



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III  
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210  
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

July 30, 2020

Mr. Scott Sharp  
Site Vice President  
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant  
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota  
1717 Wakonade Drive East  
Welch, MN 55089-9642

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT – INTEGRATED  
INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; AND  
07200010/2020001

Dear Mr. Sharp:

On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. On July 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One NRC-identified Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

***/RA/***

Hironori Peterson, Chief  
Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000282; 05000306; and  
07200010

License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60; and  
SNM-2506

Enclosure:  
As stated

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Letter to Scott Sharp from Hironori Peterson dated July 30, 2020.

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; AND 07200010/2020001

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000282; 05000306; 07200010

License Numbers: DPR-42, DPR-60, SNM-2506

Report Numbers: 05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; 07200010/2020001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0041 and I-2020-001-0143

Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota

Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

Location: Welch, Minnesota

Inspection Dates: April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020

Inspectors: J. Dalzell, Health Physicist  
R. Edwards, Senior Health Physicist  
N. Feliz-Adorno, Branch Chief  
L. Haeg, Senior Resident Inspector  
K. Pusateri, Resident Inspector

Approved By: Hironori Peterson, Chief  
Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71152.

### List of Findings and Violations

Cask Transport Vehicle Evaluation			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Not Applicable	NCV 05000282,05000306/2020002-01 Open/Closed	Not Applicable	60855.1
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.146, "Design Control" for failing to adequately analyze, control deviations, and translate into procedures the design for the interfacing surfaces of the tracked Cask Transport Vehicle (CTV) which affected quality. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.			

### Additional Tracking Items

None.

## PLANT STATUS

Units 1 and 2 operated at or near full power for the entirety of the inspection period, with the exception of brief power reductions to perform surveillance testing or flexible power operations.

## INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

## REACTOR SAFETY

### 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

#### Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Unit 1 caustic addition system on 04/16/2020
- (2) 12 diesel-driven cooling water pump on 05/4/2020
- (3) 121 safeguards travelling screen on 05/20/2020

#### Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the following:

- (1) Unit 1 control rod system on 06/19/2020

### 71111.05 - Fire Protection

#### Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Fire zone 18 relay and cable spreading room on 04/22/2020
- (2) Fire zone 58 Unit 1 charging pumps 11, 12, and 13 on 04/22/2020
- (3) Fire zone 75 plant screen house elevation 695' on 05/20/2020
- (4) Fire zone 74 plant screen house elevation 670' on 06/15/2020

### 71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

#### Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

- (1) 695' elevation turbine building on 04/28/2020

### 71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

#### Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Control room observations during a spent fuel loading campaign on 05/26/2020

#### Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator training in the simulator on 05/27/2020

### 71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

#### Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) Component cooling water system on 04/27/2020
- (2) AR 501000039958; PMT unsatisfactory due to leak on 4/23/2020

### 71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

#### Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;

- (1) AR 501000039494; 23 fan coil unit damper did not re-position on 04/09/2020
- (2) AR 501000039466; 2A reheater drain level control failure on 04/10/2020
- (3) AR 501000039723; CV-31941 had dual indication on the control board on 04/16/2020
- (4) 22 diesel-driven cooling water jacket water hose leak availability determination on 05/12/2020
- (5) Maintenance risk during 12 residual heat removal pump breaker replacement on 06/23/2020

#### 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

##### Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) 23 containment fan coil unit damper past operability review on 05/04/2020
- (2) 22 diesel driven cooling water jacket water hose leak past operability review on 05/06/2020
- (3) 22 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump bearing temperature in the alert range on 04/21/2020
- (4) 11 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump past operability review on 06/04/2020

#### 71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

##### Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

- (1) AR 501000038420; 23 containment fan coil unit damper did not re-position on 04/09/2020
- (2) Maintenance on 13 charging pump breaker following instantaneous trip test failure on 04/22/2020
- (3) AR 501000039981; PMT planning issues on 2SM-5-4 on 04/23/2020
- (4) D5 emergency diesel generator ventilation system testing following damper maintenance on 06/10/2020
- (5) 22 component cooling water heat exchanger temperature control valve failure on 06/02/2020

#### 71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

##### Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) SP 1856; Bus 26 undervoltage test on 4/28/20

##### Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) SP 1089A; RHR quarterly pump and valve test on 05/08/2020



71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)  
(1 Sample)

- (1) Licensed operator re-qualification training with DEP Performance Indicator evaluation on 06/19/2020

**OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE**

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

- (1) MSPI high pressure injection 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/22/2020

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)

- (1) MSPI heat removal 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/23/2020

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program during the period of January 1, 2020, through June 30, 2020, for potential adverse trends in maintenance practices that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) RCE 501000036932; Breaker 26-16 undersized on 03/31/2020

**OTHER ACTIVITIES – TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL**

60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants

Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants (1 Sample)

- (1) Due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, the inspectors remotely evaluated the licensee's Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) cask loading through use of the licensee's in-plant camera system on May 26 - May 29, 2020. To complete this inspection, the inspectors intend to visit the Prairie Island ISFSI before the end of 2020 to evaluate the material and radiological conditions of the site. This site visit is pending further reductions in risk associated with travel during the public health emergency. During the remote portion of the inspection, the inspectors observed the

following activities:

- Fuel selection and fuel loading for the third and final cask in the campaign, cask number 47
- Heavy load movement of the cask out of the spent fuel pool to the cask processing area, and movement of the cask in preparation for transport to the ISFSI
- Drying and backfill evolutions
- Closure operations
- Cask transport evolutions
- Radiological field surveys

The inspectors evaluated the following change reviews:

- Selected corrective action program documents
- Selected 72.48 screenings and evaluations

## INSPECTION RESULTS

Cask Transport Vehicle Evaluation			
Cornerstone	Severity	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Not Applicable	Severity Level IV NCV 05000282,05000306/2020002-01 Open/Closed	Not Applicable	60855.1
<p>The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.146, "Design Control" for failing to adequately analyze, control deviations, and translate into procedures the design for the interfacing surfaces of the tracked Cask Transport Vehicle (CTV) which affected quality. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.</p>			
<p><u>Description:</u></p> <p>A new CTV was procured by the licensee for transporting TN-40/40HT casks between the Auxiliary Building and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad. Calculation No. 2018-03457, "Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for Loading Associated with New Cask Transport Vehicle," Revision 0, was a safety related analysis that included an evaluation of the stability of spent fuel casks (empty and full) and the CTV (loaded and unloaded). The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) ISFSI was licensed by the NRC in Renewed License SNM-2506, License for Independent Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, Amendment 10. License Condition 9, "Authorized Use," of SNM-2506, states, in part, that the basis for this license was submitted in the Safety Analysis Report dated August 31, 1990 and as further supplemented and amended in accordance with 10 CFR 72.70 and 10 CFR 72.48. Calculation No. 2018-03457 utilized the ISFSI design basis to establish the acceptance criteria for factors of safety against sliding and tipping. Specifically, section 6.1 of Calculation No. 2018-03457 states "the factors of safety against sliding and overturning shall be 1.1 or greater per Ref[erence]s. 5a and 6a." Reference 5a is Revision 18 of the PINGP ISFSI Safety Analysis Report which established 1.1 as the minimum factor of safety to sliding in section 4.2.1, "Structures," for postulated</p>			

earthquake loads. The TN-40/40HT cask is safety-related equipment and the Auxiliary Building slab foundation is considered a safety-related structure.

In Calculation No. 2018-03457, a sliding analysis was performed to assess whether the CTV will slide during a postulated design basis earthquake. The conclusion that the cask would not slide was based on an assumed coefficient of friction of 0.5 between the Auxiliary Building concrete slab and the CTV tracks. This coefficient of friction value was taken from Calculation No. 8708-320, "Spent Fuel Storage Cask Transporter for Xcel Energy Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant," Revision 3. In Calculation No. 8708-320, the coefficient of friction was specified as "coefficient of friction to road;" however, the interfacing surfaces for this value are not described and the CTV travels over multiple surfaces on the haul path towards the ISFSI, including concrete and gravel. Calculation No. 2018-03457 also permits "SS [stainless steel] deck plates or plywoods may be placed to protect concrete surfaces if the contact areas between CTV treads and SS deck plates/plywoods are not greater than 8.0 ft<sup>2</sup> with maximum thickness of 3/8 in[ch]."

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Maintenance Procedure No. D95.10, "Tracked Cask Transporter Vehicle Operations," Revision 0, provided the detailed instructions for the inspection, startup, and operation of the tracked CTV. This procedure did not contain any limitations or guidance regarding the material, size, or placement of the protective surfaces between the Auxiliary Building slab and the tracked CTV. The actual configuration, as remotely observed by the inspectors during ISFSI operations on May 28, 2020, consisted of 1/2-inch-thick high-density plastic sheets placed between the steel CTV treads and the painted Auxiliary Building concrete slab. Since the design for protective surfaces was not translated into a procedure, the installed protective surfaces were not as analyzed in Calculation No. 2018-03457 and deviations to the design were not controlled. Specifically, there were 3 examples where the interfacing surfaces relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was inadequately analyzed, deviations were not controlled, and the installation of these surfaces was not controlled by a procedure to ensure the configuration matched the design:

- The chosen coefficient of friction value of 0.5 for the surface between the Auxiliary Building floor and tracks of the CTV was taken from a haul path analysis where these surfaces differed from the interfacing surfaces in the Auxiliary Building (the Auxiliary Building had relatively smooth, painted, concrete floors).
- To protect the Auxiliary Building floor, Calculation No. 2018-03457 stated up to 8.0 ft<sup>2</sup> of 3/8-inch-thick plywood or stainless-steel plates on the Auxiliary Building floor were permissible, but no analysis was provided about how these multiple surfaces impact sliding or tipping. That is, the analysis did not analyze the interfacing surfaces between the floor and plywood/plate, and similarly did not consider the interfacing surface between the plywood/plate and the tracks on the CTV.
- The 3/8-inch plywood or stainless-steel plates were not used. Instead, 1/2-inch-thick high-density plastic sheets were used; however, the change in material and thickness was not analyzed for how it might impact the sliding and tipping analysis.

Corrective Actions: The inspector identified this concern during the transfer of the last cask in the loading campaign. Transfer of the loaded cask to the ISFSI was completed safely and without incident. The concern was placed in the corrective action program, and while corrective actions were still being developed at the conclusion of the inspection, preliminary actions include revising Calculation No. 2018-03457.

Corrective Action References: AR 501000041132; New Cask Transporter Revise Evaluation; May 29, 2020

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors concluded that measures were inadequate to ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into Procedure No. D95.10, the design calculation was accurate, and deviations to appropriate quality standards specified in design Calculation No. 2018-03457 were controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met which resulted in a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance using IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix E, "Example of Minor Issues." Example 3.e was found to be similar in that the licensee failed to establish measures to ensure that the procedures for setting up the CTV in the auxiliary building were in accordance with the design which lead to reasonable doubt whether the seismic sliding and tipping analysis requirements were met for a CTV loaded with spent fuel. In the 3.e example, the design was correct; however, the installed configuration was not. In this case, the design analysis had deficiencies as well as the procedure, which led to a conclusion that the multiple deficiencies was an issue of more than minor concern.

Significance: In accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy, ISFSIs are not subject to the SDP and traditional enforcement will be used for these facilities. Traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.

Enforcement:

Severity: The inspectors determined that the violation could be evaluated, using Section 6.5.d.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, as a violation of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) because the licensee failed to meet a regulatory requirement that had a more than minor safety significance.

Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.146, "Design Control," states, in part, that the licensee shall establish measures to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as specified in the license for those structures, systems, and components to which this section applies, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures must include provisions to ensure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from standards are controlled.

Contrary to the above, on May 28, 2020, measures were inadequate to ensure the design basis was correctly translated into Procedure No. D95.10, the design calculation was accurate, and deviations to appropriate quality standards specified in design Calculation No. 2018-03457 were controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation: Safeguards Breaker Racking Procedure Inappropriate to the Circumstances	71152
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.	
<p>Violation: Title 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. Procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to this requirement, on January 24, 2020, the licensee identified that a 4.16kV safeguards breaker 26-16 (D6 emergency diesel generator supply to Bus 26) with an incorrect amperage rating had been installed and in service within Bus 26 since October 11, 2019, due, in part, to insufficient acceptance criteria within Operating Procedure C20.5-1, "4.16kV Breaker Rack Out/Rack In," Revision 41.</p> <p>Significance/Severity: Green. The finding was of very low safety significance because it was a deficiency affecting the qualification of Bus 26 4.16kV safeguards breaker 26-16 (a mitigating SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability.</p> <p>Corrective Action References: AR 501000036932</p>	

Observation: D6 Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Breaker to Bus 26 Undersized	71152
The inspectors reviewed a past operability review and root cause evaluation following the January 24, 2020, identification that Breaker 26-16 (D6 EDG Supply to Bus 26) was installed with an incorrect, undersized amperage since October 11, 2019. This condition was identified by the licensee during troubleshooting following load sequencer modifications for which post maintenance testing was not successful. The breaker was promptly replaced with a correctly-sized breaker prior to restoring operability of D6 and Bus 26. Based on the inspector's review of the licensee's evaluation, the inspectors did not identify any past operability or reportability concerns; however, a Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation of Very Low Safety Significance (Green) was identified and is discussed in this report.	

Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review	71152
Based on the spring of 2020 COVID-19 public health crisis, the inspectors performed a semi-annual trend review of the licensee's corrective action program during the first and second calendar quarters of 2020. The inspectors focused on whether any adverse trends existed related to human performance, equipment performance, and programmatic effectiveness during this timeframe and did not identify any concerns. For low-level trends that were identified by the licensee, the inspectors did not identify any concerns with the trend inputs, level of evaluation, and planned corrective actions.	

## EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On July 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. S. Sharp, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

- On June 12, 2020, the inspectors presented interim ISFSI cask loading inspection results to Mr. S. Sharp, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

**DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
60855.1	ALARA Plans		Radiation Protection Job Plan 2020 Dry Cask 45, 46, 47 Work	Revision 0
			Radiation Work Permit 205000	Revision 0
	Calculations	12911.54-SC-10	Design of Buried Electrical Ducts Subjected to Cask Transporter Loading	Revision 1
		2018-03457	Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for Loading Associated with New Cask Transporter	Revision 0
		Calc. No. 03457	Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for Loading Associated with New Cask Transporter	12/16/2019
	Corrective Action Documents		Selected Corrective Action Documents Created Since April 2018	
		Issue ID 501000023147	ISFSI Concrete Strength Greater than ISAR	02/14/2019
		Issue ID 501000034318	ISFSI Dose Calc Incorrect Berm Height	11/04/2019
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	Issue ID 501000041017	ISFSI INS: Question 21 Response Time	05/28/2020
		Issue ID 501000041018	Lesson Learned Observation of CASK 47	05/28/2020
		Issue ID 501000041059	NRC ID's Steps Not Signed in PE	05/28/2020
		Issue ID 501000041074	NRC ID's Signoffs in PM Not Transferred	05/28/2020
		Issue ID 501000041132	New Cask Transporter Revise Evaluation	05/29/2020
	Miscellaneous	72.48 Evaluation No. 1146	PINGP ISFSI Expansion Calculation Methodology Departures	Revision 0
		72.48 Evaluation No. 1150	PINGP ISFSI Expansion: AB-5 Procedure and Dose Scaling Approach Evaluation	Revision 0
		72.48 Screening No. 5565	PINGP ISFSI Expansion	Revision 0
		72.48 Screening	EC60100001234; PINGP ISFSI New CTV	Revision 0

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		No. 5640		
		72.48 Screening No. 5641	EC 60100001234; PINGP ISFSI New CTV	Revision 0
		72.48 Screening No. 5652	EC601000002176; Sensitivity Analysis for Drop Eval of TN40HT	Revision 0
		72.48 Screening No. 5659	EC 601000002232 - Revise Calculation TN40HT-0512	Revision 0
		Cask No. 47	Cask Inventory Verification	05/26/2020
		D95.1	Cask Inventory Verification	05/26/2020
		D95.1 Appendix A	Cask Loading Report	05/26/2020
		FP-MA-COM-02	Supplemental Worker Oversight Plan	01/17/2020
		OP-2014-002	Prairie Island Dry Fuel Storage Project Oversight Plan	Revision 5
		Sample ID: SFP 0706 and 0715	Spent Fuel Pool Boric Acid	05/26/2020
	NDE Reports	BOP-PT-20-015 and BOP-MT-20-2008	TN-40 Special Lift Fixture	04/23/2020
	Procedures	AB-5	Buried Cask	Revision 3
		D95.1	TN-40 Cask Loading Procedure	Revision 32
		D95.10	Tracked Cast Transporter Vehicle Operation	Revision 0
		D95.3	TN-40 Cask Removal and Storage Procedure	Revision 39
		SP 1075.HT	TN-40HT Fuel Selection and Identification	Revision 4
	Radiation Surveys	Survey PI-M-20200521-9	Cask 46 Transferred To ISFSI Pad #41	05/21/2020
	Self-Assessments		2019 Nuclear Oversight Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Audit of Programs	10/01/2019
			Master Lessons Learned Cask 41-44	05/03/2018
		600000598736	Snapshot 2020 NRC Inspection	02/28/2020
		CR No. 603000004605	Fleet Cask Loading Challenge Board	04/09/2020
		QF0406	2020 ISFSI NRC Inspection Snapshot	02/28/2020
	Work Orders	WO 7000059192	SP1077 Special Lift Fixture TN-40 Cask	04/17/2020
		WO 700056472	AUX Building Crane Mechanical/Electrical Inspection	02/25/2020



Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		WO 700059191	SP 1057 TN-40 Fuel Selection & Identification	03/17/2020
		WO 700061687	SP1076 ISFSI Qtr Sfty Status	03/16/2020
71111.04	Drawings	NF-39252	Flow Diagram, Caustic Addition System, Units 1 and 2	Revision 83
	Procedures	C1.1.7-1	Unit 1 Reactor Control Checklist	Revision 10
71111.05	Procedures	C5-1	Rod Control System Checklist	Revision 10
		C6-1	System Prestart Checklist Rod Position Indication System	Revision 6
71111.06	Calculations	ENG-ME-732	Determination of HELB/Flooding Interactions in the Turbine Building	Revision 1
		ENG-ME-759	GOTHIC Internal Flooding Calculation for the Turbine Building	Revision 1
	Procedures	TP 1398	Internal Flooding Walkdown	Revision 10
71111.12	Miscellaneous		Prairie Island Maintenance Rule Basis Document	04/20/2020
	Procedures	FP-E-MR-03	Maintenance Rule Monitoring	Revision 8
		FP-E-MR-05	Maintenance Rule Expert Panel	Revision 8
		MSIP 5015	Swagelok Compression Tubing Fittings	Revision 4
		RPIP 3655	Sampling Unit 2 Pressurizer	Revision 9
		WO #70000942010	Replace Valve and Fittings as Needed	Revision 0
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents	AR 501000039494	23 CFCU Damper Past Operability Review	05/04/2020
		AR 501000039494	23 FCU Damper Did Not Reposition	04/08/2020
		AR 501000039981	PMT Planning Issues on 2SM-5-4	04/23/2020
		AR 501000040177	22 DDCLP Jacket Water Hose Leak POR	05/06/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		AR 501000040177	Coolant Leak of 22 DDCLP Jacket Cooling	05/01/2020
71111.19	Corrective Action Documents	AR 501000039981	PMT Planning Issues on 2SM-5-4	04/23/2020
71111.22	Procedures	SP 1089A	RHR Quarterly Pump and Valve Test	05/08/2020
		SP 1089A	Train A RHR Pump and Suction Valve From RWST Quarterly Test	Revision 32
		SP 1856	Bus 26 Undervoltage Test	04/28/2020
		SP 1856	Monthly 4kV Bus 16 Undervoltage Relay Test (OMICRON)	Revision 9
71151	Procedures		MSPI High Pressure Injection Data 2Q19 through 1Q20	04/22/2020
		FP-E-MSPI-01	Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI)	Revision 10