



**Commonwealth Edison**  
72 West Adams Street, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690 - 0767

October 22, 1986

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region III  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL. 60137

Subject: Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2  
Response to Inspection Report Nos.  
50-254/86-11 and 50-265/86-10  
NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265

Reference: July 25, 1986 letter from W.D. Shafer to  
Cordell Reed

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is in response to the inspection conducted by Mr. T. Ploski of your staff on August 25-27, 1986, of activities at Quad Cities Station. Although no violations of NRC requirements were identified, the referenced letter requested we advise you of the corrective actions we are taking regarding weaknesses identified during the August 26, 1986 Quad Cities GSEP Exercise. Our response is provided in the Attachment.

If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Very truly yours,

M. S. Turbak  
Operating Plant Licensing Director

klj

Attachment

cc: NRC Resident Inspector - Quad Cities

*IE 35*  
*|||*

2301K

8610310285 861022  
PDR ADOCK 05000254  
Q PDR

OCT 23 1986

ATTACHMENT A

The following items respond to weaknesses identified in the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. Tom Ploski, and associates on August 25-27, 1986 at the Quad Cities Station.

- 1) WEAKNESS- There were several examples of improper Controller actions in the Control Room
- RESPONSE- For the next exercise, March 1987, a Controller ACTION SHEET will be developed for use at all Exercises and Drills. This Action Sheet will contain information as to the proper Controller actions during Exercises and Drills. In addition, it will have a section containing a list of past Controller improper actions and what proper actions should have been taken. This Controller Action Sheet will be reviewed prior to each Exercise and/or Drill. The Controller Action Sheet will be placed in the Controller's Scenario manuals for reference during future exercises. These sheets will be developed and in use by March 31, 1987.
- 2) WEAKNESS- Internal breakdowns in communications within the TSC resulted in late awareness of a radioactive release, late awareness of the cause of the loss of secondary containment and the late simulated evacuation of non-essential on-site personnel.
- RESPONSE- To address the general problems observed in communications within the TSC, Commonwealth Edison proposes several corrective actions. In order to facilitate formal updates by the Station Director to the TSC staff, a Public Address (PA) system will be installed in the TSC. The Station Director will be able to use the PA system to give loud, understandable updates to the entire TSC. In addition, the physical arrangement of the Director's desk will be reviewed in light of the need to provide a convenient physical location for the Station Director to hold caucus meetings in the TSC with his staff. TSC staff communications could be enhanced with an accommodating location for small group meetings. The PA system will be installed in time for the next exercise, by no later than March 31, 1987.

Additionally, to further enhance the communications skills of the TSC personnel, the station will establish drill scenario practice sessions on a regular basis. These sessions will include role-playing for the Station Directors to the extent necessary to maintain their performance at an acceptable level. These sessions will be coordinated by the station GSEP Coordinator and he shall provide feedback to the Station Directors as appropriate in the form of a critique at the end of each session. The GSEP Coordinator will stress weak areas from other recent company exercises so as to maintain the level of station performance commensurate with other stations in the company. These sessions will be held quarterly (beginning in the last quarter of 1986), until the next annual exercise, at which time, the performance of the Station Directors will be evaluated to determine the need for further practice sessions.

To address the late simulated evacuation of non-essential onsite personnel, the station will revise QEP 360-3 on Site Evacuation. The revision will include and clarify when an evacuation is necessary, how to choose the evacuation route, determining whether a survey of the chosen route is necessary and how the evacuation will be implemented. The revision will clarify who is responsible for these different steps. After the revision is complete, the directors involved in the evacuation process will be trained on the changes and their responsibilities. This will be done prior to the March 1987 exercise.

3) WEAKNESS-

Technicians involved with post-accident sampling failed to follow procedural guidance regarding handling of samples at the collection point and to properly shield, label and log receipt of the samples at an appropriately posted counting facility.

RESPONSE-

The station will retrain affected personnel, technicians and chemists, on the use of procedures QCP 920-2, Labeling Post-Accident Samples and QCP-920-3, Storage of Post-Accident Samples, in annual retraining and by use of a practical exercise to demonstrate knowledge of these procedures. QCP 920-3 will have a log sheet added to it for logging of post-accident samples. A storage cabinet will be designated in the TSC for necessary materials that would be needed as result of counting and temporary storage of samples in the TSC.

4) WEAKNESS- An excessive amount of time was taken to have the EOF fully operational from the time that the decision was made to activate this facility.

RESPONSE- In the next Recovery Manager's training class increased emphasis will be placed on NST procedure EOF-1, Attachment A, Section 4, under NOTE, which states "It is a goal of GSEP to establish the command and control function within 60 minutes of declaration (Accident classified time, Item 7 of NARS Form) of a Site or General Emergency." In addition, a procedural inquiry will be started on NST-EOF-1 to review that procedure in regard to activation and staffing of the EOF at the Alert stage. Training will be complete by June 30, 1987.

5) WEAKNESS- Late changes in the on-site scenario were inadequately coordinated with the NRC evaluators and at least some offsite exercise Controllers.

RESPONSE- Refer to the response for weakness number 1 on improper Controller actions. In addition, any significant changes to the on-site scenario affecting EALs or other pertinent scenario developments must be communicated through the Chief Controller and only after all appropriate parties have been notified. This is an example that will be used as discussed in response to Weakness Number 1.

2301K