

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-461/86061(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-461

Permit No. CPPR-137

Licensee: Illinois Power Company
500 South 27th Street
Decatur, IL 62525

Facility Name: Clinton Power Station

Inspection At: Clinton site, Clinton, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: September 22, 1986

Inspector: J. P. Patterson *W. Snell for*

10/1/86
Date

Approved By: *W. Snell* William Snell, Chief
Emergency Preparedness
Section

10/1/86
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on September 22, 1986 (Report No. 50-461/86061 (DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of emergency preparedness at the Clinton Power Station to evaluate licensee actions on previously identified emergency preparedness items. The inspection was conducted by one NRC inspector.
Results: No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified as a result of this inspection.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*D. Waddell, Assistant Supervisor, Emergency Planning
J. Brownell, Project Specialist, Licensing & Safety Department

*This person attended the exit interview on September 22, 1986.

2. Applicant Actions on Previously Identified Items Related to Emergency Preparedness

a. (Closed) Open Item No. 461/85039-26: This item was required to be completed prior to fuel load. The NRC appraisal team (Report No. 461/85039) recommended, where appropriate, that the System/Plant Operating Procedures (3000 series), Off-Normal Procedures (4000 Series) and Annunciator Procedures (5000 Series), reference and implement Emergency Planning Implementing Procedure (EPIP) EC-02, Emergency Classifications. The inspector examined the corrective actions the licensee had taken to reference the emergency classification procedure, EC-02, to the Off-Normal Procedures (4000 Series). Several individual 4000 series procedures were selected at random by the inspector and all had an EPIP EC-02 reference in an appropriate part of the procedure where Emergency Action Levels (EALs) should be considered. The applicant provided the inspector with a list of 47 specific, 4000 series procedures which were revised to reference the EALs or other appropriate EPIPs. The applicant's review also determined that Operating Procedures (3000 series) and Annunciator Response Procedures (5000 series) direct the operators to the emergency Off-Normal Procedures (4000 series) which in turn, reference EPIP EC-02. Therefore, the Operating Procedures and Annunciator Response Procedures do not require a direct reference to EPIP EC-02. The inspector's review and discussion with an Emergency Planning representative concluded that the corrective actions taken to reference EPIP EC-02 or other applicable EPIP's to other operating related procedures, as previously referred to, were satisfactory. This item is closed.

b. (Closed) Open Item No. 461/85040-01: This item was required to be completed by fuel load and resulted from an event occurring in the December 4, 1985 annual emergency exercise which resulted in a Site Area Emergency classification being made based on an EAL of "severe damage to Safe Shutdown Equipment from explosion." The applicant was asked to review this EAL for appropriateness and applicability.

EPIP EC-02 Attachment 10, Page 2 of 10 was changed to clarify the EAL with respect to explosions. The current revision examined specified that a Site Area Emergency classification for explosions is applicable only for severe explosions occurring in a vital area. A bulletin was sent to all Shift Supervisors, Shift Technical Advisor's (STA's), EOF Emergency Action Level Evaluators and training personnel to notify them of this revision. Training for Operations

Shift Personnel will include this revision during scheduled licensed operator requalification. After reviewing these corrective actions, the inspector concluded that this item is closed.

- c. (Closed) Open Item No. 461/86021-01: This item was required to be completed by fuel load. From previous discussions by the inspectors with Control Room personnel and review of EPIP EC-02, there was a disagreement between the classification of a stuck open safety relief valve event as either an Unusual Event or an Alert. The two conflicting descriptions were listed in Attachment 1, Page 3 of 7, and in Attachment 10, Page 4 of 10 in EPIP EC-02. The classification of a stuck open safety relief valve as an Alert (Attachment 1, Page 3 of 7) has been deleted by the applicant.

Additionally an Emergency Planning Bulletin was issued April 10, 1986 to alert appropriate personnel of Advance Change Notice (ACN)2/1 which relates to EPIP EC-02. Individuals were requested to review and become familiar with the procedure change which classifies the stuck open safety relief valve as an Unusual Event. After reviewing the corrective actions taken on this item and discussing them with an Emergency Planning Representative, the inspector concluded that this item is closed.

- d. (Closed) Open Item No. 461/86021-02: This item was required to be completed prior to exceeding 5% power. The applicant was requested to revise their EPIP's to establish criteria to convert appropriate meteorological data to a stability class and the hierarchy in which it is to be used. Previously the applicant had installed backup meteorology instrumentation on the microwave tower. EPIP RA-01, Manual Radiological Dose Assessment, was initiated to incorporate the standard deviation of wind direction, sigma theta, into the procedure as a backup stability indicator which will be used to determine stability classes. Section 4.1.4, Section 6.0 and Attachment 5 of EPIP RA-01 address these areas. The hierarchy of source data is described in Sections 4.1.2-4.1.5 of this procedure. Also, Attachment 5 states that the stability class is determined by sigma theta only if the primary meteorological information is unavailable. The inspector's review of these procedural changes concluded that the corrective actions are satisfactory, and this item is closed.

3. Exit Interview

The inspector held an exit interview on September 22, 1986, with the applicant representative denoted in Section 1 and discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The inspector also informed the NRC Resident Inspector of which Open Items were closed. The applicant's representative stated, when asked by the inspector, that none of the information discussed during the exit interview should be considered proprietary.