



Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
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NLS970171
September 29, 1997

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Gentlemen:

Subject: Safeguards Licensee Event Report No. 97-S01
Cooper Nuclear Station, NRC Docket 50-298, DPR-46

The subject Safeguards Licensee Event Report is forwarded as an enclosure to this letter.

Sincerely,

M. F. Peckham
Plant Manager

/rar
Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator
USNRC - Region IV

Senior Project Manager
USNRC - NRR Project Directorate IV-1

Senior Resident Inspector
USNRC

NPG Distribution

INPO Records Center

W. Turnbull
MidAmerica Energy

IE741

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PDR ADOCK 05000298
S PDR



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION
COLLECTION REQUEST 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO
THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING
BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (7-6 F33),
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE
PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION (CNS)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000298

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

SAFEGUARDS EVENT

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
08	29	97	97	-- S01	-- 00	09	29	97	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
										05000	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
										05000	
OPERATING MODE (9)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)		100	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
			20.2203(a)(1)			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)		X 73.71
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Michael D. Hamm, Security Manager

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(402) 825-5337

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X NO

EXPECTED
SUBMISSION
DATE (15)

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

See text for Safeguards Event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION	
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION	05C00298	97	-- S01	-- 00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

At 1725 on August 29, 1997, a member of the security force opened a locked contingency weapons storage cabinet and discovered that a shotgun shell (a slug) was missing from the ammunition carrier attached to one of the contingency shotguns stored in the cabinet. Only security personnel have access to these locked weapons storage cabinets. The officer reported the missing shell and it was replaced at 1730 hours. An extensive search of the cabinet and the surrounding area was conducted with negative results. In accordance with 10CFR73.71 (b) (1), a one-hour notification was made to the NRC Operations Center that a confirmed tampering with security equipment had occurred.

The missing shell was subsequently found inside the protected area on an adjacent building rooftop at approximately 1433 on September 5, 1997. A numbered seal has been placed on each of the contingency weapons cabinets. Officers are no longer allowed to open the cabinet except during a contingency event or during a required inventory/inspection.

1. DATE AND TIME OF EVENT

The event was discovered at 1725 on August 29, 1997. A formal daily inventory of the weapons and ammunition in this cabinet had been conducted at approximately 0430 on August 29, 1997 and all ammunition was accounted for at that time. The missing shotgun shell was found inside the protected area on an adjacent building rooftop at approximately 1433 on September 5, 1997.

2. LOCATION OF EVENT

The event occurred inside the non-critical switchgear room. The location was within the plant protected area, but was not within a vital area.

3. OPERATING PHASE DURING THE EVENT

The plant was operating at approximately 100 percent power.

4. SAFETY SYSTEMS AFFECTED OR THREATENED

None. The missing shell was part of the contingency ammunition available with this loaded security contingency weapon. The missing shell was replaced immediately. Accountability of all security weapons was conducted and no other discrepancy was found. Therefore, there was neither a direct nor indirect threat to plant safety systems by this event.

5. TYPE OF SECURITY FORCE

Contract.

6. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED

The investigation concluded that one contract security officer was involved in the event.

7. METHOD OF DISCOVERY

A contract security officer unlocked and opened a contingency weapons storage cabinet to obtain a pair of binoculars stored in the cabinet. The officer observed that the ammunition carrier, attached to one of the contingency shotguns stored in the cabinet, was missing one round of ammunition.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION	05000298	97	-- S01	-- 00	3 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

8. PROCEDURAL ERROR INVOLVED

Security Procedure 1.6, "Firearms, Issuance, Maintenance, and Use," discusses the proper issuance and control of weapons and ammunition. Security Force training reinforces the expectations that the security custodian of any issued or contingency weapon maintain control and accountability of the weapon(s) and ammunition.

9. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN

The missing shell was immediately replaced. The contents of the cabinet and surrounding area were searched. An accountability of all security contingency weapons and ammunition was conducted. No weapons tampering or other missing ammunition was found.

10. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

A numbered seal has been placed on each of the contingency weapons cabinets. Officers are no longer allowed to open the cabinet except during a contingency event or during a required inventory/inspection. The investigation to determine the identity and motive of the officer who removed the shell is closed unless new evidence becomes available. A positive identification may not be possible unless a confession is obtained.

11. LOCAL, STATE OR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONTACTED

The NRC Operations Center was notified of this safeguards event on 08/29/97.

12. DESCRIPTION OF MEDIA INTEREST AND PRESS RELEASE

None.

13. INDICATION OF PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENT

None.

14. KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACT

Michael D. Hamm
Security Manager
Cooper Nuclear Station
(402) 825-5337

