NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4) Automatic Start of the Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Personnel Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 5	1 9	8 6	8 6	— 0 0 5	— 0 0	0 6	1 6	8 6		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Ronald Jackson Technical Staff Engineer X549	AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 19, at 1408 hours, with Unit 3 in shutdown condition and all fuel removed from the reactor, the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator (DG) automatically started and closed onto 4KV Bus 34-1 due to an undervoltage condition on the bus. At the time of the event, the Electrical Maintenance Department (EMD) was troubleshooting Bus 39 480V main feed breaker, which had previously failed to close while attempting to return Bus 39 feed breakers to normal lineup from Bus 34-1. The lineup was needed to allow the Operational Analysis Department to perform outage testing. Upon request by EMD to have Bus 39 main feed breaker opened, the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) inadvertently opened Bus 34-1 feed breaker, which started the Unit 3 emergency DG. The DG ran loaded for 22 minutes before reclosing the Bus 34-1 feed breaker.

Bus 39 was being supplied by an alternate breaker lineup from 4KV Bus 33-1 due to outage related activity. Bus 39 is normally supplied from 4KV Bus 34-1 through two bus-tie breakers. Each set of bus-tie breakers for Buses 39 and 34-1 has one switch that operates both bus-tie breakers simultaneously. The control switches are 2 inches apart on the control room panel.

The cause of this event has been attributed to the NSO's lack of concentration while attempting to operate the breaker control room switch. This event was discussed with the individual involved. The safety significance was minimal since the DG operated as designed, and the testing of the DG breakers are only conducted during unit outages. The last occurrence was reported under DVR 12-2-86-28.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

On May 19, 1986, at 1408 hours, with Unit 3 in a shutdown condition and all fuel removed from the reactor, the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator (EIIS Code EK) automatically started and closed onto 4KV Bus 34-1 (EIIS Code EA) due to an undervoltage condition on the bus. At the time of the event, the Electrical Maintenance Department (EMD) was troubleshooting Bus 39 480V main feed breakers (EIIS Code EC), 252-MF39, which had previously failed to close while attempting to return Bus 39 feed breakers to normal lineup from Bus 34-1. This lineup was needed to allow the Operational Analysis Department to perform outage testing on the Unit 2/3 diesel generator 4KV breakers. Upon request by EMD to have Bus 39 main feed breaker opened, the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) inadvertently opened Bus 34-1 feed breaker. Consequently, the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator started automatically. The NSO immediately recognized his error and allowed the diesel generator to run loaded for 22 minutes prior to shutting it down and reclosing Bus 34-1 feed breaker. The diesel generator operated with no difficulties during this event.

During the occurrence, Bus 39 was being supplied by an alternate breaker lineup from 4KV Bus 33-1 due to outage related activity. This breaker alignment supplied power to Bus 39 through two groups of bus-tie breakers. One group connecting 4KV Bus 33-1 to 480V Bus 38 (A.C.B. 152-3325 and A.C.B. 252-MF38) connecting Bus 38 to Bus 39 (A.C.B. 252-3939 and A.C.B. 252-3938). Bus 39 is normally supplied from 4KV Bus 34-1 through two bus-tie breakers with one breaker (A.C.B. 152-3426) connected to the 4KV side. Electrical power is supplied to Bus 34-1 through two bus-tie breakers (A.C.B. 152-3403 and A.C.B. 152-3432) from 4KV Bus 34, which is powered from Unit 3 reserve auxiliary transformer 32. Each set of bus-tie breakers for Buses 39 and 34-1 has one control room switch that operates both bus-tie breakers simultaneously. The control switches are approximately 2 inches apart on the control room panel.

Personnel error was the root cause of this event. The NSO's lack of attentiveness caused him to trip open the wrong breaker resulting in the automatic start of the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator. The NSO explained that a large amount of work related activity at the time of the occurrence contributed to his loss of concentration. In addition, both control switches for Buses 39 and 34-1 feed breakers are approximately 2 inches apart. Therefore, if an operator is not fully aware of his actions, he could inadvertently trip the wrong breaker. The NSO was reminded of the importance of verifying that he is on the correct switch before operating any equipment. The NSO and SCRE were also instructed that it was their responsibility to control the work activity in the control room to the extent that their ability for attention to detail is not hampered. The safety significance of this event was minimal since the emergency diesel generator operated as designed, and the testing of the diesel generator breakers are only conducted during unit outages. A previous occurrence of an emergency diesel generator starting automatically due to personnel error was reported under DVR 12-2-86-28.

Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

June 17, 1986

DJS LTR: #86-421

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
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Licensee Event Report #86-005-0, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

for D. J. Scott
Station Manager

DJS/rme

Enclosure

cc: J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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