

## NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Commonwealth Edison Company  
LaSalle County Station

Docket No. 50-373  
Docket No. 50-374

As a result of the inspection conducted on April 14-21, 1986, and in accordance with the "General Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1985), the following violation was identified:

Technical Specification 6.2.A. requires that detailed written procedures including applicable checkoff lists covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, and surveillance and test requirements shall be adhered to.

- A. Item 1.c of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 identifies "Equipment Control (e.g., locking and tagging)." Procedure LAP 900-4, Revision 24, entitled Equipment Out Of Service Procedure, requires all necessary Out-Of-Service Cards be placed on safety-related equipment removed from service in accordance with the Checklist.

Contrary to the above, on March 19, 1986, the day shift EA hung the OOS card and de-energized a breaker that was not specified on the Temporary Lift Checklist.

- B. Item 1.c of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 identifies procedures for Equipment Control (e.g., locking and tagging). Both Procedure LAP 1600-2, "Conduct of Operators Procedure," and LAP 900-4 require that a second independent verification shall be made when placing safety-related equipment into or out of service.

Contrary to the above, on March 19, 1986, a second verification of the OOS Card placement was not performed after placing the High Pressure Core Spray Suppression Pool Full Flow Test Valve motor operator breaker out of service.

- C. Item 1.g of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 identifies "Shift and Relief Turnover" as required procedures. Procedure LAP 200-3 requires that the oncoming Shift Engineer, oncoming Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE)/plant SRO, oncoming Shift Foreman, and offgoing Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) with the oncoming NSO shall perform a visual control room panel check which shall include the status of safety-related systems (green board concept).

Contrary to the above, on the afternoon of March 19, 1986, the oncoming Shift Engineer, Shift Control Room Engineer, Shift Foreman, Nuclear Station Operator, and offgoing Nuclear Station Operator failed to determine the status of a safety-related system in that they failed to identify that the High Pressure Core Spray Suppression Pool Full Flow Test Valve was inoperable.

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- D. Step F.33.f of Shift Surveillance procedure LOS-AA-S1 requires that the HPCS Full Flow Test to Suppression Pool valve, 1(2)E22-F023, be checked to indicate closed.

Contrary to the above, on March 19, 1986, the afternoon shift NSO failed to perform Step F.33.f of the procedure.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation: (1) corrective action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.

6/5/86  
Dated

*Carl J. Paperiello*  
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Carl J. Paperiello, Director  
Division of Reactor Safety