PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 22, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
UNIT NO. 2
REPORT 86-6
SPECIAL REPORT

This Special Report describes the planned impairment of certain fire barrier penetrations because of construction activities relating to the Safety Parameter Display System. Because the impairment exceeded seven days, this report is being submitted for informational purposes in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager-
Salem Operations

RSP:ama

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SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER 86-6

PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Fire Barrier Penetrations Inoperable For Greater Than Seven Days - Planned Evolution

Event Date: 07/24/86

Report Date: 08/22/86

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 86-238

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1100 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

This special report describes the intentional impairment of fire barriers for more than seven (7) days. This report is being submitted for informational purposes in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, which states:

> With one (1) or more of the required fire barrier penetrations inoperable, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one (1) side of the inoperable fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the inoperable fire barrier penetration(s) to operable status within seven (7) days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next thirty (30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to operable status.

On July 17, 1986, penetration fire barriers in the Unit 2 computer room were declared inoperable to permit planned construction activities, related to the installation of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The impaired barriers were cable penetrations, which were opened to permit cable pulling for the SPDS. Fire Protection Impairment Permit No. 86-308 was issued on July 1, 1986, approving the work.

Continuous fire watches were established while the penetrations were impaired. During the impairment period Kaowool was stuffed into the penetrations as an added precaution, since it was impractical to reinstall permanent barriers. Most of the penetrations were

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DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

permanently closed within seven (7) days with Semkits, restoring them to operable status. However, three (3) of the cable penetrations were still impaired on July 24, 1986, which exceeded the time limit of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. The impairment of the cable penetration fire barriers was part of a planned evolution, and credit is taken for fire watches in effect. The establishment of a fire watch in conjunction with the operable fire detection equipment assures that a fire on either side of the fire barrier would be detected and extinguished before it could involve the adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. However, because three (3) cable penetration fire barriers were not restored to operable within the seven (7) days specified by Technical Specification 3.7.11, the occurrence became reportable as of July 24, 1986, and this special report is therefore submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The cable pulling was completed, and the penetrations restored to an operable status by installing Semkits. The action statement was terminated on August 19, 1986. Independent review by Station Quality Assurance personnel verified that the affected penetrations were adequately restored. It should be noted that other fire barrier penetrations will be similarly impaired to permit additional cable pulling in support of SPDS installation.

General Manager-
Salem Operations

RSP

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