OMB-016
50-312

September 8, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dennis Crutchfield, Assistant Director
for PWR-B
Division of PWR Licensing-B

FROM: John Stolz, Director
PWR Project Directorate #6
Division of PWR Licensing-B

SUBJECT: OUTLINE FOR THE RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
RESTART SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT

Enclosed is the draft outline for the Rancho Seco restart safety evaluation report (SER) including a preliminary assignment of responsibility (by branch) for the writing of the specific sections which make up the SER. Please review the draft SER outline and the indicated branch assignments for each SER section and identify reviewers responsible for each SER section input. Please provide me with any comments you may have by COB September 11, 1986.

We have provided preliminary copies of the outline to Region V and to IE for their comments and will coordinate them in finalizing the SER outline. We are also coordinating with DHFT in the areas of maintenance, training, and human engineering reviews.

A E Edison for

John F. Stolz, Director
PWR Project Directorate #6
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/enclosure: G. Edison
R. Weller
S. Miner
G. Kalman

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*See previous white for concurrences.

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

OUTLINE
RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
SAFETY EVALUATION

Responsibility		
PBD#6	1.	Introduction
PBD#6	2.	Background Discussion
PBD#6		2.1 Brief discussion of December 26, 1985 overcooling event
PBD#6		2.2 Summary of NRC actions and correspondence
PBD#6		2.3 Summary of Sacramento Municipal Utility District's response
PBD#6		2.3.1 Plant performance and management improvement program
	3.	Resolution of Identified Concerns Related to the December 26, 1985 Overcooling Event
		3.1 Plant mechanical, electrical and control systems deficiencies
PEICS		3.1.1 Loss of DC power to ICS
PEICS		3.1.2 Plant response on loss of ICS
PEICS		3.1.3 Auxiliary feedwater control - EFIC installation
RSB		3.1.4 Water supply to makeup/HPI pumps
EB		3.1.5 Effects of overcooling event on reactor vessel and steam generators
PEICS		3.1.6 Operation of radiation monitoring systems following containment isolation
EB		3.1.7 Flooding of the main steam headers. Steam generator overfill
PEICS		3.1.8 Main steam line failure logic system
FOB		3.2 System review and test program
		3.2.1 Program overview
		3.2.2 Program evaluation
DHFT/MTB		3.3 Plant maintenance, testing and surveillance

	3.3.1	Valve preventive maintenance and manual valve operability
	3.3.2	AFW flow control valve operability
	3.3.3	Previous maintenance deficiencies - identification/resolution
	3.3.4	Troubleshooting/root cause determination
DHFT/HFB	3.4	Training and operator performance
	3.4.1	Operator training
	3.4.2	Minimum staffing requirements
	3.4.3	Incapacitated operator
	3.4.3	Potential security/safety interface issues
FOB	3.5	Plant normal and emergency procedures
	3.5.1	Need for event-related procedures
	3.5.2	ATOG adequacy
	3.5.3	Health physics and emergency preparedness procedures
	3.5.4	Annunciation procedures manual
	3.5.5	Methodology for procedure updating
DHFT/HFB	3.6	Human engineering considerations
	3.6.1	Simplified schematics for S1 & S2
	3.6.2	Valve position indication
	3.6.3	Control room HVAC noise
	3.6.4	Alarms for ICS
FOB	3.7	Management considerations
	3.8	Retrospective considerations
RSB	3.8.1	Evaluation of FSAR accident analyses that presumed availability of non-safety systems
PEICS	3.8.2	Reevaluation of responses to previous reports on B&W transients and operating experience (NUREG-0560, NUREG-0667, BAW-1564, Bulletin 79-27)

EB 3.8.3 Probability of pressurized thermal shock incidents per BAW 1791

4. Resolution of Concerns Unrelated to the December 26, 1985 Overcooling Event

PEICS 4.1 Post accident sampling system

PEICS 4.2 Control room/technical support center HVAC system

PEICS 4.3 125V DC station batteries

PEICS 4.4 Radioactive liquid effluent releases

PEICS 4.5 Emergency plan
- Meteorology

PBD#6 5. Summary and Conclusions

Appendices

- EDO action letter regarding IIT report

- References