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October 3, 1986

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U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DFR-42
50-306 DPR-60

Response to Inspection Reports
No. 282/86009 and 306/86011

In response to your letter of September 5, 1986, which transmitted Inspection Reports No. 282/86009 and 306/86011, the following information is offered.

Violation #1

"G. Penetration Fire Barriers

1. All penetration fire barriers in fire area boundaries protecting equipment required to be operable shall be operable.
2. If Specification 3.14.G.1 cannot be met, a continuous fire watch shall be established on at least one side of the affected penetration(s) within one hour.

Restore the inoperable penetration fire barriers to Operable status within 14 days or submit a special report to the Commission within 30 days outlining the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the barriers to Operable status."

Contrary to the above, prior to July 28, 1986, penetration fire barrier 1657 was inoperable for a period of time in excess of the requirements stated in Technical Specification 3.14.G.2.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

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Response

The open fire penetration was discovered at about 1040 hours on July 29 during the 18-month surveillance of fire barriers. A fire watch was posted within one hour and the penetration was sealed by 1445 hours. Full compliance has been achieved. It is not known how long the penetration had been open. A pipe had been removed from the penetration and it may not have been resealed at that time. To improve the work control process, and to reduce the chance of degrading fire barriers, all work requests affecting fire barriers are now reviewed by the fire protection system engineer before work is allowed to start. It was concluded that the time clock for taking action and reporting started at discovery of the opening, and that actions taken after discovery were within Technical Specification requirements; therefore, no report was made.

Violation #2


10 CFR Part 50 Section 72 (Immediate Notification Requirements For Operating Nuclear Power Reactors) states in part that the licensee shall notify the NRC within four hours of the occurrence of any event that results in an unplanned actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF).

Contrary to the above, on August 1, 1986 an unplanned start of the 21 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump occurred and the NRC was not notified of this within four hours.

This is a Severity Level V violation.

Response

This event was discussed with involved personnel. Full compliance has been achieved. The event report is being reviewed by all operations personnel to remind them that any unplanned start of engineered safety features equipment is reportable within 4 hours. This event was reported to the NRC as Unit 2 LER 86-004.



C E Larson
Vice President, Nuclear Generation

c: Regional Administrator-III, NRC
Resident Inspector, NRC
G Charnoff