AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO.	50-346		
UNIT	Davis-Besse Unit		
DATE	February 13, 1987		
COMPLETED BY	Morteza Khazrai		
TELEPHONE	(419) 249-5000,		
	Ext. 7290		

AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)	DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
30	17	411
0	18	413
186	19	410
397	20	411
404	21	410
406	22	412
409	23	412
410	24	410
398	25	418
386	26	438
412	27	469
411	28	492
410	29	466
412	30	461
410	31	471
414		

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DATE February 13, 1987

COMPLETED BY Morteza Khazrai

TELEPHONE 419-249-5000, Ext. 7290

OPERATING	STATUS

OF ERATING STATES			
1. Unit Name:Davis-Besse Unit 1		Notes	
2. Reporting Period: January 1987	7		
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2772			
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 925			
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906			
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe):	. 904		
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe):	860		
8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items N	iumber 3 Through 7) Sinc	e Last Report, Give Re	easons:
9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net 10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any:	MWe):		
	This Month	Yrto-Date	Cumulative
1. Hours In Reporting Period	744	744	74, 68
2. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical ,	708.5	708.5	36,763.6
3. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	35.5	35.5	4,660.3
4. Hours Generator On-Line	697.6	697.6	35,186.2
5. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	0.0	0.0	1,732.5
6. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	1,009,895	1,009,895	82,436,559
7. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	319,592	319,592	27,281,979
8. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	287,599	287,599	25,524,262
9. Unit Service Factor	93.8	93.8	47.2
0. Unit Availability Factor	93.8	93.8	49.5
1. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	44.9	44.9	39.8
2. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	42.7	42.7	37.8
3. Unit Forced Outage Rate	6.2	6.2	36.7
4. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Ty	pe, Date, and Duration of	Each):	
5. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estima	ated Data of Sec.		
6. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Oper	ration):	Forecast	Achieved
INITIAL CRITICALITY			
INITIAL ELECTRICITY			
COMMERCIAL OPERATION	V		

UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

DOCKET NO. HINTT NAME DATE

TELEPHONE

COMPLETED BY

50-346

Davis-Besse Unit 1 February 13, 1987

Morteza Khazrai

419-249-5000, Ext. 7290

REPORT MONTH January 1987

Shutting Down Reactor³ Code5 Method of Reason2 Duration Licensee System Code⁴ Cause & Corrective Typel (Hours) Event Action to No. Date Report # Prevent Recurrence F 2.6 N/A SB PSP Turbine generator was taken off line 86 12 30 A Con't due to two steam leaks on the steam lines downstream of control valves. F 43.9 3 87-001 S.I TRB 87 01 01 A Main Feedwater Pump Turbine (MFPT) #1 tripped as a result of high vibration due to bearing failure. The loss of feedwater initiated an Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS)/ Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip which shutdown the unit.

F: Forced S: Scheduled Reason:

A-Equipment Failure (Explain)

B-Maintenance or Test

C-Refueling

D-Regulatory Restriction

E-Operator Training & License Examination

F-Administrative

G-Operational Error (Explain)

H-Other (Explain)

Method:

1-Manual

2-Manual Scram

3-Automatic Scram

4-Continuation from

Previous Month

5-Load Reduction

9-Other (Explain)

Exhibit G - Instruccions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File

(NUREG-0161)

Exhibit I - Same Source

(9/77)

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY JANUARY 1987

The turbine generator was synchronized on line at 0235 hours on January 1, 1987.

The reactor power was maintained at approximately 40% power until 1039 hours on January 1, 1987, when a reactor trip occurred. The trip was the result of the loss of Main Feedwater Pump Turbine (MFPT) #1. The MFPT #1 tripped as a result of high vibration due to bearing failure. MFPT #2 was out of service at the time. The loss of feedwater initiated an Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS)/Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip which shutdown the unit.

The reactor criticality was established at 2212 hours on January 2, 1987.

The turbine generator was synchronized on line at 0630 hours on January 3, 1987.

Reactor power was slowly increased to 50% which was attained at approximately 1900 hours on February 3, 1987. The power increase was limited between 50% and 70% power the rest of the month due to the testing and troubleshooting of MFPT #1.

REFUELING INFORMATION DATE: January 1987

- 1. Name of facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
- 2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: February 1988
- 3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: April 1988
- 4. Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what in general will these be? If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuration been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

Ans: Expect the Reload Report to require standard reload fuel design
Technical Specification changes (3/4.1 Reactivity Control Systems and 3/4.2
Power Distribution Limits).

- Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information: Summer, 1987
- 6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.

Ans: None identified to date.

7. The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage pool.

(a) 177 (b) 204 - Spent Fuel Assemblies

8. The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies.

Present: 735 Increase size by: 0 (zero)

9. The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity.

Date: 1996 - assuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained.

FCR NO.

85-027

SYSTEM

Auxiliary Steam

COMPONENT

Supports No. HBD 87-H9 and HBD 87-H10

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPIREMENT

FCR 84-027 performed the following changes and modifications;

1. Replaced the bottom channel on support HBD 87-H9

- 2. Replaced the top and bottom channels on support HBD 87-H10
- 3. Modified the weld design which had welds around the entire perimeter of the channels to welding only three (3) sides of the channels.

This FCR 84-027 was closed November 4, 1986.

REASON FOR CHANGE

FCR 84-027 was initiated due to NCR 83-123 and 83-0068 which identified nonconforming welds on structural members of subject supports.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY

This FCR 84-027 replaced horizontal structural members on supports HBD 87-H9 and HBD 87-H10 and modified the weld design from all around perimeter to three sides only.

The safety functions of the supports is to restrain the piping under a postulated seismic loading. The supports have been analyzed and found to be acceptable for short term operation (BT-14402). Modification performed by FCR 84-027 will allow long term operations. Based on the above issue an unresolved safety question does not exist.

FCR NO.

85-131

SYSTEM

Reactor Coolant System

COMPONENT

PSV-RC02

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT

FCR 85-131 modified the PORV discharge line by adding a pair of flanges in the PORV discharge line.

This FCR 85-131 was closed October 23, 1986.

REASON FOR CHANGE

This modification was incorporated to provide easier access to the PORV for removal and reinstallation.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY

The purpose of this modification improved conditions related to PORV maintenance. The installation of these flanges permitted the removal of the valve and spool piece as a unit, eliminating lengthy exposure and maneuvering of the valve around existing piping and equipment. The installation of these flanges does not alter the intended design function of the piping system.

Therefore, the occurrence, consequences, malfunction, probability and possibility of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) is not increased as a result of this modification. The margin of safety as defined in Tech. Spec. has not been reduced. This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

FCR NO.

85-071

SYSTEM

Main Steam System

COMPONENT

Various

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT

FCR 85-071 modified the various pipe supports on the main steam inlet lines to the Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Turbines 1-1 and 1-2.

This FCR 85-071 was closed on November 11, 1986.

REASON FOR CHANGE

This modification was implemented due to Nonconformance Report 85-0019, which identified several supports needing repairs, ranging from replacement of expansion anchors to replacement of pipe saddles.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY

The function of a pipe support is to provide support for all design loads. The pipe support from the main steam inlet lines to the auxiliary feedwater pumps was analyzed by Bechtel with one bolt inactive. This was found to meet all short and long term conditions. However, the base plate for this support was found to be damaged and required rework per NCR 85-0071. The damaged anchor bolt was replaced and this restored the support to the original design.

This modification does not create a reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

FCR NO. 84-193

SYSTEM Moisture Separator and Reheater System

COMPONENT MSR Safety Valve Vents

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT

FCR 84-0193 allowed the installation of a threaded reheat safety valve vent line to the condenser.

This FCR 84-193 was closed February 21, 1986.

REASON FOR CHANGE

The safety valve vent lines were hard piped to the condenser during valve maintenance these lines needed to be cut. Installing unions facilitates maintenance work on the safety valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY

The subject vent lines are used to vent the area above the bellows in the case of a bellows leak in these valves. These lines serve no nuclear safety related function. Addition of unions does not effect any nuclear safety related items. This change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.



EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO, OHIO 43652

February 13, 1987

KB87-00019

File: RR 2 (P-6-87-01)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

Mr. Harold Denton, Director Office of Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Haller:

Monthly Operating Report, January 1987 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1

Enclosed are ten copies of the Monthly Operating Report for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 for the month of January 1987.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Morteza Khazrai at (419) 249-5000, Extension 7290.

Yours truly,

Flant Manager

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

LFS/MK/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. A. Bert Davis, w/l
Regional Administrator, Region III

Mr. James M. Taylor, Director, w/2 Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. Paul Byron, w/l NRC Resident Inspector

Nuclear Records Management, Stop 3220

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