

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7				PAGE 13 1 OF 0 3		
TITLE (4) Entry Into LCO 3.0.3 To Perform 4KV ESS Bus Degraded Voltage Relay Surveillances																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 1	1 9	8 7	8 7	0 0 2	0 0	0 2	1 7	8 7	SSES - Unit 2				0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8			
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		20.402(b)		20.405(a)		80.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)						
POWER LEVEL (10)		1 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(i)		80.38(a)(1)		80.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(e)						
				20.406(a)(1)(ii)		80.38(a)(2)		80.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)						
				20.406(a)(1)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(i)		80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)								
				20.406(a)(1)(iv)		80.73(a)(2)(ii)		80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)								
				20.406(a)(1)(v)		80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(ix)								
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Duane Sadvary - Power Production Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 7 5 4 2 1 - 3 8 5 1 6						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE:)												NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 19, 1987 with both Units operating at 100% power, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 was entered and cleared four (4) times on each Unit to perform surveillances on the 4.16 KV Engineered Safeguard System (ESS) buses (EISS Code: EB).

To perform the monthly degraded voltage channel functional tests on the ESS buses, all degraded voltage protection on the bus is taken out of service although the bus remains energized. Technical specifications require 2 channels of degraded voltage protection per bus, and both channels must be operable.

The loss of both channels of degraded voltage protection is not addressed by the action statement, therefore entering Tech Spec 3.0.3 is required.

A Tech Spec change request has been submitted to the NRC to clarify the action statements of table 3.3.3-1 section 5 to address the situation where both channels of degraded voltage protection are inoperable at the same time. This will prevent the necessity of entering Tech Spec 3.0.3 to perform this testing.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 8 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		87	0 0 2	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description Of Event

Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 was entered and cleared four (4) times on each unit to perform surveillances on the 4.16 KV Engineered Safeguard System (ESS) Buses (EIIS Code: EB). The event occurred on January 19, 1987 while both Units were operating at 100% power.

To perform the monthly degraded voltage channel functional tests on an ESS bus, all degraded voltage protection on the bus is taken out of service although the bus remains energized. Technical specifications require 2 channels of degraded voltage protection per bus, and both channels must be operable. Action Statement 36 of Tech Spec Table 3.3.3-1 section 5 states: "With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the total number of channels, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour; operation may then continue until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST."

Cause Of The Event:

The loss of both channels of degraded voltage protection is not addressed by the action statement, therefore entering Tech Spec 3.0.3 is required.

Analysis Of The Event:

The amount of time spent in LCO 3.0.3 for each bus was minimal as shown below:

<u>BUS</u>	<u>TIME LCO DECLARED</u>	<u>TIME LCO CLEARED</u>	<u>MINUTES IN LCO</u>
1A201	0800	0817	17
1A202	0818	0832	14
1A203	0833	0845	12
1A204	0846	0859	13
2A201	0950	1000	10
2A202	1001	1015	14
2A203	1016	1030	14
2A204	1031	1041	10

Disabling the degraded voltage protection for an ESS bus while the bus remains energized means that if the bus experienced a degraded voltage condition, there would be no automatic transfer to the alternate source or the associated Diesel Generator. The alternate source and the Diesel Generator operability are not in question for they would operate properly if any other bus (with operable degraded voltage protection) was to see a degraded voltage condition. The resulting situation is that a bus which is energized during degraded voltage protection testing would become inoperable if an actual degraded voltage condition occurred.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		05000387	87	-002	-00	03	OF

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

Due to redundancy of ESS supplied systems (all of which were operable during the performance of the surveillances) and the restrictions of Technical Specifications allowing testing of only one bus at a time, the safety implications of losing the bus under test are bounded by the current safety analysis.

This event has been determined reportable per 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) in that entry into LCO 3.0.3 means the plant is operating in a "Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications" as identified in NUREG-1022 Supplement No. 1.

Corrective Actions:

A Tech Spec change request has been submitted to the NRC to clarify the action statements of table 3.3.3-1 section 5 to address the situation where both channels of degraded voltage protection are inoperable at the same time. This will prevent the necessity of entering Tech Spec 3.0.3 to perform this testing.

Additional Information:

There have been 8 other LERs addressing the entry into LCO 3.0.3 to perform the Degraded Voltage Relay Surveillances. Refer to LERs - 86-019, 86-025, 86-027, 86-030, 86-032, 86-036, 86-037, and 86-042.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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
February 17, 1987

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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-002-00
FILE R41-2
PLAS- 232

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 87-002-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i), in that the plant entered LCO Action Statement 3.0.3 four times on each unit to perform surveillance testing on the 4.16 KV Engineered Safeguard System (ESS) buses.


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DDS/cdn

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