


## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

## REGION III

Docket Nos: License Nos:	50-010; 50-237; 50-249 DPR-2; DPR-19; DPR-25
Report Nos:	50-010/97017(DRS); 50-237/97017(DRS); 50-249/97017(DRS)
Licensee:	Commonweaith Edison Company (ComEd)
Facility:	Dresden Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3
Location:	R. R. No. 1 Morris, IL 60450
Dates:	Between August 4 and 20, 1997
Inspector:	T. Madeda, Physical Security Inspector
Approved by:	James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

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


## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Reports 50-010/97017; 50-237/97017; 50-249/97017

This inspection included a review of plant support activities relating to the physical protection of your facility. This report reviewed the effectiveness of security management control activities, verified the performance of protected area security equipment, reviewed security training and qualification activities, and follow-up on previous inspection findings. Also reviewed were Licensee Security Event Reports regarding a failure to control personnel access to the protected area and tampering with a vital area locking device. The inspection was conducted between August 4 and 20, 1997.

- Overall, security performance was acceptable. Security force members generally demonstrated an appropriate working knowledge of security requirements. Management activities to support security requirements regarding equipment effectiveness and problem resolution were sound.
- The inspector identified a violation regarding a failure to control unsearched packages in the protected area. The event was caused by plant personnel misinterpretation of security package control requirements. The significance of this violation was that previous corrective action for a similar event had not prevented recurrence. (Section S4.1)
- The inspector identified a minor violation when a security officer failed to properly search a storage compartment on the undercarriage of a vehicle. The event was caused by cognitive personnel error. The significance of the event was reduced because it was an isolated personnel error. (Section S4.2)
- The licensee identified a violation when a security officer assigned to control access at a protected area control point failed to detect the unauthorized access of an individual into the protected area. The event was caused by weak attention to duty. The significance of the event was reduced because the unauthorized access was immediately detected by plant personnel. (Section S4.3)
- The licensee identified a violation when a contractor supervisor's failed to report the arrest of a subordinate to licensee personnel, due his misinterpretation of the licensee's arrest reporting policy. (Section S4.4)



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