NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Misunderstanding Of RPS Action Statement Results In Technical Specification Violation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 5	0 8	8 6	8 6	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 6	0 6	8 6		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
5	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Paul Russ, Compliance Engineer, Ext. 6472	2 1 6 — 2 5 9 — 3 7 3 7

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 8, 1986, at 1830, neutron monitoring system Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) instruments "C" and "G" were declared inoperable due to an overdue surveillance. The associated Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip system was not placed in the tripped condition within one hour as required by Technical Specifications 3.3.1. The Technical Specification action statements had been misunderstood by the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and Unit Supervisor (US) on shift.

A control rod block was in effect at the time of the event which prevented performance of the IRM C and G Channel Functional Test. The rod block was due to the reactor mode switch being locked in the Shutdown position, as required by Technical Specifications. On May 10, 1986, the rod block was removed and the surveillance was satisfactorily completed.

In order to prevent recurrence the STA's and appropriate Operations Section shift personnel will receive additional training for Technical Specification actions required in response to inoperable RPS sensors.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0	8 6	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On May 8, 1986, at 1830, neutron monitoring system Intermediate Range Monitor instruments (IRM) [IG] "C" and "G" were declared inoperable due to an overdue surveillance. The associated Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] trip system was not placed in the tripped condition within one hour as required by Technical Specifications. At the time of the event the plant was in Operational Condition 5 (Refuel) prior to initial criticality with the mode switch locked in the Shutdown position. All control rods were fully inserted, a rod block was in effect and no core [AC] alterations were in progress. Reactor vessel pressure was atmospheric and reactor coolant temperature was approximately 75 degrees.

On May 7, 1986, the reactor mode switch was locked in the Shutdown position as required by Technical Specifications for existing plant conditions. This caused a control rod block. With a rod block in effect Surveillance Test (SVI)-C51-T0022C "IRM C and G Neutron Flux Trips Channel Functional Test" could not be performed. This caused the surveillance to lapse past it's required interval. On May 8, 1986, at 1830 the IRM "C" and "G" channels were declared inoperable. The associated RPS trip system was not placed in the tripped condition within one hour as required by Technical Specifications. On May 9, 1986, at 2300 this error was discovered and the RPS A and C channels were placed in the tripped condition. On May 10, 1986, the mode switch was returned to the Refuel position, removing the rod block. At 1920, SVI-C51-T0022C was satisfactorily completed, and the RPS A and C channels were restored to the non-tripped condition.

The cause of this event was personnel error. Although the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and Unit Supervisor (US) verified core alterations were not in progress, they misunderstood the Technical Specifications and failed to initiate all the required actions.

The RPS consists of two trip systems, each with two channels. RPS will actuate when at least one channel in each trip system is tripped. During reactor startup in the intermediate range, two IRM instruments provide input to each RPS channel. The IRM "C" and "G" instruments are both in the RPS "C" channel. If the IRM "C" and "G" instruments had actually been inoperable during a reactor startup RPS channel "C" would have been rendered inoperable. However, RPS channels "A", "B" and "D" would have been available to respond to a high flux trip signal. IRM instruments "C" and "G" were found to be operable upon performance of SVI-C51-T0022C, therefore, the event had no safety significance. No previous similar events were identified.

To prevent recurrence the individuals involved will receive counseling and all STA's and appropriate Operations shift personnel will receive additional training for Technical Specification actions required in response to inoperable RPS sensors.

Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as [XX].