NRC Form 366 (9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
Standby Gas Treatment Start Due To Opened Breaker

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 6	2 8	8 6	8 6	0 4 3	0 1	1 0	1 3	8 6		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): 4

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
E.R. Grant - Director-Nuclear Licensing	5 0 4 6 3 5 - 6 9 9 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
B	E C	S W G R	G 0 8 0	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 6/28/86 with the unit in cold shutdown preventative maintenance (PM) had just been completed on circuit breaker ACB-450 in NJS-SWGR1, and had been functionally tested satisfactorily and returned to service. In preparation to perform the same PM on circuit breaker ACB-472, the breaker was opened and ACB-450 immediately opened resulting in a loss of power to the "A" Reactor Protection system motor generator set. This loss of power initiated the start of an engineered safety feature, both trains of the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and the isolation of shutdown cooling (SDC) and reactor water cleanup unit (RWCU). These systems performed as designed upon loss of power. Investigation revealed that maladjustments in ACB-450 may have caused the breaker to open. A maintenance work request (MWR-41270) has corrected these maladjustments and the breaker was returned to service. The health and safety of the public was not affected by this event since the initiation of the SGTS placed the unit in a more conservative condition.

NRC Form 366 (9-83)

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REPORTED CONDITION

On 6/28/86 at approximately 1135 with the unit in mode 4 (cold shutdown) circuit breaker ACB-450 located in NJS-SWGR1 opened immediately after ACB-472 had been opened causing a loss of power to "A" Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) set. This resulted in an initiation of both trains of the standby gas treatment system (SGTS), an engineered safety feature, and isolation of shutdown cooling (SDC) and the reactor water cleanup unit (RWCU). All of these systems performed as designed upon a loss of power. ACB-450 was manually reclosed and SGTS, SDC and RWCU was secured and returned to normal status.

INVESTIGATION

A Preventative Maintenance Procedure (PMP-1021) had just been completed on ACB-450 to clean, check, and check operation of the breaker and it had successfully completed its functional test. During the Preventative Maintenance (PM), the loads on ACB-450 were supplied thru tie breaker ACB-461 and supply breaker ACB-472. Upon returning ACB-450 to service, ACB-472 was opened to perform a similar PM. Immediately upon opening ACB-472, ACB-450 also opened causing the loss of power to the "A" RPS MG set.

An investigation into the logic and elementary diagrams for ACB-450 and ACB-472 were reviewed and no interlocks were discovered that could cause this trip. A maintenance work request (MWR)-41270 was initiated to verify the settings and adjustments of ACB-450. This revealed a misalignment of the flux shift trip device and a maladjustment of the trip latch bar. These settings and adjustments are factory preset and the breakers were installed as received.

Discussion of the sequence of events with the Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) revealed that following the opening of ACB-450, the breaker was able to be reclosed without the operator resetting the trip reset mechanism. The breaker stayed closed indicating that the trip mechanism had not been tripped. Therefore, the maladjustment of the trip latch bar in conjunction with the impact of opening ACB-472 is the probable cause for the breaker opening without receiving a trip signal. The misalignment of the flux shift trip device did not contribute to cause the opening of the breaker.

The manufacturer (General Electric) was contacted and questioned as to whether or not they have had any problems with the trip latch adjustments on these types of breakers (AKR, AKRT). The manufacturer stated that they were not aware of any type of generic problems with these breakers. Additionally, a search of the NPRDS data base was conducted and no problems of this nature were found on any AKR or AKRT breakers.

There are seventy-two (72) of these type breakers used in Category I applications at RBS. A check of maintenance records for any maintenance or preventive maintenance performed on ACB-450 was completed and revealed that no maintenance was performed on the trip latch mechanism. Breaker ACB-450 is a Category II application and due to the additional QC and EQ involvement on Category I equipment there is no reason to believe there is a generic problem with the Category I breakers. This position is further supported by the concurrence of the manufacturer.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

MWR-41270 performed corrective maintenance procedure CMP-1023 which checked all the manufacturer's recommended adjustments and alignments. This resulted in the discovery and correction of the misaligned flux shift device and the maladjusted trip latch bar. Circuit breaker ACB-450 has been returned to service.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

There was no impact on the safe operation of the plant or to the health and safety of the public. The opening of the ACB-450 placed the unit in a more conservative condition by initiating the operation of the standby gas treatment system which would filter any radioactive material from effluent released to the environment.

Additionally, since power was restored to the bus when ACB-450 was reclosed RPS "A", SCD and RWCU were restored as required by plant conditions without effect on the safe operation of the plant or to the health and safety of the public.

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

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October 13, 1986
RBG- 24563
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 86-043 Revision 1 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. This report is being revised to provide an update on the investigation and corrective actions taken to date.

Sincerely,

J. E. Booker

J. E. Booker
Manager-Engineering,
Nuclear Fuels & Licensing
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/TFP/PDG/DAS/je

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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