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# CP&L

6 JUN 9 P12: Carolina Power & Light Company

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT  
P. O. Box 101  
New Hill, North Carolina 27562

JUN 04 1986

File Number: SHF/10-13510E  
Letter Number: HO-860304 (O)

Dr. J. Nelson Grace  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 2900)  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

NRC-453


Dear Dr. Grace:

In reference to your letter of May 5, 1986, referring to RII:  
50-400/86-24-02, the attached is Carolina Power & Light Company's  
reply to the violation identified in Enclosure 1.

It is considered that the corrective actions taken are  
satisfactory for resolution of the item.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Yours very truly,

  
J. L. Willis  
Plant Manager  
Harris Nuclear Project

RAW/lme

Attachment

cc: Messrs. G. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)  
B. C. Buckley (NRC)

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Attachment to CP&L Letter of Response to NRC Report RII:  
50-400/86-24-02

10 CFR 50.55(f)(1) requires CP&L to implement the quality assurance program described or referenced in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Section 1.8.5.5 of the CP&L Quality Assurance Program requires that measures be established to insure that activities are conducted in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, and approved drawings.

Contrary to the above, on April 8, 1986, a clearance center control operator, while initiating a clearance procedure, failed to use the appropriate drawings to insure that the spent fuel pool cooling system would be returned to an isolated status. The clearance was issued and performed as written, which allowed draining the Refueling Water Storage Tank to the spent fuel pool.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement II).

Denial or Admission and Reason for the Violation:

The violation is correct as stated.

The violation occurred when a clearance was being removed from a Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump strainer. The removal section of the clearance specified opening suction valves from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and the Spent Fuel Pool No. 1. When these valves were opened, water drained from the RWST to the Spent Fuel Pool No. 1. The pool was flooded to about 1½ feet forcing construction personnel working in the pool to evacuate.

The principal causes of the event are poor communications and inattention to detail. The operator responsible for the clearance specified a removal line-up that "opened" the valves that were required to be "closed" by the clearance. The operator did not consult process flow drawings in making this decision. The Start-Up Engineer was informed of the removal line-up but he assumed that the removal line-up had been checked more thoroughly.

Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved:

The spent fuel pool was subsequently pumped out to allow continuation of construction activities. The event did not have any adverse consequences on safety-related structures within the spent fuel pool.

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Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Noncompliance:

The operator involved has been disciplined for his failure to use available resources for restoration of the clearance. Each shift has been briefed on this incident and cautioned to use appropriate prints, operating procedures and plant conditions when restoring clearances. In addition a Shift Note (No. OP-011-86) has been issued providing guidance on restoration of equipment or systems after the clearance is canceled.

Start-up engineers were cautioned to be more thorough in providing guidance to operators on restoring valve lineups.

Date When Full Compliance Was Achieved:

Full compliance was achieved on May 1, 1986.