
COMPANY Houston Lighting & Power P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 (713) 228-9211

June 2, 1986 ST-HL-AE-1661 File No.: G3.3

Mr. Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011



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South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Response to IE Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings"

Dear Mr. Martin:

The Light

This response to NRC IE Bulletin 85-03 addresses development and implementation of a program to ensure that torque switch settings on certain safety-related motor-operated valves are selected, set, and maintained correctly. The program will allow the valves to accommodate the maximum differential pressures expected on these valves during both normal and abnormal events within the design basis of the South Texas Project.

The valves falling under the scope of IEB 85-03 are listed in Attachment A. Attachment B provides the design basis for each valve, including the maximum differential pressure expected (during both opening and closing the valve) both for the "as purchased" specification and for the safety design basis, and the recommended differential pressures and test conditions for dynamic preoperational testing. Note that the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) includes two motor operated valves whose function is to admit steam to the AFW turbine to start the turbine driven AFW pump. These valves are not included in the attachments because they are not considered to be within the intended scope of IEB 85-03 for the South Texas Project. Routine testing of these valves is sufficient because test conditions are similar to those that would be present during postulated accident conditions.

Operation of the affected valves is controlled as follows:

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1) Operation in the opening direction will be controlled by a limit switch set to remain closed until the valve opens to approximately 95%. The limit switch is connected in series with the parallel combination of a torque switch and a torque bypass limit switch.

PDR

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Houston Lighting & Power Company

ST-HL-AE-1661 File No.: G3.3 Page 2

The torque bypass limit switch in the opening direction will be set to remain closed until the valve is approximately 95% open. This amount of opening has been determined to be sufficient for performance of any safety function required. Also, because of the slow speed of these valves (as compared to the speed discussed in IEB 85-03) and the small mass of the discs, this limit switch setting will preclude the disc from impacting the backseat on the opening stroke.

2) Operation in the closing direction is controlled by both a torque switch and a torque bypass limit switch connected in parallel. The bypass limit switch will be set to remain closed until the valve shuts to approximately 95% closed, during which time opening of the torque switch will not interrupt the closing stroke. After the torque bypass switch has opened, the closing operation continues and is controlled by the torque switch. The torque switch will be set to the valve manufacturer's recommended value.

Torque and limit switches will be set per design requirements and in accordance with approved prerequisite test procedures. Safety-related motor-operated valves will be dynamically tested during preoperational testing. This testing will be completed prior to issuance of the Operating License.

A method will be developed to document and control torque switch settings and tolerances for motor-operated valves. Completion is expected no later than fuel load.

If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. S. M. Head at (512) 972-8392.

Very truly yours,

J. H. Goldberg V Group Vice President, Nuclear

PLW/1jm

Attachment: (A) Valve List (B) IEB 85-03 Valve Data Houston Lighting & Power Company

cc:

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Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 (3 Copies)

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street Washington, DC 20555

Revised 5/22/86

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter

Houston Lighting & Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-498 50-499

South Texas Project Units 1 and 2

AFFIDAVIT

J. H. Goldberg being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Group Vice President, Nuclear of Houston Lighting & Power Company; that he is duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the attached response to NRC IE Bulletin 85-03; is familiar with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

J. H. Goldberg Group Vice President, Nuclear

STATE OF TEXAS)) COUNTY OF MATAGORDA)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for Matagorda County, Texas this and day of June , 1986.

Matagorda County, Texas this Matagorda County, Texas this My commission expires in the operation of the second sec BEVERLY J. FITE Notary Public, State of Texas My Commission Expires 10/17

Notary Public in and for the State of Texas

ATTACHMENT A ST-HL-AE- 1661 PAGE / OF 1

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Attachment A

Valve List

The valves falling within the scope of IE Bulletin 85-03 are as follows:

1. High Head Safety Injection System

XSI-0004A XSI-00048 HHSI Pump Discharge Valve XSI-0004C XSI-0006A XSI-0006B HHSI to Cold Leg XSI-0006C XSI-0008A XSI-0008B HHSI to Hot Leg XSI-0008C SI-0011A SI-00118 SI-0011C HHSI Pump Min. Flow Valve SI-0012A SI-0012B SI-0012C


2. Aux. Feedwater System

AF-0019 AFW Pump (Turbine Driven) Discharge to Steam Generator

AF-0048 AF-0065 AFW Pump (Motor Driven) Discharge to Steam Generator AF-0085

AF-FV7526 AFW Flow Control (Turbine Driven Train)

AF-FV7523 AF-FV7524 AFW Flow Control (Motor Driven Train) AF-FV7525



SI-0012C

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Attachment B

IEB 85-03 Valve Data

Valve

Function Valve # Manufacturer Type Model Size, inches Rating, PSIG	HHSI Pump Disch. XSI-0004A West. Gate 6GM77FHA 6 1750	HHSI to Cold Leg XSI-D006A West. Gate 6GM78FNB 6 2500	HHSI to Hot Leg XSI-0008A West. Gate 6GM78FNB 6 2500	HHSI Pump Min Flow SI-0011A Kerotest PMD Globe 9909MO 2 2485
Valve Operator				
Manufacturer Model	Limitorque SB-1	Limitorque SB-1	Limitorque SB-1	Limitorque SMB-00-10
Motor RPM Stroke Time, sec	3600 15	3600 15	3600 15	1700 ⁽⁸⁾ 10
Max \triangle P, as purchased				
To Open, psi To Close, psi	1500 1000	2750 1000	2750 1000	2485 2485
Max 🛆 P, Safety Design Basis				
To Open, psi To Close, psi	0 ⁽⁴⁾ 38	20 20	10 10	0 ⁽⁴⁾ 1730
Recommended Preoperational Test \triangle P				
To Open, psi To Close, psi	$\binom{(3)}{0}$	0 ⁽³⁾ 0 ⁽³⁾	$\binom{(3)}{0}$	0 0 ⁽⁵⁾
Data also applied to Valve Numbers	XSI-0004B XSI-0004C	XSI-0006B XSI-0006C	XSI-0008B XSI-0008C	SI-0011B SI-0011C SI-0012A SI-0012B

ATTACHMENT B ST.HL.AE. 1661 PAGE & OF 3

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Attachment B

IEB 85-03 Valve Data (Continued)

Valve

b.

Function Valve # Manufacturer Type Model Size, inches Rating, PSIG	AFW to S/G ⁽¹⁾ Isol. Valve AF-0019 Rockwell Stop-Check D85-32184 4 2700	AFW to S/G Isol. Valve AF-0048 Rockwell Stop-Check D85-32185 4 1800	AFW Flow(1) Control AF-FV-7526 Valtek Globe Channelstream 4 2700	AFW Flow Control AF-FV-7523 Valtek Globe Channelstream 4 1800
Valve Operator				
Manufacturer Model	Limitorque SMB-2-40	Limitorque SMB-2-60	Limitorque SMB-0-10	Limitorque SMB-0-10
Motor RPM Stroke time, sec	1900 ⁽²⁾ 60	1800 45	1900 ⁽²⁾⁽⁸⁾ 55	1800 ⁽⁸⁾ 45 ⁽⁸⁾
Max \triangle P, as purchased				
To Open, psi To Close, psi	2700 2700	1800 1800	2700 2700	1680 1680
Max \triangle P, Safety Design Basis				
To Open, psi To Close, psi	1925 2010	1570 1660	1925 2010	1570 1660
Recommended Test Δ P				
To Open, psi To Close, psi	1925 ⁽⁶⁾ 1925 ⁽⁶⁾ (7)	1570 ₍₇₎ 1570 ⁽⁷⁾	1925 ⁽⁶⁾ 1925 ⁽⁶⁾ (7)	1570(7) 1570 ⁽⁷⁾
Data also applied to Valve Numbers		AF-0065 AF-0085		AF-FV-7524 AF-FV-7525

NOTES

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- 1. Turbine Driven Pump Train
- 2. DC Motor
- 3. It is not practical to establish the safety design basis differential pressure for stroke testing. It is acceptable to test with no ΔP established because the safety design basis differential pressures are negligible in comparison to the as purchased capability of the operator.

ATTACHMENT B ST HL AE 1661 PAGE 3 OF 3

- 4. There is no safety design basis requirement for valve movement in this direction.
- 5. The only practical method of closing this valve under the safety design basis differential pressure would be to close the valve while the HHSI pump is running. There are no suitable alternative flow paths available. Running the 1000 HP HHSI pump with no flow would run an unacceptable risk of damaging or degrading the pump.
- 6. The test is performed at the actual AFW pump discharge pressure on minimum flow recirculation through the automatic recirculation valve with the steam generator pressure near 85 PSIG. The actual AFW pump discharge pressure could be up to 20% less than this value because of the actual turbine governor's characteristics.
- 7. The exception to testing at less than the maximum safety design basis differential pressure is acceptable for the following reasons:
 - a. The safety design basis Λ P is based on a secondary line break.
 - b. There are two alternative ways to stop the flow to a faulted steam generator:
 - 1. Stop the pump, or
 - 2. Close the other valve.
 - c. The safety design basis differential pressure is less than the as purchased capability of the operator.
- 8. This is based on preliminary information available at time of submittal.