the deficiency listed for Berrien County (items E5, E6, E7). Item G4C (rumor control), was demonstrated by Berrien County at the Palisades-86 Exercise on August 19, 1986. The State does not agree with the comments on the JPIC (E7) listed as an Area Requiring Corrective Action (see comments). The scenario for the September 22 drill will be provided to your staff in the near future.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office.

Sincerely,

Peter Basolo
CAPTAIN PETER R. BASOLO
Deputy State Director of
Emergency Services

C.C. Mr. Dennis Loope, D.C. Cook Plant
Mr. James Collis, Berrien County
Sgt. Raymond Brotebeck, 5th District

PRB:DMS:pfr

Attachment #1

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

June 18, 1986
(Date)

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action

Michigan
(State)

Michigan
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Weakness</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
2.7	News releases issued at the JPIC did not include instructions for either the resident or the transient population. The areas affected were described by sectors rather than in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries.	Instructions to residents and transient population are released via EBS and not the JPIC. All releases described the areas affected in terms of landmarks and boundaries. Only the initial news release contained both boundaries and sectors.	N/A N/A	

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

June 18, 1986
(Date)

Michigan
(State)

Berrien County
(Community)

1. Deficiencies

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Weakness</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
E.5, E.6 and E.7.	Problems associated with public alerting and instruction were observed throughout the exercise. These weaknesses included timeliness, message content, message information format, siren/EBS sequencing and reporting.	All pre-scripted EBS messages have been rewritten.	9-22-86	
		Road boundaries have been pre-scripted.	9-22-86	
		Message flow procedures have been changed to bypass the message controller to speed EBS/Siren activation.	9-22-86	
		Personnel will be trained in the EBS/Siren activation process.	9/86	
		Remedied drill scheduled for 9/22/86.		

UTILITY: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant

Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

June 18, 1986
(Date)

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action

Michigan
(State)

Berrien County
(Community)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Narrative Statement of Weakness</u>	<u>Corrective Action Proposed</u>	<u>Scheduled Date</u>	<u>Actual Date</u>
E.7	News releases issued at the JPIC did not include instructions for either the resident or the transient population. The areas affected were described by sectors rather than in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries.	Instruction to residents and transients are released via EBS, not JPIC All releases described the affected areas by familiar landmarks and boundaries, except the 1st release which also contained Sectors.	N/A N/A	
G.4.c	Rumor control was not demonstrated by Berrien County at the JPIC.	Will be demonstrated at the Palisades-86 Exercise.	8-19-86	



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

September 29, 1986

Captain Peter R. Basolo
Deputy State Director of
Emergency Services
Department of State Police
111 S. Capitol Ave., lower level
Lansing, Michigan 48913

Dear Captain Basolo:

We have reviewed the schedule of corrective actions dated August 26, 1986 for the exercise weaknesses identified during the June 10, 1986 D.C. Cook REP exercise. Our evaluation of the proposed corrective actions is discussed below.

Berrien County: E.5, E.6, and E.7

The proposed corrective actions were reviewed and evaluated during the D.C. Cook remedial drill on September 22, 1986. The evaluation of the remedial drill has been incorporated into the final exercise report for the June 10, 1986 D.C. Cook REP exercise. The corrective actions which have been undertaken and the demonstration of those corrective actions during the remedial drill have successfully corrected the deficiency identified during the June 10, 1986 exercise. Two copies of the final exercise report are enclosed.

Berrien County: G.4.c

Rumor control was demonstrated by Berrien County during the Palisades-86 exercise on August 19, 1986. The evaluation of this activity is contained in the draft Palisades exercise report. As will be noted in the Palisades exercise report that demonstration was sufficient to correct the weakness identified during the June 10, 1986 exercise.

State of Michigan and Berrien County: E.7

We have reviewed the EBS messages and news releases generated during the June 10, 1986 D.C. Cook exercise and generally concur with your assessment of their content. However, as noted in the exercise report and underscored during the exercise, news releases at the JPIC reinforce the EBS messages. In that regard, EBS messages prepared in the Berrien County EOC should be forwarded to the JPIC for release to the media.

It was noted during the remedial drill that Berrien County now has a datafax machine for hard copy transmittal to the JPIC and State EOC as well as other locations. During the drill the datafax machine was used to transmit hard copy EBS messages and status reports to the State EOC. Berrien County staff indicated that the datafax machine would be programmed to provide data to the JPIC. This will correct the exercise weakness identified in the report. This will remain


Attachment #2

Captain Peter R. Basolo
Deputy State Director of
Emergency Services

an area requiring corrective action to be demonstrated by Berrien County during the next D.C. Cook biennial exercise.

We will advise you of the action taken by FEMA HQ with respect to the final exercise report and the 44 CFR 350 approval. If you have any questions, please call Wally Weaver at 312-886-9530.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Wallace J. Weaver".

Wallace J. Weaver, Chairman
Regional Assistance Committee

Enclosure