UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 1)
EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (RTS COMPONENTS)
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-460

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, an automatic trip signal based on steam generator low-low level was generated at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

On February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences. The results of the staff's inquiry are reported in NUREG-1000, "Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the NRC requested, by Generic Letter 83-28, dated July 8, 1983 (Reference 1), all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events. These concerns are categorized into four areas: (1) Post-trip review, (2) equipment classification and vendor interface, (3) post-maintenance testing, and (4) reactor trip system reliability improvements.

Part 1 of Item 2.1 of GL 83-28 required licensees and applicants to confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.

II. EVALUATION

By letter dated March 30, 1984 (Reference 2), Washington Nuclear Public Power Supply System, the applicant for Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 1 (WNP-1) responded to GL 83-28. The staff and its consultant, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (EG&G), have reviewed the applicant's response to Part 1 of Item 2.1. As a result of its review, EG&G issued the attached Technical Evaluation Report (EGG-NTA-7319) (TER). The staff has reviewed this TER and concurs with its findings. This TER is considered a part of this Safety Evaluation.

In its March 30, 1984 letter (Reference 2) the applicant stated that the design of the WNP-1 trip system has not been completed and committed to provide a complete response to Item 2.1 two years prior to fuel load. This will allow adequate time for the staff to complete its review and ensure that the requirements of Item 2.1 are implemented prior to the issuance of an operating license. In view of the delayed construction status of WNP-1 this is acceptable.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on its review, the applicant's commitment, and the delayed construction status of WNP-1, the staff concludes that the applicant's response to Part 1 of Item 2.1 of GL 83-28 is acceptable.

Dated: Novemer 19, 1986

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REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)", July 8, 1983.

2. Washington Public Power Supply System letter to NRC, G. C. Sorenson to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, "Nuclear Project No. 1 Response to Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS Event", March 30, 1984.